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March 23, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Com. v. Pearsall, T.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 3240 EDA 2024
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Sullivan

• Opinion

• Authorities (8)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (4.4K)

• PDF

Lead Opinion

                        by Sullivan

J-A30040-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
TYRONE Q. PEARSALL : No. 3240 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered November 15, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0003609-2024

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED MARCH 23, 2026

The Commonwealth appeals from the order granting the suppression

motion of Tyrone Q. Pearsall (“Pearsall”). The Commonwealth’s appeal hinges

on whether Pearsall had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a black bag

placed under the passenger seat—his seat—of the vehicle in which he was

traveling. Because the Commonwealth has failed to show that Pearsall did

not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the bag under his seat—and

the Commonwealth has preserved no other basis to justify the warrantless

search that resulted in the discovery of the firearm inside the bag—we are

constrained to affirm the trial court’s order granting suppression.

The trial court provided the following factual and procedural history of

this appeal:
J-A30040-25

[I]n May [] 2024, [Philadelphia Police Officer Tyler Cruz
(“Officer Cruz”)] observed a vehicle that failed to use a turn signal.
Based on this traffic violation, police initiated a traffic stop. Once
the vehicle came to a stop, Officer Cruz began running the
vehicle’s tag. While the tag report was processing, Officer Cruz
observed [Pearsall] using his right arm to attempt to reach around
the center [console] into the back[]seat. Officer Cruz learned
from the tag report that the car was registered to a [Ruoyu]
Zhang, the registration was expired, and there were no reports
that it was stolen. [The driver of the vehicle indicated she had
rented the vehicle using an app. The Commonwealth does not
dispute that she was in lawful possession of the vehicle at the time
nor that Pearsall was a lawful passenger.]

Officer Cruz and his partner approached the stopped vehicle.
Officer Cruz approached [Pearsall] in the passenger seat and
asked him for his identification card. Upon being asked for his
identification, [Pearsall] began reaching into the backseat again[,]
and Officer Cruz told him to stop. [Pearsall] explained that he had
dropped his identification under the seat. After this explanation,
[Pearsall] opened the car door. Officer Cruz asked him to get back
into the vehicle[,] and [Pearsall] complied with the request.

Officer Cruz opened the back passenger door, without
permission or consent, and reached his hand under [Pearsall’s]
seat. Officer Cruz located the dropped identification and closed
the car door. Officer Cruz handed [Pearsall’s] identification to his
partner, while [Officer] Cruz stayed with [Pearsall] and the driver
of the vehicle. During this time, the driver explained that she
rented the car via an app. During this discussion, [Pearsall] was
“just sitting there” and [also] talking with Officer Cruz.

Upon running [Pearsall’s] identification, Officer Cruz’s
partner indicated that [Pearsall] needed to be taken out of the
vehicle based on a warrant. Based on this indication, both officers
approached the passenger side, while working together to take
[Pearsall] out of the vehicle. After getting [him] out of the vehicle,
Officer Cruz felt that [Pearsall] had begun “pulling away” upon
being removed from the vehicle. Officer Cruz interpreted this
pulling as [Pearsall] attempting to run away or otherwise flee.
However, [the] officers were able to immediately restrain
[Pearsall] and place him in the back of the police car. No other
evidence was presented that [Pearsall had] attempted to run away
or otherwise flee.

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J-A30040-25

After [Pearsall] was placed in the police car, Officer Cruz
went back to the vehicle and began searching under the passenger
seat[,] which was the same seat he reached under to get
[Pearsall’s] identification. Officer Cruz testified that he felt
justified in returning to the car because people with warrants do
not “ever really try to run.” Officer Cruz acknowledged that he
returned to the car to search for potential drugs or other
contraband, without a warrant.

During this search, Officer Cruz reached under [Pearsall’s]
seat, which was where he found [Pearsall’s] ID. Officer Cruz
testified[] that he “pull[ed] a firearm out” from under the seat.
However, [Officer] Cruz later acknowledged that he initially just
“felt a plastic bag[,]” and only after he “start[ed] pulling and
feeling around the bag” did he [ascertain] it was a gun. After this
search, the officer let the driver go[] without citation or arrest.

---

[Police] arrested [Pearsall for various firearms
offenses]. . . . [Pearsall later] filed a motion to suppress the
search[,] arguing that the vehicle search was unlawful [under both
the U.S. and Pennsylvania constitutions], and all evidence
collected should be [suppressed] as fruit of the poisonous tree.

[I]n October [] 2024, the court held [a] suppression hearing
and found that [Pearsall] had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the passenger area of the car, and the police lacked probable
cause and exigent circumstances to search the vehicle[] without
a warrant[ and after Pearsall] had been placed in custody. . . .
[T]he Commonwealth filed a motion to reconsider, which was
denied . . .. The Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal [in
which it certified that the suppression order terminates or
substantially handicaps the prosecution, per Pa.R.A.P. 311(d).]

Trial Court Opinion, 2/12/25, at 2-5 (unnecessary capitalization and citations

to the record omitted; some brackets in original; some paragraphs re-ordered

for clarity). Both the Commonwealth and the trial court have complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

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J-A30040-25

The Commonwealth raises the following issue for our review:

Did the lower court err by suppressing the gun recovered from
beneath a seat in a rental car in which [Pearsall] was a passenger,
where the evidence established that [he] lacked a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the area searched?

Commonwealth’s Brief at 4.

The Commonwealth’s issue turns on whether the trial court erred in

granting Pearsall’s suppression motion.

Our well-settled standard of review is as follows:

When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order, we
follow a clearly defined standard of review and consider only the
evidence from the defendant’s witnesses together with the
evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the
entire record, remains uncontradicted. The suppression court’s
findings of fact bind an appellate court if the record supports those
findings. The suppression court’s conclusions of law, however, are
not binding on an appellate court, whose duty is to determine if
the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.

Our standard of review is restricted to establishing whether the
record supports the suppression court’s factual findings; however,
we maintain de novo review over the suppression court’s legal
conclusions.

Commonwealth v. Rice, 304 A.3d 1255, 1259–60 (Pa. Super. 2023)

(internal citation and indentation omitted).

As noted above, the Commonwealth’s appeal centers on whether

Pearsall had a reasonable expectation in the bag under his seat. As an initial

matter, we note, relevant to automobile searches, that warrantless vehicle

searches are generally impermissible under Article I, Section 8 of the

Pennsylvania Constitution, absent both probable cause and exigent

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J-A30040-25

circumstances. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Saunders, 326 A.3d 888, 903

(Pa. Super. 2024). The Commonwealth does not dispute that Officer Cruz

performed a warrantless search without exigent circumstances.

Once a defendant files a motion to suppress, “it is the Commonwealth's

burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the challenged

evidence was not obtained in violation of the defendant's rights.”

Commonwealth v. Wallace, 42 A.3d 1040, 1047-48 (Pa. 2012). In

Pennsylvania, a defendant charged with a possessory offense has “automatic

standing” to pursue a suppression motion. Commonwealth v. Enimpah,

106 A.3d 695, 698 (Pa. 2014). “[A] defendant must show that he had a

privacy interest in the place invaded or thing seized that society is prepared

to recognize as reasonable.” Id. “The expectation of privacy is an inquiry

into the validity of the search or seizure itself; if the defendant has no

protected privacy interest, neither the Fourth Amendment nor Article I, § 8 is

implicated.” Id. at 699.

In determining whether an individual’s expectation of privacy is

legitimate or reasonable, we must consider the totality of the circumstances

and the determination “ultimately rests upon a balancing of the societal

interests involved.” Commonwealth v. Peterson, 636 A.2d 615, 619 (Pa.

1993). “The constitutional legitimacy of an expectation of privacy is not

dependent on the subjective intent of the individual asserting the right but on

whether the expectation is reasonable in light of all the surrounding

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J-A30040-25

circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Burton, 973 A.2d 428, 435 (Pa. Super.

2009) (en banc) (citation omitted).

A person who is authorized to use a vehicle may have a reasonable

expectation of privacy in the vehicle. Cf. Powell, 994 A.2d at 1104.

Additionally, a reasonable expectation of privacy in a searched vehicle extends

not just to the drivers, but also passengers. See id. Additionally, while

passengers may maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents

of luggage they placed inside a vehicle, “it would be unreasonable to maintain

a subjective expectation of privacy in locations of common access to all

occupants.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Viall, 890 A.2d 419, 422-23

(Pa. Super. 2005)).

A defendant may relinquish his reasonable expectation of privacy in

property by abandoning it, i.e., if that defendant “voluntarily discarded, left

behind, or otherwise relinquished his interest in the property in question so

that he could no longer retain a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard

to it at the time of the search.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 636 A.2d 656,

658 (Pa. Super. 1994) (internal citation omitted) (finding abandonment where

the defendant placed a bag in a tree in a public park). The “theory of

abandonment is predicated upon the clear intent of an individual to relinquish

control of the property he possesses.” Commonwealth v. Elverton, 311

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J-A30040- 25

A.3d 592 (Pa. Super. 2023) (unpublished memorandum at *42) (internal

citation and quotation omitted; emphasis added).1

The Commonwealth argues the trial court erred in granting suppression

because Pearsall did not have “any expectation of privacy—much less a

reasonable one—in the area in which it was found.” Commonwealth’s Brief at

1. The Commonwealth asserts Pearsall was merely present in the vehicle as

an “ordinary passenger” in a rental car, and he had no reasonable expectation

of privacy in the “entire passenger compartment.” Id. The Commonwealth

also suggests that Pearsall abandoned the bag when he attempted

unsuccessfully to flee. See id. at 13.

The trial court considered the Commonwealth’s arguments and found

them unpersuasive. Firstly, the trial court concluded the Commonwealth’s

abandonment argument is a distinct theory that it failed to raise at the

suppression hearing, and, accordingly, it is waived. See Trial Court Opinion,

2/12/25, at 5-6 (citing Commonwealth v. Smith, 304 A.3d 35, 40 (Pa.

Super. 2023) for the proposition that the Commonwealth may not offer new

legal theories after an order granting suppression).

The court additionally reasoned that while passengers do not have a

reasonable expectation of privacy in the entirety of a vehicle, they do have an

interest in areas where they are able to keep their effects private. See id. at

---

1 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (unpublished memoranda filed after May 1, 2019
citable for their persuasive value).

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J-A30040-25

1. The court determined, based on the totality of the circumstances, that

Pearsall had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area under his seat:

The proffered evidence presented at the hearing demonstrated
the following: [Pearsall] was in the passenger seat of the vehicle
at the time of the traffic stop; [he] complied with the officer’s
requests and answered the officer’s questions; the car was not
stolen; it was uncontroverted that the driver had rented the car
and was allowed to leave with the vehicle; [Pearsall] waited while
[the] police ran his ID card; [o]fficers arrested [him] for
outstanding warrants; [he] attempted to “pull away” from
officers, but was immediately subdued; [o]fficers contained
[him] and placed him in the back of the police car; Officer Cruz
returned to the vehicle to search for drugs or contraband.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/12/25, at 9-10 (emphasis added).

Initially, we conclude the record supports the trial court’s finding that

the Commonwealth waived its abandonment theory. While there was

evidence from which the court could possibly conclude Pearsall attempted

(unsuccessfully) to flee, the Commonwealth simply pointed to his attempted

flight as contributing to probable cause for the search, not in support of a

theory of abandonment. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 14 (citing to N.T.,

10/11/24, at 19-20 (Officer Cruz’s testimony), 34-35 (argument regarding

probable cause)); accord Commonwealth v. Sumpter, 292 A.3d 1092 (Pa.

Super. 2023) (unpublished memorandum at *3 n.4) (finding waiver of an

abandonment theory where the Commonwealth had not argued it, but had

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J-A30040-25

instead argued based on other factors that the defendant did not have a

legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle).2

Next, we conclude the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that

Pearsall had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area under his seat.

We find our decision in Commonwealth v. Cruz, 324 A.3d 1203 (Pa. Super.

2024) (unpublished memorandum), persuasive. In Cruz, officers initiated a

traffic stop for a “tag cover violation” and discovered the driver was lawfully

using the car as a cab. 324 A.3d 1203 (unpublished memorandum at *1).

There were two men in the back seat, Cruz and another man named

Roundtree. Roundtree appeared nervous; Cruz did not. See id. Cruz

presented what appeared to be a fake ID, after which officers frisked the

vehicle’s occupants and performed a protective search during which they

found a “Christmas-style” gift bag on the floor of the back seat between where

Cruz and Roundtree were sitting. See id. An officer “initially stated that he

looked inside the gift bag and saw twenty racks of heroin,” and later clarified

that inside the gift bag was another bag, a “white plastic bag that was knotted

at the top,” that the officer opened. Id. After peeling back the paper of the

---

2 We also observe the Commonwealth has provided no authority for its
assertion that attempted, and unsuccessful, flight evinces a clear intent to
relinquish the defendant’s property rights. Additionally, we note that officers
arrested Pearsall for resisting arrest, not flight. See Criminal Complaint at
1.

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J-A30040-25

drug packaging, he discovered the bag contained heroin, after which officers

arrested Cruz and charged him with several offenses, including PWID.

Cruz moved for suppression, and the trial court granted it. The court

concluded, in relevant part, that Cruz had a reasonable expectation of privacy

in the closed bag on the floor at his feet. See id. at *2. The Commonwealth

appealed, and this Court affirmed. This Court explained: “[P]olice did not

recover drugs that were sitting out in the open in the backseat of the car;

rather [they] recovered the drugs from a tied-off plastic bag that was inside

a Christmas gift bag, which was situated at Cruz’s feet,” and, accordingly, the

record supported the trial court’s finding that “Cruz intended to keep the

contents of the plastic bag, which was tied off and sitting inside a Christmas-

style gift bag, private,” and thus had a reasonable expectation of privacy. See

id. at *5.

Here, similar to Cruz, Pearsall was a lawful passenger inside of the

vehicle, which in this case was rented by the driver, and, accordingly, while

he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the entire vehicle, he

had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the bag he placed inside the

vehicle. The following facts support the trial court’s finding that Pearsall had

a reasonable expectation of privacy in the bag: he was in the passenger seat

of the vehicle, and was observed reaching around the center console behind

the seat he was occupying; and his identification was located under the seat

where the black plastic bag was located. The fact that the bag was under the

• 10 - J-A30040-25

seat Pearsall occupied where his identification was located, rather than out in

the open and accessible to any and all occupants of the vehicle, indicates that

Pearsall intended to keep the contents of the bag private, and, accordingly,

he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area under his seat including

the bag. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/17/25, at 12 (concluding Pearsall “clearly

did have a privacy interest in his bag that he placed under his seat near his

identification card,” and that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy);

Cruz, 324 A.3d 1203 at 5-6; accord Commonwealth v. Rivera, 273 A.3d

1032 (Pa. Super. 2022) (unpublished memorandum at *5) (providing that a

passenger in a vehicle maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy in

luggage that “he or she places inside a vehicle provided, however, that the

passenger, by his or her conduct, exhibits an actual or subjective expectation

of privacy in the backpack as determined by the totality of the circumstances

and that expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as

reasonable”) (footnote omitted).3 As such, the trial court’s findings are

supported by the record and its legal conclusions appropriate. Thus we affirm

the trial court’s order granting suppression.

Order affirmed.

---

3 Additionally, the contraband nature of the contents of the bag was not
immediately apparent to Officer Cruz, who testified, “I felt the plastic bag, and
there was some weight to it. As I start pulling and feeling around the
bag, I felt a firearm.” N.T., 10/11/24, at 31 (emphasis added).

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Date: 03/23/2026

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