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March 20, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Matthew Reed v. Beko Technologies Corp.

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25-11210
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Nature of Suit: NEW

• Opinion

• Authorities (8)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (5.6K)

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Combined Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-11210 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 03/20/2026 Page: 1 of 8

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 25-11210
Non-Argument Calendar

---

MATTHEW REED,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus

BEKO TECHNOLOGIES CORP.,
Defendant-Appellee.

---

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-03563-WMR

---

Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff-Appellant Matthew Reed appeals the district court’s
order granting Defendant-Appellee Beko Technologies Corpora-
USCA11 Case: 25-11210 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 03/20/2026 Page: 2 of 8

2 Opinion of the Court 25-11210

tion’s (Beko) renewed motion for judgment as a matter law follow-
ing a jury verdict in Reed’s favor on his retaliation claim in his 42
U.S.C. § 1981 employment-discrimination action. After careful re-
view, we vacate and remand.
I.
Reed, an African American man, sued Beko, his former em-
ployer, for claims of race discrimination and retaliation under 42
U.S.C. § 1981. After discovery, Beko moved for summary judg-
ment on both claims. The court granted summary judgment on
race discrimination but denied summary judgment on the retalia-
tion claim. Notably, the court explained that there was a genuine
issue of material fact as to what happened in a phone call between
Reed and Beko’s CEO Tilo Fruth, a white man, which led to the
end of Reed and Beko’s working relationship.
At trial, Reed testified that during his performance review in
January 2021, 1 he was told that he would not be getting a raise and
that no one at the facility would be getting a raise either due to the
pandemic. After this conversation, Reed spoke with Robert
Turner, a white man, where he learned that Turner had received a
raise but had been told to keep it under wraps. Reed spoke with
his manager, who told him that Fruth had instructed him not to
give Reed a raise.
Later, in August 2021, Andy Davis, who worked for the
safety division, came to Reed’s station and harassed him. Reed

1 Reed began working at Beko in 2016.
USCA11 Case: 25-11210 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 03/20/2026 Page: 3 of 8

25-11210 Opinion of the Court 3

emailed Melanie Jauch, Beko’s Human Resource Manager, about
the incident. Jauch set up a time for Fruth to call Reed to talk about
the incident.
Reed testified that during that call Fruth asked Reed what
had happened, and Reed told him about his interactions with his
coworker Davis. Reed explained that Fruth repeatedly told Reed
to drop the case. At that point, Reed reiterated that he was not
going to drop it and then asked Fruth if raises were determined by
performance, and Fruth said they were. Reed asked why he had
not received a raise that year, and Fruth told him that nobody had
received a raise because of the pandemic. Reed stated that Turner
had received a raise, and Fruth asked why Reed was bringing up
Turner, to which Reed replied, “because he’s white.”
According to Reed, Fruth then “went off,” telling Reed “I
don’t want you here. Get out of here. I don’t want you at Beko. I
don’t want you here. Just give a two week notice. No. Give a four
week notice.” Fruth continued to badger Reed “to email Melanie
and tell her you’re giving her a four-week notice and I want you to
copy on it,” and kept repeating that he wanted Reed to resign.
Eventually Reed “got tired, [told Fruth] okay,” at which point
Fruth hung up the phone call. Reed never emailed Jauch to resign.
Reed then went on paid time off and ultimately never went back
to work at Beko.
Fruth testified at trial that he spoke with Reed about the in-
cident with Davis and that Reed became very upset during the con-
versation. According to Fruth, in that phone call Reed ultimately
USCA11 Case: 25-11210 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 03/20/2026 Page: 4 of 8

4 Opinion of the Court 25-11210

said he was resigning and would give his notice. Jauch testified that
after this conversation, Fruth told her about Reed’s resignation and
wanted Jauch to follow up. Jauch then emailed Reed: “To follow
up on your conversation with Tilo this morning, this email serves
as a confirmation that we accept your 2 week notice of resigna-
tion.” Reed responded to Jauch’s email saying “that [he] did not
resign, [he] did not give you a written four-week notice or two
weeks’ notice.”
The jury returned a verdict for Reed, specifically finding that
he had engaged in a protected activity, that Beko had taken an ad-
verse employment action against him, that the action was because
of Reed’s protected activity, and that he suffered damages as a re-
sult of the action. The jury awarded damages of $84,724.46 and
found that Beko acted with malice or reckless indifference to
Reed’s federally protected rights, awarding him $450,000 in puni-
tive damages. 2
Beko renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law,
arguing that considering all the evidence, no reasonable jury could
have found that Reed had shown a claim of retaliation. The district
court agreed and found that the evidence did not support a finding
that Reed had suffered a material adverse action. Reed timely ap-
pealed.

2 Reed also moved for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (b).
Because the
district court granted Beko’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict, it denied Reed’s motion for attorney’s fees.
USCA11 Case: 25-11210 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 03/20/2026 Page: 5 of 8

25-11210 Opinion of the Court 5

II.
We review de novo the district court’s ruling on whether to
grant a party judgment as a matter of law. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co. v.
AmSouth Bank, 100 F.3d 893, 898–99 (11th Cir. 1996). We review
all the evidence, and all reasonable inferences from it, in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 899. In considering
the evidence, the court should grant the motion only if “the facts
and inferences point [so] overwhelmingly in favor of one
party . . . that reasonable people could not arrive at a contrary ver-
dict.” Brown v. Ala. Dep’t of Transp., 597 F.3d 1160, 1173 (11th Cir.
2010) (citation omitted). We do not assume the jury’s role of
weighing conflicting evidence or inferences, or assessing the credi-
bility of witnesses. Id. The court, however, should deny the mo-
tion so long as there is “substantial evidence opposed to the motion
such that reasonable people, in the exercise of impartial judgment,
might reach differing conclusions.” Hipp v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co.,
252 F.3d 1208, 1230 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that,
if a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial, and
the court determines that a reasonable jury would not have a le-
gally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on the issue,
the court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law
against the party on the claim or defense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1).
Rule 50(b) provides that the party may then renew the motion after
trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
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6 Opinion of the Court 25-11210

Section 1981 of Title 42 of the U.S. Code encompasses race-
based retaliation claims in the employment context.3 CBOCS W.,
Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 455, 457 (2008). To establish a prima
facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he engaged
in statutorily protected conduct; (2) suffered an adverse employ-
ment action; and (3) there is some causal relationship between the
two events. Tolar v. Bradley Arant Boult Commings, LLP, 997 F.3d
1280, 1289 (11th Cir. 2021). If the plaintiff does so, and the em-
ployer proffers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its ac-
tions, then the plaintiff must show that the reason given is pre-
textual. Brown, 597 F.3d at 1181–82.
The district court found that “the evidence clearly shows
that [Reed] resigned from his employment, [and] there is no mate-
rially adverse action to support” his claim for retaliation. Reed ar-
gues that the district court erred in granting Beko’s renewed mo-
tion for judgment as a matter of law by finding, based on disputed
evidence at trial, that no reasonable jury could have found that he
had suffered a materially adverse action, or that he had been termi-
nated, rather than voluntarily resigned. We agree with Reed.
As noted above, only two people know what occurred on
the phone call in August 2021—Reed and Fruth. There are two
versions of what occurred on that phone call. Reed testified that

3 Section 1981 has the same requirements of proof and uses the same analytical

framework as claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1325 n.14 (11th Cir. 2011).
USCA11 Case: 25-11210 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 03/20/2026 Page: 7 of 8

25-11210 Opinion of the Court 7

he was continuously berated by Fruth and demanded that Reed re-
sign, while Fruth testified that Reed got angry and resigned.
Whether Reed involuntarily resigned was the key question that the
jury had to answer. Our case law shows that when determining
whether a resignation is involuntary enough to be considered co-
erced resignation, we take into account the circumstances of the
resignation and how they affected the employee’s ability to exer-
cise free choice. Hargray v. City of Hallandale, 57 F.3d 1560, 1568
(11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Considering the facts presented to
the jury in the light most favorable to Reed as the non-moving
party, Reed was not given an alternative to resignation, he did not
believe that he had actually resigned during the phone call, he was
not given time to make a decision, and he did not have the advice
of counsel. All these factors support a deduction that Reed’s resig-
nation was not voluntary, and there is sufficient evidence for a jury
to have believed Reed. See id.
The district court erroneously construed the evidence in the
light most favorable to Beko at every opportunity. This was inap-
propriate when reviewing a motion for renewed judgment as a
matter of law. See Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 100 F.3d at 899. Instead,
the district court should have made inferences in favor of the non-
movant, Reed, as the legal standard requires. See id. Thus, the dis-
trict court erred in granting Beko’s renewed motion for judgment
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8 Opinion of the Court 25-11210

as a matter of law because there was a legally sufficient evidentiary
basis to support the jury’s verdict that Reed had not resigned.4
III.
Reed also argues that the district court erred by denying his
motion for attorney’s fees because it erred in granting Beko’s re-
newed motion for judgment as a matter of law. We review the
grant of attorney’s fees for an abuse of discretion. Bonner v. Mobile
Energy Servs. Co., 246 F.3d 1303, 1304 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
The district court abused its discretion when it improperly
denied Reed’s motion for attorney’s fees based on its erroneous rul-
ing granting Beko’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of
law. Thus, we vacate the denial of attorney’s fees and remand for
the district court to determine in the first instance Reed’s entitle-
ment to attorney’s fees.
VACATED AND REMANDED.

4 There was also sufficient evidence that a reasonable jury could have believed

that in a phone call to Fruth, Reed complained about not getting a raise when
his white co-worker did, which was protected conduct, and that Fruth’s de-
mands for resignation in the same phone call showed a causal relationship be-
tween Reed’s involuntary resignation and the protected conduct.