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March 16, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Mia Toles, V. George Toles

Court of Appeals of Washington

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 87615-5

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (3)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (4.1K)

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Lead Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

MIA TOLES, No. 87615-5-I

Respondent, DIVISION ONE

v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION

GEORGE TOLES,

Appellant.

FELDMAN, J. — George Toles, proceeding pro se, appeals a domestic

violence protection order (DVPO) protecting his stepdaughter, Mia Toles, for a two-

year period and a related order to surrender and prohibit weapons. Because the

trial court failed to correctly apply the controlling statutory provisions to the conduct

at issue, we reverse both orders.

I

On May 23, 2024, following many months of ongoing conflict and related

legal proceedings, Mia, an unemancipated minor child at the time, filed a petition

for a DVPO alleging that George had committed various acts that constituted

“domestic violence” as defined in RCW 7.105.010(10)(b). 1 In her petition, Mia

claimed George had assaulted her; taken away her cell phone; “attempted to

thwart” her academic success by requiring that she unenroll in the Running Start

1 Because the parties have the same last name, we use their first names for clarity.
No. 87615-5-I

educational program; placed tracking devices on her vehicles; asked one of friends

to bring her to an agreed location so George and his wife, Phuong Toles (Mia’s

biological mother), could bring her home; “yelled at” 2 and “berated” her; and filed

in court evidence that she had shared intimate photos with a romantic partner. 3

George characterizes these behaviors as “helping his wife recover their runaway

child from an unlawful, dangerous situation,” while Mia describes them as “an

escalation of physical and mental abuse at the hands of her step-father.”

Although the trial court’s DVPO includes a preprinted finding that “[t]he

restrained person has subjected the protected person to domestic violence,” it

does not include any specific findings regarding the alleged misconduct. Instead,

the court incorporated by reference its “oral ruling.” In that ruling, the court found

insufficient evidence that George had assaulted Mia but concluded she had

established “stalking-type behavior . . . and/or harassing-type of behavior” and

“coercive control.” It then found, “Mia has met her burden to prove domestic

violence by a preponderance of the evidence.” The court described the matter as

“a very close case” and “not a straightforward resolution.” It nevertheless granted

Mia’s petition, entered a two-year DVPO protecting her from George (expiring on

September 24, 2026), and entered a related order to surrender and prohibit

weapons. George then filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied.

This timely appeal followed.

2
Elsewhere in the record, Mia explains that George yelled at her “about how ungrateful I was,” “for
forgetting to wash the dishes,” “about my attitude,” and that “I'm to blame for the fact that he does
not have a relationship with his sons.” No further information is provided.
3 Although George admittedly failed to file the photos under seal in accordance with GR 15, the trial

court immediately rectified this serious oversight.

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No. 87615-5-I

II

George argues “[t]he errors here span multiple categories: jurisdictional

defects, statutory misapplications, discretionary abuses, and constitutional

violations.” Because we agree the trial court did not correctly apply the DVPO

statute to the conduct at issue, we reverse on that basis. We therefore need not

reach George’s remaining arguments.

We review the trial court’s decision to grant a DVPO for abuse of discretion.

Maldonado v. Maldonado, 197 Wn. App. 779, 789, 391 P.3d 546 (2017). “An

abuse of discretion is found when a trial judge’s decision is exercised on untenable

grounds or for untenable reasons, or if its decision was reached by applying the

wrong legal standard.” Id. A trial court also abuses its discretion “if it applies the

law incorrectly.” In re Custody of SA-M, 17 Wn. App. 2d 939, 951, 489 P.3d 259

(2021). “We review challenges to a trial court’s factual findings for substantial

evidence,” which “exists if the record contains evidence of a sufficient quantity to

persuade a fair-minded, rational person of the truth of the declared premise.” In

re Marriage of Fahey, 164 Wn. App. 42, 55, 262 P.3d 128 (2011).

RCW 7.105.010(10)(b) defines “domestic violence” for purposes of a DVPO

involving family or household members as

[p]hysical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of
physical harm, bodily injury, or assault; nonconsensual sexual
conduct or nonconsensual sexual penetration; coercive control;
unlawful harassment; or stalking of one family or household member
by another family or household member.

(Emphasis added.) Relevant to Mia’s arguments in the trial court below, the

definition includes assault, coercive control, unlawful harassment, and stalking.

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No. 87615-5-I

As noted previously, the trial court found insufficient evidence that George

had assaulted Mia. Mia has not cross-appealed that finding, so it is a verity on

appeal. In re Dependency of A.N.C., 24 Wn. App. 2d 408, 416, 520 P.3d 500

(2022). Nor did the court find “unlawful harassment” or “stalking.” Instead, the

court found that Mia had established “stalking-type behavior . . . and/or harassing-

type of behavior.” These “findings” are wholly inadequate, as the DVPO statute

requires “unlawful harassment” or “stalking” and expressly defines the meaning of

those terms in RCW 7.105.010(37) and (35), respectively. Here, the most this

court can conclude is that the trial court found that George’s actions resembled

stalking or harassment but not necessarily either. In so ruling, the trial court failed

to make an express finding of “unlawful harassment” or “stalking” as defined by the

statute. 4

While the trial court expressly found “coercive control,” it again failed to

correctly apply the controlling statutory provision. The DVPO statute defines

“coercive control” as “a pattern of behavior that is used to cause another to suffer

physical, emotional, or psychological harm, and in purpose or effect unreasonably

interferes with a person’s free will and personal liberty.” RCW 7.105.010(4)(a).

Also relevant here, the statute provides a non-exclusive list of examples of

coercive control that includes (1) “intimidation” by “[d]amaging, destroying . . . or

forcing the other party to relinquish, goods, property, or items of special value,”

4 The trial court’s oral ruling is also confusing in another respect. After reciting the definition of

domestic violence, including the reference to assault, the trial court stated, “Other things that don’t
apply: coercive control, unlawful harassment, or stalking of one family or household member by
another family or household member.” (Emphasis added.) Given the trial court’s subsequent
analysis of these issues, as discussed in the text above, we assume the italicized text “don’t” was
transcribed in error though the parties in their briefing have not so stated.

-4-
No. 87615-5-I

(2) “[d]epriving the other party of basic necessities,” (3) “monitoring the other

party’s movements,” and (4) “[e]ngaging in psychological aggression.” RCW

7.105.010(4)(a)(i)(A), (iii), (iv), (vi).

But the statutory definition also recognizes the salutary interests of parental

caregivers such as those at issue here. It does that in two ways. First, subsection

(a) provides that “[i]n determining whether the interference is unreasonable, the

court shall consider the context and impact of the pattern of behavior from the

perspective of a similarly situated person.” RCW 7.105.010(4)(a). Second,

subsection (b) states that coercive control “does not include protective actions

taken by a party in good faith for the legitimate and lawful purpose of protecting . . .

children from the risk of harm posed by the other party.” RCW 7.105.010(4)(b).

Thus, context matters; while the actions described in subsection (a) may warrant

judicial intervention in some circumstances, they may be both appropriate and

permissible when their intended purpose and effect is to locate, protect, and

retrieve a runaway minor.

Here, the trial court identified only two actions that purportedly constituted

“coercive control”: the first was “coordinating with someone Mia thought was her

friend to deliver her” to her parents, and the second was an “unreasonable level of

monitoring a nearly grown woman,” which the trial court stated “is concerning.” As

to both instances, George testified without contradiction that these behaviors were

intended to protect and retrieve Mia (who was an unemancipated minor at the time)

from what George and his wife believed was a destructive lifestyle that included

“running away,” driving cars without insurance, and various other “illegal, high-risk

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No. 87615-5-I

activities.” Contrary to the plain language of RCW 7.105.010(4)(a) and (b), as

discussed above, the trial court failed to sufficiently consider the protective purpose

and effect of George’s actions. Nor did it identify any behavior that is not plausibly

related to purported protection of an unemancipated minor.

Based on our careful review of the trial court record alongside both parties’

arguments, we conclude the trial court failed to correctly apply the controlling

statutory provisions (as detailed above) to the conduct at issue and thereby abused

its discretion in entering the DVPO and related order to surrender and prohibit

weapons. To be sure, we agree with the trial court—and the record confirms—

that this is a “very close case” and “not a straightforward resolution.” But as the

trial court also noted, Mia is now emancipated and no one has alleged any behavior

that falls under the DVPO statute after the decree of emancipation. If and to the

extent any such behavior commences, nothing herein precludes Mia from seeking

an appropriate protection order (supported by sufficient findings of fact and

conclusions of law) based on conduct that satisfies the controlling statutory

requirements.

III

We reverse the DVPO and related order to surrender and prohibit weapons.

WE CONCUR:

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