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March 18, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

U.S. Bank Trust N.A. v. Puleo, R. & Puleo, L.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: 2026 Pa. Super. 51
• Docket Number: 754 MDA 2025

• Judges: Lane

• Opinion

• Authorities (4)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (11.5K)

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Lead Opinion

                        by Lane

J-A04032-26 & J-A04033-26

2026 PA Super 51

U.S. BANK TRUST NATIONAL : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
ASSOCIATION NOT IN ITS : PENNSYLVANIA
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY BUT SOLELY :
AS TRUSTEE FOR HOF GRANTOR :
TRUST 1 :
:
v. :
:
RICHARD J. PULEO, LORRAINE B. : No. 754 MDA 2025
PULEO :
:
v. :
:
FAY SERVICING, INC., PETER :
MELTZER, ESQ., AND WEBER, :
GALLAGHER, SIMPSON, STAPLETON, :
FIRES & NEWBY, LLP :
:
APPEAL OF: RICHARD J. PULEO AND :
LORRAINE B. PULEO :
:

Appeal from the Order Entered February 25, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Civil Division at No(s):
2024-SU-000938

U.S. BANK TRUST NATIONAL : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
ASSOCIATION NOT IN ITS : PENNSYLVANIA
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY BUT :
SOLELY AS TRUSTEE FOR HOF :
GRANTOR TRUST 1 :
:
v. :
:
LEWISBERRY PARTNERS, LLC : No. 755 MDA 2025
:
Appellant :
:

Appeal from the Order Entered February 27, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Civil Division at No(s):
2024-SU-000946
J-A04032-26 & J-A04033-26

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KING, J., and LANE, J.

OPINION BY LANE, J.: FILED: MARCH 18, 2026

In these related mortgage foreclosure actions, we address together the

pro se appeal of Richard J. Puleo, Esquire and his wife, Lorraine B. Puleo

(collectively, “the Puleos”), and the appeal of Lewisberry Partners, LLC

(“Lewisberry Partners”),1 from the orders granting the petitions of U.S. Bank

Trust National Association (“U.S. Bank”),2 to appoint a temporary receiver for

the mortgaged properties. The Puleos and Lewisberry Partners challenge the

orders on the basis that the trial court did not require the temporary receiver

to post mandatory security pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 1533(d). While these

appeals were pending, the trial court entered subsequent orders appointing a

permanent receiver. Despite the entry of subsequent orders appointing a

permanent receiver, we hold that these appeals are not moot. We further

hold that a trial court may not dispense with the mandatory security

requirement of Rule 1533(d) when appointing a temporary or permanent

receiver, even where the parties have contractually agreed to the appointment

of a receiver. Accordingly, we affirm in part, and reverse in part.

By way of background, these mortgage foreclosure actions involve fifty

townhomes located in a development in Lewisberry, York County. The Puleos

owned twenty townhomes. The Puleos also own an 82.237% interest in

---

1 Richard J. Puleo, Esquire is counsel of record for Lewisberry Partners.

2 U.S. Bank is proceeding not in its individual capacity, but solely as trustee

for HOF Grantor Trust 1.

-2-
J-A04032-26 & J-A04033-26

Lewisberry Partners, which, in June 2019, purchased thirty townhomes in the

same development for $10,600,000. To finance the acquisition, Lewisberry

Partners borrowed $8,025,000 (the “Loan”) from a loan funder (the “Lender”).

As security for the Loan, Lewisberry Partners executed a mortgage (the

“Lewisberry Partners Mortgage”), encumbering its thirty properties. On the

same date, the Puleos also executed a mortgage (the “Puleo Mortgage”) in

favor of the Lender, which encumbered their twenty properties as additional

collateral for the Loan. For ease of discussion, we refer to these two

mortgages collectively as the “Mortgage Documents.”

Relevant to the disputes at issue in these appeals, the Mortgage

Documents executed by the Puleos and Lewisberry Partners contained

identical provisions authorizing the appointment of a receiver upon the filing

of a foreclosure action:

(e) Upon, or at any time after the filing of an action to
foreclosure this Mortgage, the court in which such action is
filed may, at the request of [U.S.Bank,] the Mortgagee,
appoint a receiver of the Property. Such appointment may be
either before or after sale, with notice to Mortgagor, without
regard to the solvency or insolvency of Mortgagor [or] the
adequacy or inadequacy of any remedy available at law . . . and
Mortgagee hereunder or any agent of Mortgagee may be
appointed as such receiver. Such receiver shall have the power
to perform all of the acts . . . necessary or . . . customary in such
cases for the protection, possession, control, management and
operation of the Property during such period[.]

Puleos Mortgage, 6/26/19, at 17 (emphasis added); see also Lewisberry

Partners Mortgage, 6/26/19, at 17.

-3-
J-A04032-26 & J-A04033-26

In April 2020, Lewisberry Partners defaulted on the Loan. In February

2021, Lewisberry Partners filed for bankruptcy protection in federal court.

While the bankruptcy action was pending, the Lender assigned its rights under

the Loan Documents to U.S. Bank. Lewisberry Partners also sold five

properties.

In August 2022, under the supervision of the bankruptcy court, the

Puleos, Lewisberry Partners, and the Lender entered into a settlement

agreement (the “Settlement Agreement”). The Settlement Agreement

acknowledged an outstanding loan balance of $8,880,413 and required

Lewisberry Partners to pay that amount in full within one year. The Settlement

Agreement also required the Puleos and Lewisberry Partners to remit rent

payments from the mortgaged properties to U.S. Bank. The Settlement

Agreement expressly provided that, upon the filing of a foreclosure action on

either the Puleos’ properties or the Lewisberry Partners’ properties, the Puleos

and Lewisberry Partners waived all defenses and consented to the entry of a

confession of judgment.

Lewisberry Partners failed to pay the loan balance in full by August 2023.

In March 2024, U.S. Bank instituted the instant foreclosure proceedings

against the Puleos and Lewisberry Partners based upon their failure to comply

with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Lewisberry Partners

subsequently filed for bankruptcy protection a second time. During the

pendency of the second bankruptcy, Lewisberry Partners sold additional

properties and remitted the proceeds to U.S. Bank, leaving thirty-seven unsold

-4-
J-A04032-26 & J-A04033-26

townhomes secured by the mortgages. In December 2024, the bankruptcy

court issued an order which, inter alia: (1) dismissed Lewisberry Partners’

second bankruptcy action; (2) held the Settlement Agreement remained in

effect and binding on the parties; and (3) held the outstanding loan balance

was $8,434,924, with per diem interest of $4,792.3

In February 2025, U.S. Bank filed separate petitions seeking the

appointment of a temporary receiver for the Puleos’ and Lewisberry Partners’

properties. The trial court docket, as well as certificates of service attached

to the petitions, indicates that the Puleos and Lewisberry Partners were both

served with notice by first class mail.4 U.S. Bank alleged that: (1) a

receivership was necessary to protect and preserve the mortgaged properties

because the Puleos and Lewisberry Partners had not remitted any rent

payments since September 2024; and (2) pursuant to the Mortgage

Documents, it was entitled to the appointment of a receiver upon default.

On February 25, 2025, and February 27, 2025, the trial court entered

the underlying orders appointing the same individual as temporary receiver

over the mortgaged properties. The orders authorized the receiver, effective

---

3 The bankruptcy court’s order also found the aggregate fair market value of

the thirty-seven properties was approximately $8,885,000.

4 For purposes of our analysis, the relevant inquiry is whether service was
made in accordance with the rules governing notice. See Pa.R.Civ.P.
440(a)(1)-(2) (permitting service by first-class mail); Pa.R.Civ.P. 440(b)
(providing that “Service by mail is complete upon mailing”). Therefore,
service is deemed complete upon mailing, and an order entered after mailing
but before actual receipt is not entered “without notice.”

-5-
J-A04032-26 & J-A04033-26

March 1, 2025, to assume exclusive possession and control of the Puleos’ and

Lewisberry Partners’ properties, to exercise authority over rent payments and

security deposits, and to take all actions necessary to manage, operate,

preserve, maintain, administer, and market the properties. The orders

specified that the receiver was not required to post security.

In response to the appointment orders, the Puleos and Lewisberry

Partners each timely filed motions for reconsideration and notices of appeal.5

In their respective motions for reconsideration, the Puleos and Lewisberry

Partners challenged the appointments of the temporary receiver on the ground

that the trial court failed to require the receiver to post security, as mandated

by Rule 1533.6

On March 27, 2025, while these appeals were pending, the trial court

conducted a hearing to determine whether to continue the receivership.7

---

5 The Puleos and Lewisberry Partners erroneously filed their notices of appeal

in the Commonwealth Court, which then transmitted them to this Court.
Nevertheless, we treat the notices of appeal as timely pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
751(a) (providing that when a court lacking jurisdiction transfers an appeal to
a court with jurisdiction, the appeal “shall be treated as if originally filed in
transferee court on the date first filed”).

6 The Puleos and Lewisberry Partners did not dispute that the Loan Documents

authorized U.S. Bank, upon default and after notice, to seek the appointment
of a receiver.

7 Although the filing of an appeal generally divests the trial court of jurisdiction

to proceed further in the matter, see Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a), Pa.R.A.P. 311
expressly designates an order appointing a receiver as an immediately
appealable interlocutory order. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(2). Rule 311 further
provides that Rule 1701(a) “shall not be applicable” to such an appeal.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

-6-
J-A04032-26 & J-A04033-26

Immediately following the hearing, the trial court entered orders continuing

the receivership and appointing the same receiver on a permanent basis for

the Puleos’ properties and the Lewisberry Partners’ properties. The permanent

receivership orders likewise specified that the receiver was not required to

post security. Neither the Puleos nor Lewisberry Partners filed a notice of

appeal from those orders.

Meanwhile, with regard to the instant appeal, the Puleos and Lewisberry

Partners complied with the trial court’s orders to file Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise

statements of matters complained of on appeal. The trial court issued two

Rule 1925(a) opinions, suggesting that its subsequent March 27, 2025

permanent receivership orders rendered moot these appeals from the

temporary receivership orders.

This Court issued per curiam rules on the Puleos and Lewisberry Partners

to show cause why these appeals, from the appointment of a temporary

receiver, were not rendered moot where the trial court had subsequently

entered orders appointing a permanent receiver. The Puleos responded that

the appeals were not moot “because the requested relief is not impossible,”

and argued the merits of the requirement of security. Puleos’ Response to

Rule to Show Cause, 7/14/25, at 2; see also Lewisberry Partners’ Response

to Rule to Show Cause, 7/11/25, at unnumbered 2. This Court discharged the

---

Pa.R.A.P. 311(h). Accordingly, the filing of these appeals did not divest the
trial court of jurisdiction to conduct the hearing and enter the March 27, 2025
permanent receivership orders.

-7-
J-A04032-26 & J-A04033-26

rule to show cause but advised that the merits panel may revisit the issue of

mootness.

The Puleos present the following issues for our review:

1. Did the [trial] court abuse its discretion and/or commit error of
   law by failing to require the appointed receiver to post a bond,
   as mandated by [Rule] 1533(a) and 1533(d)?

2. Did the [trial] court abuse its discretion and/or commit error of
   law by failing to follow the binding precedent set forth in the
   Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision in Levin v. Barish,
   . . . 481 A.2d 1183 ([Pa.] 1984), requiring the posting of a
   bond in receivership appointments?

Puleos’ Brief at 2-3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

Lewisberry Partners presents the following issue for our review:

Did the [trial court] commit error of law and abuse its discretion
when it appointed a receiver over [Lewisberry Partners’]
mortgaged real property (consisting of 37 residential townhomes
with a fair market value over [$9,000,000]) without . . . requiring
the receiver to post a bond, contrary to [Rule] 1533([d]) and the
controlling case law?

Lewisberry Partners’ Brief at 3-4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

As the issues raised by the Puleos and Lewisberry Partners are

essentially the same, we address the appeals together. We first consider the

issue of mootness raised by the trial court. Generally, an appellate court will

not decide moot questions. See Shirley v. Pa. Legis. Reference Bureau,

318 A.3d 832, 850 (Pa. 2024). An issue is moot when the court’s

determination cannot have any practical effect on the existing controversy.

See id. at 850. An appeal may become moot due to an intervening change

in circumstances eliminating the underlying dispute. See id.

-8-
J-A04032-26 & J-A04033-26

The trial court concluded that its subsequent orders appointing a

permanent receiver rendered moot these appeals from the earlier temporary

receivership orders. We disagree.

In Northampton Nat’l Bank v. Piscanio, 379 A.2d 870 (Pa. 1977)

(“Piscanio”), our Supreme Court held that termination of a temporary

receivership did not moot an appeal challenging the propriety of the

appointment. Although Piscanio involved a contested appointment, the

Court’s mootness analysis did not turn on the merits of the appointment itself,

but rather on the potential legal consequences flowing from the period of

appointment, despite its termination. See id. at 871–72. The Court reasoned

that, because Rule 1533 conditions a party’s ability to recover damages on a

determination that the appointment was “vacated because improperly

made[,]” dismissal of the appeal would foreclose meaningful relief. Id. The

Court further emphasized the serious consequences attendant to a

receivership and that “[b]y dismissing the appeal as moot we would be

foreclosing the appellants’ rights to seek damages.” Id. at 872.

That rationale applies with equal force here. In its appointment orders,

the trial court expressly ordered that neither the temporary nor the permanent

receiver was required to post security. A determination regarding the legality

of that condition carries continuing legal significance and may affect the

parties’ rights and liabilities. See id. Where a court authorizes a receiver to

act without first requiring the security mandated by Rule 1533(d), the legality

of that authorization bears directly upon the parties’ potential remedies and

-9-
J-A04032-26 & J-A04033-26

exposure. See id. at 871. Thus, even though the temporary receivership

ended upon the trial court’s later orders appointing a permanent receiver, a

ruling on whether the temporary appointment complied with the security

requirements of the Rule has practical consequences beyond the mere

expiration of the temporary receivership. Indeed, if this Court were to dismiss

these appeals as moot, we would be foreclosing the rights of the Puleos and

Lewisberry Partners to seek damages for actions taken by the temporary

receiver during his appointment. Thus, because this Court can still grant relief

that meaningfully affects the parties’ rights, the appeals are not moot. We

therefore proceed to review the issues presented.

The Puleos and Lewisberry Partners contend that the trial court erred as

a matter of law by appointing a receiver without requiring the posting of

security as mandated by Rule 1533(a) and (d). Appellate review of

receivership orders considers “whether there has been an abuse of discretion

by the lower Court, or an error or misapprehension of the law.” Tate v.

Philadelphia Transp. Co., 190 A.2d 316, 323 (Pa. 1963).

We first address the contention by the Puleos and Lewisberry Partners

that Rule 1533(a) applies to the appointment of the temporary receiver in

these matters. Rule 1533(a) requires a plaintiff to provide security when a

temporary receiver is appointed “without notice.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1533(a)

(emphasis added). Subsection (a) is directed to situations in which a party

seeks the appointment of a receiver without notice to the adverse party and

obtains relief ex parte. The Puleos and Lewisberry Partners contend that

• 10 - J-A04032-26 & J-A04033-26

subsection (a) governs here because they did not receive the petition until

after the trial court entered the orders appointing a temporary receiver.

We are not persuaded that subsection (a) applies in these

circumstances. As indicated above, the record reflects that U.S. Bank served

the petitions in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure. See Pa.R.Civ.P.

440(a)(1)-(2). Under Rule 440(b), “[s]ervice by mail . . . is complete upon

mailing.” Thus, for purposes of Rule 1533(a), the question is whether the

appointment was entered ex parte without compliance with the service rules,

not whether the opposing party physically received the mailing before the

court acted. Where, as here, U.S. Bank served the petitions in accordance

with the procedural rules prior to entry of the orders, the appointment is not

“without notice” within the meaning of Rule 1533(a).

Additionally, the Puleos and Lewisberry Partners executed the Mortgage

Documents, agreeing to the appointment of a receiver upon foreclosure “with

notice.” The record reflects that this procedure was followed, undermining

their assertion that U.S. Bank secured the appointment ex parte. Moreover,

the Puleos and Lewisberry Partners do not challenge the trial court’s authority

to appoint a receiver, as contemplated by the Mortgage Documents upon

default. Accordingly, we conclude that subsection (a) does not control our

analysis.

We now consider the application of subsection (d), which governs the

security required of the receiver and applies to all receivers, temporary or

permanent. It provides:

• 11 - J-A04032-26 & J-A04033-26

(d) Except as otherwise provided by an Act of Assembly, a
receiver, whether temporary or permanent, must give such
security for the faithful performance of the receiver’s duty
as the court shall direct. A receiver shall not act until he or
she has given the security required.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1533(d) (emphasis added).

Rule 1533(d) imposes a mandatory obligation on the receiver to post

security. See Levin, 481 A.2d at 1189. The Rule’s use of the word “must”

leaves no discretion to dispense with security altogether; the trial court’s

discretion extends only to determining the amount and form of the security.

See id. at 1188–89. The failure to require a receiver to post security

constitutes legal error. See id.

The requirement for the posting of security stems from a recognition

that a receivership is an extraordinary equitable remedy that transfers

possession and control of property from its owner to a court-appointed

fiduciary. See Piscanio, 379 A.2d at 872–73. Because a receiver is vested

with authority to take control of property and act on behalf of the court, Rule

1533(d) requires security “for the faithful performance of the receiver’s duty,”

and prohibits the receiver from acting until such security is given. Pa.R.Civ.P.

1533(d). As Levin makes clear, this requirement is mandatory absent an Act

of Assembly providing otherwise. See Levin, 481 A.2d at 1188–89.

Further, although parties may contractually agree to the appointment of

a receiver upon default, see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Liberty Ctr.

Venture, 650 A.2d 887, 891 (Pa. Super. 1994), such agreements concern the

• 12 - J-A04032-26 & J-A04033-26

availability of the remedy, not compliance with the procedural requirements

governing a court-appointed receivership. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1533(d).

On appeal, the Puleos and Lewisberry Partners rely on Levin, asserting

that Rule 1533(d)’s security requirement is mandatory and that contractual

consent to a receivership does not permit a court-appointed receiver to act in

contravention of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.

The trial court considered this issue but determined that because the

Puleos and Lewisberry Partners contractually agreed to the appointment of a

receiver, no security was required. The court reasoned:

We have no appellate authority which requires [a] bond when
there is a contractual agreement in place for the appointment of
a receiver, whether temporary o[r] permanent. Further, [the
Puleos and Lewisberry Partners have] not brought any such
authority to our attention, either at the hearing or since the
hearing. Where two parties contract for the appointment of a
receiver, we do not see the need for [a] bond.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/7/25 at 6; see also Trial Court Opinion, 5/13/25 at 6.

Applying our standard of review, we conclude that the trial court

committed legal error. See Tate, 190 A.2d at 323. We first acknowledge

what is not in dispute. The Mortgage Documents expressly authorized the

appointment of a receiver upon the filing of a foreclosure action. The Puleos

and Lewisberry Partners do not now challenge the trial court’s authority to

appoint one. Contractual consent to the appointment of a receiver concerns

the availability of that remedy; compliance with the procedural safeguards

governing its implementation remains mandatory. See Levin, 481 A.2d at

• 13 - J-A04032-26 & J-A04033-26

1188-89; see also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 650 A.2d at 891. While the

Puleos and Lewisberry Partners agreed that a receiver could be appointed

upon default, they did not agree to waive the security requirement imposed

by Rule 1533(d). The two are distinct.

Rule 1533(d) provides that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by an Act

of Assembly, a receiver, whether temporary or permanent, must give such

security for the faithful performance of the receiver’s duty as the court shall

direct,” and that a receiver “shall not act” until such security is given.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1533(d). As our Supreme Court explained in Levin, the Rule’s

use of the word “must” renders the posting of security mandatory; the trial

court’s discretion extends only to the amount and form of that security, not

to whether it is required at all. Levin, 481 A.2d at 1188–89.

The mandatory language of Rule 1533(d) reflects the substantive

safeguard it imposes. A receivership is an extraordinary equitable remedy

that divests property owners of possession and control and places substantial

authority in a court-appointed fiduciary. See Piscanio, 379 A.2d at 872–73.

Here, the orders vested the receiver with exclusive control of assets exceeding

eight million dollars and broad authority over rents, deposits, and property

management. In such circumstances, the security required by Rule 1533(d)

ensures funds are available in the event of mismanagement or breach of

fiduciary duty. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1533(d); see also Piscanio, 379 A.2d at

872–73.

• 14 - J-A04032-26 & J-A04033-26

Because no statutory exception applies here, the trial court lacked

authority to permit the receiver to act without first posting security. See

Levin, 481 A.2d at 1188–89. Once a court appoints a receiver — temporary

or permanent — it is bound to comply with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil

Procedure governing receiverships. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1533(d); see also

Levin, 481 A.2d at 1188–89.

Accordingly, we affirm the appealed orders to the extent that they

appointed a temporary receiver. We reverse those orders insofar as they

excused the posting of security and remand for compliance with Rule 1533(d).

The failure to require the posting of security contravenes Rule 1533(d), and

compliance with that Rule is required on remand. The amount of such security

shall be determined by the trial court in accordance with Rule 1533(d).

Orders affirmed in part and reversed in part. Case remanded with

instructions. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 03/18/2026

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