NaQueen Unique Zaire v. James Brooks, et al. — Motions to Dismiss Granted

Jump To

Top Caption Trial Court Document

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

Feb. 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

NaQueen Unique Zaire v. James Brooks, et al.

District Court, D. New Jersey

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2:24-cv-00939

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (12)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (53.1K)

• PDF

Trial Court Document

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

NAQUEEN UNIQUE ZAIRE, Civil Action No.: 24-939

Plaintiff,

v. OPINION & ORDER

JAMES BROOKS, et al.,

Defendant.

CECCHI, District Judge.
Before the Court are the motions to dismiss pro se Plaintiff NaQueen Unique Zaire’s
second amended complaint (ECF No. 25, “SAC”) under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) filed by defendants Wilmington Savings Fund, FSB, not in its private
capacity but solely as Trustee for Verus Securitization Trust 2019-INV3, Verus Securitization
Trust 2019-INV3, Baron Silverstein, Newrez LLC d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing, and
VMC REO, LLC (collectively, “Bank Defendants”) (ECF No. 31), the Honorable Jodi Lee Alper
and Michelle Smith (collectively, “State Defendants”) (ECF No. 32), Eric S. Hausman, the Law
Offices of Steven A. Varano, P.C., and James Brooks (collectively, “Law Firm Defendants”)
(ECF No. 35), Antonio Bonnani (ECF No. 38), and Armando B. Fontoura (ECF No. 50).
Plaintiff opposed the motions (ECF Nos. 44, 51), and Defendants replied (ECF Nos. 43, 45, 52).
Plaintiff also submitted a sur-reply.1 ECF No. 48. The Court decides this matter without oral
argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b). For the reasons set forth below,
Defendants’ motions are GRANTED.

1 Plaintiff’s motion to file a sur-reply is granted, and the Court considers the sur-reply in the instant
Opinion and Order.
I. BACKGROUND
The SAC is difficult to interpret, but “because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court
attempts to glean [her] factual allegations and legal claims through liberal construction of [her]
pleading.” Off. of Ex’x on behalf of Naqueen Unique Zaire Est. v. Alper, No. 24-541, 2024 WL
4648008, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 1, 2024).
This case arises from a prior state court foreclosure action (“State Court Action”) involving
the property located at 28 Laurel Avenue, Irvington, New Jersey (the “Property”). SAC ¶ 84.
Plaintiff defaulted on a note and mortgage on the Property, and the New Jersey Superior Court,

Law Division, entered a final judgment and a writ of execution foreclosing on the Property on
August 4, 2023 (“Final Judgment”). ECF No. 31-3. 2 On October 31, 2023, the Property was sold
at a foreclosure sale. ECF No. 1-2, Ex. B; ECF No. 31-5. On January 16, 2024, Plaintiff received
a Notice of Eviction letter from the Essex County Sheriff informing her that she must vacate the
Property by February 21, 2024. SAC ¶ 97; ECF No. 1-2, Ex. C.
On January 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed a federal action in the District of New Jersey seeking
to vacate the judgment. See Zaire v. Alper, No. 24-541 (D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2024) (the “First Federal
Action”). On February 20, 2024, in the State Court Action, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Stay the
Sheriff’s Eviction, which was denied. ECF No. 16-2, Ex. A. The same day, Plaintiff filed the
instant federal action. ECF No. 1. On February 21, 2024, Plaintiff was evicted. SAC ¶ 115.

On November 1, 2024, in the First Federal Action, the Honorable Brian R. Martinotti found
that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and dismissed her claims

2 Courts may rely on materials beyond the complaint in a motion to dismiss “when the extrinsic
document is integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint.” Talley v. Pillai, 116 F.4th 200,
207 n.7 (3d Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts may also rely on “attached
exhibits” to the complaint and “matters of public record.” Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263,
268 (3d Cir. 2007).
without prejudice. Zaire, 2024 WL 4648008, at *6. However, Judge Martinotti denied Plaintiff
leave to amend her complaint. Id. On January 31, 2025, in the instant action, this Court dismissed
Plaintiff’s claims, in part because they were barred by Rooker-Feldman and in part because she
failed to state a claim. ECF No. 24. Plaintiff then filed the instant SAC, which Defendants seek
to dismiss.
In her SAC, Plaintiff asserts two categories of allegations related to her foreclosure: first,
that the foreclosure was unlawful; and second, that she was mistreated in the aftermath of her
eviction. As to the former, Plaintiff appears to contend that the Bank Defendants did not “provide[]

consideration for the transaction as . . . stated in the promissory note,” and so the note—on which
she defaulted—was unenforceable. SAC ¶¶ 21–36. Plaintiff thus concludes that all Defendants
are liable because they assisted in facilitating her allegedly unlawful foreclosure and eviction. Id.
¶ 68.
Plaintiff’s other allegations, regarding mistreatment following her eviction, are nearly
identical to those in her first amended complaint (“FAC”) and were dismissed for failure to state
a claim. They include allegations that the individuals who carried out her eviction mishandled her
personal property and locked her son out of the property even though the “eviction did not name
him,” and that the eviction notice was visible to her neighbors and delivery drivers. Id. ¶¶ 105–
60. Unlike in her FAC, the SAC does not assert any causes of action under which Plaintiff seeks

to proceed.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a court to dismiss a complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. See Ballentine v. United States, 486 F.3d 806, 810 (3d Cir. 2007). Two
types of challenges can be made under Rule 12(b)(1): a facial attack or a factual attack. See In re
Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 632 (3d Cir. 2017). A facial
attack “challenges subject matter jurisdiction without disputing the facts alleged in the complaint,
and it requires the court to consider the allegations of the complaint as true.” Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 346 (3d Cir. 2016) (citation modified). A factual challenge “attacks the factual
allegations underlying the complaint's assertion of jurisdiction, either through the filing of an
answer or ‘otherwise present[ing] competing facts.’” Id. (quoting Const. Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 2014)). The instant motions to dismiss facially challenge subject-
matter jurisdiction.
To survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must meet the pleading requirements

of Rule 8(a)(2) and “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted). In
evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, a court must also draw all reasonable inferences in favor
of the non-moving party. Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008).
Ultimately, a complaint “that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or . . . tenders ‘naked assertions’
devoid of further factual enhancement,” will not withstand dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s FAC should be dismissed because (1) the Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; and (2) the SAC fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.
A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Rooker-Feldman is a preclusion doctrine that “strips federal courts of jurisdiction over
controversies that are essentially appeals from state-court judgments.” Duffy v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., No. 16-4453, 2017 WL 2364196, at *4 (D.N.J. May 31, 2017) (citations omitted). “[It] is
implicated when, ‘in order to grant the federal plaintiff the relief sought, the federal court must
determine that the state court judgment was erroneously entered or must take action that would
render that judgment ineffectual.’” In re Madera, 586 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted). Thus, Rooker-Feldman applies in “[1] cases brought by state-court losers [2]
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments [3] rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and [4] inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”
Malhan v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of State, 938 F.3d 453, 458 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp.
v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). The Court will consider each factor in
turn.

The first Rooker-Feldman requirement is met. Plaintiff was the losing party in the
foreclosure action—a prior state court action. See ECF No. 16-2, Ex. A. As to the second
requirement of Rooker-Feldman, “an injury must in fact be caused by the state court judgment
itself, rather than the actions of another entity—even if that other entity is a party to the state court
proceedings.” Luft v. Clerk of the Superior Ct. of New Jersey, No. 19-11728, 2020 WL 967857,
at *3 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2020) (citations omitted). Here, the gravamen of Plaintiff’s SAC appears to
be that the New Jersey courts had no basis to issue the foreclosure judgment or to permit the
subsequent sheriff’s sale and eviction. See SAC ¶¶ 21–185. Given that the SAC seeks to redress
Plaintiff’s alleged injuries caused by the foreclosure decision, the second requirement is met. The
third requirement of Rooker-Feldman is also met as Plaintiff commenced this action on February

20, 2024, after the New Jersey Superior Court entered a final judgment against Plaintiff on August
4, 2023.
The fourth requirement of Rooker-Feldman requires that the federal action be “so
inextricably intertwined [with the state court action] that a ‘favorable decision in federal court
would require negating or reversing the state-court decision.’” Duffy, 2017 WL 2364196, at *7
(quoting Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 170 n.4 (3d Cir.
2010)). Plaintiff contends that Defendants did not have the right to take possession of the property
because she claims she owed no debt under the mortgage. See SAC ¶¶ 26–83; id. ¶ 83 (“Due to
the direct actions of the State Defendants and Bank Defendants, including but not limited to the
false implication that Complainants owed a debt to the Bank Defendants, Complainants were
injured by the Eviction Defendants.”); id. ¶ 185 (demanding that “the court order[] a conveyance
to [Plaintiff] of legal and beneficial title”). Given that the SAC seeks an order that would overturn
the foreclosure judgment, the fourth Rooker-Feldman requirement is satisfied. See id.; see also
Martinez v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 15-8926, 2016 WL 1135441, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 2016)

(“This type of action is exactly what Rooker-Feldman is meant to prevent: an attempt to invalidate
the final judgment of foreclosure.”) (citations omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims that seek
a Court “action that would render the [Final Judgment] ineffectual” are barred by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine. In re Madera, 586 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2009).
B. Failure to State a Claim
The SAC contains a section of facts that are virtually identical to those pleaded in the FAC.
Compare SAC ¶¶ 84–162 with FAC ¶¶ 7–85. In the FAC, these allegations were separate from
those that sought reversal of the foreclosure. Specifically, Plaintiff contended that these
allegations—which asserted misconduct related to the eviction process—supported claims for
“interference of reputation,” invasion of privacy, aiding and abetting a fiduciary duty, and violation

of the Fair Debt Collection Act (“FDCA”). See ECF No. 7. Although the Court found that these
asserted claims were not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, it nonetheless dismissed them
because they failed to meet the Rule 12(b)(6) pleading standard. Specifically, the Court held that
(1) Plaintiff failed to plead a violation of the FDCA because she did not allege that any defendant
qualified as a debt collector; (2) Plaintiff’s claim for “interference with reputation” is not a
recognized cause of action, and to the extent her claim could be construed as defamation, it failed
because she identified no false statement; (3) Plaintiff’s invasion-of-privacy claim was deficient
because her allegations described a standard eviction process rather than conduct constituting an
invasion of privacy under New Jersey law; and (4) Plaintiff’s aiding-and-abetting a breach of
fiduciary duty claim failed because she did not plausibly allege that any defendant owed her a
fiduciary duty.
In her SAC, the allegations that supported these claims are re-pleaded essentially
verbatim,3 except that they are now unaccompanied by causes of action, and Plaintiff now
describes them as her injuries, not as independent claims to relief. See SAC ¶¶ 83–162.

Furthermore, in Plaintiff’s prayer for relief, she does not appear to seek damages or injunctive
relief related to these allegations.
But even if Plaintiff did connect her factual allegations to causes of action, and even if it
was clear that she sought relief for them, she did not cure the deficiencies identified by the Court
in its prior opinion. Instead, she repeated the same allegations that the Court found deficient and
added allegations that the Court previously explained were barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. Therefore, to the extent the Court construes any allegations as extending beyond those
barred by Rooker-Feldman, they fail to state a claim.
C. Dismissal with Prejudice
Defendants seek dismissal with prejudice. “A District Court has discretion to dismiss a

complaint with prejudice when there are repeated failures to cure the deficiency by amendments
previously allowed,” Stovall v. Grazioli, No. 20-2041, 2023 WL 3116439, at *3 (3d Cir. Apr. 27,
2023), or “if amendment would be . . . futile.” Bankwell Bank v. Bray Entertainment, Inc., No.

3 The SAC does contain new allegations, see SAC ¶¶ 21–83, 163–85, but they pertain only to the
alleged invalidity of the foreclosure, which, as discussed above, Plaintiff is barred from raising in
federal court under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
20-49, 2021 WL 211583, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 21, 2021). “An amendment is futile if it is frivolous
or advances a claim or defense that is legally insufficient on its face.” Lombreglia v. Sunbeam
Prod., Inc., No. 20-0332, 2021 WL 118932, at *5 (D.N.J. Jan. 13, 2021). Here, as discussed,
Plaintiff’s claims seeking to regain title to the Property are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
and therefore are legally insufficient on their face because the Court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction. However, dismissals for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction must “be without
prejudice.” Poole v. USCIS Pittsburgh Field Off., No. 24-1297, 2024 WL 3439777, at *2 (3d Cir.
July 17, 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 598 (2024). Therefore, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s

claims seeking to invalidate the foreclosure without prejudice, but will deny Plaintiff leave to re-
plead these allegations.
As to Plaintiff’s allegations which are not barred by Rooker-Feldman, but fail to state a
claim, Plaintiff is granted leave to file a limited third amended complaint (“TAC”). The TAC shall
not challenge the final judgment of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Essex County, dated August
4, 2023, No. F-0004013-21 (“Final Judgment”). For avoidance of doubt, this means that the TAC
shall not challenge the validity of the foreclosure ordered by the Final Judgment. The TAC shall
be limited to the events described in the SAC at paragraphs 84 through 162, and shall clearly
identify the causes of action that the alleged misconduct is intended to support. Furthermore,
Plaintiff’s SAC and related submissions advance several obscure theories related to the creation

of trusts, equity, subrogation, the state court’s authority to order foreclosure, among others, that
are unfounded and have no basis in law. As such, Plaintiff is advised that the Court will not
construe or rely on such theories. Plaintiff shall limit her allegations to facts supporting the specific
unlawful harm she claims to have suffered, rather than abstract or unsupported legal propositions.
Accordingly, IT IS, on this 27th day of February, 2026,
ORDERED that the Court grants Defendants’ motions to dismiss (ECF Nos. 31, 32, 35,
38, 50) and dismisses Plaintiff’s SAC (ECF No. 25) without prejudice; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days from entry of this Opinion and Order
to submit an amended complaint that addresses the deficiencies identified in this Opinion. Insofar
as Plaintiff submits a further amended complaint, she shall also provide a form of the amended
complaint that indicates in what respect it differs from the current complaint, by bracketing or
striking through materials to be deleted and underlining materials to be added. See L. Civ. R.
15(a)(2); and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a sur-reply (ECF No. 47) is
GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.
SO ORDERED.
s/ Claire C. Cecchi
CLAIRE C. CECCHI, U.S.D.J.