Jump To

Top Caption [Lead Opinion

                  by Panella](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10811167/com-v-millhouse-m/#o1)

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Com. v. Millhouse, M.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1325 EDA 2024
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Panella

• Opinion

• Authorities (12)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (7.8K)

• PDF

Lead Opinion

                        by [Jack A. Panella](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/8243/jack-a-panella/)

J-S47007-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MICHAEL MILLHOUSE :
:
Appellant : No. 1325 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 30, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006832-2021

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 19, 2026

Michael Millhouse appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County on his convictions of possession

of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (PWID), possession of a

controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of a

firearm by a person prohibited.1 Millhouse challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence, the weight of the evidence, the factual basis of the search warrant,

and the constitutionality of Section 6105 as applied to him. His arguments are

without merit, and therefore we affirm.

The trial court briefly set forth the factual and procedural history.

On May 21, 2020, and May 22, 2020. Officer Ernest Brown
(“Officer Brown”), Officer Jeremy Olesik (“Officer Olesik”), and
Officer Louis Hardy (“Officer Hardy”) conducted a narcotics

---

1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), 35 P.S. § 780-
113(a)(32), and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1), respectively.
J-S47007-25

investigation during which they made a controlled purchase of
marijuana from [Millhouse], arrested [Millhouse], and executed a
search warrant on his residence at 5126 Ranstead Street in the
City and County of Philadelphia. [On Millhouse’s person and in his
residence, officers found 15.68 grams of marijuana, 81
methamphetamine pills, a digital scale, containers, a marijuana
grinder, $75 in cash, and an operational firearm.2]

[Millhouse filed a motion challenging the four corners of the search
warrant. A hearing was held on July 25, 2022. The trial court
denied the motion stating that “[t]here’s no information
whatsoever in the record of any fabrication [by the officers,] and
based on the court’s review of the warrant “there was probable
cause and reasonable suspicion for the issuance of the warrant.”
N.T., 7/25/22, at 9-10.

Millhouse filed a motion to suppress. On September 9, 2022, a
suppression hearing was held. The trial court denied the motion
to suppress, in relevant part, because “[t]he officers had
reasonable suspicion and probable cause to arrest [Millhouse],
search [Millhouse] and execute the warrant on the house.” N.T.,
9/9/22, at 68.

Trial commenced on September 12, 2023.] The jury convicted on
all charges except for the possession of an instrument of crime
[(“PIC”)] and, on November 30, 2023, th[e trial] court sentenced
[Millhouse] to one to two years’ incarceration with credit for time
served, followed by two years’ reporting probation along with drug
and alcohol evaluation. On December 8, 2023, [Millhouse] filed a
Motion for a New Trial arguing that the verdicts were against the
weight of the trial evidence and challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence presented for the drug charges and 6105 firearm charge.
[Millhouse’s] motion was denied by operation of law on April 15,
2024. [Millhouse] filed his Notice of Appeal on May 13, 2024,
delineating his grounds for appeal.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/4/25, at 2.

---

2 Initially, the officers thought the pills were “ecstasy”, but later lab testing

revealed that the pills contained methamphetamine. The parties and the trial
court refer to the pills as “ecstasy” and methamphetamine interchangeably.
For the sake of accuracy, we refer to the narcotics as methamphetamine.

-2-
J-S47007-25

Thereafter, Millhouse and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania

Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)-(b).

Millhouse raises the following issues for our review.

1) Was the evidence insufficient to sustain the guilty verdicts for
PWID ([methamphetamine]) and VUFA-6105, for the following
reasons:

A. VUFA-6105 as a Felony-1: [Millhouse’s] prior
conviction establishing ineligibility was for a drug
offense, and the evidence did not establish that the
firearm was on [Millhouse’s] person or within reach,
therefore the evidence did not prove the gradation as
a Felony-1.

B. PWID ([methamphetamine]): the evidence was
insufficient to establish [Millhouse] possessed
[methamphetamine] under circumstances proving
any intent to distribute, as none of the paraphernalia
recovered was that used for distributing
[methamphetamine], there were no sales of
[methamphetamine] and no expert testimony
establishing intent to distribute. At most, the evidence
established simple possession?

2) Were the guilty verdicts against the weight of the evidence, for
the following reasons:

A. PWID: there was no video of any sales, no forensic
evidence connecting [Millhouse] to any controlled
substances purportedly sold, no pre-recorded buy
money recovered, and police testimony was
materially inconsistent and unreliable to include
varying descriptions of what the alleged seller was
wearing. The foregoing coupled with no expert
testimony establishing possession with the intent to
distribute, further disproved the offense of PWID.

B. VUFA-6105: there was no forensic evidence
connecting [Millhouse] to the firearm, the evidence
disproved that the firearm was on his person and
disproved it was even within his reach. Moreover, as

-3-
J-S47007-25

[Millhouse] was acquitted of possessing the firearm
with the intent to employ it criminally (PIC), the
evidence therefore disproved that he possessed it at
all as the allegation was that it was possessed in
furtherance of the drug trade?

3) [Whether] the suppression court erred in denying the motion
to suppress any evidence, as there lacked reasonable suspicion or
probable cause to seize and search [Millhouse], and there lacked
probable cause to search the home, which was based on a search
warrant unsupported by a factual basis that any drugs were being
sold out of the home?

4) Did the VUFA-6105 conviction violate [Millhouse’s] right to bear
arms pursuant to the 2nd Amendment as incorporated by the 14th
Amendment to the US Constitution, where his ineligibility to
possess a firearm stemmed from a non-violent 2015 PWID
conviction, and where there is no historical tradition in
Pennsylvania to permanently disarm non-violent offenders, such
as [Millhouse]?

Appellant’s Brief, at 9-10 (renumbered).

In his first issue, Millhouse challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for

his PWID and Section 6105 convictions. Specifically, Millhouse argues that the

evidence was insufficient to establish that he possessed the

methamphetamine pills with the intent to distribute them, as opposed to use

them for personal use, and that the Commonwealth failed to establish

possession of the firearm because he was not in physical control of the firearm

and it was not within his reach. See Appellant’s Brief, at 33-37.

A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of
law. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict
when it establishes each material element of the crime charged
and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable
doubt. Where the evidence offered to support the verdict is in
contradiction to the physical facts, in contravention to human
experience and the laws of nature, then the evidence is insufficient

-4-
J-S47007-25

as a matter of law. When reviewing a sufficiency claim, the court
is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable
inferences to be drawn from the evidence.

Commonwealth v. McClelland, 204 A.3d 436, 441 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(citation and brackets omitted).

“When determining whether an individual in possession of drugs

intended to deliver them, the starting point is the quantity possessed.”

Commonwealth v. Brockman, 167 A.3d 29, 39 (Pa. Super. 2017). “If the

quantity of the controlled substance is not dispositive as to the intent, the

court may look to other factors.” Commonwealth v. Roberts, 133 A.3d 759,

768 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). Other factors to consider for intent

to deliver include the drug packaging, the defendant’s behavior, the presence

of drug paraphernalia, sums of cash, and expert testimony. See id.

The trial court summarized the evidence that established Millhouse’s

intent to distribute methamphetamine.

Here, police conducted a controlled purchase of marijuana from
[Millhouse] on May 21, 2020 outside 5126 Ranstead. N.T.[,
9/12/23, at] 83. When police arrested [Millhouse] on May 22,
2020, they found the silver key, a clear plastic bag containing two
grams of “loose green weed and seed substance”, and a yellow
container referred to as a “stash container” that contained 13
[methamphetamine] pills. N.T.[, 9/12/23, at] 105-8. [Millhouse]
kept the [methamphetamine] in the same locations as the
marijuana. Property Receipt 3447427 reflected that [Millhouse]
carried both marijuana and [methamphetamine] on him at the
time of his arrest. Property Receipt 3447428 reflected that
[Millhouse] not only kept marijuana and [methamphetamine] in
the jeans underneath the firearm but also that some of the
marijuana and [methamphetamine] were kept in plastic
containers. [See] Property Receipt 3447428 attached hereto as

-5-
J-S47007-25

Court’s Exhibit ‘F’. A clear container with a blue top held roughly
two grams of marijuana while a blue container with a blue top held
28 [methamphetamine] pills, 14 of which were blue, the rest of
which were yellow.

Considering that the [methamphetamine] was not only found in
the same locations as the marijuana [Millhouse] had been
confirmed to be selling but were also packaged similarly, the
evidence was sufficient for the jury to determine that [Millhouse]
was selling or intended to sell the [methamphetamine], even
without evidence of a controlled purchase of such pills by police.
Similarly, the drug paraphernalia recovered by police indicated the
sale of narcotics, not the personal use of them.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/4/25, at 17-18.

We agree with the trial court. Officers recovered around 81

methamphetamine pills on Millhouse’s person and in his residence as well as

storing and packaging material and a digital scale. This was sufficient to

establish that Millhouse possessed the methamphetamine with the intent to

deliver.

For his Section 6105 conviction, Millhouse claims there was insufficient

evidence that he possessed the firearm.

“Where a defendant is not in actual possession of the prohibited items,

the Commonwealth must establish that the defendant had constructive

possession to support the conviction.” Commonwealth v. Rojas-Rolon, 256

A.3d 432, 437 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted). “We have defined

constructive possession as conscious dominion, meaning that the defendant

has the power to control the contraband and the intent to exercise that

control.” Commonwealth v. Parrish, 191 A.3d 31, 36 (Pa. Super. 2018)

-6-
J-S47007-25

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Constructive possession

requires proof that the defendant had knowledge of the existence and location

of the item.” Commonwealth v. Hall, 199 A.3d 954, 961 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(citation omitted). Thus, “the Commonwealth must establish facts from which

the trier of fact can reasonably infer that the defendant exercised dominion

and control over the contraband at issue.” Parrish, 191 A.3d at 36.

Additionally, constructive possession may be established and proven by the

totality of the circumstances and circumstantial evidence. See Rojas-Rolon,

256 A.3d at 437.

The trial court explained the evidence of Millhouse’s constructive

possession of the firearm.

As proven by the corresponding testimony and property receipts,
the firearm was found inside of [Millhouse’s] home on a pile of
clothing next to the front door. [See] N.T.[, 9/12/23, at] 56-57,
72, 99-100[;] Property Receipt 3447430 attached hereto as
Court’s Exhibit “C”. Having thoroughly established that the firearm
was inside [Millhouse’s] house, the Commonwealth then
presented a certified court order from February 3, 2015, proving
that [Millhouse] was legally prohibited from owning a firearm.
[See] N.T.[, 9/14/23, at 4;] Court Order from February 3, 2015
attached hereto as Court’s Exhibit “D”. Viewing this evidence in
the light most favorable to the verdict winner and giving the
Commonwealth the benefit of all reasonable inferences, the
evidence sufficiently demonstrated that [Millhouse], while being
legally prohibited from possessing a firearm, constructively
possessed a firearm in his home, on the laundry basket with clean
clothes and the drugs.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/4/25, at 13.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence

was sufficient to establish that Millhouse constructively possessed the firearm.

-7-
J-S47007-25

The firearm was located inside his house on a pile of laundry next to his front

door. In light of this, it is reasonable to infer that he exercised dominion and

control over the firearm. Therefore, Millhouse’s arguments challenging the

sufficiency of the evidence are without merit.

In his second issue, Millhouse challenges the weight of the evidence for

his PWID and Section 6105 convictions. He argues that his PWID conviction

was against the weight of the evidence because the officers had inconsistent

descriptions of his clothing and the evidence indicated that the

methamphetamine in his possession was consistent with personal use not an

intent to distribute. See Appellant’s Brief, at 30. Regarding Section 6105,

Millhouse argues that his conviction was against the weight of the evidence

because he was found not guilty of PIC, which according to him is “logically

inconsistent” with finding him guilty of Section 6105. See Appellant’s Brief, at

31-33.

A claim alleging the verdict was against the weight of the evidence
is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. Accordingly, an
appellate court reviews the exercise of the trial court’s discretion;
it does not answer for itself whether the verdict was against the
weight of the evidence. It is well settled that the fact-finder is free
to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine the
credibility of the witnesses, and a new trial based on a weight of
the evidence claim is only warranted where the fact-finder’s
verdict is so contrary to the evidence that it shocks one’s sense of
justice. In determining whether this standard has been met,
appellate review is limited to whether the trial judge’s discretion
was properly exercised, and relief will only be granted where the
facts and inferences of record disclose a palpable abuse of
discretion.

-8-
J-S47007-25

Commonwealth v. James, 297 A.3d 755, 768 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation

omitted).

The trial court briefly summarized the weight of the evidence presented.

At trial, the Commonwealth presented a plethora of evidence
including but not limited to the search warrant, multiple property
receipts, three separate seizure analyses, a firearms report, and
the testimonies of Officer Brown, Officer Olesik, and Officer Hardy.
[See] Exhibit List attached hereto as Court’s Exhibit “B”. With this
evidence, the Commonwealth conveyed to the jury that
[Millhouse] was outside of his house at 5126 Ranstead Street
selling marijuana and meth while keeping additional supplies of
those drugs as well as a loaded firearm in his residence.

By contrast, [Millhouse] only presented limited evidence: notes
from the preliminary hearing, the 75-49, and Google street photos
labeled from the vantage point of 5147 Ranstead Street and 5129
Ranstead Street. [Millhouse] also cross-examined the officers
about another individual entering 5126 Ranstead Street on May
19th, 2020 in an attempt to raise reasonable doubt that the
narcotics and firearm found in the home belonged to [Millhouse].
However, the mere presence of another individual selling drugs at
5126 Ranstead on May 19, 2020 had no effect on other evidence,
such as Officer Brown’s testimony of his controlled purchase of
marijuana directly from [Millhouse] on May 21, 2020.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/4/25, at 11-12.

Based on the evidence presented, we discern no abuse of discretion on

the part of the trial court in rejecting Millhouse’s weight of the evidence claim.

Millhouse further argues that his Section 6105 conviction was against

the weight of the evidence because of his acquittal of PIC.

“Well-settled Pennsylvania law permits inconsistent verdicts, provided

sufficient evidence supports the conviction.” Commonwealth v. Houck, 102

A.3d 443, 451 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted). Further, “[a]n acquittal

-9-
J-S47007-25

cannot be interpreted as a specific finding in relation to some of the evidence.”

Id. (citation omitted).

“One narrow exception to this rule exists where the jury specifically

acquits the defendant of an underlying crime, and that underlying crime is a

necessary predicate to a second crime.” Commonwealth v. Rose, 960

A.2d 149, 158 (Pa. Super. 2008) (emphasis in original). “In that case, the

conviction for the second crime cannot stand, ‘[g]iven the special weight

afforded acquittals.’” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Magliocco, 883 A.2d

479, 493 (Pa. 2005)) (alteration in original).

PIC is not a necessary predicate of Section 6105. To sustain a conviction

for Section 6105, the Commonwealth must establish that the defendant

“possessed a firearm and that he was convicted of an enumerated offense that

prohibits him from possessing, using, controlling, or transferring a firearm.”

Commonwealth v. Miklos, 159 A.3d 962, 967 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation

omitted). Meanwhile, for PIC the Commonwealth must establish two

elements: “(1) possession of an object that is an instrument of crime and (2)

intent to use the object for a criminal purpose.” Commonwealth v. Moore,

263 A.3d 1193, 1205 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted). “Instrument of

crime” is defined as “[a]nything specially made or specially adapted for

criminal use[,]” or “[a]nything used for criminal purposes and possessed by

the actor under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for lawful uses it

may have.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907(d).

• 10 - J-S47007-25

As PIC is not a necessary predicate of Section 6105, Millhouse’s

argument regarding inconsistent verdicts is without merit.

In his third issue, Millhouse argues that the trial court erred in denying

his suppression motion because there was insufficient evidence to establish

probable cause for a search warrant of the residence. See Appellant’s Brief,

at 38. He argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish probable cause

because, on May 19, 2020, officers conducted a controlled buy of marijuana

from an unidentified individual who entered and exited 5126 Ranstead, the

drug transactions that occurred on the porch were outside the home, and the

officers were not credible. See id. at 40-41.

“Probable cause exists where, based upon a totality of the circumstances

set forth in the affidavit of probable cause, including the reliability and veracity

of hearsay statements included therein, there is a fair probability that

evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Commonwealth v.

Fletcher, 307 A.3d 742, 746 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation and ellipses omitted).

Again, the trial court comprehensively explained the reason the officers

had probable cause to search Millhouse’s residence.

[Millhouse’s] claim fails as the available record establishes
probable cause in the instant matter. The Honorable Zachary C.
Shaffer stated his reasons for denying the motion to suppress at
a hearing held on September 9, 2022. These reasons included but
were not limited to: finding that Officer Hardy testified credibly;
the controlled purchase of narcotics from [Millhouse];
observations from the investigating officers of [Millhouse] entering
and exiting 5126 Ranstead multiple times; and the recovery of
various items from [Millhouse] upon his arrest, which included a
clear bag containing marijuana, a yellow container that held

• 11 - J-S47007-25

[methamphetamine], and a silver key to 5126 Ranstead. [See]
N.T.[, 9/9/22, at] 63-68. Judge Shaffer also determined that
[Millhouse] did not ask officers why they were entering his house
in the context of a custodial interrogation but, rather, that
[Millhouse] had asked that question without any prompting on the
officers’ behalf.

Based on the available record, including Judge Shaffer’s findings
of fact and conclusions of law, the court determined that police
did in fact have “reasonable suspicion and probable cause to arrest
[Millhouse], search [Millhouse] and execute the warrant on the
house” in this matter. [See id. at] 68[.] The record supports this
determination. Officers conducted controlled purchases of
narcotics, specifically marijuana, from [Millhouse]. This, at the
very least, gave officers reasonable suspicion if not probable
cause, to arrest [Millhouse].

When [Millhouse] was arrested, he had in his possession
marijuana, [methamphetamine], and a key to the residence, in
which was found a loaded firearm, more narcotics, and drug
paraphernalia. Officers had testified that on May 21 st, 2020 and
May 22nd, 2020, [Millhouse] was the only one to enter and exit the
5126 Ranstead Street house, even though [Millhouse] had been
sitting outside the property with another individual. [See id. at]
82[-]83[.]

Trial Court Opinion, 3/4/25, at 22-23.

Based on the findings of fact, there was a fair probability that the officers

would find evidence of a crime inside Millhouse’s residence. Therefore,

Millhouse’s argument that police lacked probable cause to search his residence

is without merit.

In his final issue, Millhouse argues that his Section 6105 conviction is

unconstitutional because it violated his Second Amendment right to bear arms

where his prior disqualifying conviction of PWID was “non-violent,” and there

is no historical tradition of disarming such non-violent offenders. See

• 12 - J-S47007-25

Appellant’s Brief, at 42-44. The Commonwealth argues that the instant case

is indistinguishable from and controlled by Commonwealth v. Randolph,

343 A.3d 1248 (Pa. Super. 2025).3 See Appellee’s Brief, at 25-27. The

Commonwealth is correct.

In Randolph, after surveying United States Supreme Court Second

Amendment jurisprudence, and recent Superior Court decisions applying that

jurisprudence to other constitutional challenges to Section 6105, we

recognized that PWID offenders pose a “credible threat” to the safety of others

and thus, we held that Section 6105 as applied to PWID offenders was

constitutional. See Randolph, 343 A.3d at 1258-59.4

Recently, we have applied Randolph to reject the same argument that

Millhouse raises here. See Commonwealth v. Delauder, No. 721 MDA 2024,

2025 WL 2417742, at *5 (Pa. Super. filed Aug. 21, 2025) (unpublished

memorandum) (relying on Randolph to summarily reject argument that

applying Section 6105 to a prior conviction for PWID violates the Second

Amendment); Commonwealth v. Lewis, No. 1272 MDA 2024, 2025 WL

3270529, at *8 (Pa. Super. filed Nov. 20, 2025) (unpublished memorandum),

---

3 The Commonwealth also points out that Millhouse’s previous PWID conviction

was not his only disqualifying offense under Section 6105 because Millhouse
also had two prior convictions for receiving stolen property. See Appellee’s
Brief, at 21-22.

4 Randolph was issued approximately one month after Millhouse filed his
appellate brief.

• 13 - J-S47007-25

reargument denied (Jan. 27, 2026) (same); Commonwealth v.

Megenhardt, No. 1688 MDA 2024, 2025 WL 3281510, at *7 (Pa. Super. filed

Nov. 25, 2025) (unpublished memorandum) (same). 5

As we have previously considered and rejected the argument that

Millhouse raises, he is entitled to no relief. Therefore, we affirm.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 3/19/2026

---

5 Unpublished decisions filed after May 1, 2019 may be cited for their
persuasive value. See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b).

• 14 -