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March 20, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Alice Bruce v. U.S. Bank National Association

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25-12152
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Nature of Suit: NEW

• Opinion

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Combined Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-12152 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 03/20/2026 Page: 1 of 15

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 25-12152
Non-Argument Calendar

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ALICE MARIE BRUCE,
a.k.a. Alice Bruce,
ROY W. BRUCE,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus

U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
as Trustee, Successor in Interest to
Bank of America,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
as Trustee for Washington Mutual Asset
Backed Certificates,
WMABS SERIES 2006-HE3 TRUST,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
as Trustee by Merger, to Lasalle Bank,
MEGHAN P. KEANE,
Esq., Individually, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
USCA11 Case: 25-12152 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 03/20/2026 Page: 2 of 15

2 Opinion of the Court 25-12152

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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:25-cv-00404-MSS-AEP

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Before JORDAN, KIDD, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Alice and Roy Bruce (“the Bruces”), proceeding pro se,
appeal the dismissal of their lawsuit relating to the foreclosure of
their home after Florida state-court proceedings. The district court
dismissed the Bruces’ lawsuit with prejudice for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. The district court concluded that it lacked
jurisdiction because (1) the Bruces did not assert any claims arising
under federal law, (2) the Bruces failed to allege adequately
diversity of citizenship between the parties, and (3) all of their
lawsuit was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
After review, we conclude that the district court erred by
dismissing the Bruces’ lawsuit with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction
because (1) the Bruces’ first amended complaint contained
sufficient allegations to trigger, at least at this juncture, federal
question jurisdiction, and (2) the district court failed to evaluate the
Bruces’ six claims individually and instead summarily dismissed
them all as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Accordingly, we
vacate the dismissal with prejudice and remand for further
proceedings.
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25-12152 Opinion of the Court 3

I. BACKGROUND
We explicate the complicated procedural history to explain
the limited nature of what we are deciding.
A. Initial Complaint
On February 18, 2025, the Bruces filed a complaint against
U.S. Bank National Association (“U.S. Bank”), asserting various
Florida state-law and federal statutory claims for relief. The
complaint alleged that U.S. Bank was liable to the Bruces for its
actions relating to its efforts to foreclose on their home based on
their defaulted mortgage. The complaint focused primarily on a
foreclosure judgment that U.S. Bank obtained against the Bruces in
Florida state court on July 18, 2024.
As relief, the complaint sought, among other things,
(1) millions of dollars in monetary damages, (2) a declaratory
judgment “invalidating all claims against [their] property,” and
(3) a “[p]ermanent injunction against foreclosure.”
The complaint asserted that the district court had subject
matter jurisdiction based on federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, and diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a)(1).
B. Denial of Preliminary Injunction
Soon after filing their initial complaint, the Bruces filed a
motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to stop altogether the
foreclosure of their home. The district court denied that motion
as procedurally defective. The Bruces then filed an amended
motion seeking the same relief. The district court denied the
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4 Opinion of the Court 25-12152

amended motion because it was not “empowered to enjoin final
actions of a state court except in very limited circumstances” that
were not present in this case.
The Bruces moved for reconsideration of that denial. On
February 28, 2025, the district court denied the Bruces’ motion for
reconsideration with prejudice. The district court explained in
more detail that under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine it lacked
jurisdiction to intervene in the state court foreclosure proceedings
or provide relief from the state court foreclosure judgment. The
district court reasoned that because the relief that the Bruces
sought would require it “to review and reject the state court’s
judgment,” the Bruces’ action “[fell] squarely within the scope of
Rooker-Feldman.” 1
C. March 13 First Amended Complaint
On March 13, 2025, the Bruces then filed an amended
complaint with six claims for relief. The amended complaint
contained allegations encompassing a timeline of the Bruces’
mortgage, the actions of U.S. Bank and its predecessors in interest
with respect to the mortgage, U.S. Bank’s efforts to foreclose, and
U.S. Bank’s foreclosure sale of their home on March 10, 2025.
For Count 1, the Bruces asserted a Florida-law claim of
“wrongful foreclosure.” The Bruces alleged that U.S. Bank
(1) initiated the foreclosure proceedings “without standing,” (2) did

1 This is a traditional application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and the

district court’s denial of this injunction is not an issue in this appeal.
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25-12152 Opinion of the Court 5

not have a valid assignment as to the mortgage, (3) proceeded with
foreclosure despite the fact that the mortgage debt had been
cancelled, (4) conducted the foreclosure sale without proper
statutory notice under Florida law, and (5) sold the property “with
knowledge of fatal defects in chain of title.”
For Count 2, the Bruces asserted a Florida-law claim of “civil
theft of property,” contending that U.S. Bank “committed civil
theft” by, among other things, (1) initiating the state court
foreclosure action without owning the mortgage debt and
(2) selling the property without legal authority.
For Count 3, the Bruces asserted a Florida-law claim of
“breach of chain of title and void assignments.” For this claim, the
Bruces merely incorporated their allegations regarding the factual
background of the mortgage and foreclosure without including any
additional allegations.
For Count 4, the Bruces did the same incorporation of prior
allegations and asserted a claim of “violations of federal consumer
protection laws.”
For Count 5, the Bruces asserted that U.S. Bank violated the
federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) by, among
other things, (1) conducting the foreclosure sale while knowing
that the mortgage debt had been canceled, (2) misrepresenting the
character, amount, and status of the mortgage debt, and
(3) conducting the foreclosure sale without legal authority.
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6 Opinion of the Court 25-12152

For Count 6, the Bruces asserted a Florida-law claim of
“quiet title,” which sought to establish their rights as to the
property and “[n]ullify” the foreclosure sale.
D. March 26 Second Amended Complaint
On March 26, 2025, (thirteen days later) the Bruces filed a
second amended complaint that (1) contained more alleged factual
details, and (2) slightly changed the claims asserted against
U.S. Bank.
The second amended complaint also asserted new claims
against new defendants (1) Meghan Keane, the attorney who
represented U.S. Bank in the state foreclosure and present federal
court proceedings and (2) Bitman O’Brien, PLLC (“Bitman law
firm”), the law firm that represented U.S. Bank in those
proceedings and employed Keane. The Bruces again sought
largely the same relief as in the first two complaints.
For Count 1, the Bruces sought a declaratory judgment that,
among other things, (1) their mortgage debt was discharged back
in 2014, (2) U.S. Bank lacked standing to foreclose, and (3) all of
U.S. Bank’s actions relating to the foreclosure were void.
For Count 2, the Bruces reasserted their Florida-law
quiet-title claim.
For Count 3, the Bruces alleged that U.S. Bank was liable
under the federal Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) for the actions of
its predecessor in interest—JPMorgan Chase Bank—regarding a
2014 modification of the mortgage loan. Specifically, the Bruces
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25-12152 Opinion of the Court 7

asserted that JPMorgan Chase (1) failed to provide proper
disclosures for the modification, (2) misrepresented the true nature
of the modification, and (3) failed to disclose accurately the
principal amount of the mortgage loan after the modification.
For Count 4, the Bruces alleged that U.S. Bank violated the
federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”) because
its servicer failed to respond properly to the Bruces’ qualified
written requests relating to the foreclosure.
For Count 5, the Bruces realleged their federal
FDCPA claim.
For Count 6, the Bruces alleged that U.S. Bank violated the
Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (“FCCPA”) based on
the same actions alleged in Count 5.
For Counts 7 and 8, the Bruces asserted that lawyer Keane
and the Bitman law firm lacked authority to represent U.S. Bank in
the state court foreclosure proceedings and misrepresented facts in
those proceedings.
For Count 9, the Bruces asserted that all defendants engaged
in fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations in their handling
of the mortgage debt and efforts to foreclose on the property.
Lastly, for Count 10, the Bruces reasserted their Florida-law
claim for “breach of chain of title and void assignments.”
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8 Opinion of the Court 25-12152

E. U.S. Bank’s April 8 Motion to Dismiss the Suit and Strike
the Second Amended Complaint
On April 8, 2025, U.S. Bank moved to dismiss the first
amended complaint and to strike the second amended complaint.
U.S. Bank argued that all claims in the first amended complaint
(1) were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, (2) were barred by
collateral estoppel and res judicata since they were already litigated
in the state court proceedings, (3) failed to state a valid claim since
every claim was based on the legally erroneous conclusion that
U.S. Bank lacked authority to foreclose, and (4) were taken
together an impermissible shotgun pleading.
As to striking the second amended complaint, U.S. Bank
pointed out that (1) the Bruces amended their complaint once as of
right, (2) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) they needed
to obtain leave of the district court or written consent from U.S.
Bank to file the second amended complaint, and (3) the Bruces had
obtained neither leave from the district court nor U.S. Bank’s
consent.
F. The Bruces’ April 11 Motion to Amend the Complaint
After U.S. Bank filed its motions to dismiss and strike, the
Bruces moved for the district court to retroactively grant them
leave to file the second amended complaint under Rule 15(a).
On May 29, 2025, the Bruces even filed a motion for leave to
file a third amended complaint.
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25-12152 Opinion of the Court 9

G. May 30 Dismissal Order
On May 30, 2025, the district court dismissed the “case” with
prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. The district court’s order did not
rule on (1) U.S. Bank’s April 8 motion to strike the second amended
complaint, (2) the Bruces’ April 11 motion for leave to file the
second amended complaint, or (3) the Bruces’ May 29 motion for
leave to file a third amended complaint. The order simply
contained a jurisdictional ruling dismissing the “case.”
First, the district court determined that it lacked federal
question jurisdiction over the case because U.S. Bank’s state court
foreclosure complaint did not assert a federal cause of action, and
U.S. Bank’s right to foreclose did not depend on the resolution of
any federal issue.
Second, the district court concluded that it lacked diversity
jurisdiction because “the Complaint [did] not adequately allege the
citizenship of each Defendant.”
Lastly, the district court stated that, “[e]ven if the
requirements of diversity jurisdiction were met,” it nevertheless
lacked jurisdiction to hear the case under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. The district court explained that it had already
determined in the February 28, 2025, order—which denied the
Bruces’ motion for reconsideration of the denial of a preliminary
injunction—that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred it “from
exercising jurisdiction in the state court proceedings.” Rather than
examining the individual six counts in the first amended complaint,
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10 Opinion of the Court 25-12152

the district court summarily dismissed the whole “case” as barred
by Rooker-Feldman.
H. June 5 District Court Order
In a separate order, on June 5, 2025, the district court denied
as moot the Bruces’ motion to file a third amended complaint
because of the dismissal order. The district court noted that “[t]he
Motion was filed the day before the dismissal Order and appears to
have been crossed in the mail with” the dismissal order.
I. The Bruces’ June 17 Motion for Relief from the Dismissal
On June 17, 2025, the Bruces moved for relief from the May
30 dismissal order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b),
which the district court denied. On June 24, 2025, the Bruces filed
a timely notice of appeal challenging the May 30, 2025
dismissal order.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a district court’s determination that it lacks
subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th 1206,
1209 (11th Cir. 2021).
III. DISCUSSION 2
Based on the procedural history, the operative complaint at
the time of the May 30 dismissal order was arguably the first

2 The Bruces move to supplement the record on appeal with a document that

they claim factually proves that fraud was committed in relation to their
mortgage after the state court entered the foreclosure judgment. We DENY
this motion. This document is irrelevant to the jurisdictional issues presented
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25-12152 Opinion of the Court 11

amended complaint. The district court had not ruled on the
Bruces’ motion for leave to file the second amended complaint or
U.S. Bank’s motion to strike it. We need not decide which of the
amended complaints was the operative pleading because the
district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was erroneous in
either event for the reasons laid out below.
A. Federal Question Jurisdiction
First, the district court erred by concluding that it lacked
federal question jurisdiction over the “case.”
Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over “all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “‘Arising under’
jurisdiction—more often known as federal-question
jurisdiction—enables federal courts to decide cases founded on
federal law. A suit most typically falls within that statutory grant
‘when federal law creates the cause of action asserted.’” Royal
Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 26 (2025) (quoting
Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 257 (2013)).
“The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is
governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that
federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented

by this appeal. See Est. of Keeter v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 75 F.4th 1268,
1288 (11th Cir. 2023) (explaining that this Court only enlarges the record on
appeal in exceptional circumstances). In any event, we review the factual
record in the district court below, and to the extent the Bruces seek to add
facts to that record, we also deny the motion to supplement.
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12 Opinion of the Court 25-12152

on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Schleider
v. GVDB Operations, LLC, 121 F.4th 149, 155-56 (11th Cir. 2024)
(quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)). “The
well-pleaded complaint rule means that a federal question is
‘presented’ when the complaint—on its face—invokes federal law
as the basis for relief.” Id.
Here, both the first and second amended complaints each
assert at least one claim that “invokes federal law as the basis for
relief.” See id. In their first amended complaint, the Bruces asserted
that U.S. Bank violated the FDCPA by attempting to foreclose on
their property despite the fact that their mortgage debt had
purportedly been previously cancelled. And in their second
amended complaint, the Bruces reasserted their FDCPA claim and
separately alleged that (1) U.S. Bank was liable under the TILA
based on the actions of its predecessors in interest with respect to a
2014 modification of the mortgage loan, and (2) U.S. Bank violated
the RESPA by failing to properly respond to their qualified written
requests relating to the foreclosure through its servicer.
These alleged claims seeking relief under federal statutes,
even if later shown as subject to dismissal, are facially enough to
provide the district court with subject matter jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331. See Royal Canin, 604 U.S. at 26. The district court
was therefore also empowered to consider whether, in its
discretion, to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Bruces’
state-law claims. See id. at 27.
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25-12152 Opinion of the Court 13

B. Rooker-Feldman
The district court also erred by alternatively concluding that
the “case” was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is derived from the Supreme
Court cases Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal district court may not
hear a case that is effectively an appeal from a state court decision.
Target Media Partners v. Specialty Mktg. Corp., 881 F.3d 1279, 1284
(11th Cir. 2018). The Supreme Court has explained that the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine is “confined to . . . cases brought by
state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of
those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544
U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
The district court erred in its application of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine in three respects.
First, the district court did not conduct the necessary
“claim-by-claim” analysis that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
requires. See Behr, 8 F.4th at 1213. As this Court has explained, in
applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, district courts should not ask
“whether the whole complaint seems to challenge a previous state
court judgment” but should instead use “a more targeted
approach,” asking “whether resolution of each individual claim
requires review and rejection of a state court judgment.” Id. The
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14 Opinion of the Court 25-12152

district court did not review whether each of the Bruces’ claims
individually sought review of the state court foreclosure judgment
but instead concluded that their complaint generally was seeking
such review.
Second, the district court erred by concluding that dismissal
of the entire action was warranted because the Bruces have
asserted at least some claims that are not barred by Rooker-Feldman.
For example, in their first amended complaint, the Bruces asserted
a claim for damages against U.S. Bank for violation of the FDCPA.
And in their second amended complaint, the Bruces asserted
the same claims against U.S. Bank as well as (1) violation of the
TILA, (2) violation of the RESPA, (3) violation of the FCCPA, and
(4) fraud relating to the mortgage debt generally and the
foreclosure proceedings specifically.
The Bruces also asserted claims for damages against the
attorney and law firm that represented U.S. Bank in the state court
foreclosure proceedings for “unauthorized practice and
misrepresentation” and fraud. These claims do not appear to
directly seek to overturn the state court foreclosure judgment.
See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284.
That is not to say that none of the Bruces’ claims are barred
by Rooker-Feldman. For example, the Bruces clearly attempted to
overturn the state court foreclosure judgment by (1) seeking a
declaratory judgment voiding the foreclosure, (2) asserting a claim
of quiet title as to their property, and (3) seeking an injunction
blocking the foreclosure sale. Regardless, other claims seek relief
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25-12152 Opinion of the Court 15

for damages under federal statutes that do not seem at this time to
be based on overturning the state court foreclosure judgment. So
the district court’s decision to dismiss the case as a whole based on
that doctrine was legally erroneous.
Lastly, the district court also erred by dismissing the case
with prejudice on jurisdictional grounds. See McIntosh v. Royal
Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 5 F.4th 1309, 1313 (11th Cir. 2021) (“If
subject-matter jurisdiction does not exist, dismissal must be
without prejudice.”); Target Media, 881 F.3d at 1284
(“Rooker-Feldman raises a question about our subject matter
jurisdiction . . . .”).
IV. CONCLUSION
The district court erred by dismissing the Bruces’ “case”
with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. On remand, the district
court should address U.S. Bank’s motion to strike the second
amended complaint and the Bruces’ motion for leave to amend to
add the second amended complaint. After deciding which pleading
is the operative complaint, the district court may then conduct the
claim-by-claim analysis required by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
and any other applicable jurisdictional analysis. See Behr, 8 F.4th at
1213. We leave it fully to the district court in the first instance how
best to handle all of the proceedings on remand.
The May 30, 2025 order dismissing the case with prejudice
is VACATED, and we REMAND the case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.