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March 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Iliuk v. Village of Pennbrook Apts

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1011 EDA 2025

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (12)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (26.8K)

• PDF

Lead Opinion

J-A25003-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

VALENTYNA ILIUK : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
VILLAGE OF PENNBROOK : No. 1011 EDA 2025
APARTMENTS, ABC CORPORATION 1- :
3, JOHN/JANE DOE 1-3, FALLS :
TOWNSHIP, PLATINUM PAVING AND :
SEALCOATING, VILLAGE OF :
PENNBROOK 2, LLC :

Appeal from the Judgment Entered July 18, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No(s):
2023-00634

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., BOWES, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED MARCH 19, 2026

Valentyna Iliuk appeals from the judgment entered upon a directed

verdict in favor of Appellee Village of Pennbrook Apartments (Pennbrook) and

dismissing Iliuk’s claims.1 After review, we affirm on the basis of the well-

written opinion authored by the Honorable Jeffrey R. Sommer.

---

• Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The trial court’s initial February 12, 2025 order granting Pennbrook’s motion

for a directed verdict was announced at trial but not entered upon the trial
court docket. Iliuk then filed a motion for reconsideration of the directed
verdict on February 21, 2025. The trial court denied that motion on March 5,
2025. Iliuk then filed a timely appeal from the February 12, 2025 order. The
February 12, 2025 oral order, not having been entered upon the trial court’s
docket, was not yet an appealable order. See Pa.R.A.P. 301(a)(1) (“[N]o
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-A25003-25

We adopt the trial court’s factual summary set forth in its opinion, see

id. at 1-6, and provide only an abbreviated version here. Iliuk began living

at Pennbrook’s eponymous property in 2013 or 2014. See N.T. Trial, 2/10/25,

at 45. On February 7, 2021, a snowstorm began in Levittown, Pennsylvania

between 6:30-7:00 a.m., starting as a wintry mix before turning into snow

and eventually tapering off between 3:30-4:00 p.m. after leaving

approximately 3.5 inches of snow accumulation. Id., 2/11/25, at 50-51.

Pennbrook’s maintenance staff began clearing snow and salting the walkways

---

order of a court shall be appealable until it has been entered upon the
appropriate docket in the trial court.”). Accordingly, this Court issued a
directive for Iliuk to enter judgment upon the verdict, which she subsequently
did. See id. at (d) (“[T]he clerk of the trial court shall, on praecipe of any
party . . ., forthwith prepare, sign, and enter an appropriate order, judgment,
or final decree in the docket[.]”). Judgment was entered upon the verdict on
July 18, 2025. Because Iliuk’s appeal was filed after the announcement of the
trial court’s determination but before the entry of an appealable order, we
treat the appeal as if it was filed after such entry and on the day thereof. See
Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5) (“A notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a
determination but before the entry of an appealable order shall be treated as
filed after such entry and on the day thereof.”).

Furthermore, the underlying action initially included claims against defendants
Falls Township, Platinum Paving & Sealcoating LLC, John/Jane Doe 1-3, and
ABC Corporation 1-3. The claims against Falls Township and Platinum Paving
& Sealcoating LLC were dismissed via stipulation on January 9 th and January
13th, 2025, respectively. The claims against Jane/John Doe 1-3 and ABC
Corporation 1-3 were not disposed of by the trial court’s dismissal order.
However, the unidentified defendants were never identified on the docket,
never entered an appearance, and were never served. Therefore, even if the
trial court’s dismissal order did not dispose of the complaint as to all named
defendants, the unidentified defendants never became parties to the action
and, accordingly, are not parties to this appeal. See Hill v. Ofalt, 85 A.3d
540, 546 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2014) (defendant that never entered an appearance
and was never served with process was not “a party to the action”).

-2-
J-A25003-25

around 3:30-4:00 p.m. on the 7 th and were still working at 12:40 a.m. on the

morning of the 8th. Id. at 28, 42. Around 12:40 a.m. on the 8th, Iliuk took

her dog for a walk. Id., 2/10/25, at 46, 66. While out on the walk, Iliuk

slipped and fell and hit her head on the sidewalk. Id. at 47-48.

On February 2, 2023, Iliuk commenced an action against Pennbrook

alleging it had been negligent in, inter alia, failing to take appropriate

measures to remedy its property after the snowfall, and that such negligence

was the direct and proximate cause of Iliuk’s damages. Iliuk sought

compensatory damages in excess of $50,000.00, punitive damages, interest,

costs, attorneys’ fees, and whatever additional relief the trial court deemed

appropriate.

A jury trial was held from February 10 to February 12, 2025. On

February 12, 2025, after the close of evidence, Pennbrook’s counsel moved

for a directed verdict based upon the evidence presented. Counsel posited

that Iliuk had not met her burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence,

and that Pennbrook had “acted reasonably at all times and did its job by

shoveling the sidewalk and spreading salt and doing everything that it was

supposed to under the reasonable [person] standard.” N.T. Trial, 2/12/25, at

11-12. The trial court granted the motion for a directed verdict and dismissed

the case.

Iliuk filed a timely notice of appeal and court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. She raises the following

issues for our review:

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J-A25003-25

1. Did the [trial] court commit an error by entering a directed
   verdict based on the facts elicited at trial and the applicable law?

2. Did the [trial] court commit an error by applying the “hills and
   ridges” doctrine in the instant matter?

3. Did the [trial] court commit an error by not allowing the jury
   to determine the reasonableness of the snow remediation
   performed by [Pennbrook]?

4. Did the [trial] court commit an error by allowing [Pennbrook’s]
   weather expert Thomas M. Else to testify that he saw “black ice”
   in a photograph which was outside the scope of his report?

Appellant’s Brief, at 6.

Our well-established standard of review is as follows:

A directed verdict may be granted only where the facts are clear
and there is no room for doubt. In deciding whether to grant a
motion for a directed verdict, the trial court must consider the
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must
accept as true all evidence which supports that party’s contention
and reject all adverse testimony.

Whittington v. Daniels, 332 A.3d 102, 107 (Pa. Super. 2025) (quoting

Keffer v. Bob Nolan’s Auto Service, Inc., 59 A.3d 621, 632 (Pa. Super.

2012)) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

We will reverse a trial court’s grant or denial of a directed verdict .
. . only when we find an abuse of discretion or an error of law that
controlled the outcome of the case. Further, the standard of
review for an appellate court is the same as that for a trial court.

There are two bases upon which a directed verdict . . . can
be entered[:] one, the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law and/or two, the evidence is such that no two
reasonable minds could disagree that the outcome should
have been rendered in favor of the movant. With [a
directed verdict], the court reviews the record and
concludes that, even with all factual inferences decided
adverse to the movant, the law nonetheless requires a
verdict in his favor.

-4-
J-A25003-25

Whittington, 332 A.3d at 107 (quoting Hall v. Episcopal Long Term Care,

54 A.3d 381, 395 (Pa. Super. 2012)) (some brackets and citation omitted).

Iliuk’s first three issues are interrelated and, thus, we address them as

one issue.2 The crux of Iliuk’s first three issues is that the trial court erred in

granting Pennbrook’s directed verdict where: (1) Iliuk put forth sufficient

evidence at trial such that the reasonableness of Pennbrook’s snow removal

efforts should have been decided by the jury; and (2) the trial court erred in

its application of the hills and ridges doctrine 3 to preclude recovery. See

Appellant’s Brief, at 14-25.

In support of the argument that the reasonableness of Pennbrook’s

snow removal efforts should have gone to the jury, Iliuk avers that, based

upon several evidentiary reasons, she established that Pennbrook’s snow

removal efforts were not reasonable. Id. at 17-19. Based on the foregoing,

Iliuk contends that the question of whether Pennbrook breached a duty should

have gone to the jury. Id.

Iliuk next argues that the trial court incorrectly applied the hills and

ridges doctrine because there was “clear evidence of ‘human intervention’ in

the creation of the localized patch of ice that caused [Iliuk’s] fall.” Id. at 24.

---

2 We note that Iliuk’s argument for her first three issues is couched under one

heading in her brief. See Appellant’s Brief, at 14-25 (titling argument section
“The Trial Court Committed an Error by Not Allowing the Jury to Determine
the Reasonableness of the Snow Remediation Performed by Appellee”). While
this is in violation of our appellate briefing rules, see Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), we
decline to find waiver on this basis.

-5-
J-A25003-25

This argument relies upon Iliuk’s assertion that “[t]he ice was not formed by

a[n] ‘entirely natural phenomenon’ such that the hills and ridges doctrine

applies.” Id. Ultimately, Iliuk concludes that because of the “undisputed

‘human intervention[,]’” the hills and ridges doctrine should not have applied,

and, even if it were applicable, the testimony presented was sufficient such

that “the jury should have decided if [Iliuk] was unable to recover.” Id. at

25.

To prevail in a negligence action, a plaintiff must prove the defendant

“owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, that the duty was breached, the breach

resulted in the plaintiff’s injury, and the plaintiff suffered an actual loss or

damages.” Collins v. Philadelphia Suburban Development Corp., 179

A.3d 69, 73 (Pa. Super. 2018) (quoting Merlini ex rel. Merlini v. Gallitzin

Water Authority, 980 A.2d 502, 506 (Pa. 2009)). In the context of an invitee

bringing a suit for negligence in the maintenance of property against the

landowner,

[a] land possessor is subject to liability for physical harm caused
to an invitee only if the following conditions are satisfied:

[the land possessor] knows of or reasonably should have
known of the condition and the condition involves an
unreasonable risk of harm, [the possessor] should expect
that the invitee will not realize it or will fail to protect
[herself] against it, and the [possessor] fails to exercise
reasonable care to protect the invitee against the danger.

Estate of Swift v. Northeastern Hosp. of Philadelphia, [] 690
A.2d 719, 722 ([Pa. Super.] 1997) (citation omitted). An invitee
must present evidence proving “either the [possessor] of the land
had a hand in creating the harmful condition, or he had actual or
constructive notice of such condition.” Id.. . .

-6-
J-A25003-25

The hills and ridges doctrine, “as defined and applied by the courts
of Pennsylvania, is a refinement or clarification of the duty owed
by a possessor of land and is applicable to a single type of
dangerous condition, i.e., ice and snow.” Wentz v. Pennswood
Apartments, [] 518 A.2d 314, 316 ([Pa. Super.] 1986). See
Williams v. Shultz, [] 240 A.2d 812, 813–14 ([Pa.] 1968)
(indicating that the doctrine of hills and ridges applied to preclude
liability where “the accident occurred at a time when general
slippery conditions prevailed in the community as a result of
recent precipitation”) (citations omitted[)].

In order to recover for a fall on an ice[-] or snow[-]covered
surface, a plaintiff must show:

(1) that snow and ice had accumulated on the
sidewalk in ridges or elevations of such size and
character as to unreasonably obstruct travel and
constitute a danger to pedestrians travelling
thereon; (2) that the property owner had notice,
either actual or constructive, of the existence of
such condition; and that it was the
dangerous accumulation of snow and ice which
caused the plaintiff to fall.

This Court has further opined that “the only duty upon the
property owner or tenant is to act within a reasonable time
after notice to remove [the snow and ice] when it is in a
dangerous condition.”

Biernacki [v. Presque Isle Condominiums Unit Owners
Ass’n, Inc.], 828 A.2d [1114,] 1117 (Pa. Super. 2003).

As this Court has held, “the hills and ridges doctrine may be
applied only in cases where the snow and ice complained of are
the result of an entirely natural accumulation following a recent
snowfall[.]” Harvey v. Rouse Chamberin, Ltd., 901 A.2d 523,
526 (Pa. Super. 2006) (quotation marks, quotation, and emphasis
omitted[)]. Further, “the protection afforded by the doctrine is
predicated on the assumption that ‘[t]hese formations are
[n]atural phenomena incidental to our climate[.]’” Id. (quotation
and citation omitted).

Collins, 179 A.3d at 73–74 (emphasis added).

-7-
J-A25003-25

Here, we agree with the trial court’s analysis and application of the hills

and ridges doctrine. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/17/25, 11-15. The trial court

correctly concluded that Iliuk

failed to provide any evidence that the alleged ice was created by
[Pennbrook]’s actions, as opposed to natural accumulation. On
the contrary, senior forensic meteorologist Thomas Michael Else
explained that the general slippery conditions in the community
were a result of temperature fluctuations during and after the
storm, a natural phenomenon incidental to our climate, which led
to the refreezing of melted snow.

Id. at 11. The record does not indicate that the ice Iliuk slipped on was

anything but “the result of an entirely natural accumulation following a recent

snowfall.” Harvey, 901 A.2d at 526. Further, based upon the nature of the

remedial measures taken and the resulting dangerous condition—the salting

and shoveling of a sidewalk as opposed to snowbanks created by plowing the

road—we also consider the cases Iliuk relies upon—Bacsick4 and Harvey—

distinguishable from the case before us.5 Therefore, the trial court correctly

determined that the “human intervention” exception to the hills and ridges

doctrine does not apply here.

Further, the trial court correctly held that Iliuk did not put forward

sufficient evidence that “an accumulation, whether in the form of ridges or

other elevations, was of such size and character to unreasonably obstruct

travel and constitute a danger to pedestrians traveling thereon.” Trial Court

---

4 See Bacsick v. Harvey, 341 A.2d 157, 160 (Pa. Super. 1975) (considering

snowbank created by plowing and that blocked access to the sidewalk to be
“of artificial origin”).

-8-
J-A25003-25

Opinion, 4/17/25, 11-12 (citing Collins, 179 A.3d at 74). Accordingly, the

hills and ridges doctrine applies and precludes Iliuk from recovery here. 6 See

Collins, 179 A.3d at 74.

Mindful of the record, the applicable standard of review, the relevant

caselaw, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s

thorough and well-reasoned opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/17/25, at 1-

1. The parties are directed to attach a copy of the trial court’s opinion in the

event of further proceedings.

Judgment affirmed.

Ford Elliott, PJE., Joins this Memorandum.

Bowes, J., Files a Dissenting Memorandum.

Date: 3/19/2026

---

6 Because the doctrine applies, Iliuk cannot recover for the circumstances
presented and, thus, the reasonableness of Pennbrook’s remedial measures
are moot. Additionally, because of our disposition of Iliuk’s first three issues,
her fourth issue—whether the trial court erred in admitting certain expert
testimony—is moot, and we will not consider it here.

-9-

Dissent

J-A25003-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

VALENTYNA ILIUK : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
VILLAGE OF PENNBROOK : No. 1011 EDA 2025
APARTMENTS, ABC CORPORATION 1- :
3, JOHN/JANE DOE 1-3, FALLS :
TOWNSHIP, PLATINUM PAVING AND :
SEALCOATING, VILLAGE OF :
PENNBROOK 2, LLC :

Appeal from the Judgment Entered July 18, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No(s):
2023-00634

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., BOWES, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.*

DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED MARCH 19, 2026

The learned Majority affirms the trial court’s decision to grant a directed

verdict in favor of Pennbrook. Since I find that the trial court abused its

discretion in concluding that the hills and ridges doctrine precluded Iliuk’s

negligence action, I respectfully dissent.

Fundamentally, I disagree with how the trial court considered the

evidence presented in this case in determining whether Pennbrook was

entitled to a directed verdict. To reiterate, the principles governing review of

such a motion are as follows:

---

• Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-A25003-25

A directed verdict may be granted only where the facts are clear
and there is no room for doubt. In deciding whether to grant a
motion for a directed verdict, the trial court must consider the
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party
and must accept as true all evidence which supports that
party’s contention and reject all adverse testimony.

We will reverse a trial court’s grant or denial of a directed verdict
only when we find an abuse of discretion or an error of law that
controlled the outcome of the case. Further, the standard of
review for an appellate court is the same as that for a trial court.

There are two bases upon which a directed verdict can be entered;
one, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and/or
two, the evidence is such that no two reasonable minds could
disagree that the outcome should have been rendered in favor of
the movant. With a directed verdict, the court reviews the record
and concludes that, even with all factual inferences decided
adverse to the movant, the law nonetheless requires a verdict in
his favor.

Whittington v. Daniels, 332 A.3d 102, 107 (Pa.Super. 2025) (cleaned up,

emphasis added), appeal granted on other grounds, 344 A.3d 1059 (Pa.

2025).

Turning to the pertinent doctrine, we have explained:

The doctrine of hills and ridges provides that an owner or occupier
of land is not liable for general slippery conditions, for to require
that one’s walks be always free of ice and snow would be to
impose an impossible burden in view of the climatic conditions in
this hemisphere. Snow and ice upon a pavement create merely
transient danger, and the only duty upon the property owner or
tenant is to act within a reasonable time after notice to remove it
when it is in a dangerous condition.

The hills and ridges doctrine protects an owner or occupier of land
from liability for generally slippery conditions resulting from ice
and snow where the owner has not permitted the ice and snow to
unreasonably accumulate in ridges or elevations.

-2-
J-A25003-25

Harvey v. Rouse Chamberlin, Ltd., 901 A.2d 523, 526 (Pa.Super. 2006)

(cleaned up). Critically, it “may be applied only in cases where the snow and

ice complained of are the result of an entirely natural accumulation,

following a recent snowfall, as . . . the protection afforded by the doctrine is

predicated on the assumption that these formations are natural phenomena

incidental to our climate[.]” Id. (cleaned up, emphasis in original).

With this in mind, I turn to the evidence presented in this case.

Pennbrook acknowledged that it was responsible for clearing the apartment

buildings’ sidewalks by shoveling and salting following snowfalls, and that it

had on-site maintenance staff to perform that task. See N.T. Jury Trial,

2/10/25, at 93-94. On February 7, 2021, it snowed in the relevant area until

about 4:00 p.m. See N.T. Jury Trial, 2/11/25, at 51. Thereafter, the

maintenance team began shoveling and salting the sidewalks.

Iliuk, a tenant, took her chihuahua, Rocky, for a walk around midnight.

By that time, the maintenance supervisor believed that the sidewalks had

been shoveled and a first pass of salt application had occurred. Moments

before her fall at 12:40 a.m., Iliuk encountered a maintenance worker walking

towards her and salting the sidewalk she was about to traverse with a salt

spreader, purportedly completing his second pass in that regard. Iliuk picked

up Rocky and stepped off the sidewalk to allow him to continue salting the

sidewalk where she had just been. Id. at 24-25, 33-34; N.T. Jury Trial,

2/10/25, at 46-47.

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J-A25003-25

Once Iliuk returned to the sidewalk and began walking again, she “just

slipped and . . . fell exactly on the back of [her] head.” N.T. Jury Trial,

2/10/25, at 47. After regaining consciousness, she observed that she had

fallen “[o]n a patch of ice.” Id. at 48. Iliuk averred that the ice on which she

slipped “was bumpy and uneven” and she could not see it before the fall. Id.

at 49. Viktor Zavinskyy, who lived in the building adjacent to where Iliuk fell

and at the time of trial had become her husband, aided her and took a picture

of the relevant portion of sidewalk. He similarly noted that the ice was

“bumpy.” Id. at 87. Zavinskyy believed that the ice formation was related

to water that would come down a nearby downspout. Id.

Pennbrook presented testimony from, inter alia, Thomas Michael Else, a

senior forensic meteorologist who reconstructs weather events. He opined

that any melted snow or slush from the February 7 snowfall would have

refrozen into solid ice in the late evening hours before Iliuk’s fall. See N.T.

Jury Trial, 2/11/25, at 51. Looking at Zavinskyy’s picture of where the fall

occurred, Else observed that the sidewalk had been shoveled and he could

detect “glare ice,” which he described as similar to black ice and could be seen

when light shines on its surface. Id. at 53.

After Iliuk rested, but before Else testified, Pennbrook moved for a

compulsory non-suit:

A motion for compulsory non-suit allows a defendant to test the
sufficiency of a plaintiffs’ evidence and may be entered only in
cases where it is clear that the plaintiff has not established a cause
of action; in making this determination, the plaintiff must be given
the benefit of all reasonable inferences arising from the evidence.

-4-
J-A25003-25

When so viewed, a non-suit is properly entered if the plaintiff has
not introduced sufficient evidence to establish the necessary
elements to maintain a cause of action; it is the duty of the trial
court to make this determination prior to the submission of the
case to the jury.

Hong v. Pelagatti, 765 A.2d 1117, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2000) (cleaned up).

The trial court denied the motion, elucidating as follows:

The legal concept of hills and ridges is something that I would
have to instruct the jury upon, but based upon some of the
testimony, whether they credit the plaintiff herself or her husband,
. . . Zavinskyy, about bumpiness and how and where it comes
from, that’s a jury question of fact. I can’t put my thumb on the
scale. So I’m going to deny your motion at this time.

N.T. Jury Trial, 2/11/25, at 20. However, after Else’s testimony had been

presented, Pennbrook moved for a directed verdict, which the court granted.

In doing so, it determined that Pennbrook had acted reasonably by shoveling

and salting the sidewalks after the snowfall. See N.T. Jury Trial, 2/12/25, at

1. The court explained that it had “considered all the evidence” and “a

variety of cases,” and dismissed Iliuk’s case. Id. at 18-19.

Thereafter, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court expounded that it

granted the motion based upon an application of the hills and ridges doctrine

because Iliuk “failed to provide any evidence that the alleged ice was created

by [Pennbrook’s] actions, as opposed to natural accumulation.” Trial Court

Opinion, 4/17/25, at 11. In so concluding, the court emphasized the

meteorologist’s expert testimony and held that despite evidence of Pennbrook

salting the sidewalk, Iliuk “introduced no evidence to sustain the claim that

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J-A25003-25

she fell on ice traceable to [Pennbrook’s] salting activity, rather than

conditions naturally incident to the weather.” Id.

At trial, the court cited LaCroix v. Tri-State Props. LLC, 256 A.3d 19,

2021 WL 1886182 (Pa.Super. 2021) (non-precedential decision), in support

of its ruling. See N.T. Jury Trial, 2/12/25, at 18. In that case, we affirmed

an order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants based upon

the hills and ridges doctrine where the defendants had salted the sidewalk

before the plaintiff fell:

[T]he [trial] court concluded that there was no genuine issue of
material fact that the sidewalk and parking lot . . . were generally
slippery as a result of ongoing precipitation at the time of
Appellant’s fall. In addition, the court concluded that the evidence
indicated that these conditions were prevalent in the community
at the time of the fall, and observed that Appellant had not alleged
the existence of hills and ridges of snow and ice. Accordingly, the
court concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact
in dispute. The record supports this conclusion.

LaCroix, 2021 WL 1886182, at *6.

As a non-precedential decision, this case at most holds persuasive value.

In any event, I find its application inapt. Iliuk averred that the ice on which

she fell was bumpy. Furthermore, unlike LaCroix where there was an active

freezing rain event creating slippery conditions throughout the community at

the time the plaintiff fell, the matter at hand concerned cleanup efforts on a

sidewalk roughly eight hours after a snowfall, and the shoveling and salting

conducted by Pennbrook altered the naturally occurring conditions such that

-6-
J-A25003-25

Iliuk’s negligence action would not be precluded by the hills and ridges

doctrine.

Critically, by placing more weight on the meteorologist’s testimony and

discounting that offered by Iliuk and Zavinskyy, the court failed to consider

the evidence in the light most favorable to Iliuk as the non-moving party.

Upon a proper application of the standard for a directed verdict, it is plain to

me that there was room for doubt regarding the pertinence of the hills and

ridges doctrine given the evidence that Pennbrook’s staff had been shoveling

and salting and thereby potentially interfering with the natural accumulation

of snow and ice. See Harvey (explaining that “the evidence introduced by

Appellants in this case suggests that the condition of the land was influenced

by human intervention. In other words, given Watts’[s] interaction with the

snow via plowing, the ice in this case could not have been ‘the result of an

entirely natural accumulation.’” (emphases in original)).

As noted, Iliuk and Zavinskyy both attested that the ice was bumpy,

and Zavinskyy’s testimony suggested that Pennbrook’s downspout impacted

the ice formation where Iliuk fell. Accordingly, the jury could have inferred

that this patch of sidewalk had accumulated ice in a manner that was not

naturally occurring, but created by Pennbrook in some manner. Ultimately,

considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Iliuk and rejecting all

adverse evidence, as required when reviewing a request for a directed verdict,

I find that the trial court abused its discretion by taking away from the jury

the question of whether the hills and ridges doctrine applied and, if the jury

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J-A25003-25

finds it does not apply, whether the snow remediation efforts were reasonable.

Therefore, I would reverse the court’s order directing a verdict in favor of

Pennbrook and remand for a new trial.1

---

1 As I would remand for a new trial, I would not reach the question of whether

the trial court erred in letting Else testify about black ice despite it not being
mentioned in his expert report. See Iliuk’s brief at 25-28.

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