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March 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State of Louisiana v. Tremel Boss

Louisiana Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2026-K-0026
• Judges: Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano; Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins; Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase

• Disposition: Writ Granted; Judgment Reversed Jenkins, J., Dissents I Would Deny the Writ Application.

• Opinion

• Authorities (8)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Disposition

Writ Granted; Judgment Reversed Jenkins, J., Dissents I Would Deny the Writ Application.

Lead Opinion

                        by Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase

STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2026-K-0026

VERSUS *
COURT OF APPEAL
TREMEL BOSS *
FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
STATE OF LOUISIANA

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APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO
CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 565-874, SECTION “J”
Honorable Franz Zibilich, Judge, ad hoc

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Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase

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(Court composed of Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano, Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins,
Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase)

JENKINS, J., DISSENTS

Liz Murrill
Louisiana Attorney General
J. Bryant Clark, Jr.
J. Taylor Gray
Louisiana Department of Justice
P.O. Box 94005
Baton Rouge, LA 70804

COUNSEL FOR RELATOR STATE OF LOUISIANA

Kevin Boshea
Attorney at Law
8075 Jefferson Highway
Baton Rouge, LA 70809

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT TREMEL BOSS

WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED
MARCH 13, 2026
TGC
JCL

Relator, State of Louisiana (hereinafter “the State”), seeks review of the

district court’s November 13, 2025 ruling finding no probable cause and granting

Respondent, Tremel Boss’, motion to suppress. After consideration of the writ

application before this Court and the applicable law, we grant the writ and reverse

the district court’s ruling finding no probable cause and granting the motion to

suppress.

Relevant Facts and Procedural History

On March 2, 2025, Louisiana State Trooper Calvin Nguyen was conducting

“foot patrols” near the intersection of Canal Street and Royal Street during the

Bacchus parade. He observed Respondent wearing a “solid black mask that

cover[ed] [Respondent’s] whole face except [his] eyes.” Trooper Nguyen

approached Respondent and notified him of the mask prohibition and asked him if

he was concealing a weapon. Respondent answered in the negative and Trooper

Nguyen initiated a pat down, during which a gun was discovered. Trooper Nguyen

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then read Respondent his Miranda rights.1 During a search incident to arrest, two

Percocet pills were seized from Respondent’s pocket.

On April 3, 2025, the State filed a bill of information charging Respondent

with one count of wearing masks, hoods or other facial disguises in a public place,

a violation of La. R.S. 14:313; one count of possession of a firearm by a person

convicted of certain felonies, a violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1; one count of

possession of a controlled dangerous substance schedule II, a violation of La. R.S.

40:967(C)(1); one count of illegal carrying of a weapon, a violation of La. R.S.

14:95(E); one count of illegal possession of a stolen firearm, a violation of La. R.S.

14:69.1; and one count of negligent carrying of a concealed handgun, a violation of

La. R.S. 40:1382(A)(2). Respondent filed an omnibus motion to suppress

statements, evidence and identification which was considered by the district court.

After examining the mask worn by Respondent, the district court found no

probable cause and suppressed the evidence against Respondent. This application

for supervisory review followed.

Discussion

La. R.S. 14:313 provides, in pertinent part, that no person shall wear a hood

or mask in public, except for those persons participating in carnival parades or

Mardi Gras festivities. In granting the motion to suppress, the district court posited

that the exception, of wearing a mask during Mardi Gras season, would apply even

to individuals who were not participating in the parade. For the district court, the

definition of the word “participate” in La. R.S. 14:313 was the sole dispositive

issue. We disagree. Irrespective of the mask prohibition, we find the germane issue

more accurately defined as whether law enforcement had probable cause to

1 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)

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effectuate a stop and arrest of Respondent. The determination of whether probable

cause exists for an arrest or reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop is an

objective inquiry that considers all of the information known collectively to the

law enforcement personnel involved in the investigation. State v. Elliott, 2009-

1727, p. 5 (La. 3/16/10), 35 So.3d 247, 251. The state trooper directly observed

conduct constituting a violation of La. R.S. 14:313, giving him probable cause to

arrest Respondent. A search conducted incident to a lawful arrest is a well-

established exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Surtain, 2009-1835, p. 7

(La. 3/16/10), 31 So.3d 1037, 1043 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.

218, 224, 94 S.Ct. 467, 471, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973)). “It is well established

searches incident to arrest conducted immediately before formal arrest are valid if

probable cause to arrest existed prior to the search.” Surtain, 2009-1835, p. 11, 31

So.3d at 1046 (quoting State v. Sherman, 2005-0779, p. 9 (La. 4/4/06), 931 So.2d

286, 292); see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 2564,

65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980) (“Where the formal arrest followed quickly on the heels of

the challenged search of petitioner’s person, we do not believe it particularly

important that the search preceded the arrest rather than vice versa.”). Under that

doctrine, the search of Respondent’s person, during which the firearm and

narcotics were recovered, was constitutionally permissible.

Further, reasonableness dictates the necessity of balancing legitimate law

enforcement concerns and an individual’s protected privacy interest. State v.

McClendon, 2013-1454, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/30/14), 133 So.3d 239, 244. The

stop in this matter occurred two months after the terrorist attack on Bourbon Street,

which no doubt heightened law enforcement’s concerns. Respondent was wearing

a ski mask, not a type of mask commonly worn during Mardi Gras season, which

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covered his entire face and concealed his identity. Under the totality of the

circumstances, wearing a ski mask, in the French Quarter, two months after a

terrorist attack in the French Quarter provided legal justification to conduct an

investigatory stop of Respondent. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98

S.Ct. 1717, 1723, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) (“the fact that the officer does not have

the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal

justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as

the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”). Accordingly, we grant

the writ and reverse the district court’s ruling finding no probable cause and

granting the motion to suppress.

WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED

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