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March 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State of Louisiana v. Jermeil Young

Louisiana Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2025-KA-0427
• Judges: Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins; Judge Rachael D. Johnson; Judge Karen K. Herman

• Disposition: Affirmed

• Opinion

• Authorities (14)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (14.2K)

• PDF

Disposition

Affirmed

Lead Opinion

                        by Judge Rachael D. Johnson

STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2025-KA-0427

VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL

JERMEIL YOUNG * FOURTH CIRCUIT

• STATE OF LOUISIANA

---

APPEAL FROM
CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 556-490, SECTION “E”
Judge Rhonda Goode-Douglas

---

Judge Rachael D. Johnson

---

(Court composed of Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins, Judge Rachael D. Johnson,
Judge Karen K. Herman)

Jason R. Williams
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
Brad Scott
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY
619 South White Street
New Orleans, LA 70119

COUNSEL FOR STATE/APPELLEE

Christopher A. Aberle
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT
P.O. Box 8583
Mandeville, LA 70470-8583

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

AFFIRMED
MARCH 13, 2026
RDJ
SCJ
KKH Defendant, Jermeil Young (“Defendant”), appeals the district court’s denial

of his Batson challenge, finding that the State’s reason for peremptorily striking a

prospective juror was race-neutral and not pretextual. For the following reasons,

we affirm the district court’s judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts of the underlying offense are not relevant for resolving the issue

raised on appeal.

During voir dire, a prosecutor (Ms. Kissinger) asked the prospective jurors if

they could vote to find Defendant guilty for first-degree rape knowing that the

sentence was life in prison without parole:

MS. KISSINGER:
So, you know that the charge in this case is first degree rape. The
sentence for first degree rape by law is mandatory life in prison.
That’s without benefit of parole or probation or suspension of
sentence. So, if you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty of this crime, then the sentence is mandatory life.

Now let me be very clear, you don’t get to determine sentence, right? .
. . Your job is [to] determine[] guilty or not guilty. That’s it. But the
law says that you need to know the charges [sic] what the defendant is
facing if you find him guilty.

So, we have to talk about how you feel about that. . . . [K]nowing that
it’s a mandatory life sentence, does that change your mind?

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Most prospective jurors answered directly. The following exchange occurred

between the prosecutor and a particular juror, “Juror Fourteen”:

MS. KISSINGER:
Okay. Juror number fourteen.

JUROR NUMBER FOURTEEN:
Just point of clarification.

MS. KISSINGER:
Sure.

JUROR NUMBER FOURTEEN:
So, if proven guilty, if we say guilty, it’s a mandatory sentence. If we
say not guilty is their sentencing obviously — no?

MS. KISSINGER:
It’s a good question. It’s a good question. So, the law says we have
what’s called responsive verdicts. So, the law says if you don’t
believe, if you believe that he’s guilty of first-degree rape, then your
verdict should be not guilty — I mean, should be guilty. But if you
don’t believe that he’s guilty of first-degree rape then but you believe
he’s guilty of second-degree rape then you can vote guilty to second
degree rape. And it goes down. There’s a series of charges that you
may feel fit better. Okay? So, that’s always an option. But the
question is specifically, and the state intends to prove that he’s guilty
of what he is charged. So, if we prove that, can you vote guilty?

JUROR NUMBER FOURTEEN:
I’m also assuming that well, if selected obviously we will have the
option to choose second degree, third degree, first degree or whatever
is that a part of the option?

MS. KISSINGER:
There are responsive verdicts.

JUROR NUMBER FOURTEEN:
Right, sure.

JUDGE GOODE-DOUGLAS:
And let me just make it clear. Mr. Fourteen, you will not know the
sentences of the responsive, okay?

JUROR NUMBER FOURTEEN:
Sure, sure.

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JUDGE GOODE-DOUGLAS:
The only reason why you’re knowing this is just because the law
allows the state and the defense to question you about life without
benefit sentence.

JUROR NUMBER FOURTEEN:
Sure, but we’ll be responsible for saying this is second degree or —

JUDGE GOODE-DOUGLAS:
Yes.

JUROR NUMBER FOURTEEN:
— Okay.

JUDGE GOODE-DOUGLAS:
You’ll have the opportunity to, you’ll be presented with some
responsive verdicts, okay?

JUROR NUMBER FOURTEEN
Thank you. Then, yes.

MS. KISSINGER:
Okay. Thank you.

Directly after, the prosecutor probed a different juror, “Juror

Thirteen”:

MS. KISSINGER:
Juror number thirteen.

JUROR NUMBER THIRTEEN:
I feel like fourteen kind of clarified some questions I had. So, yes.

MS. KISSINGER:
Okay. So, if we prove guilt to you first degree rape, can you convict
of first-degree rape knowing that the sentence is life?

JUROR NUMBER THIRTEEN:
Yes.

Later, in chambers, the State exercised a peremptory strike of Juror Fourteen

based on the aforementioned exchanged:

MS. KISSINGER:
There's, let’s see — yeah, so there’s a couple we'd like to talk to.
Number one is — well, the first one is number fourteen. He never
would answer the question about whether or not he could vote guilty

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as charged. He did say that if he had other options, he could vote. But
he never would say whether or not he could vote with the first-degree
rape.

JUDGE GOODE-DOUGIAS:
Okay. I think I kind of went over it with him, but we can call him
back.

The State called Juror Fourteen back in chambers to clarify his position:

MS. KISSINGER:
We talked about the life without probation, without the benefit of
probation, parole benefits. And you seemed, you said you were unsure
initially if you could vote if you believed the state proved its case
beyond a reasonable doubt —

JUROR NUMBER FOURTEEN:
Sure.

MS. KISSINGER:
— you weren’t sure if you could vote guilty as charged on the first-
degree rape. You did say that you would be fine with the responsive,
but the question is if we proved that he is guilty of first-degree rape,
can you find, can you vote guilty?

JUROR NUMBER FOURTEEN:
Yes.

MS. KISSINGER:
You can?

JUROR NUMBER FOURTEEN:
Yes.

MS. KISSINGER:
Okay.

The State exercised peremptory strikes against five black male prospective

jurors, including Juror Fourteen. This left only one black male juror on the petit

jury. The State used its two remaining peremptory strikes against a white female

prospective juror and black female prospective juror.

Based on the fact that five of the seven peremptory strikes were against

black male prospective jurors, counsel for Defendant (Mr. Zagory) lodged an

4
objection based on Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986), which held that

peremptory strikes based on race or gender are unconstitutionally discriminatory.

MR. ZAGORY:
Judge, I’m going to raise a Batson challenge. Looking at the state’s
seven strikes, I’m counting up five of them are black men. As a result
of that, there’s only one remaining black man left on this jury. And
that is, as far as I was able to perceive it, that is the security guard who
works a[t] [a prosecutor’s] children’s school. By my count . . . five of
the seven strikes are black men with only one remaining black male
on the jury.

The State then provided race-neutral reasoning for its peremptory

challenges. For Juror Fourteen, the State explained that his response to whether he

could convict of first-degree rape knowing the mandatory life without parole

sentence was “not solid enough”; he only affirmed that he could find Defendant

guilty after confirming that there would be responsive verdicts.

MS. KISSINGER:
So, [Juror Fourteen] was unsure on [life without benefit of parole].
And although he said that he could, it was only after he learned that
there confirmed that there were responsive [verdicts] that could be
found on. And so, because of that we felt that his response on [life
without benefit of parole] was not solid enough for us to keep him.

Counsel for Defendant did not challenge the State’s reasoning. The court

found that the State provided race-neutral and valid reasons:

JUDGE GOODE-DOUGLAS:
Okay. All right. So, at this time, the court is going to find that the state
has provided valid reasons for their strikes of the individuals that Mr.
Zagory has noted were stricken by the state in regard to what he
believes to be based upon their race. The court does believe that the
state has provided race neutral and valid reasons for the rationale
behind them using their peremptory strikes on those individuals. And
so, I will deny the Batson challenge; however, I will note your
objection for the records.

Following a four-day trial, a jury found Defendant guilty as charged of four

counts of first-degree rape. On April 7, 2025, Defendant filed motions for post-

verdict judgment of acquittal and for new trial. He asserted, in part, that the district

5
court’s finding that the State provided a “satisfactory” race-neutral reason for

striking Juror Fourteen was “prejudicial error.” The judge denied these motions at

the April 16, 2025 sentencing hearing and sentenced Defendant to four concurrent

life sentences.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“A reviewing court owes the district judge’s evaluations of discriminatory

intent great deference and should not reverse them unless they are clearly

erroneous.” State v. Turner, 2016-1841, p. 51 (La. 12/5/18), 263 So. 3d 337, 374

(citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364, (1991); Batson, 476 U.S. at 98,

n.21). Therefore, this Court should sustain the district court’s ruling on the Batson

objection unless it is clearly erroneous.

APPLICABLE LAW

“An exercise by the state of its peremptory strikes to remove potential jurors

from the venire panel solely on the basis of race or gender violates the Equal

Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.” State v. Crawford, 2014-

2153, p. 27 (La. 11/16/16), 218 So. 3d 13, 30 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 89-90).

The Louisiana Supreme Court adopted this holding in State v. Collier, 553 So. 2d

815 (La. 1989); the holding has also been codified in Louisiana law under La.

C.Cr.P. art. 795.

The Louisiana Supreme Court has articulated how courts are to analyze a

Batson challenge:

The United States Supreme Court in Batson and the cases that
followed has provided a three-step process to guide courts in
evaluating a claim of racial discrimination in jury selection:

(1) An opponent of the strike must make a prima facie
showing that a peremptory challenge has been exercised
on the basis of race;

6
(2) if the requisite showing has been made, the proponent
of the strike “must demonstrate that ‘permissible racially
neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced
the monochromatic result;’” and

(3) in light of the parties’ submissions, the trial court
must determine if the “[the opponent of the strike] has
established purposeful discrimination.”

The burden of persuasion never shifts from the opponent of the strike.
However, after the opponent of the strike establishes a prima facie
case of racial discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the
proponent of the strike to articulate race-neutral reasons for its use of
peremptory challenges.

State v. Jones, 2017-0658, pp. 5-6 (La. 10/22/19), 285 So. 3d 1074, 1078

(alteration in original) (citations omitted).

Under step one of a Batson analysis, to make a prima facie case of

discrimination, the challenging party must establish: (1) that the prosecutor’s

challenge was directed at a member of a cognizable group; (2) that the challenge

was peremptory rather than for cause; and (3) circumstances sufficient to raise an

inference that the prosecutor struck the prospective juror on account of race. State

v. Williams, 2013-0283, p. 16 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/7/16), 199 So. 3d 1222, 1232

(citing State v. Nelson, 2010-1724, pp. 9-10 (La. 3/13/12), 85 So. 3d 21, 29).

For step two of a Batson analysis, “if a prima facie showing of

discrimination is made, the burden shifts to the proponent of the strike to articulate

a race-neutral explanation for the challenge.” Nelson, 2010-1724 at p. 9, 85 So. 3d

at 29. “[T]he trial court must then determine if the opponent of the strike has

carried the ultimate burden of proving purposeful discrimination.” Id. “The Batson

explanation does not need to be persuasive, and unless a discriminatory intent is

inherent in the explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race-neutral.” State

7
v. Bender, 2013-1794, p. 4 (La. 9/3/14), 152 So. 3d 126, 129 (quoting State v. Elie,

2005-1569, p. 5 (La. 7/10/06), 936 So. 2d 791, 795).

Regarding step three of a Batson analysis, the Louisiana Supreme Court has

explained:

[T]he proper inquiry in the final stage of the Batson analysis is not
whether the State has disproved the existence of purposeful
discrimination suggested by the defendant’s prima facie case; rather,
the question is whether the defendant’s proof, when weighed against
the prosecutor’s proffered “race-neutral” reasons, is strong enough to
persuade the trier-of-fact that such discriminatory intent is present.

Id. (quoting State v. Green, 1994-0887, p. 29 (La. 5/22/95), 655 So. 2d 272, 290).

“Thus, while the State is only required to offer a reason for the strike, the

defendant raising a Batson challenge must establish proof of discriminatory

intent.” Id., 2013-1794 at p. 5, 152 So. 3d at 129.

[T]he focus of the Batson inquiry is upon the intent of the
prosecutor at the time he exercised his peremptory strikes. The
trial court should examine all of the available evidence in an effort to
discern patterns of strikes and other statements or actions by the
prosecutor during voir dire that support or reject a finding of
discriminatory intent. Because the factual determination pertaining to
intentional discrimination rests largely on credibility evaluations, the
trial court’s findings are entitled to great deference by the reviewing
court.

State v. Tilley, 1999-0569, p. 5 (La. 7/6/00), 767 So. 2d 6, 13 (emphasis added)

(citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Defendant argues that the district court erred in denying his

Batson challenge. Specifically, Defendant argues that “because the State used six

of its seven peremptory strikes on black jurors, five of whom were male, and

because the reasons given for the strike of at least one of those jurors was

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contravened by the record, this Court should vacate the conviction and remand for

a new trial.”

The State argues that the district court properly found that it provided race-

neutral reasons for striking Juror Fourteen as well as the other black male

prospective jurors. Additionally, the State asserts that Defendant’s failure to

dispute the State’s race-neutral reason in the district court constituted waiver of the

claim.

Defendant does not challenge the State’s grounds for removing any other

prospective jurors, so we will pretermit discussion of the State’s rationale in

striking them. It is only relevant that the court found those reasons to be valid and

race-neutral. Nonetheless, in his brief to this Court, Defendant argues that the

State’s choice to strike five black male prospective jurors was discriminatory.

Defendant cannot rely on the mere fact that the petit jury ultimately included

only one black male juror to illustrate that striking Juror Fourteen was

discriminatory. This Court has summarized the jurisprudence concerning reliance

on statistics to illustrate a prima facie case of discrimination:

The jurisprudence thus holds that bare statistics alone, without any
context, are insufficient to support a prima facie case of
discrimination. This is because “the value of numbers alone, without
any indication of the race or gender composition of the jury selected
or the pool from which it was drawn, is limited at best.”

Williams, 2013-0283 at p. 20, 199 So. 3d at 1235 (citations omitted). In Williams,

this Court further noted that “[t]here is no magic number of challenged jurors

which shifts the burden to the government to provide a neutral explanation for its

actions.” Id. (quoting United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F. 2d 695, 698 (9th Cir.

1989)). Thus, the fact that the State peremptorily struck multiple other black male

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prospective jurors from the petit jury is insufficient to show that striking Juror

Fourteen was discriminatory.

In furtherance of his argument that the State’s reasoning for striking Juror

Fourteen was pretextual, Defendant points to the response of Juror Thirteen.

Defendant argues that Juror Thirteen, who was female, “adopted” Juror Fourteen’s

answer, and the State’s failure to use a peremptory strike against her on the same

grounds as Juror Fourteen evidences discrimination.

We find that Juror Thirteen did not “adopt” Juror Fourteen’s answer. Rather,

she simply explained that Juror Fourteen’s questions provided her clarification.

Unlike Juror Fourteen, Juror Thirteen did not hesitate in stating that she could find

Defendant guilty knowing the mandatory sentence.

Contrastingly, Juror Fourteen only acquiesced that he could vote to find

Defendant guilty once the prosecutor made clear that there would be responsive

verdicts. He asked the judge and prosecutor if the jurors would “be responsible for

saying this is second degree,” and when the judge responded “You’ll have the

opportunity to, you’ll be presented with some responsive verdicts, okay?” He

replied “Thank you. Then, yes.” (Emphasis added). This phrasing creates the

reasonable inference that Juror Fourteen’s affirmative answer was conditional on

the option of having responsive verdicts (which may not carry the same mandatory

life sentence).

Indeed, the State later asked Juror Fourteen in chambers to clarify his stance,

at which point he stated that he could vote to convict Defendant guilty knowing the

mandatory sentence. However, this occurred after he already verified that there

would be responsive verdicts. He initially hesitated in his response and only

assented after learning of the responsive verdicts. Comparatively, his fellow

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prospective jurors gave direct responses as to whether they could vote to convict

Defendant knowing the mandatory sentence. Juror Fourteen’s initial hesitation, in

the context of the other prospective jurors’ direct and confident responses, serves

as a valid and race-neutral reason for the State to strike him.

The court found that the State’s decision to strike Juror Fourteen did not

indicate an intent to exclude him because of his race. Counsel for Defendant did

not challenge the State’s race-neutral explanation at trial, neither during voir dire

nor in chambers when following up with Juror Fourteen. The United States Fifth

Circuit has held that “a defendant waives objection to a peremptory challenge by

failing to dispute the prosecutor’s explanations” in district court. United States v.

Arce, 997 F. 2d 1123, 1127 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Rudas, 905 F.

2d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1990)).1 So, Defendant has waived his right to challenge the

State’s race-neutral explanation at this stage of the proceeding.

The decision of the district court must be given great deference and cannot

be reversed unless it is clearly erroneous. The facts here do not indicate that the

district court was clearly erroneous in accepting the State’s race-neutral reasoning

for peremptorily striking Juror Fourteen.

1 In Rudas, the United States Second Circuit found, in pertinent part:

Once the Government has offered reasons for its peremptory challenges, defense
counsel must expressly indicate an intention to pursue the Batson claim. . . . By
failing to dispute the Government’s explanations, [defendants] appeared to
acquiesce in them.

905 F. 2d at 41 (alteration in original).

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CONCLUSION

Finding that the State produced valid, race-neutral reasons for using a

peremptory strike against Juror Fourteen, we affirm the district court’s decision to

deny Defendant’s Batson challenge.

AFFIRMED

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