People v. Fairchild - Long-Term Mental Health Certification Affirmed

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April 16, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Peo in Interest of Fairchild

Colorado Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 26CA0234

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (4)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

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Combined Opinion

26CA0234 Peo in Interest of Fairchild 04-16-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 26CA0234
City and County of Broomfield District Court No. 25MH11
Honorable Jeffrey Smith, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Petitioner-Appellee,

In the Interest of Kenneth Fairchild,

Respondent-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ
Pawar and Johnson, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 16, 2026

Nancy D. Rodgers, City and County Attorney, Courtney Thiemann, Senior
Assistant City and County Attorney, Broomfield, Colorado, for Petitioner-
Appellee

Tezak Law, P.C., Mary Tezak, Florence, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant
¶1 Respondent, Kenneth Fairchild, appeals the district court’s

order extending his certification for long-term mental health

treatment at the Colorado Mental Health Hospital at Fort Logan

(Fort Logan). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In August 2023, Fairchild was admitted to the Colorado

Mental Health Hospital in Pueblo (the hospital) for restoration

treatment after being found incompetent to proceed in a criminal

case. About a year and a half later, the criminal court ordered that

Fairchild be evaluated for a civil commitment, and the hospital

petitioned for short-term mental health treatment. Providers at the

hospital reported that Fairchild had displayed a “persistent and

complex persecutory delusional system,” including beliefs that he

was being remotely monitored, was being stalked, and had devices

implanted in his body.

¶3 In April 2025, hospital providers requested that Fairchild’s

short-term certification be extended. A few months later, the

criminal court dismissed Fairchild’s criminal charges, finding that

he could not be restored to competency. Hospital providers then

petitioned for long-term mental health treatment, alleging that

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Fairchild was a danger to others and gravely disabled. Fairchild

stipulated to the long-term certification, which the court entered in

July 2025.

¶4 In October 2025, Fairchild was transferred from the hospital

to Fort Logan. Fairchild’s treating physician at Fort Logan then

requested an extension of the long-term certification. The district

court held a hearing in January 2026, at which Dr. Jaclyn Bala

(one of Fairchild’s treating physicians) and Fairchild testified. After

hearing the evidence, the court found that Fairchild was a danger to

others and gravely disabled, and it granted the request for an

extension of the long-term certification. This appeal followed.

II. Long-Term Certification

¶5 Fairchild asserts that the district court erred by extending the

long-term certification because he was not a danger to others or

gravely disabled. We are not persuaded.

¶6 When a patient challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we

must affirm if the evidence, viewed as a whole and in the light most

favorable to the People, is sufficient to support the order. People in

Interest of R.K.L., 2016 COA 84, ¶ 13. As the fact finder, the district

court determines the sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the

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evidence, along with the inferences and conclusions to be drawn

from it. People in Interest of R.C., 2019 COA 99M, ¶ 7. We must

defer to the district court’s factual findings if they have record

support, but we review its legal conclusions de novo. R.K.L., ¶ 13.

¶7 To authorize long-term certification for mental health

treatment, the district court must find, among other things, that

the patient has a mental health disorder and, as a result of that

disorder, is (1) a danger to others; (2) a danger to themself; or

(3) gravely disabled. § 27-65-110(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025. As relevant

here, a person is a danger to others when the person “poses a

substantial risk of physical harm to another person or persons, as

manifested by evidence of recent homicidal or other violent behavior

by the person in question.” § 27-65-102(10)(b), C.R.S. 2025.

¶8 At the hearing, Dr. Bala testified that she had diagnosed

Fairchild with a delusional disorder, mixed type, with “grandiose

and persecutory delusions.” She explained that people with

delusional disorders have “fixed beliefs that are false” but otherwise

their “behavior is not bizarre” or “odd” in any way. According to

Dr. Bala, Fairchild had a delusion that an employer had “drugged

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him and implanted a chip in his body,” which the employer then

used to control him.

¶9 Dr. Bala opined that, even though Fairchild hadn’t acted

violently or threatened anyone while he’d been hospitalized, he

continued to be a danger to others. She explained that, before his

hospitalization, Fairchild had made “over 130 . . . police reports”

about the person he believed was controlling him, but because the

police didn’t do anything about it, he took matters into his own

hands, which led to his criminal case and charges of attempted

murder. She also testified that Fairchild continued to hold the

same delusional belief; that he still expressed concern over the

same person’s supposed exertion of control over him; and that if he

were released, he would pose a danger to others in the community.

¶ 10 To support her opinion, Dr. Bala explained why Fairchild was

at such high risk of committing violence. To begin, she noted that,

in conducting a violence risk assessment, “the single best predictor

of future violence is past violence.” She then explained that

Fairchild’s past violent acts were “predatory” rather than “reactive”

because his actions took “careful planning and time” and that past

predatory violence presents a greater risk of being repeated than

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reactive violence. She also explained that Fairchild’s delusions were

“systemized” and associated with fear, anger, and anxiety, which

increases the likelihood of aggression.

¶ 11 Finally, Dr. Bala testified as to why Fairchild’s lack of violence

in the hospital wasn’t a good predictor of his risk in the community.

Specifically, she noted that the hospital is a “restricted setting”

where “other people can’t just walk in.” She also said that Fairchild

had told staff at the hospital in Pueblo that he “felt safe there”

because it was “out of the zone of his electronic tracking.” Thus,

she opined that Fairchild’s risk of physical harm to others was

directly related to whether he was in the community.

¶ 12 For his part, Fairchild testified that he didn’t believe he was a

danger to others, he didn’t have any intentions of harming anyone if

released from Fort Logan, and no one had any reason to be afraid of

him. He also claimed that he didn’t think anyone was “out to get”

him. Yet he continued to deny that he had a mental illness, even

though he said he would take medication and “do whatever a doctor

recommends” to get out of Fort Logan.

¶ 13 The district court determined, among other things, that

Fairchild was a danger to others. In reaching this decision, the

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court found that, to the extent that there were conflicts in the

testimony, Dr. Bala’s testimony was more credible than Fairchild’s,

given “all the evidence presented, the totality of circumstances, and

the [c]ourt’s review of other materials.” The court then noted the

allegations that had resulted in Fairchild’s criminal charges and

found that Fairchild “still has the same types of delusional beliefs”

that he had acted on before. The court also relied on Dr. Bala’s

opinions about predictors of violence to decide that Fairchild would

be a danger to others if he didn’t continue in his long-term care and

in-patient treatment.

¶ 14 On appeal, Fairchild asserts that there was insufficient

evidence that he was a danger to others because he testified that he

was not a danger to others. But the district court didn’t find his

testimony credible. And we “must defer to the court’s credibility

determinations and its weighing of conflicting evidence.” People in

Interest of Ramsey, 2023 COA 95, ¶ 30.

¶ 15 Fairchild also contends that the evidence was insufficient

because it established that he hadn’t exhibited any behavioral

problems while in the hospital or Fort Logan. We are not

convinced, particularly given that Fairchild had previously

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committed violent acts because of his delusion that an employer

was controlling his actions, the evidence showed that he continued

to hold the same delusion, and Dr. Bala opined that his delusion

was connected to his violent behavior such that the behavior was

likely to recur if he were returned to the community. See People in

Interest of King, 795 P.2d 273, 275 (Colo. App. 1990) (“[B]ased on

the totality of the evidence[,] including the psychologist’s

professional opinion as to respondent’s potentiality for danger, the

court was justified in ordering continued involuntary treatment.”);

see also R.K.L., ¶¶ 21-23 (relying in part on a doctor’s testimony

about violent behavior over a year earlier in affirming a finding that

the respondent continued to be a danger to others); People v.

Pflugbeil, 834 P.2d 843, 846-47 (Colo. App. 1992) (same).

¶ 16 Therefore, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, we

conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Fairchild

was a danger to others as defined in section 27-65-102(10)(b). See

R.K.L., ¶¶ 13, 25;.

¶ 17 Finally, because the statute requires a showing of grave

disability or dangerousness, § 27-65-110(1)(a), we need not reach

the issue of whether Fairchild was also gravely disabled. See

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Lombard v. Colo. Outdoor Educ. Ctr., Inc., 187 P.3d 565, 571 (Colo.

2008) (“Generally, we presume the disjunctive use of the word ‘or’

marks distinctive categories.”).

III. Disposition

¶ 18 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.

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