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March 18, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Mare Deckard v. Town of Port Royal Zoning

Court of Appeals of South Carolina

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2024-001984

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (6)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Combined Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Mare Deckard, Appellant,

v.

Town of Port Royal Zoning Board of Appeals,
Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2024-001984

Appeal From Beaufort County
Robert J. Bonds, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-127
Submitted February 3, 2026 – Filed March 18, 2026

AFFIRMED

Mare Deckard, of Port Royal, pro se.

Thomas Allan Bendle, Jr., of Howell Gibson & Hughes,
PA, of Beaufort, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Mare Deckard appeals the circuit court's order affirming the
Town of Port Royal Zoning Board of Appeals's (the Board's) decision that
determined the construction of a fence on a neighbor's property fully complied
with the relevant zoning ordinance. On appeal, Deckard argues (1) the circuit
court erred in affirming the Board's decision because the Board failed to utilize the
correct section of the Town of Port Royal Development Code (the Development
Code) governing alleyways; (2) the circuit court erred in failing to properly
consider the Town of Port Royal's (the Town's) withholding of material fact, the
Town's attorney's untruthful statements, and the Board's improper reliance on
hearsay evidence; and (3) the circuit court and the Board failed to properly
articulate their findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm pursuant to Rule
220(b), SCACR.

1. We hold the circuit court did not err in affirming the Board's decision to permit
   the construction of the fence because evidence supports the Board's determinations
   that only division 5 of the Development Code was applicable to the construction of
   the fence and that the fence complied with division 5. See Venture Eng'g ex rel.
   DT LLC v. Horry Cnty. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 433 S.C. 419, 426, 858 S.E.2d 638,
   642 (Ct. App. 2021) ("In reviewing a decision of a zoning board of appeals, [an
   appellate] court applies the same standard of review as the circuit court."); Arkay,
   LLC v. City of Charleston, 418 S.C. 86, 91, 791 S.E.2d 305, 308 (Ct. App. 2016)
   ("The appellate court gives 'great deference to the decisions of those charged with
   interpreting and applying local zoning ordinances.'" (quoting Gurganious v. City of
   Beaufort, 317 S.C. 481, 487, 454 S.E.2d 912, 916 (Ct. App. 1995))); id. at 91-92,
   791 S.E.2d at 308 ("[An appellate] court will not reverse a zoning board's decision
   unless the board's findings of fact have no evidentiary support or the board
   commits an error of law."); Rest. Row Assocs. v. Horry County, 335 S.C. 209, 216,
   516 S.E.2d 442, 446 (1999) (providing a decision of a zoning board will only be
   overturned "if it is arbitrary, capricious, has no reasonable relation to a lawful
   purpose, or if the board has abused its discretion"); Town of Port Royal, S.C., Dev.
   Code art. 2, div. 2.2, § 2.2.10 (2025) ("This [d]ivision provides general standards
   for laying out blocks, lots, civic space set-asides, and thoroughfares. These
   standards are suitable for use in new developments, as well as the retrofit or infill
   of existing locations . . . ." (emphases added)); Town of Port Royal, S.C., Dev. Code
   art. 2, div. 2.3, § 2.3.10 (2025) ("The intent of this [d]ivision is to provide a catalog
   of pre-approved thoroughfare components and assemblies that are appropriate to
   use within each transect zone. Components can be combined to form
   thoroughfares. Assemblies are pre-approved groupings of components. Both are
   suitable for use in new developments, as well as the retrofit of existing
   locations . . . ." (emphases added)); Town of Port Royal, S.C., Dev. Code art. 5, div.
   5.5, § 5.5.20 (2025) ("The provisions of this [s]ection shall apply to all
   construction, substantial reconstruction, or replacement of fences or walls not
   required for support of a principal or accessory structure, or any other linear barrier
   intended to delineate different portions of a lot."); Town of Port Royal, S.C., Dev.
   Code art. 5, div. 5.5, § 5.5.30(A)(1)(b) (2025) ("Fences and walls are
   permitted . . . [o]n a property line adjacent to, but outside a public right of way.").

2. We hold Deckard's arguments that the circuit court erred in failing to consider
   the town's withholding of evidence, the Town's attorney's untruthful statements,
   and the Board's improper reliance on hearsay evidence are abandoned on appeal.
   Deckard failed to include any supporting authority in furtherance of her arguments
   and made merely conclusory statements that such errors occurred and were
   prejudicial to her. See First Sav. Bank v. McLean, 314 S.C. 361, 363, 444 S.E.2d
   513, 514 (1994) (holding that when an appellant "fails to provide arguments or
   supporting authority," he is "deemed to have abandoned th[e] issue"); Palmer v.
   State, 427 S.C. 36, 47, 829 S.E.2d 255, 261 (Ct. App. 2019) ("When a party
   provides no legal authority regarding a particular argument, the argument is
   abandoned and the court will not address the merits of the issue.").

3. We hold the Board's order satisfied the statutory requirements because the order
   was in writing and separately stated its findings of fact and conclusions of law and
   thus, the circuit court did not err in affirming it. See S.C. Code Ann. § 6-29-800 (F)
   (Supp. 2025) ("All final decisions and orders of the board must be in writing and
   be permanently filed in the office of the board as a public record. All findings of
   fact and conclusions of law must be separately stated in final decisions or orders of
   the board . . . ."). We also hold Deckard's argument that the circuit court's order
   was insufficient is not preserved for appellate review because she did not raise this
   issue with the circuit court in her Rule 59(e), SCRCP motion and raised it for the
   first time on appeal. See Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731,
   733 (1998) ("It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on
   appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the [circuit court] to be
   preserved for appellate review.").

AFFIRMED.1

WILLIAMS, C.J., and KONDUROS and VINSON, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.