April Manuel v. BHG Holdings LLC - Motion to Dismiss Granted

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April 1, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

April Manuel v. B H G Holdings L L C ET AL

District Court, W.D. Louisiana

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2:23-cv-01644

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (15)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

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Trial Court Document

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAKE CHARLES DIVISION

APRIL MANUEL CASE NO. 2:23-CV-01644

VERSUS JUDGE JAMES D. CAIN, JR.

B H G HOLDINGS L L C ET AL MAGISTRATE JUDGE LEBLANC

MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court is a “Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ P. 12(b)(6)” (Doc.
25) wherein Defendants, BHG Holdings, LLC d/b/a/ Behavioral Health Group, BHG LXII,
LLC d/b/a BHG Medical Services-Louisiana, VCPHCS VI, LLC d/b/a BHG Lake Charles
Treatment Center move to dismiss certain counts of the qui tam Complaint against them
for failure to state claims upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (9)(b).
Relator, April Manuel, brings this action on behalf of (1) the United States, by and
through its agency, the Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) and the
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”),; (2) the Department of Defense
("DOD"), Defense Health Agency ("DHA"), and the Department of Veterans Affairs
("VA"); (3) the Louisiana Department of Health, which is responsible for operating the
Louisiana Medicaid Program; and (4) herself.
Relator has failed to oppose Defendants’ motion and the deadline for doing so has
passed.1 As such, the Court accepts Defendants’ Motion and Memorandum in support

thereof as unopposed.
BACKGROUND
Relator was employed as a Counselor by Defendant, BHG Lake Charles Treatment
Center (“BHG Lake Charles”) from May 12, 2022, until her termination on October 23,
2023.2 Defendant BHG Louisiana is a limited liability company that facilitates and
provides Opioid Treatment Programs (“OTPs”) to patients throughout southwest

Louisiana, including at the Lake Charles facility, where Relator worked. Defendant BHG
Holdings is a holding company that owns and operates OTPs in at least 115 subsidiaries,
five of which are located in Louisiana.3
Relator alleges the following fraudulent act/schemes:
(1) As of July 1, 2023, after the departure of Clinical Supervisor Naomi Bellard,

there was no Clinical Supervisor (“CS”) who was on duty and on call. By not
having a CS, Defendant failed to meet the prerequisite requirement to receive
state or federal funding. Because there was no CS present, there was no one to
provide supervision to any unlicensed behavioral health professional (“UPs”).
Therefore, Defendants failed to comply with the express condition for SAMHSA

1 Doc. 26, Notice of Motion Setting.
2 Complaint, Doc. 1, ¶ ¶ 33, 34.
3 Id. ¶ 41.
certification and were not eligible for Medicaid reimbursement from July 1,
2023, through October 23, 2023.4

(2) The OTPs were required to have a sufficient number of licensed mental health
professionals (“LMHPs”) to meet the needs of its patients. The UPs, including
Relator, had caseloads that exceeded 75 patients. By having such a high
caseload, Defendants pressured its employees to take on a much higher caseload
than allowed by Federal, State, and local laws and regulations. Relator alleges,
“upon information and belief,” that Defendants increased the UPs’ caseloads to

maximize profit, regardless of whether adequate counseling services were ever
provided. She further alleges that Defendants knowingly presented, or caused to
be presented, a false or fraudulent claim and used or caused to be used a false
record of statement material to a false or fraudulent claim.5
(3) UPs must be supervised by LMPHs. According to the Louisiana Counseling

Association, a Provisionally Licensed Professional Counselor must be
supervised by an LMHP or a physician.6 Relator alleges that Defendants
submitted bills to commercial insurers and Government Health Programs for
“false and fraudulent” group therapy sessions.7 She also alleges that Dr. John
DiGiglia, the Medical Director, and Deidra Richard, the Program Director,

orchestrated a scheme that pressured and coerced employees to perform

4 Id. ¶ ¶ 280-281.
5 Id. ¶ ¶ 283-303.
6 Id. ¶ 311, 316.
7 Id. ¶ 327.
counseling services on patients that were falsely or fraudulently billed that did
not occur for the length of time billed and were not conducted by an LMHP.8

(4) Relator alleges she was “forced to participate” in conduct which included falsely
documenting that Defendants’ counselors and therapists were performing a
certain type of counseling therapy or face disciplinary consequences.9 She
alleges that BHG Lake Charles facility counselors and therapists created general
templates to combine Reassessments and Brief Addiction Monitor (“BAM”)
responses of different patients.10 Relator alleges that the Reassessments and

BAMs were done to “comply” with federal law. Relators allege that the
Defendants engaged in this conduct to save time so that they could see more
Government Healthcare Program patients without taking the necessary time to
provide counseling services.11
(5) To conceal the fraudulent nature of the Reassessments and BAMs, Relator

alleges that the facility shredded the physical copies of these documents. Relator
alleges that (1) the purpose of the facility-wide emails with pre-populated
templated Reassessments and BAMs was to avoid providing actual therapy to
patients and to increase Defendants’ revenue; (2) this policy was directed by
Defendants at the corporate level, and (3) Defendants submitted Governmental

8 Id. ¶ 328.
9 Id. ¶ ¶ 331-336.
10 Id. ¶ ¶ 363-365.
11 Id. ¶ ¶ 372-373.
Healthcare Programs for false and fraudulent individual counseling therapy
sessions.12

(6) Relator alleges that Defendants did not meet the requirements for time billed for
the 30-minute therapy session. Specifically, Relator alleges that Defendants
consistently billed for more patients than can possibly be seen at the Lake
Charles facility during counseling hours.13 Relator alleges that Defendants
submitted bills to Government Healthcare Programs for false and fraudulent
individual counseling therapy sessions.14

(7) Relator alleges that Defendants did not provide adequate therapy services to its
OBOT patients. Relators alleges that patient records reflect that Defendants did
not complete Admission Assessments or Comprehensive Assessments on 60 out
of 109 patients. Relator alleges that Relator and other employees were requested
to backdate the documents and that Defendants submitted claims to

Governmental Healthcare Programs for these false and fraudulent service notes
and treatment.15
(8) Relator alleges that Defendants knowingly made false statements, implied
certifications, and express certifications that were material to the Governmental
Healthcare Programs’ decisions to pay claims for individual therapy and

counseling services at the Lake Charles Facility.16 The falsification of

12 Id. ¶ ¶ 375-378.
13 Id. ¶ ¶ 379-392.
14 Id. ¶ 399.
15 Id. ¶ ¶ 400-415.
16 Id. ¶ 429.
Assessments, BAMS and Treatment Plans was knowingly performed at the
direction of Defendants at the corporate level.17 Additionally, Defendants

engaged in and continue to engage in a pattern and practice of falsifying OBOT
and individual counseling service records for Governmental Healthcare Program
beneficiaries at the Lake Charles facilities,18 and submitted false and fraudulent
claims for individual therapy and counseling services to Governmental
Healthcare Programs for patients.19
(9) Relator alleges that Defendants’ submission of individual or group therapy

claims to a Governmental Healthcare Program, they made express and/or
implied false certifications of compliance with: (a) Federal law, regulations, and
treatment standards; (b) Louisiana law; (c) SAMHSA certification requirements;
(d) SAMHSA accreditation requirements; (e) Provider agreements; and (f)
LaSOR20 grant subrecipients.

Relator alleges the following Counts, that are relevant to this Motion:
(1) Count I – Federal False Claims Act (FCA): Presenting or Causing the
Presentation of False Claims 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (a)(1)(A)
(2) Count II – Federal False Claims Act (FCA): Use of False Record or Statement
Material to a False Claim 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (a)(1)(B)

17 Id. ¶ 430.
18 Id. ¶ 431.
19 Id. ¶ 432.
20 Louisiana State Opioid Response.
(3) Count III – Violations of the False Claims Act: Conversion 31 U.S.C. §
3729 (a)(1)(D)

(4) Count IV – Violations of the False Claims Act: Submission of Express and
Implied False Certifications 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (a)(1)(B)
(5) Count V - Violations of the False Claims Act: Fraudulent Inducement 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729 (a)(1)(B)
(6) Count VI – Violations of the False Claims Act: Reverse False Claims 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729 (a)(1)(G)

(7) Count VII – Violations of the False Claims Act: “Conspiracy” 31 U.S.C. §
3729 (a)(1)(c)
(8) Count VIII – Health Care Fraud – 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (9) Count IX – Violations of Louisiana Medical Assistance Programs Integrity
LAW (“LMAPIL”) Louisiana Revised Statute § § 46:437.1

(10) Count X – Violations of the Federal Whistleblower Statute 42 U.S.C. § 6971 et seq.
(11) Count XII – Vicarious Liability Respondeat Superior, Louisiana Civil
Article § 2320
In her prayer for relief, as to Counts I, II, III, IV, V, VI and VII, Relator requests

that Relator and the United States be awarded a judgment against each Defendant, jointly
and severally for damages, and triple damages pursuant to Federal False Claims Act, §
3729(A) to include civil penalties for each false claim submitted with reasonable attorneys’
fees pursuant 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (a)(3)(B), expenses and costs with prejudgment and post
judgment interest. Additionally, Relator requests that Defendants be fined under the title
or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both. Relator also requests that the Court grant

permanent injunctive relief as to the alleged false claims.
As to Counts IX and XII, Relator requests that Relator and Louisiana be awarded a
judgment against each Defendant, joint and severally for actual damages, plus treble
damages pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statute § 46:438.1 et seq. plus the maximum
percentage of any recovery allowed pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statute § 46:439.4.
Generally, Relator requests that Defendants be sanctioned to include a refund of

payments made to a physician or LMHP who failed to make the required disclosures, as
well as suspension, revocation, refusal to issue, or imposition of probationary or other
restrictions on any license or permit held or applied for by the physician or LMHP who is
found to have committed a violation. La. Admin. Code 46, pt. XLV, § 4217.
As to Count X, Relator requests that she be awarded a judgment to include the

amount of all costs and expenses of this litigation including reasonable attorney fees, and
expert witness fees.
As to Count XI, Relator requests compensatory damages, past and future lost wages,
pain and suffering, mental anguish, benefits, loss of earning capacity, reinstatement
reasonable attorney fees and court costs.
RULE 12(b)(6) STANDARD
Rule 12(b)(6) allows for dismissal when a plaintiff “fail[s] to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted.” When reviewing such a motion, the court should focus on the
complaint and its attachments. Wilson v. Birnberg, 667 F.3d 591, 595 (5th Cir. 2012). The
court can also consider documents referenced in and central to a party’s claims, as well as
matters of which it may take judicial notice. Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224
F.3d 496, 498–99 (5th Cir. 2000); Hall v. Hodgkins, 305 Fed. App’x 224, 227 (5th Cir.
2008) (unpublished).

Such motions are reviewed with the court “accepting all well-pleaded facts as true
and viewing those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Bustos v. Martini Club,
Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 461 (5th Cir. 2010). However, “the plaintiff must plead enough facts
‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Accordingly, the court’s task is not to evaluate the plaintiff’s likelihood of success
but instead to determine whether the claim is both legally cognizable and plausible. Lone
Star Fund v. (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010).
LAW AND ANALYSIS

Defendants contend that Relator’s Complaint (1) fails to plead facts sufficient to
state a plausible claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6) for all the FCA and MAPIL claims,
and (2) fails to satisfy the heightened particularity requirements applicable to fraud-based
claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. 9(b). Defendants argue that Relator alleges
only conclusory assertions of wrongdoing, and allegations made “upon information and
belief,” without identifying specific claims, dates, amounts, billing codes, or participants
necessary to connect Defendants to actionable misconduct. Additionally, Defendants

maintain that Relator has alleged several causes of action that are wholly inapplicable to
the law or facts of the case. As such, Defendant move to dismiss Counts I through X and
Count XII.
Count I – Federal False Claims Act (FCA): Presenting or Causing the Presentation of
False Claims 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (a)(1)(A)

The FCA establishes liability against “any person who—(A)knowingly presents, or
causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval:” or “knowingly
makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or
fraudulent claim;. . . .”
There are three requisite elements to plead a violation of § 3729(a)(1)(A): (a) the
presentment of a claim, (b) the claim is false or fraudulent, and (c) knowledge that the
claim presented was false or fraudulent. The “presentment” provision “includes an express
presentment requirement” and a requirement “that the claim was false or fraudulent and
that the action was undertaken knowingly.” See U.S. ex. rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, [565

F.3d 180, 188](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/65353/united-states-ex-rel-grubbs-v-kanneganti/#188) (5th Cir. 2009). The “knowingly” element requires a finding that the
defendant purposely acted with the intent to get a false claim paid. Id. at 192.
Defendants maintain that Relator’s allegations in the Complaint do not plead any of
the aforementioned elements with the required specificity. In Grubbs, the Fifth Circuit held
that “to plead with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud for a False Claims Act

§ 3729(a)(1) claim, a relator’s complaint, if it cannot allege the details of an actually
submitted false claim, may nevertheless survive by alleging particular details of a scheme
to submit false claims paired with reliable indicia that leads to a strong inference that claims

were actually submitted.” Id. at 190. In Grubbs, the court appeared to accept a complaint
that included both particular details of a scheme to present fraudulent bills to the
Government and allegations making it likely bills were actually submitted, which puts
Defendants on notice of the allegations made against them. In other words, to satisfy Rule
9(b), the complaint should set out the particular working of a scheme that was
communicated directly to the relator (a first-hand experience) by those perpetrating the

fraud. See Grubbs at 191-192.
The particularity requirement of Rule 9(b) applies to FCA allegations. See
Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 579 U.S. 176, 195, n.6 (2016). “The FCA
penalizes persons who present, or cause to be presented, to the federal government ‘a false
or fraudulent claim for payment or approval.’ Thus, Rule 9(b) requires both that the

circumstances of the alleged fraud and the claims themselves be alleged with particularity.”
Lawton ex rel. United States v. Takeda Pharm. Co., Ltd., 842 F.3d 125, 130 (1st Cir. 2016)
(citing 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (a)(1)). Defendants argue that Relator’s Complaint contains only
conclusory and general factual allegations regarding allegedly false schemes and lack
specificity.

Defendants contend that there is not one specific allegation of a knowingly false
claim that was presented to a Government payor for payment. As previously noted, no
opposition have been filed. As such, this claim will be dismissed.
Count II – Federal False Claims Act (FCA): Use of False Record or Statement Material to
a False Claim 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (a)(1)(B)

In pertinent part, the FCA establishes liability for "any person who . . . knowingly
makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or
fraudulent claim . . . ." See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (a)(1)(B). Relator seeks relief against
Defendants under 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (a)(1)(B) of the False Claims Act for violations after
May 15, 2022.21 Relator alleges that Defendants made, used, or caused to be made or used,
false records and statements, and omitted material facts, to get false claims paid or

approved, within the meaning of 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (a)(1)(B).22
Defendants maintain that Relator’s Complaint fails to allege sufficient facts that
these records were false. Considering that Relator does not oppose the Motion, Count II
will be dismissed.
Count III – Violations of the False Claims Act: Conversion 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (a)(1)(D) and
Count VI – Violations of the False Claims Act: Reverse False Claims 31 U.S.C. §
3729 (a)(1)(G)

Defendant argues that Relator is attempting to bring an FCA claim under a
conversion theory of liability that is improper. A plaintiff may bring an FCA claim “under
a ‘conversion’ theory of liability against ‘any person who has possession, custody, or
control of property or money used, or to be used, by the Government and knowingly
delivers, or causes to be delivered, less than all of that money or property.’” United States

21 Id. ¶ 508.
22 Id. ¶ 509.
Ex rel. Harbit v. Consultants in Gastroenterology, P.A., 2021 WL 1197124, at *7 (D.S.C.
Mar. 30, 2021) (citing U.S. ex rel. Kasowitz Benson Torres, 285 F. Supp. 3d 44, 47 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (a)(1)(D)). “For a defendant to ‘know’ that he is delivering or causing to
be delivered ‘less than all’ of a certain property ‘used, or to be used, by the Government,’
he must necessarily also know that the property belongs to the [G]overnment.” Id. (citing
Kasowitz, 285 F. Supp. 3d at 55 (quoting U.S. ex rel. Harper v. Muskingum Watershed
Conservancy Dist., 842 F.3d 430, 439 (6th Cir. 2016)).
Defendants argue that Relator has failed to allege what property was converted, or

what funds that are in Defendants’ possession, when they allegedly obtained such property,
how much was purportedly withheld or facts to show that Defendants acted with
knowledge that the property belonged to the Government. Defendants also contend that
this claim is duplicative of Relator’s Reverse False Claims Act claim alleged in Count VI.
In Count VI, Relator has asserted a reverse false claims theory under § 3729(a0(1)(G),

alleging Defendants concealed or avoided an “obligation” to pay money to the
Government, including by retaining overpayments.
The Court agrees with Defendants here that either these claims are duplicative,
and/or Relator has failed to allege sufficient facts to support either claim. The Court will
dismiss Counts III and VI.

Count IV – Violations of the False Claims Act: Submission of Express

“[F]alse certifications of compliance create liability under the FCA when
certification is a prerequisite to obtaining a government benefit. Thus, where the
government has conditioned payment of a claim upon a claimant’s certification of
compliance with, for example, a statute or regulation, a claimant submits a false or

fraudulent claim when he or she falsely certifies compliance with that statute or
regulation.” U.S. ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899, 902 (5th Cir. 1997). Stated plainly, Rule 9(b) requires “that a claim of false certification be pled
with particularity, identifying facts such as what the certification of compliance stated, who
submitted the certification, when and where it was submitted to the government, and how
the actual certification was false.” Thompson v. LifePoint Hosps., Inc., 2013 WL 5970640,

at *4 (W.D. La. Nov. 8, 2013). Where the “Relator has failed to identify a single claim that
was actually submitted pursuant to the allegedly fraudulent schemes identified in the
Complaint,” dismissal is proper. Id. at *3. “[T]he Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held that a
relator cannot maintain a FCA case unless: (1) the provider was required to file a
certification in connection with the claim; (2) the filed certification was false; and (3)

relator identified specific claims and/or certifications that were fraudulent.” Thompson, 2013 WL 5970640, at *3 (emphasis added).
Defendants argue that Relator has failed to allege a specific claim for payment that
was made with a specific certification that is alleged to be false such that there is no actual
allegation in the Complaint as to which certification was made, when it was made, who

made a certification, and what that certification entailed.
The Court agrees that the Complaint is lacking as to any specific claim for payment
that was made with a specific certification alleged to be false. The Court will dismiss
Counts IV.
Count V - Violations of the False Claims Act: Fraudulent Inducement 31 U.S.C. §
3729 (a)(1)(B)

In Count V, Relator asserts a fraudulent-inducement theory under the FCA. Section
3729(a)(1)(B) imposes liability on any person who “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to
be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim.” 31
U.S.C. § 3729 (a)(1)(B). Relator pleads fraudulent inducement by alleging Defendants’
purported misrepresentations and omissions induced the Government (and/or Louisiana)
to certify, accredit, and contract with, or authorize Defendants to participate in Government

Healthcare Programs and receive payment.
Fraudulent inducement claims under the False Claims Act require four essential
elements in healthcare contexts: (1) falsity—i.e., misrepresentations or omissions during
contract formation or program enrollment; (2) knowledge—i.e., actual knowledge,
deliberate ignorance, or reckless disregard of the falsity, see 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (b)(1); (3)

materiality—i.e., misrepresentations must have a natural tendency to influence the
government’s payment decision under the demanding standard established in Universal
Health Services v. Escobar, 579 U.S. 176, 194-96 (2016); and (4) causation—i.e., the false
statements must have actually induced the government’s decision to enter the contract or
make payments, not merely had the potential to induce. United States ex rel. Longhi v.

Lithium Power Technologies, Inc., 575 F.3d 458, 467 (5th
Cir. 2009).
Defendant comment that these claims apply when healthcare providers obtain
contracts or program participation through fraud. Under a fraudulent-inducement theory,
plaintiffs must show not only that defendants’ misrepresentations had the potential to
induce government action, but that they actually did induce (or cause) the government to

act. United States ex rel. Blaum v. Triad Isotopes, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 3d 901, 916 (N.D. Ill.
2015).
Defendants argue that Relator has failed to allege any facts to establish any false or
fraudulent statement made to any of the government payors during the provide enrollment
or contract formation that induced the government’s decision to enter into the contract and
make payments. The Court agrees and finds that Count V will be dismissed.

Count VII – Violations of the False Claims Act: “Conspiracy” 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (a)(1)(c)
Relator alleges that Defendants conspired to defraud the United States by getting
false or fraudulent claims allowed or paid, in violation of 31 U.S.C. §3729 (a)(3), and
conspired to commit violations of 31 U.S.C. §§3729 (a)(1)(A) and 3729(a)(1)(B), in
violation of 31 U.S.C. §3729 (a)(1)(C).

Defendants maintain that Relator does not plead any agreement among identified
actors, the time and scope of the agreement, or specific overt acts taken to accomplish the
submission of false claims. Instead, she alleges an “atmosphere” where profit outweighed
compliance. Defendants argue that Relator’s allegations do not amount to an agreement, or
satisfy Rule 9(b) or the plausibility standard. The Court finds that Relator has not pled a

viable underlying FCA violation with particularity and has not pled the elements of an
agreement. The Court finds that Relator has failed to allege sufficient facts to establish a
conspiracy and therefore, Count VII will be dismissed.
Count VIII – Health Care Fraud – 18 U.S.C. § 1347 Relator alleges that each claim made by Defendants through means of false or
fraudulent pretenses in connection with the delivery of or payment for health care benefits,

items, or services for behavioral healthcare services represents a false claim for payment
because each claim carried with it services that were not rendered.
Defendants note that Section 1347 authorizes federal authorities to bring criminal
charges against individuals for health care fraud. However, it does not create any civil right
of action under the False Claims Act or any other civil law. See e.g., Garcia v. Jones, 2022
WL 2754853, at *7 (D. Or. July 14, 2022) (“To the extent that Plaintiff’s allegations of

fraud, stalking, money laundering, and tampering with evidence assert violations of federal
criminal statutes, such statutes do not generally create a private right of action or provide
a basis for civil liability.”) (citing Abcarian v. Levine, 972 F.3d 1019, 1026 (9th Cir. 2020)).
The Court agrees and will dismiss Count VIII.
Count IX – Violations of Louisiana Medical Assistance Programs Integrity LAW
(“LMAPIL”) Louisiana Revised Statute § § 46:437.1

Here, Relator, acting on behalf of herself and the state of Louisiana seeks to recover
treble damages and civil penalties under the Louisiana Medical Assistance Programs
Integrity Law, Louisiana Revised Statute § 46:437.1 et seq. Defendant remarks that the
Relator relies on generalized descriptions of Medicaid requirements, supervision and

staffing allegations, and “upon information and belief” conclusions that Defendants
submitted improper claims. Defendants argue that Relator does not plead particular
Medicaid claims, dates of service, billing codes, amounts or claim submissions to infer a
plausible MAPIL violation with specificity. The Court agrees and will dismiss Count IX.
Count X – Violations of the Federal Whistleblower Statute 42 U.S.C. § 6971 et seq.
Relator asserts a claim against Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 6971, Employee

Protection. Defendants point out that this statute involves Solid Waste Disposal and applies
only to matters outlined in Chapter 82 involving same. Thus, it is inapplicable. Considering
that Relator has failed to oppose Defendants’ Motin, the Court will dismiss Relator’s claim
In Count X.
Count XII – Vicarious Liability Respondeat Superior, Louisiana Civil Article § 2320
Relator asserts a claim of respondeat superior against her employer under Louisiana

Civil Code article 2320, which provides that: “Masters and employers are answerable for
the damage occasioned by their servants and overseers, in the exercise of the functions in
which they are employed.”
Defendants argues that Louisiana law regarding vicarious liability for tortious acts
and omissions does not apply in a False Claims Act case, which has its own liability and

scienter requirements. Furthermore, Defendants also argue that MAPIL sets forth the
liability and scienter requirements for claims brought under it. Defendants contend that
even assuming that La. C.C. art. 2320 could apply to the case, Relator has failed to name
any individual defendant in this case for whom Article 2320 would apply and has failed to
cite any authority setting forth “vicarious liability” as a separate cause of action. The Court

agrees and will dismiss Relator’s claim regarding vicarious liability.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained herein, the Court will grant “Motion to Dismiss Pursuant
to Fed.R.Civ P. 12(b)(6) (Doc. 25) in its entirety and dismiss with prejudice, Relator’s
claims in Count I-X and XII.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED in chambers on this Ist da ril, 2026.

JAMES D. CAIN, JR. .
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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