Paknad v. Superior Court - Work Product Waiver in Employment Discrimination Discovery

Jump To

Top Caption Combined Opinion The text of this document was obtained by analyzing a scanned document and may have typos.

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

April 17, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Paknad v. Super. Ct.

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known

• Docket Number: H052652

• Opinion

• Authorities (0)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (27.3K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

Filed 3/24/26; Modified and Certified for Pub. 4/17/26 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

MICHELLE PAKNAD, H052652
(Santa Clara County
Petitioner, Super. Ct. No. 19CV350641)

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SANTA
CLARA,

Respondent;

INTUITIVE SURGICAL, INC., et al.,

Real Parties in Interest.

This is the second mandate proceeding occasioned by two reports and
investigative materials prepared by an attorney commissioned by defendants and real
parties in interest, Intuitive Surgical, Inc. and Intuitive Surgical Operations, Inc., to
investigate plaintiff and petitioner Michelle Paknad’s claims of sexual harassment,
gender discrimination, and unlawful retaliation as an Intuitive employee.
In the first proceeding, we concluded that despite a “relationship . . . giving rise to
the attorney-client privilege and work product protections,” Intuitive waived the privilege
“by placing the scope and adequacy of the investigations at issue, . . . such that . . .
disclosure of the material is ‘ “essential for a fair adjudication of the action.” ’ ” (Paknad
v. Superior Court (May 20, 2024, H050711) nonpub. opn., quoting
Wellpoint Health Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 110, 128
(Wellpoint).) While we stopped short of holding that Intuitive had necessarily waived
protection as to all the investigator’s materials or core work product under Code of Civil
Procedure 2018.030, subdivision (a),1 we issued a peremptory writ directing the
respondent court to “grant[] the motion [to compel production of the] . . . reports and
related investigative materials,” subject to an in camera review “to determine ‘if some
protection is warranted notwithstanding the waiver’ . . . .” (Paknad I, supra, H050711,
quoting Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 740 (Costco
Wholesale Corp.) and citing People v. Superior Court (Jones) (2021) 12 Cal.5th 348, 366
(Jones).)
Before the respondent court, the parties disputed whether Intuitive’s waiver of
attorney work product protection extended to core work product. The court ultimately
ordered disclosure of the reports and investigative materials subject to Intuitive’s
proposed redactions. Because the redactions excised all the investigator’s factual
findings, Paknad petitioned again for mandamus relief.
Having reviewed the proposed redactions of the records lodged with the
respondent court, we will grant Paknad’s second petition for writ of mandate.
I. BACKGROUND

While still employed by Intuitive, Paknad made two formal complaints of
discrimination, harassment, and retaliation—complaints that Intuitive retained attorney
Andrea Kelly Smethurst to investigate. Smethurst interviewed witnesses, reviewed
documents, and produced two reports containing her findings and conclusions. While a
summary of the findings was conveyed to Paknad, Intuitive did not share with Paknad the
underlying reports.

1
Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

2
After she was fired, Paknad sued the company and her former supervisors.2 In
asserting avoidable consequences as an affirmative defense to Paknad’s complaint,
Intuitive cited the Smethurst investigations and touted their thoroughness and
independence, stating “[d]efendant . . . thoroughly investigated every allegation that
[p]laintiff presented by hiring an independent, outside investigator to conduct two
investigations, interview numerous witnesses (some of which she interviewed several
times), and review a large volume of documentary evidence.” (See Paknad I, supra,
H050711.)
A. Paknad I

After the trial court denied her motion to compel production of the reports and
investigative materials, Paknad petitioned this court for mandamus relief. After the
California Supreme Court directed us to issue an order to show cause why relief should
not be granted, we granted the petition in part and ordered issuance of a peremptory writ
directing the trial court to vacate its order denying Paknad’s motion to compel “insofar as
it relates to the Smethurst reports and related investigative materials, and to enter a new
order granting the motion.” (See Paknad I, supra, H050711.) We followed Wellpoint,
supra, 59 Cal.App.4th 110, 128, concluding that once an employer puts the adequacy of
an investigation directly at issue in response to an employee’s lawsuit, that employer
“cannot stand on the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine to preclude a

2
In her operative complaint, Paknad pleaded eight causes of action: (1) sex and
gender discrimination—against Intuitive (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (a)), (2) quid pro
quo sexual harassment—against Intuitive and former supervisors Jeroen van Heesewijk
and Kevin Collins (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (j)), (3) hostile work environment sexual
harassment—against Intuitive, van Heesewijk, and Collins (Gov. Code, § 12940,
subd. (j)), (4) retaliation—against Intuitive (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (h)), (5) failure to
take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent and correct discrimination, harassment, and
retaliation—against Intuitive (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (k)), (6) wrongful discharge—
against Intuitive, (7) violation of Labor Code section 1102.5—against Intuitive, and
(8) negligent hiring, retention, and supervision—against Intuitive.

3
thorough examination of [the investigation’s] adequacy.” (Paknad I, supra, H050711.)
But because we gathered from Intuitive’s privilege log that some aspects of the reports
and investigative materials would contain core work product (§ 2018.030, subd. (a)) that
might exceed the scope of what Intuitive had put at issue, we authorized the respondent
court to review materials in camera to determine “if some protection is warranted
notwithstanding the waiver.” (Paknad I, supra, H050711, citing Jones, supra, 12 Cal.5th
at p. 366, inter alia.)
B. Subsequent Proceedings

After issuance of the writ, the parties contested the scope of Paknad I. According
to Paknad, because we concluded that Intuitive had placed the Smethurst investigations at
issue, core attorney work product is “waived as to every aspect of Plaintiff’s workplace
complaints” and “the only material” in the Smethurst reports that might still be entitled to
work product protection are discussions of unrelated cases, or of “specific legal—as
opposed to factual—issues or strategies.” By contrast, Intuitive claimed we held that
protection of core work product—meaning, the investigator’s “ ‘findings, mental
impressions, and conclusions regarding [P]laintiff’s allegations of discrimination and
retaliation’ ”—had not been waived and that all these items from the Smethurst reports
“should be redacted and withheld from production.”
The respondent court directed Intuitive to provide it with an unredacted copy of
the Smethurst reports and related investigative materials, and a second copy identifying
Intuitive’s proposed redactions.
1. The Reports and Intuitive’s Proposed Redactions

The 437 pages of purportedly unredacted materials comprised (1) Smethurst’s two
reports, dated May 29, 2018, and November 16, 2018; (2) documents (primarily e-mails)
Smethurst reviewed in her investigations; and (3) Smethurst’s interview notes.3 The

3
What Intuitive lodged with the respondent court as “completely unredacted
versions of these materials” still included what Intuitive after oral argument on appeal

4
reports were both organized in five numbered parts: (I) Paknad’s allegations;
(II) identification of the witnesses interviewed and documents examined;
(III) Smethurst’s detailed summaries of witness interviews; (IV) Smethurst’s factual
findings; (V) Smethurst’s conclusions, including her legal recommendations to Intuitive
going forward.
Intuitive proposed redacting all Part IV’s factual findings, substantive portions of
Part V’s conclusions, along with several other lines and paragraphs. Intuitive also
proposed redacting a few documents in the underlying materials, including portions of
e-mails and lines from the interview notes.
2. In Camera Review and Order

Upon in camera review of the materials and redactions, the court found Intuitive’s
redactions were all “ ‘an attorney’s impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research
or theories’ and are therefore ‘not discoverable under any circumstances.’ ” The court
accepted Intuitive’s redactions, vacated its prior denial of Paknad’s motion to compel,
granted the motion, and ordered Intuitive to produce the redacted reports and
investigative materials to Paknad.
C. The Current Petition

Paknad again petitioned for mandamus relief. After a panel of this court
summarily denied the petition, the California Supreme Court granted Paknad’s petition
for review and transferred the matter with instructions to issue an order to show cause,
specifying that “[t]he response to the order to show cause should address the application
of People v. Superior Court (Jones) (2021) 12 Cal.5th 348, 361–364 . . . and Wellpoint
Health Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 110, 126, 128.”

acknowledged “inadvertently contained partial redactions to four e[-]mails.” Intuitive
has lodged with this court the now-unredacted e-mails.

5
II. DISCUSSION

Paknad argues that by permitting the redaction of all factual findings from the
investigator’s reports, the respondent court failed to follow Jones and this court’s
mandate in Paknad I. Specifically, Paknad contends that the court erred in limiting its in
camera review solely to whether the redacted materials constituted attorney work product
under section 2018.030, subdivision (a), without further considering the scope of waiver.
Having reviewed the materials and redactions at issue, we agree, although we construe
the scope of Intuitive’s waiver more narrowly than Paknad has argued.
A. Waiver of Attorney Work Product Protection4

Preliminarily, both Paknad and Intuitive misstate the scope of our opinion in
Paknad I. In its brief submitted before the in camera review, Intuitive represented to the
respondent court that we “held that Intuitive’s ‘outside counsel’s findings, mental
impressions, and conclusions regarding [P]laintiff’s allegations of discrimination and
retaliation’ had not been waived, such that they should be redacted and withheld from
production.” Intuitive reiterated this position in its answer to our order to show cause,
contending that this court had “contemplated ‘conclusion’ and ‘finding’ as identical
concepts” and had “describ[ed] conclusions and findings interchangeably.”
We do not recognize our prior opinion in Intuitive’s characterization, and
Intuitive’s pincites do not support its assertions. We neither suggested that findings and

4
Intuitive also contends that Paknad’s contention is barred by the law of the case,
the doctrine that “ ‘prevents parties from seeking reconsideration of an issue already
decided absent some significant change in circumstances.’ ” (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v.
University of Southern California (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1505). But Paknad does
not seek reconsideration of an already decided issue, merely clarification of the scope of
work product protection Intuitive may still claim despite our conclusion that Intuitive put
at issue the adequacy of Smethurst’s investigations. And even if the law of the case were
implicated here, we take the Supreme Court’s citations to Jones and Wellpoint in
transferring the matter as directing consideration of the scope of work product protection
in view of Intuitive’s waiver.

6
conclusions were synonymous nor authorized the continued withholding of Smethurst’s
factual findings. What Intuitive in the respondent court mischaracterized as what we
“held” was merely our quotation of Intuitive’s own contention: “In its privilege logs,
Intuitive describes the Smethurst reports as ‘[i]nvestigation report[s] prepared by outside
counsel summarizing outside counsel’s findings, mental impressions, and conclusions
regarding [p]laintiff’s allegations of discrimination and retaliation.’ ” (Paknad I, supra,
H050711.) What Intuitive pincites in its briefing before us now is our conclusion—
without access then to the reports themselves—that “[b]ased on this description [in
Intuitive’s privilege log], at least some aspect of the reports” may properly be withheld.
(Ibid., italics added.) This is not a holding that Smethurst’s factual findings may be
withheld.
Nor do we agree with Paknad that our prior opinion sweeps so broadly as to
permit redactions only of “such limited material[s] that [are] unrelated to [Smethurst’s]
workplace investigations.” Paknad relies on Jones for her maximalist interpretation of
our opinion, but Jones does not stand for the blanket proposition that any waiver of work
product protection requires disclosure of all otherwise protected matters. (See Jones,
supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 353.) Rather, Jones is entirely consistent with the proposition that
the scope of a waiver turns on what the party has placed “at issue.” (Id. at p. 353.)
Indeed, Jones cautioned that the question of waiver is an “ ‘intensely practical one,’ ” and
that “ ‘[w]hat constitutes a waiver with respect to work-product materials depends, of
course, upon the circumstances’ ” of each case. (Id. at p. 363 & fn. 11.)
In Jones, the prosecutor defended against a Batson/Wheeler claim by relying on an
undisclosed juror rating system as the purportedly nondiscriminatory basis for his
challenged strikes. The Supreme Court held that the prosecutor had thereby put the
rating system itself at issue, such that he had “impliedly waived any claim of work
product protection over notes containing information about the system.” (Jones, supra,
12 Cal.5th at p. 348, italics added.) So too here: Because, as we explained in Paknad I,

7
Intuitive’s answer and interrogatory responses put at issue the scope and adequacy of
Smethurst’s investigations, Intuitive’s waiver of work product protection extends to those
matters. (See Paknad I, supra, H050711 [“Intuitive has directly placed at issue questions
relating to the investigations’ scope and adequacy”].)5
We recognize that much of the parties’ dispute in these proceedings centers upon
whether in Paknad I we intended to find a waiver of work product protection, as well as
the attorney-client privilege. And our disposition’s bracketed reference to only the
attorney-client privilege obscured our observation elsewhere in the opinion that Intuitive,
“by placing the scope and adequacy of the investigations at issue,” made “disclosure of
the materials . . . necessary for a fair adjudication of the action.” (Paknad I, supra,
H050711.) “Although the work product statute [section 2018.030, subdivision (a)] does
not directly address the issue of waiver, it is well established that work product
protection, like other forms of privilege, can be waived through conduct.” (Jones, supra,
12 Cal.5th at p. 362.) Consistent with that proposition, Wellpoint makes clear that both
the attorney-client communication and work product protection are waived when a party
elects to defend itself by putting otherwise privileged information at issue. (See
Wellpoint, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 128 [holding that if a defendant employer “hopes
to prevail by showing that it investigated an employee’s complaint and took action
appropriate to the findings of the investigation . . . it does so with the understanding that
the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine are thereby waived” (italics
added)].) And Jones itself confirms that even core work product is subject to waiver
when the beneficiary of that protection puts it at issue. (Jones, at pp. 365–366 [holding
that prosecutor waived work product protection as to his juror rating system by relying on
that undisclosed system to defend his peremptory challenges as nondiscriminatory].)

5
Paknad appears to recognize that at least some aspects of the Smethurst reports,
such as “pure legal advice,” remain outside the scope of Intuitive’s work product waiver.

8
Indeed, based on Jones and Wellpoint, counsel for Intuitive conceded at oral argument
that it had waived attorney work product protection and that the sole remaining issue is
the scope of that waiver. Intuitive’s concession is well taken.
As in Paknad I, we follow Jones and Wellpoint. We clarify that Intuitive, by its
voluntary conduct, has waived attorney-client privilege and attorney work product
protection as to (1) all Smethurst’s factual findings about Paknad’s allegations of
discrimination, harassment, or retaliation, and (2) information—whether in Smethurst’s
reports or the underlying investigative materials—relevant to the scope or adequacy of
Smethurst’s investigation of Paknad’s allegations.
B. Scope of Redactions

Although we have every confidence that this clarification of our holding in
Paknad I will resolve any ambiguity for the respondent court, we will for the parties’
benefit address Intuitive’s alternative arguments for accepting its proposed redactions.
1. Intuitive’s Legal Theory for Limiting Disclosure

Intuitive argued for the first time during oral argument that Southern Cal. Gas Co.
v. Public Utilities Com. (1990) 50 Cal.3d 31, United States v. Nobles (1975)
422 U.S. 225, and Jones, taken together, support limiting the scope of Intuitive’s
disclosure obligations not by what the company put at issue but by whether what it has
since disclosed will suffice for Paknad to meet Intuitive’s avoidable consequences
defense at trial. Leaving aside the pragmatic challenges posed by this proposal, we do
not read these cases to support Intuitive’s proposed limitation. Southern Cal. Gas Co.
addressed the antecedent issue of waiver—whether the company had “place[d] in issue its
privileged communications,” such that the information is “vital to a fair adjudication in
th[e regulatory] proceeding”—not the precise contours of the waiver’s scope. (Id. at

9
pp. 42–43.)6 And Nobles and Jones both framed the issue of waiver not in terms of need,
but of what the holder of the privilege had voluntarily put at issue. (See Jones, supra,
12 Cal.5th at p. 365 [information relating to undisclosed juror rating system waived
because “the striking attorney has placed in issue [that] information”]; Nobles, at p. 239
[“by electing to present the investigator as a witness, [defendant] waived the privilege
with respect to matters covered in his testimony”].)
We accordingly decline Intuitive’s belated invitation to limit the disclosure of the
Smethurst reports and investigative materials based on a pretrial projection of whether
disclosures to date will be sufficient to meet Paknad’s needs at trial. We instead focus on
the scope of the waiver—what Intuitive has voluntarily put at issue through its assertion
of the avoidable consequences defense.
2. Factual Findings

Paknad challenges Intuitive’s wholesale redaction of all factual findings from the
Smethurst’s reports. These factual findings represent Smethurst’s interpretation and
weighing of the available evidence, her assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, and
her determination of whether Paknad’s factual allegations were substantiated. The
relevance of these factual findings to the scope and adequacy of the investigations is
undisputed. They are squarely within the scope of Intuitive’s waiver.7

6
Having resolved this antecedent question in Paknad I, supra, H050711 we will
not revisit it here, particularly in light of Intuitive’s concession of waiver.
7
To the extent Smethurst’s report includes limited findings about a third party
complainant, Paknad allows that these are “arguably within . . . the trial court’s
appropriate discretion to redact” but posits that even those findings “may have had some
bearing” on Paknad’s complaints. As we have explained, the issue is whether these
findings about a third party’s complaints bear on the scope and adequacy of Intuitive’s
investigation of Paknad’s complaints. Unless the respondent court determines that they
do, these findings about a third party complainant exceed the scope of Intuitive’s waiver,
are not subject to disclosure, and may remain redacted from the materials released to
Paknad.

10
Although Intuitive appropriately conceded at oral argument that it had waived
attorney work product protection as to Smethurst’s purely factual findings, it still
maintains that the redacted “findings” in Smethurst’s report are not subject to disclosure
because even bare credibility determinations were informed by Smethurst’s legal
judgment and experience—in short, because they are Smethurst’s work product. Because
Intuitive engaged Smethurst both to investigate Paknad’s complaints and “ ‘to make
recommendations to . . . [Intuitive] management’ about how to respond” to them (see
Paknad I, supra, H050711), the substance of Smethurst’s factual findings bear directly on
the adequacy of both the investigations and Intuitive’s response. Having put the
adequacy of both at issue and thereby waived work product protection, “Intuitive cannot
. . . disavow any interrelationship between the investigative findings it commissioned and
the response it ultimately chose. If Intuitive chose to disregard the findings of the
investigations it commissioned, those findings would be relevant to the claimed adequacy
of its response; likewise, if it chose to accept and act on the findings made, the adequacy
of its response is enmeshed with the adequacy of those investigations.” (Ibid.)
Smethurst’s factual findings are also relevant to the disputed issue of her
independence. In support of its avoidable consequences defense, Intuitive represented in
form interrogatory No. 15.1 that it “has thoroughly investigated every allegation that
[p]laintiff presented by hiring an independent, outside investigator to conduct two
investigations.” (Paknad I, supra, H050711, italics added.) Paknad has disputed
Smethurst’s independence, claiming that with respect to the second investigation, “the
outcome, as expected, was skewed to blame [Paknad] and support [Intuitive], [van]
Heesewijk, and Collins.” (Some capitalization omitted.) Intuitive having put at issue
Smethurst’s independence and objectivity, Paknad must be given access to Smethurst’s
factual findings as well so that she has equal opportunity to assess how Smethurst
reached those findings, and if warranted, to root out possible bias.

11
3. Additional Redactions

Apart from the factual findings, Intuitive also proposed limited redactions to other
portions of the reports, and to the underlying investigative materials. We will direct the
respondent court to conduct further in camera review of the remaining redactions to
(1) the two Smethurst reports; and (2) the underlying investigative materials, and to
disclose to Paknad information relevant to the scope and adequacy of the Smethurst
investigations. (Box v. Superior Court (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 60, 82 [when trial court
conducts in camera review but “attempt[s] to answer the wrong question,” the
“appropriate course is to return the matter to the trial court for further consideration of
[the] motion to compel, applying the correct standard”].)8
We reiterate that the purpose of further in camera review is not to determine
whether any information contained in the Smethurst reports and investigative materials
contain core attorney work product (§ 2018.030, subd. (a)), but whether the redacted
materials are within the scope of Intuitive’s waiver of protection for core attorney work
product. At the conclusion of the in camera review, the respondent court will disclose to
Paknad any information relevant to the scope and adequacy of the Smethurst
investigations—irrespective of whether such information would otherwise qualify for
core attorney work protection under section 2018.030.
III. DISPOSITION

Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the respondent court to vacate its
August 27, 2024 order insofar as it accepted all redactions of the investigator’s reports
and related investigative material proposed by real parties in interest Intuitive Surgical,

8
As previously noted, the materials Intuitive provided for in camera review were
themselves lightly redacted. In advance of the respondent court’s further in camera
review of the investigator’s reports and investigative materials, Intuitive must provide the
respondent court with completely unredacted versions of the underlying investigative
materials.

12
Inc., and Intuitive Surgical Operations, Inc.; conduct further in camera review of these
materials consistent with the views expressed in this opinion; and enter a new order for
the disclosure of all such materials within the scope of real parties’ waiver of
attorney-client privilege and work product protection.
Costs in this original proceeding are awarded to petitioner Michelle Paknad. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.493(a)(1)(A).)
Upon issuance of the remittitur, the temporary stay order is vacated.

13

---

LIE, J.

WE CONCUR:

---

GREENWOOD, P. J.

---

DANNER, J.

Paknad v. Superior Court
H052652
Filed 4/17/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

MICHELLE PAKNAD, H052652
(Santa Clara County
Petitioner, Super. Ct. No. 19CV350641)

v. ORDER MODIFYING OPINION,
CERTIFYING OPINION FOR
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PUBLICATION
CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SANTA
CLARA, NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT

Respondent;

INTUITIVE SURGICAL, INC., et al.,

Real Parties in Interest.

THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on March 24, 2026, be modified as
follows:
1. On page 6, line 1 of footnote 4, the word “also” is deleted.
2. On page 8, the first full paragraph, beginning “We recognize,” in its fourth
sentence beginning “Consistent with that proposition,” the word
“communication’ is changed to “privilege” so the sentence reads:

Consistent with that proposition, Wellpoint makes clear that both the
attorney-client privilege and work product protection are waived when a
party elects to defend itself by putting otherwise privileged information at
issue.
3. On page 10, first sentence under subheading II.B.2. Factual Findings, first
line, the word “the” after “from” and before “Smethurst’s reports” is deleted.
4. On page 10, line 1 of footnote 7, the words “report includes” are changed to
“reports include” so the first sentence reads:

To the extent Smethurst’s reports include limited findings about a third
party complainant, Paknad allows that these are “arguably within . . . the
trial court’s appropriate discretion to redact” but posits that even those
findings “may have had some bearing” on Paknad’s complaints.

1. On page 12, last sentence under subheading II.B.3. Additional Redactions, the word “product” is added after “work” and before “protection” to read:

At the conclusion of the in camera review, the respondent court will
disclose to Paknad any information relevant to the scope and adequacy of
the Smethurst investigations—irrespective of whether such information
would otherwise qualify for core attorney work product protection under
section 2018.030.

There is no change in the judgment.

The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on March 24, 2026, was not
certified for publication in the Official Reports. For good cause it now appears that the
opinion should be published in the Official Reports and it is so ordered.

2

---

LIE, J.

WE CONCUR:

---

GREENWOOD, P. J.

---

DANNER, J.

Paknad v. Superior Court
H052652
Trial Court: Santa Clara County Superior Court
Superior Court No.: 19CV350641

Trial Judge: Hon. Evette D. Pennypacker

Counsel: Aiman-Smith & Marcy, Randall B. Aiman-Smith, Reed W.L.
Marcy, Hallie Von Rock, Brent A. Robinson, for Petitioner.

Littler Mendelson, Darren E. Nadel, Michelle Leah Gomez, David
C. Gartenberg, Anne Sweeney Jordan, for Intuitive Surgical, Inc.,
and Intuitive Surgical Operations, Inc., Real Parties in interest.

Paknad v. Superior Court
H052652