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March 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Marriage of Ubamos CA1/3

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A172775

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (8)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (38.9K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/27/26 Marriage of Ubamos CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re Marriage of JOJIT and
MARYANN UBAMOS.
JOJIT UBAMOS,
Petitioner and Appellant,
A172775
v.
MARYANN UBAMOS, (San Mateo County
Super. Ct. No. 20-FAM-01324)
Respondent.

This appeal arises from a judgment of dissolution entered after trial.
For clarity, we refer to the parties by their given names. Jojit argues the
trial court (1) violated his due process rights by preventing him from
introducing video evidence at trial; (2) erred in enforcing the interspousal
transfer deed he signed for a house purchased by Maryann; (3) made
domestic violence findings not supported by substantial evidence; and
(4) erred in the effective date it set for retroactive modification of temporary
spousal support to $0. We affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
The Petition and Temporary Spousal Support
Jojit filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage in 2020. The parties
had been married for approximately 26 years and have two adult children.

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Jojit filed a request for order seeking temporary spousal support. The trial
court granted the request on February 9, 2021, setting temporary support at
$3,727 per month (effectively $3,227 because of a $500 per month credit) as of
February 1, 2021, with payments retroactive to August 1, 2020 at a
somewhat higher level. Then at a conference on February 26, 2021, the court
reserved jurisdiction retroactively to modify temporary support and set a trial
date to determine whether Jojit had committed domestic violence against
Maryann, and the potential impact on spousal support.
The 2021 Court Trial
On September 1, 2021, the trial court heard evidence regarding the
alleged domestic violence committed by Jojit. Maryann testified that, when
their children were young, Jojit punched her in the face multiple times, broke
a plastic bottle over her head, and verbally abused her by calling her names.
She testified that, more recently, Jojit had grabbed her by the hair and yelled
at her. She also testified that Jojit had verbally abused the children when
they were young and as adults.
The parties’ daughter testified that, over the course of her childhood,
she had witnessed Jojit hit Maryann repeatedly, kick her forehead, throw a
beer can at her, drag her down the hallway by her hair, shove her, and call
her names. The daughter also testified that she herself had been a target;
Jojit had hit her on the face approximately five times, including incidents
that split her lip open and left a scar, and yelled at her and called her names.
The parties’ son testified that he recently saw Jojit push his body on
Maryann, yell at her, and call her names. When the son tried to intervene,
Jojit grabbed his collar, pushed him against the wall, and in wrestling with
him threw him down. The son testified that, as a child, he saw Jojit grab

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Maryann’s hair, hit her with a closed fist causing her to bleed down her
forehead, yell at her, and call her names.
Jojit’s counsel recalled Maryann to testify during his presentation of
evidence. On redirect, Jojit’s counsel sought to introduce video evidence for
impeachment purposes. Maryann’s counsel objected that the video had not
been disclosed and the California Rules of Court (rule 2.1040) required a
transcript of the video. Jojit’s counsel asked for a ten-minute recess. The
trial court declined the request, stating Jojit could “testify to whatever he
would like” and counsel could “go ahead and try to prepare your transcript by
the end of the day and have [Jojit] present it at some point during his
examination.” Jojit testified, but counsel did not make any further attempt
to introduce the video.
At the conclusion of the presentation, the court issued an order finding
domestic violence pursuant to Family Code section 4320, subdivision (i).1 The
court was “persuaded that there is reasonable cause to find by a
preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner Jojit Ubamos committed
domestic violence throughout the parties’ marriage” against Maryann and
the parties’ two children. The court found the testimony of the daughter “to
be particularly persuasive as to the type and ongoing nature of the domestic
violence by Jojit, including physical violence throughout her childhood.” It
also found the son had “provided corroborating testimony of a recent act of
domestic violence” against Maryann.

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code

and all further undesignated citations to Rules are to the California Rules of
Court.
Section 4320 lists several factors a court must consider in ordering
spousal support, including a judicial finding during the pendency of a divorce
proceeding that the spouse has committed domestic violence. (Id.,
subd. (i)(5).)

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The court reserved the issue of “impact that its finding of domestic
violence has on temporary spousal support, pending review of all [section]
4320 factors.” Its prior order of temporary spousal support would remain in
effect, but Jojit was “on notice” that if there was a reallocation, he “could be
responsible for repayment of a substantial sum of temporary spousal
support.”
The 2023 Court Trial
The trial on remaining issues, including Maryann’s request for
reimbursement of temporary spousal support and enforcement of an
interspousal transfer deed, was set for one day. The first half-day was
conducted on August 16, 2023. Maryann and her forensic accounting expert
testified. Jojit appeared in pro per and cross-examined both witnesses.
Maryann testified that she had purchased a house in 2018 and
obtained a grant deed and an interspousal transfer deed, holding title of the
house in her name alone. She further testified that she did nothing to
pressure Jojit into signing the interspousal transfer deed, that he knows how
to read, and that he had an opportunity to think about signing the
interspousal transfer deed before he did.
The second half-day of trial was continued to June 11, 2024. Jojit did
not appear. The court proceeded with the trial, finding a proof of service
showed Jojit had been given notice of the trial date. Maryann resumed her
testimony, stating she and Jojit had discussed that the property would be
solely in her name and she would be solely responsible for the mortgage
payments. She also testified that Jojit had never lived at the house.
At the conclusion of her presentation, Maryann’s counsel clarified that
her request for reimbursement of temporary spousal support was being made
back to February 9, 2021 (the date support was originally granted) or, in the

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alternative, back to September 1, 2021 (the date of the domestic violence
finding). The court took the matter under submission.
Approximately one month later, Jojit filed a motion for further trial
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 657 (a provision setting forth
several “causes” for further trial “materially affecting the substantial rights”
of the aggrieved party). The motion was denied.
The court issued a written ruling on October 21, 2024 as a “courtesy” to
“fully explain” its rationale, since a statement of decision was neither
required nor requested by the parties. (Rule 3.1590(n) [statement of decision
must be requested before matter is submitted when trial is completed in less
than eight hours].) After weighing the section 4320 factors, the court set
permanent spousal support at $0.
The court retroactively modified temporary spousal support to $0
effective July 1, 2023. And for the period from September 1, 2021 (the date of
the domestic violence finding) to June 30, 2023 (when Jojit obtained
employment), it retroactively modified the rate of temporary spousal support
to $1,000 per month. The court reasoned such modification balanced the
“purpose” of temporary spousal support, its domestic violence finding,
Maryann’s “high earning” income, and Jojit’s “lower” income. While the court
“agree[d] with the general public policy that a victim should not have to
finance her abuser,” it further explained there was no criminal conviction in
this case and there was evidence Jojit had “periods of unemployment and
disability.” The court thus deemed “some amount of temporary spousal
support appropriate, albeit at a reduced amount in light of the abuse.”
As to the house purchased by Maryann, the court found she had met
her burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the
interspousal deed was valid. The court explained that, where an interspousal

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transaction advantages one spouse, as it did here, there is a presumption of
undue influence that shifts the burden to the advantaged spouse to establish
the transmutation was lawful. The advantaged spouse must prove that the
interspousal transfer was “ ‘freely and voluntarily made, with a full
knowledge of all the facts and with a complete understanding of the
transfer,’ ” the court correctly noted (citing In re Marriage of Mathews (2005)
133 Cal.App.4th 624, 631, 632), and Maryann had met this burden. The
court reasoned: “Not only was her testimony sufficient in showing [Jojit]
knew what he was signing, but her credible testimony regarding her fear of
[Jojit] in light of the domestic violence she suffered lends further support that
she would not have wanted to mislead him.” The court awarded the house as
Maryann’s sole and separate property. The statement of decision adds that
Jojit “may have had the right of reimbursement for any community property
used to pay for the house during marriage,” but he had failed to raise the
issue or present evidence on it, effectively waiving any such right.
The judgment of dissolution was entered on December 27, 2024,
attaching the October 21, 2024 ruling and fully incorporating it by reference
into the judgment “as if stated herein.”
DISCUSSION
I. Due Process
Jojit argues the trial court violated his due process rights because he
was prevented from introducing video evidence at trial without a transcript.
Rule 2.1040(b)(1) requires that, before a party may present or offer an
electronic sound-and-video recording into evidence, the party “must provide
to the court and to opposing parties a transcript of the electronic recording
and provide opposing parties with a duplicate of the electronic recording.”
Courts are afforded some discretion on this transcript requirement: they

6
may, for example, order that a transcript is not required for good cause.
(Rule 2.1040(b)(3)(C).) But Jojit offers no authority suggesting the trial
court’s decision here—not to exercise any such discretion, noting counsel still
had the opportunity to prepare a transcript for presentation during his
examination of Jojit—constitutes a due process violation.
In re Marriage of Gilbert-Valencia & McEachen (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th
520 is not on point. In that case, the trial court improperly excluded a
videotape of domestic violence from a dissolution proceeding, stating it was
“ ‘not going to have a domestic violence hearing’ ” because the “ ‘purpose’ ” of
the proceeding was to resolve remaining property issues, spousal support,
and attorney fees. (Id. at p. 528.) That is not what happened here, where the
trial court simply enforced the requirements of rule 2.1040. Nor is Evidence
Code section 1401 relevant to Jojit’s attempt to introduce video evidence, as
that provision relates to authentication of a writing. Rule 2.1040 does not
concern authentication, but is instead “designed to ensure that, in the event
of an appeal, there is an appropriate record of any electronic sound or sound-
and-video recording that was presented or offered into evidence in the trial
court.” (Advisory Com. com., rule 2.1040.)
Jojit also argues the trial court’s “subsequent actions” violated his due
process rights by limiting his ability to present the video. To the extent this
argument refers to the trial that proceeded on June 11, 2024, we reject it
because Jojit failed to appear on this trial date and does not dispute the
court’s finding that he was given notice of the date. To the extent this
argument refers to the denial of Jojit’s motion for further trial, we have no
means to review that ruling as neither the motion nor the hearing transcript
is contained in the appellate record. Any such argument is thus forfeited.
(Pringle v. La Chapelle (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1003 [appellant bears

7
burden of proof on appeal and failure to provide sufficient record results in
waiver of issues].)
II. Interspousal Transfer Deed
Jojit argues the trial court erred in enforcing the interspousal transfer
deed for two reasons. First, he suggests the trial court did not properly
consider the presumption of undue influence. That suggestion is belied by
the record. In its October 21, 2024 ruling, the court explicitly determined
that the presumption applied here because the interspousal transaction
“clearly advantages” Maryann, and thus shifted the burden to her to show
Jojit had “freely, voluntarily, and knowingly signed the interspousal transfer
deed.” It cited the correct legal standard from In re Marriage of Mathews,
supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at pages 628–629, 631 and, after considering the
evidence presented, found Maryann had met this burden.
Second, Jojit argues that this finding was not supported by substantial
evidence. “ ‘Under [the substantial evidence] standard of review, “the power
of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether
there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will
support the finding of fact.” [Citation.] In so doing, we accept all evidence
that supports the judgment, disregard contrary evidence, and draw all
reasonable inferences to uphold the judgment. [Citation.] “It is not our role to
reweigh the evidence, redetermine the credibility of the witnesses, or resolve
conflicts in the testimony, and we will not disturb the judgment if there is
evidence to support it.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of Nelson (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th
904, 914.)
We conclude there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s
finding that Jojit had freely, voluntarily, and knowingly signed the
interspousal transfer deed. Maryann testified that she and Jojit had

8
discussed that the property would be solely in her name and she would be
solely responsible for the mortgage payments. She had for a period of years
expressed to him an interest in purchasing her own house, which he did not
think was a good financial decision, she explained. She also testified that she
did nothing to pressure Jojit into signing the deed, that he knows how to
read, and that he had an opportunity to think about signing it before he did.
None of Jojit’s contentions about this testimony persuade us otherwise.
He argues it was improper for the trial court to rely “solely” on Maryann’s
“self-serving” testimony. But Jojit did not make any presentation of evidence
because he failed to appear at the second half-day of trial. And in any event,
the “ ‘direct testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a finding
unless the testimony is physically impossible or its falsity is apparent
“without resorting to inferences or deductions.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of Nelson,
supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at p. 914.) Jojit argues it was also improper for the
trial court to rely on Maryann’s testimony regarding her fear of Jojit, given
the domestic violence, as “further support” that she would not have wanted to
mislead him. We disagree, as this testimony has some tendency to
corroborate her account of her own conduct, and the trial court cited it only as
“further support” for a conclusion based on the uncontested and “sufficient”
evidence that Jojit knew what he was signing.
Jojit next contends that Maryann’s testimony about why she had him
sign the interspousal transfer deed—as a “condition of the funding” for the
mortgage—suggests he “may have believed” it was “merely a formality
required by the lender” and not a “complete relinquishment of his community
property interest.” But Jojit does not point to any evidence at trial that this
“condition” was relayed to him, let alone that he held any such belief.

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Finally, even if the interspousal transfer deed was valid, Jojit argues
the down payment for the house came from community funds and gave him a
pro tanto interest that the trial court failed to credit. (See In re Marriage of
Allen (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 497, 501 [where community funds are used on
spouse’s separate property, community is entitled to pro tanto interest or
reimbursement].) Maryann responds that Jojit has forfeited this argument
because he failed to raise it in the trial court below. Jojit does not dispute
this failure, nor does he cite evidence to support his factual assertion.
Accordingly, we deem the argument forfeited. (In re Marriage of Moore
(2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 1275, 1289 [“failure to raise an issue in the trial court
forfeits the claim of error on appeal”].)
III. Domestic Violence Findings
Jojit argues the domestic violence findings made by the court on
September 1, 2021 were not supported by substantial evidence. But Jojit
does not grapple with the substance of testimony from Maryann or their
adult children on the issue. Instead, he argues that this evidence was “one-
sided” because the video he attempted to introduce would have offered
“potentially contradictory” evidence. (Boldface and capitalization omitted.)
We reject this argument for the reasons described above.
IV. Retroactive Modification of Temporary Spousal Support
Jojit argues the trial court erred in selecting July 1, 2023 as the
effective date from which to retroactively modify temporary spousal support
to $0. He contends the effective date should have been September 1, 2021,
when the trial court made its domestic violence findings. Accepting this
contention would appear to retroactively modify Jojit’s temporary spousal
support to $0 earlier and thus result in a higher reimbursement amount owed
by him to Maryann for the September 1, 2021 to June 30, 2023 period:

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$70,994 ($3,227 monthly rate x 22 months) instead of $48,994 ($2,227
monthly rate x 22 months). Maryann does not “contest” Jojit’s position on
this issue, but the parties have not stipulated to any modification of the
judgment.
We see no legal basis to accept the argument that the trial court erred
in reducing temporary spousal support from September 1, 2021 to June 30,
2023 to $1,000 per month, instead of setting it to $0. Jojit contends it is
contrary to the public policy against domestic violence expressed in section
4320. (In re Marriage of Cauley (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1106.) Section
4320, subdivision (i)(5) requires a court to consider a judicial finding during
the pendency of a divorce proceeding that the spouse has committed domestic
violence in ordering spousal support, but nothing in section 4320 requires the
court retroactively to modify temporary spousal support to $0 upon such a
finding. To the contrary, the statute identifies several other factors for the
court also to consider when issuing an order on spousal support, including the
earning capacity of each party, periods of unemployment, the balance of
hardships, whether there is a criminal conviction of an abusive spouse, and
any other factors the court determines are “just and equitable.” (§ 4320,
subds. (a), (k), (m), (n).) That is precisely what the trial court did here,
balancing its domestic violence finding with Maryann’s “high earning”
income, Jojit’s “lower” income, evidence Jojit had “periods of unemployment
and disability,” and there being no criminal conviction for the domestic
violence in this case. While we conclude the trial court did not err here, we
note that nothing about our interpretation of section 4320 forecloses any
voluntary reimbursement of temporary spousal support.

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V. New Argument in Reply Brief
Jojit argues, for the first time in his reply brief, that the trial court
abused its discretion in setting permanent spousal support at $0 because it
failed to engage in a “comprehensive” analysis of the section 4320 factors. We
deem the argument forfeited. (Doe v. California Dept. of Justice (2009) 173
Cal.App.4th 1095, 1115 [appellant forfeits issue by failing to raise in opening
appellate brief].) And in any event, we are not persuaded by the merits
because the October 21, 2024 ruling included a detailed analysis of section
4320 factors and, upon considering and balancing those factors, the trial
court could reasonably conclude no permanent spousal support order was
appropriate.
VI. Motion for Sanctions
Maryann filed a motion for sanctions against Jojit for bringing a
frivolous appeal and submitting an opening appellate brief that violates the
Rules. Jojit did not timely file an opposition. Nevertheless, we decline to
grant the motion.
We have discretion to impose sanctions for a frivolous appeal, but such
“sanctions should be ‘used most sparingly to deter only the most egregious
conduct’ [citation], and that an appeal lacks merit does not, alone, establish it
is frivolous.” (In re Marriage of Gong & Kwong (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 510,
518.) Maryann argues Jojit’s appeal is frivolous because “ ‘it indisputably has
no merit,’ ” meaning “ ‘any reasonable attorney would agree that the appeal is
totally and completely without merit.’ ” (Kinney v. Clark (2017) 12
Cal.App.5th 724, 732.) We are not persuaded that the appeal here, which
includes a substantial evidence challenge to the enforcement of the
interspousal transfer deed with a discussion of the relevant testimony
presented at trial, satisfies that standard.

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Nor are we persuaded that sanctions are appropriate for violation of
Rules in the opening appellate brief. We note the flaws in that briefing,
which lacks record citations for many factual assertions and includes some
assertions not fully supported by the cited portions of the record, and we
remind Jojit’s counsel of the obligation to ensure briefs comply with rule
8.204. But in the exercise of our discretion, we decline to impose sanctions
here. “ ‘[T]he borderline between a frivolous appeal and one which simply
has no merit is vague,’ ” and we must police that line in a manner that avoids
a “chilling effect on the assertion of litigants’ rights on appeal.” (In re
Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 650.)
DISPOSITION
The motion to impose sanctions is denied. The judgment is affirmed.
Respondent shall recover her costs on appeal.

TUCHER, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

FUJISAKI, J.
RODRÍGUEZ, J.

Ubamos v. Ubamos (A172775)

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