Jacklin Romeo et al. v. Antero Resources Corporation - Class Summary Judgment Denied

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March 31, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Jacklin Romeo et al. v. Antero Resources Corporation

District Court, N.D. West Virginia

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:17-cv-00088

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (4)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (64K)

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Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

JACKLIN ROMEO et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. CIVIL NO. 1:17-CV-88
(KLEEH)
ANTERO RESOURCES CORPORATION,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING CLASS MEMBERS’
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NOS. 439, 482]

Pending is the Class Members’ Motion for Summary Judgment on
Their Breach of Contract Claims [ECF No. 439]. For the reasons
discussed herein, the motion is DENIED. For good cause, the Class
Members’ Motion to Add Four Class Leases as Exhibits to Their
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Their Breach of Contract
Claims is DENIED AS MOOT [ECF No. 471].
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 2, 2017, the plaintiffs, Jacklin Romeo, Susan S.
Rine, and Debra Snyder Miller, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated (together, “Plaintiffs”), filed a second
amended class action complaint, asserting one breach of contract
claim against the Defendant, Antero Resources Corporation
(“Antero”). See ECF No. 31. On September 19, 2018, Antero filed
an answer. See ECF No. 39. On March 23, 2020, this Court certified
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING CLASS MEMBERS’
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NOS. 439, 482]

the proposed class. See ECF No. 152. Specifically, the Court
defined the class as follows:
Persons and entities, including their
respective successors and assigns, to whom
Antero has paid royalties (“Royalties”) on
Natural Gas, including natural gas liquids,
produced by Antero from wells located in West
Virginia at any time since January 1, 2009,
pursuant to Leases which contain either of the
following gas royalty provisions: (a) [Lessee]
covenants and agrees “to pay monthly Lessors’
proportionate share of the one-eighth (1/8) of
the value at the well of the gas from each and
every gas well drilled on said premises, the
product from which is marketed and used off
the premises, said gas to be measured at a
meter set on the farm”; or (b) “Lessee
covenants and agrees to pay Lessor as royalty
for the native gas from each and every well
drilled on said premised producing native gas,
as amount equal to one-eighth (1/8) of the
gross proceeds received from the sale of the
same at the prevailing price for gas sold at
the well, for all native gas saved and
marketed from the said premises, payable
quarterly.” The Class excludes: (1) agencies,
departments, or instrumentalities of the
United States of America; (2) publicly traded
oil and gas exploration companies; (3) any
person who is or has been a working interest
owner in a well produced by Antero in West
Virginia; and (4) Antero.

Id. at 42-43. The Court further excluded “any royalty interest
owner who has never had their royalty payments reduced by Antero
for their related share of post-production expenses” and “any
person involved in related litigation, pursuing the same claim,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING CLASS MEMBERS’
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NOS. 439, 482]

against the same defendant based on the same facts and
circumstances.” Id. at 43.
On June 11, 2025, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia answered certified questions. See Romeo v. Antero Res.
Corp, 917 S.E.2d 26 (W. Va. June 11, 2025). After the parties
could not agree on a schedule to govern the case moving forward,
the Court entered a schedule on July 30, 2025. See ECF No. 436.
Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment with respect to
their breach of contract claim. The motion is fully briefed and
ripe for review.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant
“bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court
of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving
party to present “specific facts showing that there is a genuine
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING CLASS MEMBERS’
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NOS. 439, 482]

issue for trial.” Blair v. Defender Servs., Inc., 386 F.3d 623,
625 (4th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
“When the moving party has carried its burden . . . , its
opponent must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)
(citations omitted). Rather, the Court must ask “whether the
evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission
to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail
as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 251–52 (1986). At its core, the summary-judgment process
examines whether a trial is needed. See id. at 250. “Where the
record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to
find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for
trial.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs have moved for summary judgment on their breach of
contract claim. Under West Virginia law, “[a] claim for breach of
contract requires proof of the formation of a contract, a breach
of the terms of that contract, and resulting damages.” Birchfield
v. Zen’s Dev., LLC, 857 S.E.2d 422, 430 (W. Va. 2021) (citation
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING CLASS MEMBERS’
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NOS. 439, 482]

omitted). In order to establish the third element of their breach
of contract claim (that they suffered damages), Plaintiffs rely
solely on their expert Don Phend’s fifth supplemental report. See
Report, ECF No. 439-34. Phend calculated a portion of the class
members’ royalty underpayments for December 2009 through February
2021. He calculated the monthly amount of royalties that Antero
should have paid to the class members if Antero had paid them
royalties based upon the prices Antero (or its agent) received at
the point of its sales of residue gas and natural gas liquids
obtained from the class wells, and then subtracted the monetary
amount of monthly royalties which Antero did pay to each Class
member.
Antero opposes the motion, arguing first and foremost that
under Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court
should not consider Phend’s fifth supplemental report because
Antero did not receive it until it was filed contemporaneously
with Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion. The Court agrees with
Antero on this issue and need not address the remainder of
Plaintiffs’ motion or Antero’s response.
Rule 56(d) provides,
If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or
declaration that, for specified reasons, it
cannot present facts essential to justify its
opposition, the court may:
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING CLASS MEMBERS’
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NOS. 439, 482]

(1) defer considering the motion or deny it;

(2) allow time to obtain affidavits or
declarations or to take discovery; or

(3) issue any other appropriate order.

Antero attaches a declaration from Kris Terry stating the
following:
I have not been given an opportunity to
respond to and address Mr. Phend’s Fifth
Supplemental Report, and it was only provided
contemporaneously with Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment. Nor has Antero had
the opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Phend on
his Fifth Supplemental Report such that I
could consider Mr. Phend’s testimony regarding
his underlying methodology and other steps
taken to “adjust” his previous calculations.

Terry Decl., ECF No. 444-2, at ¶ 9. Given Antero’s representations
about the lack of opportunity to cross-examine Phend about the
Fifth Supplemental Report or investigate the report prior to the
motion’s filing, the Court finds that granting summary judgment
would be inappropriate under Rule 56(d). The Court, at this stage,
cannot find that there is no genuine issue of material fact with
respect to the existence of damages. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’
summary judgment motion with respect to their breach of contract
claim is DENIED.
ROMEO V. ANTERO 1:17-CV-88
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING CLASS MEMBERS’
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NOS. 439, 482]
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Class Members’ Motion
for Summary Judgment on Their Breach of Contract Claims [ECF No,
439] is DENIED. Because the summary judgment motion on liability
is denied, the Class Members’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Regarding the Principal Amount of Their Damages [ECF No. 482] is
also DENIED.
It is so ORDERED.
The Clerk is directed to transmit copies of this Memorandum
Opinion and Order to counsel of record.
DATED: March 31, 2026
Ton 8 Kl
THOMAS S. KLEEH, CHIEF JUDGE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA