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April 6, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State of Louisiana v. Damon Z. McFarland Jr.

Louisiana Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2025-KA-0654
• Judges: Judge Rosemary Ledet; Judge Dale N. Atkins; Judge Nakisha Ervin-Knott

• Disposition: Affirmed

• Opinion

• Authorities (49)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (99.1K)

• PDF

Disposition

Affirmed

Lead Opinion

                        by Judge Dale N. Atkins

STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2025-KA-0654

VERSUS *
COURT OF APPEAL
DAMON Z. MCFARLAND JR. *
FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
STATE OF LOUISIANA

---

APPEAL FROM
CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 555-538, SECTION “E”
Rhonda Goode-Douglas, Judge

---

Judge Dale N. Atkins

---

(Court composed of Judge Rosemary Ledet, Judge Dale N. Atkins, Judge Nakisha
Ervin-Knott)

Jason R. Williams, District Attorney
Brad Scott, Chief of Appeals
Peter J. Vesich, Assistant District Attorney
PARISH OF ORLEANS
619 S. White Street
New Orleans, LA 70119

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, State of Louisiana

Rudy W. Gorrell, Jr.
1215 Prytania Street, Suite 223
New Orleans, LA 70130

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, Damon Z. McFarland Jr.

AFFIRMED
APRIL 6, 2026
DNA

RML

NEK

This is a criminal case. Appellant is Damon Z. McFarland Jr. (“Mr.

McFarland”), and Appellee is the State of Louisiana (“State”). On July 20, 2023,

the district court denied Mr. McFarland’s “Motion to Suppress . . . Physical

Evidence Seized” (“Motion to Suppress”). Subsequently, Mr. McFarland and the

State reached a plea agreement. Mr. McFarland now appeals the district court’s

denial of his Motion to Suppress and asks this Court to remand the matter to the

district court under State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584 (La. 1976). For the following

reasons, we find the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr.

McFarland’s Motion to Suppress, and we affirm his convictions and sentences.

RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 21, 2022, the State charged Mr. McFarland by bill of

information with one count of “us[ing], possess[ing], or hav[ing] under his

immediate control, any firearm . . . while unlawfully in the possession of a

controlled dangerous substance” in violation of La. R.S. 14:95(E); one count of

“knowingly and intentionally possess[ing] with the intent to distribute marijuana,

less than 2.5 pounds” in violation of La. R.S. 40:966(B)(2)(a); and one count of

“knowingly and intentionally possess[ing] with the intent to distribute a Schedule

1
II Controlled Dangerous Substance, to wit: methamphetamine, less than 28 grams”

in violation of La. R.S. 40:967(B)(1)(a). Mr. McFarland pled not guilty to all

charges. Subsequently, on December 6, 2022, Mr. McFarland filed his Motion to

Suppress, wherein he moved the district court to suppress:

1) All physical evidence seized in connection with this case;

2) All oral or written inculpatory statements made by the
defendant;

3) All out-of-court and/or pre-trial identification of the defendant
made by State witnesses.

On May 31, 2023, the district court held a hearing on Mr. McFarland’s Motion to

Suppress.

Motion to Suppress Hearing

At the hearing on Mr. McFarland’s Motion to Suppress, the State called

Detective Timothy Jones (“Detective Jones”) of the New Orleans Police

Department (“NOPD”). Detective Jones identified himself as an officer on the

NOPD’s “ATF Task Force” and stated he also served on the task force in May

1. Detective Jones testified that in May 2022, he worked on a case connected

with “a homicide shooting outside of Xavier” University of Louisiana (“Xavier”)

in New Orleans following a graduation ceremony. Clarifying, Detective Jones

explained that he did not investigate the homicide itself but became involved in the

case when the officers searching for the person(s) responsible for the homicide

discovered certain evidence in the course of their investigation.

Detective Jones described the shooting as follows: “there were two groups of

kind of feuding people, [who] got into a verbal altercation. It turned violent.

Weapons were discharged, and, subsequently, there was a bystander that was

struck and killed.” Detective Jones answered affirmatively when counsel for the

2
State asked whether Mr. McFarland was part of the incident. Elaborating,

Detective Jones stated:

So I learned about Mr. McFarland [when] the homicide detective
[Miles Guerreri (“Detective Guerreri”)] who was investigating the
incident, seized Mr. McFarland’s car from the crime scene, and I had
the opportunity to attempt to interview Mr. McFarland. [Detective
Guerreri] ended up electing to write a search warrant for Mr.
McFarland’s car [a 2014 red Infinity four-door sedan] and,
subsequently, he found some weapons and contraband in the vehicle.

As explained by Detective Jones, when the officers investigating the homicide

discovered a “privately manufactured firearm and narcotics” in Mr. McFarland’s

vehicle, they “relayed” that information to him.1 The State then offered the search

warrant into evidence, and the district court admitted it.

The affidavit for the search warrant for Mr. McFarland’s vehicle stated:

On Tuesday, May 31, 2022[,] at approximately 11:45 a.m., while
working a graduation ceremony detail at Xavier . . . , a[n] [NOPD]
detail officer overheard shots fired outside of the graduation
ceremony. The officer exited the building and observed several
bystanders shot. . . . A . . . female victim was located on scene
suffering from an apparent gunshot wound to the head. . . . and was
[subsequently] pronounced deceased.

Video surveillance obtained from the area of the crime scene revealed
a black male subject standing in the threshold of a red sedan vehicle,
later recovered by police. On the footage[,] the subject’s hands can
not [sic] be seen, however, multiple subjects who were involved in the
altercation can be seen running and getting into the 2014 Red Infiniti
four door sedan, . . . , registered to Damon McFarland, which is driven
[away] by the black male.

The driver of the vehicle, later identified as [Mr.] McFarland is
detained by police pending the homicide investigation. Throughout
the course of the investigation, detectives learned that a firearm was
inside of the red sedan driven by Mr. McFarland.

1 Detective Jones specified that “the scope of [his] investigation [was] only into the

possession of the firearm and the narcotics that were located in [Mr. McFarland’s] vehicle.”

3
The video surveillance, as described in the above affidavit, also shows Mr.

McFarland drive his vehicle away from the scene after the shooting with some of

the individuals involved in the altercation inside of the vehicle.

Counsel for the State then asked Detective Jones about the specifics of what

the officers located in the vehicle, and he responded that the officers located a

firearm, some marijuana, and some pills later identified as methamphetamine.

Regarding the gun, Detective Jones identified it as “a privately manufactured

firearm,” which is “commonly referred to as a ‘ghost gun’ on the street.”2

According to Detective Jones, after officers took Mr. McFarland into custody,

Detective Guirreri also seized his cell phone. Detective Jones testified that he

subsequently authored a search warrant for Mr. McFarland’s phone. The State also

offered that search warrant into evidence. The affidavit for the search warrant for

Mr. McFarland’s phone detailed the items seized during the search of Mr.

McFarland’s car, namely the “[g]host gun”; “a digital scale (commonly used to

weigh narcotics)”; “one and a half pounds of marijuana in . . . vacuum seal bags”;

“clear plastic bags (commonly used to package narcotics)”; “sixty dollars of United

States currency in various denominations”; “a clear plastic bag containing an

unknown quantity of pills (believed to be pharmaceutical grade narcotic)”; and “[a]

plastic bag containing 49 multicolored pills (believed to be ecstasy).” Further,

Detective Jones stated in his affidavit that “[p]redicated on the facts,” he believed

Mr. “McFarland [was] engaged in trafficking of narcotics at a street level” and, in

doing so, “would utilize his mobile device in furtherance of the trade by setting up

sales and contacting sources.” In other words, the affidavit explained that, based

2 Detective Jones further explained that the gun “was made from a mold.”

4
on officer knowledge of the common way modern drug transactions occur,

additional evidence of drug trafficking was likely on Mr. McFarland’s cell phone.

Then, the following colloquy occurred:

A So ultimately, [Mr. McFarland’s] phone was defeated[3] and a
report was generated. And by going through the content of the phone,
there were several instances of correspondence where drug
transactions were set up. There were discussions of a type of strain,
prices, and then frequently there was [sic] locations set, and there was
Cash App money sent.

Q And in your experience, what did that look like to you?

A To me, it looked like narcotic trafficking, street level.

Q Okay. And what did you do with that information after that?

A So having now obtained the information . . . from the phone and
having the firearm as well as the narcotics that was [sic] seized from
Mr. McFarland’s car, we applied for an arrest warrant.

Thereafter, according to Detective Jones, he located Mr. McFarland at his

residence and, based on the totality of the circumstances, obtained a search warrant

for that location.

The affidavit Detective Jones authored for the search warrant for Mr.

McFarland’s residence detailed the items officers seized from Mr. McFarland’s car

and stated the search of Mr. McFarland’s phone “revealed conversations directly

after the shooting in which [Mr.] McFarland indicated the firearm and narcotics are

his and in his vehicle.” Further, Detective Jones’ affidavit stated that in a

conversation on his phone, Mr. McFarland “attempt[ed] to have his girlfriend . . .

retrieve the firearm and narcotics from [his] vehicle, however, at the time of that

conversation Mr. McFarland’s vehicle had already been seized by police on the

scene.” Additionally, Detective Jones detailed evidence of drug dealing activity

3 Based on Detective Jones’ testimony, “defeated” meant the ATF Task Force was able to

get past any passwords or other security systems on Mr. McFarland’s phone.

5
found on Mr. McFarland’s phone, namely sending pictures of marijuana to

contacts; answering questions about the “strand type, flavor, and price” of the

marijuana; and providing meet up locations “that were preceded or followed by

Cashapp transactions in small denominations.” Detective Jones stated in his

affidavit that he believed he and his fellow detectives would not only be able to

apprehend Mr. McFarland at his residence, but also search for any outstanding

narcotics, firearms, and electronics used by Mr. McFarland in the distribution of

narcotics. During his testimony, Detective Jones explained they did in fact discover

“additional firearms and magazines, marijuana, and some packing material

[associated with drug dealing].” Detective Jones testified this concluded his

involvement in the matter.

Counsel for Mr. McFarland then questioned how the investigating officers

initially developed Mr. McFarland as a suspect so as to as to justify the search

warrant for his vehicle. Detective Jones explained:

I [do not] think it was clear at the time his vehicle was seized and his
phone was seized and he was asked for an interview who the
perpetrator [of the shooting incident] was. So I think that was a
normal part of the investigation that they were conducting. They were
trying to obtain all the facts. They were trying to obtain all of the
evidence. There was a firearm used. They were looking for the
firearm for ballistic reports, and [those are] common things that are
done in homicide reports so . . .

Detective Jones further explained, “I know that [Mr. McFarland] was present in the

surveillance footage of the incident, and he was there in his vehicle.” Additionally,

Detective Jones testified, “I believe, if I recall correctly,” that Mr. McFarland “was

part of [the] altercation in which this homicide occurred, and he entered and exited

his car on more than one occasion,” so the officers searched his vehicle “to locate

any potential weapons that were used in the incident.” Further, Detective Jones

6
explained that the surveillance video showed multiple individuals involved in the

shooting incident run to and get inside Mr. McFarland’s vehicle, which fled the

scene. Detective Jones acknowledged that the investigating officers ultimately

determined that Mr. McFarland was not the one who committed the homicide. But,

Detective Jones pointed out that at the time those officers searched Mr.

McFarland’s car, they did not know who had committed the homicide, and they

had to investigate their case.

As stated previously, Detective Jones referred to surveillance footage during

his testimony. Then, while arguing against Mr. McFarland’s Motion to Suppress,

counsel for the State also referred to that surveillance footage, noting it “revealed a

black male standing outside of a red Infinity sedan” and multiple subjects involved

in the shooting incident getting into that vehicle. Counsel for the State argued that

this video provided officers with probable cause to seize and search the vehicle to

determine if the gun used to commit the homicide was located inside. The district

court held Mr. McFarland’s Motion to Suppress open and requested to review the

video evidence, including the aforementioned surveillance footage and body worn

camera footage from on-campus officers who responded to the incident. Of import,

the State did not offer, file, or introduce the video evidence into the record during

the hearing. And, counsel for Mr. McFarland did not object to the district court

viewing the videos.

Denial of Mr. McFarland’s Motion to Suppress

On July 20, 2023, the district court denied Mr. McFarland’s Motion to

Suppress. In so doing, the district court noted that although officers eventually

determined Mr. McFarland was not responsible for the homicide, “they [initially]

developed him as a potential suspect” and thus had probable cause to seize his

7
vehicle and subsequently search it. Mr. McFarland then timely filed a writ

application with this Court regarding the district court’s denial of his Motion to

Suppress. In reviewing the district court’s ruling, this Court ordered Mr.

McFarland to supplement his writ application with the video exhibits viewed by

the district court. Ultimately, this Court denied Mr. McFarland’s writ application,

ruling the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. McFarland’s

Motion to Suppress. The matter then proceeded once again before the district

court.

Plea Agreement

Thereafter, Mr. McFarland and the State reached a plea agreement; and on

January 9, 2024, Mr. McFarland entered a guilty plea pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art.

890.1.4 Specifically, Mr. McFarland pled guilty to: (1) one count of violating La.

R.S. 14:95(E) (“Illegal carrying of weapons”); (2) one count of violating La. R.S.

40:966(B)(2)(a) (“Penalty for distribution or possession with intent to distribute

narcotic drugs listed in Schedule I; possession of marijuana, synthetic

cannabinoids, and heroin”); and (3) one count of violating La. R.S. 40:967(B)(1)(a)

(“Prohibited acts—Schedule II; penalties”). After summarizing the plea agreement

for the district court, counsel for Mr. McFarland subsequently explained to the

4 Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 890.1 is titled “Waiver of minimum

mandatory sentences; procedure; exceptions” and provides in pertinent part as follows:

A. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, if a felony
or misdemeanor offense specifies a sentence with a minimum term of
confinement or a minimum fine, or that the sentence shall be served without
benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, the court, upon conviction,
in sentencing the offender shall impose the sentence as provided in the penalty
provisions for that offense, unless one of the following occurs:

(1) The defendant pled guilty pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement with
the prosecution and the court, which specifies that the sentence shall be served
with benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence or specifies a reduced
fine or term of confinement.

8
district court that he was “working with the [District Attorney (“DA”)]’s office” to

amend the plea agreement “in the next 24 hours” to make it eligible for appeal

pursuant to Crosby, 338 So.2d 584. The district court advised counsel for Mr.

McFarland that if he received approval from the DA’s office to make this a Crosby

plea, then the court would approve this. However, neither the written plea

agreement nor the agreement as orally summarized by counsel for Mr. McFarland

to the district court made mention of Crosby.

The district court judge explained that because the parties brought the plea

agreement pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 890.1, she could sentence Mr. McFarland

below the mandatory minimum.5 Then, the district court sentenced Mr. McFarland

to five years at the Department of Corrections at hard labor, with five years

suspended/deferred, and three years of active probation on Count 1 (violation of

La. R.S. 14:95(E)); five years at the Department of Corrections at hard labor, with

five years suspended/deferred, and three years of active probation on Count 2

(violation of La. R.S. 40:966(B)(2)(A)); and five years at the Department of

Corrections at hard labor, with five years suspended/deferred, and three years of

active probation on Count 3 (violation of La. R.S. 40:967(B)(1)(A)). Additionally,

the district court ordered that all of the sentences were to run concurrently and with

credit for time served.

In the record before this Court are two pleadings Mr. McFarland

subsequently filed with the district court. One is a “Notice of Intent to Apply to the

5 In particular, the district court noted the parties’ agreement departed from the
mandatory minimum sentence for illegal carrying of a weapon while in possession of narcotics in
violation of La. R.S. 14:95(E).

In State v. Kondylis, the Louisiana Supreme Court explained that La. C.Cr.P. art. 890.1,
grants district courts “the authority to depart from the mandatory terms of imprisonment and
conditions placed on those sentences otherwise specified by law by agreement of all parties.”
2014-0196, pp. 2-3 (La. 10/3/14), 149 So.3d 1210, 1211.

9
Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal” (“Notice of Intent”), and the other is a

“Petition and Order for Appeal” (“Petition for Appeal”). Mr. McFarland dated both

of these pleadings April 3, 2024, but the district court stamped them as filed in July

2024.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

On appeal, Mr. McFarland asserts four assignments of error:

1. The [district] court erred and abused its discretion in denying
   [Mr. McFarland’s] Motion to Suppress the evidence illegally
   obtained from Mr. McFarland’s vehicle.

2. The [district] court erred in finding that there was sufficient
   probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant for Mr.
   McFarland’s vehicle, cell phone, and residence on the basis that
   the officer(s) lacked sufficient probable cause to obtain search
   warrants for Mr. McFarland’s vehicle and cell phone.

3. The [district] court erred when it considered the contents of the
   video surveillance, even though the video surveillance was not
   offered, filed, and introduced into evidence.

4. The [district] court erred in failing to suppress all evidence
   obtained as a result of the search warrant of Mr. McFarland’s
   vehicle, cell phone, and residence because all the seized
   evidence constitutes “fruit of the poisonous tree”.

Before considering the merits of these assignments of error, we address some

preliminary matters and review the matter for errors patent.

PRELIMINARY MATTERS

Timeliness of Mr. McFarland’s Appeal

Before discussing the merits of Mr. McFarland’s appeal, we ex proprio motu

question the timeliness of Mr. McFarland’s appeal. We do so because for an

appellate “court to have appellate jurisdiction over a criminal case, the motion for

appeal must be timely filed.” State v. Counterman, 461 So.2d 664, 665 (La. App.

1st Cir. 1984) (emphasis removed) (citations omitted). If the defendant has not

10
timely filed his motion for appeal, then “there is nothing for an appellate court to

review, and the appeal should be dismissed.” Id., 461 So.2d at 665-66 (citations

omitted). This is because the defendant’s “conviction and sentence became final

when the defendant failed to appeal timely.” State v. Gray, 2004-1272, p. 3 (La.

App. 5 Cir. 4/26/05), 902 So.2d 1060, 1061 (citing State v. Counterman, 475 So.2d

336, 338 (La. 1985)). For the conviction and sentence to be “subject to review

under the ordinary appellate process,” the defendant must “obtain[] the

reinstatement of his right to appeal.” Id.

Delineating the time period for filing an appeal in criminal matters, La.

C.Cr.P. art. 914(B)(1) provides that “[t]he motion for an appeal must be made not

later than . . . [t]hirty days after the rendition of the judgment or ruling from which

the appeal is taken.” Despite the above-cited jurisprudence and the deadline

provided in La. C.Cr.P. art. 914(B)(1), this Court has previously considered a

defendant’s untimely appeal if the State failed to object to the procedural

irregularity at the time the defendant sought the appeal. State v. Laneheart, 2012-

1580, pp. 2-3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/26/14), 135 So.3d 1221, 1224-25. So too has the

Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. State v. Williams, 2011-881, p. 2 (La.

App. 5 Cir. 3/27/12), 91 So.3d 442, 443 n.2. As this Court explained in Laneheart,

“ordering a dismissal to allow the defendant to properly seek reinstatement of

appeal rights would only prolong the proceedings without serving any useful

purpose.” 2012-1580, p. 2, 135 So.3d at 1225 (citing Williams, 2011-881, p. 2, 91

So.3d at 443 n.2).

As stated previously, on January 9, 2024, Mr. McFarland pled guilty to all

the charges brought by the State, and the district court sentenced him that same

day. Then, the district court received two pleadings from Mr. McFarland dated

11
April 3, 2024—his Notice of Intent and Petition for Appeal—whereby he sought

review from this Court. Mr. McFarland filed both of these pleadings beyond the

thirty-day deadline for seeking an appeal, but the State did not object to the

procedural irregularity at the time Mr. McFarland filed the pleadings. Nor does the

State object in its brief to this Court. Because a dismissal of Mr. McFarland’s

appeal to allow him time to properly seek reinstatement of his appeal rights would

only prolong this matter without serving any useful purpose, we find this appeal is

properly before this Court.

Whether Mr. McFarland Reserved His Right to Appeal

A second preliminary matter we must consider is whether Mr. McFarland

reserved his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his Motion to Suppress in

light of the plea agreement. The reason we question this is because “[i]n general, a

plea of guilty waives nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings prior to the plea,”

including insufficiency of the evidence. State v. Willis, 52,126, pp. 5-6 (La. App. 2

Cir. 8/15/18), 253 So.3d 915, 919 (first citing State v. Mack, 45,552, p. 3 (La. App.

2 Cir. 8/11/10), 46 So.3d 801, 803; and then citing State v. Whittington, 46,723, pp.

4-5 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/14/11), 80 So.3d 723, 725). Nonetheless, “[u]nder Crosby,

a defendant [ca]n plead[] guilty, but reserve[] his right to appeal alleged pretrial

errors.” State v. Gross, 2009-6, p. 2 (La. App. 3 Cir. 7/8/09), 16 So.3d 551, 554.

The purpose “of this type of contingent or conditional plea ‘is to permit a fair and

efficient review of a central issue when the pretrial ruling on that issue, if

erroneous, would mandate reversal of any resulting conviction.” Id. at pp. 2-3, 16

So.3d at 554 (quoting State v. Cooper, 43,809, p. 6 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/14/09), 2

So.3d 1172, 1177-78). The rulings a defendant “typically” preserves with a Crosby

plea “include denial of a motion to suppress evidence.” State v. Joseph, 2003-315,

12
p. 2 (La. 5/16/03), 847 So.2d 1196, 1197. See also State v. Hall, 2014-0738, p. 1

(La. App. 4 Cir. 2/18/15), 160 So.3d 1060, 1062 n.3. This is precisely what Mr.

McFarland seeks from this Court—review of the district court’s denial of his

Motion to Suppress.

Notably, “[t]he consent of the district attorney to a Crosby-plea is not

necessary.” State v. Brown, 2015-1319, p. 2 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/20/16), 193 So.3d

267, 269 n.1 (citing State v. Gillis, 2007-1909, p. 4 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/26/08), 985

So.2d 745, 747). Rather, in Crosby, the Louisiana Supreme Court held, “the

[district] court has very great and virtually unreviewable discretion to reject rather

than accept a guilty plea conditioned upon reservation of appellate review of pre-

plea assignments of non-jurisdictional error.” 338 So.2d at 590 (citations omitted).

Thus, the district court, has “plenary power” to accept or reject a Crosby “plea,

regardless of whether the State [agreed or] disagreed with the plea.” Gillis, 2007-

1909, p. 4, 985 So.2d at 747. In other words, a defendant’s right “to condition his

plea upon the reservation for appellate review of pre-plea errors is subject [solely]

to acceptance by the [district] court” because “[n]othing in Crosby or the Crosby

jurisprudence suggests that there must also be agreement by the State before a trial

court can accept a Crosby plea.” Id. Also of note, “a Crosby plea, by its very

nature, is limited.” Gross, 2009-6, p. 3, 16 So.3d at 554. If “[a] defendant . . . fails

to specify which pre-trial ruling he wishes to reserve for appeal as part of a guilty

plea entered under Crosby,” the defendant “is not precluded from review

altogether, but his appellate review may be limited in scope.” State v. Lewis, 2010-

1022, p. 5 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/27/11), 75 So.3d 495, 499 (citing Joseph, 2003-315,

p. 1, 847 So.2d at 1196).

13
Turning to the matter sub judice, our concern is whether Mr. McFarland’s

plea was a Crosby plea as he alleges it was. This concern stems from the fact that

neither the written plea agreement nor the oral summary of the plea given to the

district court by Mr. McFarland’s counsel stated that the plea was a Crosby plea.

Nevertheless, after counsel for Mr. McFarland summarized the plea agreement, he

subsequently informed the district court that he was “working with the DA’s office

to . . . amend” the plea to be a Crosby plea and simultaneously referenced this

Court’s denial of Mr. McFarland’s writ application regarding his Motion to

Suppress. In response, the district court stated, “If you get approval from the DA’s

office to take it under [Crosby], the [c]ourt will allow it to be taken under

[Crosby].” Thus, the district court clearly approved Mr. McFarland’s plea being a

Crosby plea. As the previously-delineated jurisprudence explains, the approval of

the DA’s office was unnecessary—even though Mr. McFarland’s counsel sought

it6—as long as the district court approved the plea being a Crosby plea. Moreover,

Mr. McFarland’s counsel referred to Crosby at the time Mr. McFarland entered his

plea, thereby preserving his right to appellate review. Cf. State v. Smith, 2009-168,

p. 4 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/23/09), 19 So.3d 509, 510-11 (explaining “[a] defendant

may be allowed appellate review if at the time he enters a guilty plea, he expressly

reserves his right to appeal a specific adverse ruling in the case” but holding the

defendant therein did not preserve his appellate rights under Crosby because

“[t]here was no mention that the guilty plea was being entered pursuant to Crosby

6 In its brief to this Court, counsel for the State explains:

Although Appellant states that his plea was taken under . . . Crosby[] . . . and that
the State withdrew any objections to a “Crosby plea” on March 19, 2024, the
undersigned attorney cannot find anything in the record which substantiates that
claim. However, the undersigned attorney does believe, after speaking with trial
attorneys familiar with the case, that this assertion is accurate.

14
either during the plea colloquy or on the [plea] form”). Further, by referencing this

Court’s denial of Mr. McFarland’s writ application regarding his Motion to

Suppress, Mr. McFarland’s counsel established the issue for which Mr. McFarland

sought to preserve his appellate rights under Crosby, i.e., the suppression issue.

The district court therefore accepted Mr. McFarland’s guilty plea with the

preservation of his right to appeal its ruling on his Motion to Suppress. In sum, we

agree with Mr. McFarland that his plea was a Crosby plea. Having determined that

Mr. McFarland’s appeal is properly before this Court, we next conduct our errors

patent review.

ERRORS PATENT REVIEW

In accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 920, we review all criminal appeals for

errors patent. An error patent is one “that is discoverable by a mere inspection of

the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence.” La. C.Cr.P.

art. 920(2). We have reviewed the pleadings and proceedings in this record and

find there are no errors patent. Next, we turn to the merits of Mr. McFarland’s

assignments of error but discuss them out of order.

DISCUSSION

Assignment of Error Number Three: Whether the District Court Erred in
Considering the Video Evidence When Deciding Mr. McFarland’s Motion to
Suppress

In his third assignment of error, Mr. McFarland contends the district court

erred in considering the surveillance and body-worn camera videos in denying his

Motion to Suppress. Mr. McFarland asserts this was an error because the State did

not offer the videos into evidence during the hearing on his Motion to Suppress

and the district court did not admit them into evidence. The State counters the

15
district court properly considered the video evidence because Mr. McFarland—or

rather, his counsel—did not object to the district court doing so.

We begin our discussion of the merits of Mr. McFarland’s appeal by

resolving this assignment of error. The reason we do so is because “[a] court may

not consider exhibits . . . in the record which were not filed into evidence unless

the exhibits were introduced and . . . [deemed] admissible at the trial or hearing.”

Landis Constr. Co. v. State, 2015-1167, p. 3 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/29/16), 199 So.3d

1, 2 n.1. This is true for both the district court and the appellate court. State v.

Leggett, 2018-647, p. 2 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/18/19), 2019 WL 1246911, at *2

(holding the district court “judge improperly considered evidence not properly

offered and introduced at the . . . hearing” on the defendant’s motion to suppress);

State v. Cobb, 2013-0431, p. 1 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/25/14), 161 So.3d 28, 29

(explaining this Court could not consider an investigating officer’s affidavit

because the district court did not admit it into evidence during the hearing on the

defendant’s motion to quash). Thus, while Mr. McFarland questions the propriety

of the district court having reviewed the video footage, resolution of this

assignment of error not only informs the correctness of the district court’s ruling

but also what we, as an appellate court, may consider in our analysis of Mr.

McFarland’s other assignments of error.

Despite the foregoing rule, however, Louisiana courts have held that in

criminal cases “in which evidence is considered by the [district] court without

objection,” that “evidence is deemed to be tacitly admitted.” State v. Lloyd, 48,914

(La. App. 2 Cir. 1/14/15), 161 So.3d 879, 893 (citations omitted). See also State v.

Nargo, 2015-779, pp. 3-5 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/1/16), 193 So.3d 1263, 1266-67.

Moreover, in Lloyd, the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal observed that

16
defense counsel not only failed to object to the State playing certain recordings at

trial but also that “the record [was] clear that defense counsel wanted the

recording[s] played in open court so the [district] court could hear it.” Lloyd,

48,914, p. 16, 161 So.3d at 892 (emphasis added). The forgoing jurisprudence

implements the so-called “contemporaneous objection” rule established in La.

C.Cr.P. art. 841. That rule provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]n irregularity or error

cannot be availed of after verdict unless it was objected to at the time of

occurrence.” La. C.Cr.P. art. 841(A). As this Court recently explained, “[o]ne

purpose of this rule is so that ‘the [district court] judge can cure the error.’” State v.

Henderson, 2025-0097, p. 19 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/30/25), ___ So.3d __, __, 2025

WL 3763924, at *10 (quoting State v. Lanclos, 2007-0082, p. 6 (La. 4/8/08), 980

So.2d 643, 648). The rule thus “prevent[s] the defendant from gambling for a

favorable verdict and then resorting to appeal on errors that might easily have been

corrected by an objection.” State v. Rickmon, 2023-0048, p. 12 (La. App. 4 Cir.

8/30/23), 372 So.3d 60, 70 (citing State v. Vernon, 2016-0692, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir.

12/21/16), 207 So.3d 525, 529).

In the matter sub judice, when the district court judge stated she wanted to

view the videos prior to ruling on Mr. McFarland’s Motion to Suppress and asked

the State to provide her with copies of same, Mr. McFarland’s counsel did not

contemporaneously object. Further, Mr. McFarland’s counsel actually argued

before the district court that the videos served as a basis to grant Mr. McFarland’s

Motion to Suppress. Based on La. C.Cr.P. art. 841(A), Lloyd, and Nargo, we deem

the videos “tacitly admitted” into evidence. As such, the district court did not err in

17
considering the videos, and we can consider them in our resolution of Mr.

McFarland’s remaining assignments of error.7

Assignment of Error Number One: Whether the District Court Erred and
Abused Its Discretion in Denying Mr. McFarland’s Motion to Suppress with
Respect to the Evidence Obtained from His Vehicle

In his first assignment of error, Mr. McFarland asserts the district “court

erred and abused its discretion in denying [his Motion to Suppress] the evidence

illegally obtained from [his] vehicle.” Mr. McFarland contends the officers seized

the evidence “in violation of the United States and Louisiana Constitution[s]”

because they “lacked sufficient probable cause to seize and tow his vehicle”

without a warrant in the first place. As the State accurately summarizes this

assignment of error in its brief, Mr. McFarland “contest[s] all evidence seized

pursuant to . . . [the subsequent search] warrants[8] on the theory that the . . .

warrants were tainted by the initial warrantless seizure[] of [Mr. McFarland’s] car .

. . .” The State counters that Mr. McFarland’s “arguments fail here because . . .

[Detective] Jones explained the exigent circumstances” surrounding the

warrantless seizure of Mr. McFarland’s vehicle. Further, the State argues that even

if this Court were to find the situation did not present “exigent circumstances, the

warrantless seizure of [Mr. McFarland]’s car and phone did not affect any privacy

interest since a search was only conducted after police officers obtained warrants

to search [his] property.”

7 We note the videos were not originally part of the appellate record for this case.
However, in November 2025, this Court issued an Order, which advised that the “Court will
utilize the entire record, including the video recordings previously submitted in [Mr.
McFarland’s] writ application . . . in order to render a decision in the instant appeal, pursuant to
Uniform Rules-Courts of Appeal, 2-1.14.” Rule 2-1.14 of the Uniform Rules of the Courts of
Appeal provides that “[a]ny record lodged in the Court of Appeal may, with leave of court, be
used, without necessity of duplication, in any other appeal or writ application.”
8 As delineated earlier in the Opinion, after obtaining search warrants, officers searched

Mr. McFarland’s vehicle, phone, and residence.

18
Standard of Review

We begin our analysis with the relevant standard of review. As this Court

recently explained, “a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and

fact.” State v. Brown, 2025-0440, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/10/25), 424 So.3d 150,

154-55 (quoting State v. Hill, 2025-0316, pp. 10-11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/19/25), 418

So.3d 1119, 1127). In considering the district court’s ruling on a motion to

suppress, “the appellate court reviews the underlying facts for an abuse of

discretion but reviews conclusions to be drawn from those facts de novo.” Id. at p.

7, 424 So.3d at 155 (quoting Hill, 2025-0316, p. 11, 424 So.3d at 1127). The

reason an appellate court reviews the facts for an abuse of discretion and affords

great weight to the district court’s factual findings is because “the district court

ha[d] the opportunity to observe the witnesses and weigh the credibility of their

testimony.” Id. at p. 7, 424 So.3d at 154 (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting Hill, 2025-0316, p. 10, 418 So.3d at 1127). When no facts are in dispute,

“the appellate court need only consider whether the district court came to the

proper legal determination under the undisputed facts.” Id. at p. 7, 424 So.3d at 155

(quoting Hill, 2025-0316, p. 11, 418 So.3d at 1127). In the instant matter, there are

no underlying facts in dispute. Accordingly, we will conduct a de novo review of

the district court’s ruling.

Warrantless Seizures

As Mr. McFarland correctly states in his brief, both the United States and

Louisiana Constitutions protect from unreasonable searches and seizures. The

Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which is titled “Searches and

Seizures; Warrants[,]” provides that people have the right “to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures”

19
and that this right “shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon

probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the

place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Similarly, La. Const.

art. 1, § 5, states:

Every person shall be secure in his person, property,
communications, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy. No warrant shall issue
without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, the persons or things
to be seized, and the lawful purpose or reason for the search. Any
person adversely affected by a search or seizure conducted in
violation of this Section shall have standing to raise its illegality in the
appropriate court.

As this Court has held, “a warrantless . . . seizure is presumed to be unreasonable”

in light of the above constitutional provisions. State v. Debose, 2024-0217, p. 12

(La. App. 4 Cir. 6/13/24), 390 So.3d 971, 980 (quoting State v. Willis, 2022-0452,

p. 13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/1/22), 348 So.3d 167, 175).

When a defendant believes that officers unconstitutionally obtained evidence

against him, he may file a motion to suppress pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 703.9

State v. Randolph, 2023-0690, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/20/23), 377 So.3d 825,

1. If the “defendant makes an initial showing of a warrantless seizure, the burden

shifts to the [S]tate to show that the seizure falls into one of the exceptions to the

warrant requirement.” State v. Hall, 555 So.2d 495, 497 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989)

(first citing State v. Pomes, 376 So.2d 133, 135 (La. 1979); and then citing State v.

Smith, 466 So.2d 752, 757 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985)). See also State v. Washington,

591 So.2d 1388, 1389 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991) (citing Pomes, 376 So.2d at 135).

9 Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 703(A) provides that “[a] defendant

adversely affected may move to suppress any evidence from use at the trial on the merits on the
ground that it was unconstitutionally obtained.”

20
The Exigent Circumstances Exception

In relevant part, “exigent circumstances” are one such exception. Hall, 555

So.2d at 497-98 (first citing State v. Franklin, 353 So.2d 1315, 1319 (La. 1977);

and then citing State v. Perkins, 451 So.2d 1146, 1149 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984)).

The Louisiana Supreme Court has reasoned the exception exists because in certain

“situations, the need for effective law enforcement trumps the right of privacy and

the requirement of a search warrant, thereby excusing an otherwise

unconstitutional intrusion.” State v. Warren, 2005-2248, p. 11 (La. 2/22/07), 949

So.2d 1215, 1224-25 (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99, 87 S.Ct.

1642, 1645-46, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967)). The exigent circumstances exception

“arise[s] from the need to prevent [an] offender’s escape,” particularly if “the car is

movable” and “the occupants [of the car] are alerted” to the situation. State v.

Ledford, 40,318, p. 6 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/28/05), 914 So.2d 1168, 1173 (citations

omitted); State v. Wright, 562 So.2d 1192, 1195 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990) (citation

omitted). See also State v. Howard, 2012-1117, p. 13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/3/13), 120

So.3d 831, 840 (listing an exigent circumstance as one when “possessors of the

contraband were aware that the police were on their trail”). Further, the exigent

circumstances exception arises when there exists “the need . . . to minimize the

possibility of a violent confrontation which could cause injury to the officers and

the public.” Ledford, 40,318, p. 6, 914 So.2d at 1173 (citations omitted). To this

end, “[t]he safety of others is a particular concern when police respond to a report

of a crime in progress, and, in such a situation,” the officers “should be afforded an

extra degree of deference.” Warren, 2005-2248, p. 9, 949 So.2d at 1224 (quoting

Reardon v. Wroan, 811 F.2d 1025, 1029 (7th Cir. 1987)). Additionally, the exigent

circumstances exception arises if there exists a need to “preserve evidence from

21
destruction or concealment.” Ledford, 40,318, pp. 6-7, 914 So.2d at 1173. In this

regard, the reasoning behind the exception is that “the car’s contents may never be

found again if a warrant must be obtained” before seizure of the car. Wright, 562

So.2d at 1195 (citation omitted).

The Louisiana Supreme Court has explained that “[i]n determining whether

sufficient exigent circumstances exist to justify the warrantless entry and search or

seizure, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances and the inherent

necessities of the situation at the time.” Warren, 2005-2248, p. 10, 949 So.2d at

1224 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting U.S. v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506,

1511 (6th Cir. 1996)). In other words, “the exigent circumstances must be known

to the officers” at the time of the warrantless seizure, not “based on evidence

discovered during [a subsequent] search.” Id. (citations omitted)

As this Court has explained, for this exception to apply, the situation must

not only present exigent circumstances, but also “there must be probable cause to

believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime.” State v. Neville,

2008-0014, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/4/08), 986 So.2d 884, 888 (citations omitted). In

this scenario, “[p]robable cause means ‘a fair probability that contraband or

evidence of a crime will be found.’” Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,

238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). It is “reasonable grounds for

belief, supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion.”

Warren, 2005-2248, p. 10, 949 So.2d at 1224 (quoting United States v. Bennett,

905 F.2d 931, 934 (6th Cir. 1990)). The probable cause determination “must be

judged by the probabilities and practical considerations of everyday life on which

average people, and particularly average police officers, can be expected to act.”

Neville, 2008-0014, p. 6, 986 So.2d at 888 (first citing State v. Fischer, 1997-1133,

22
p. 8 (La.1998), 720 So.2d 1179, 1184; and then citing State v. Flagg, 1999-1004, p.

10 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/25/00), 760 So.2d 522, 528). Further, the Louisiana Supreme

Court has instructed that the probable cause “determination must be made from the

totality of the circumstances, based on the objective facts known to the officer at

the time.” Warren, 2005-2248, p. 10, 949 So.2d at 1224 (citing United States v.

Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 391-92 (6th Cir.1993)).

Analysis

In this matter, the record establishes that officers seized Mr. McFarland’s

vehicle without first obtaining a warrant, so the State bore the burden of proving an

exception to the warrant requirement. We find, as the State asserts in its brief, that

the exigent circumstances exception applied because the situation presented

exigent circumstances and the officers had probable cause to seize Mr.

McFarland’s vehicle without waiting for a warrant. The officers were investigating

an active crime scene involving gun violence after an altercation arose between

two groups of people and an innocent bystander died. As Detective Jones testified,

Mr. McFarland “was present in the surveillance footage of the incident . . . in his

vehicle.” More particularly, Detective Jones stated, “Mr. McFarland was part of

this altercation in which this homicide occurred, and he entered and exited his car

on more than one occasion.” Likewise, Detective Jones stated that “individuals

from [the shooting] incident were seen entering [Mr. McFarland’s] car and

fleeing.” The video surveillance confirms this and shows Mr. McFarland drive his

vehicle and the individuals away from the scene. As Detective Jones testified, the

investigating officers “were trying to obtain all of the evidence” and “looking for

the firearm[s]” used in the shooting. The exigency stemmed from the mobility of

Mr. McFarland’s vehicle; the occupants’ knowledge of the shooting and likely

23
ensuing investigation; the necessity of preventing Mr. McFarland and any

individuals potentially responsible for the homicide from escaping; and the

officers’ need to protect potential evidence pertinent to the shooting from

destruction or concealment. Further, because a shooting had just occurred, the

officers needed to secure the scene to prevent harm to themselves and members of

the public. Mr. McFarland’s first assignment of error is without merit.

Assignment of Error Number Two: Whether the District Court Erred in
Finding That There was Sufficient Probable Cause for the Issuance of the
Search Warrants

In his second assignment of error, Mr. McFarland argues the district “court

erred in finding . . . sufficient probable cause for the issuance of [the] search

warrant[s]” because “the officer(s) lacked sufficient probable cause to obtain

search warrants for Mr. McFarland’s vehicle, cell phone, and residence.” Further,

Mr. McFarland alleges “the officer(s) and detective mislead [sic] the Magistrate

Commissioner, by providing information . . . regarding the unrelated

homicide/shooting incident in an effort to successfully obtain a search warrant for

Mr. McFarland’s vehicle, cell phone, and residence.” Essentially, Mr. McFarland

argues the district court should have granted his Motion to Suppress because the

warrants were not based on probable cause. The State counters that Mr. McFarland

“failed to carry his burden to prove that the warrants were invalid,” noting he “did

not call any witnesses or present any evidence in any fashion that showed that the

warrant was based on material misrepresentations or omissions.”

Principles Applicable to a Motion to Suppress Evidence Obtained Pursuant to a
Search Warrant

As stated previously, in considering a district court’s ruling on a motion to

suppress, we “review[] the underlying facts for an abuse of discretion but review[]

24
conclusions to be drawn from those facts de novo.” Brown, 2025-0440, p. 7, 424

So.3d at 155 (quoting Hill, 2025-0316, p. 11, 418 So.3d at 1127). As we also

explained in the prior section, the initial burden of proof on a motion to suppress

rests with the defendant. La. C.Cr.P. art. 703(D). This is true when a defendant

challenges a search warrant via a motion to suppress. That is, if officers seized the

evidence that is the subject of the motion to suppress “pursuant to a search warrant,

the burden is on the defendant to show that the warrant lacked probable cause.”

State v. Lang, 2019-0586, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/22/19), 276 So.3d 558, 562

(citing La. C.Cr.P. at. 703(D)).

Probable Cause Requirement

“[T]he admissibility of evidence” depends “upon the validity of the search.”

Id. (citing State v. Bradford, 1998-1428, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/9/98), 729 So.2d

1049, 1051). For a search pursuant to a warrant to be valid, the warrant must be

supported by probable cause. This is because La. C.Cr.P. art. 162 states that “[a]

search warrant may issue only upon probable cause established to the satisfaction

of the judge, by the affidavit of a credible person, reciting facts establishing the

cause for issuance of the warrant.” Probable cause:

exists when the facts and circumstances within the affiant’s
knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information,
are sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been
committed and that evidence or contraband may be found at the place
to be searched. This determination rests on whether the totality of the
circumstances forms a substantial basis for a finding of probable
cause. Thus, [p]robable cause for the issuance of a search warrant
does not involve certainties of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or
even a prima facie showing, but rather involves probabilities of
human behavior as understood by persons trained in law enforcement
and based on the totality of the circumstances. The Louisiana
Supreme Court has explained that when a magistrate has already
found probable cause in an affidavit, reviewing courts should interpret
the affidavit in a realistic and common sense fashion, aware that it is

25
normally prepared by non-lawyer police officers in the midst and
haste of a criminal investigation.

Randolph, pp. 12-13, 377 So.3d at 834 (internal quotation marks omitted) (internal

citations omitted) (alteration in original).

Further, probable cause needs to “be within the ‘four corners’ of the

affidavit.” Randolph, p. 14, 377 So.3d at 834 (quoting State v. Casey, 1999-0023,

p. 4 (La. 1/26/00), 775 So.2d 1022, 1028). The reasoning behind this requirement

is that “the judge, not the affiant, . . . must be satisfied as to the existence of

probable cause.” Id. (quoting State v. Green, 2002-1022, p. 8 (La. 12/4/02), 831

So.2d 962, 969). Accordingly, the affiant must give the magistrate judge sufficient

“information to make an independent judgment that probable cause exists” rather

than leaving the magistrate judge to ratify “the bare conclusions of others.” Id. The

Louisiana Supreme Court advises courts to simultaneously follow these guidelines

and “[to] strive to uphold warrants to encourage their use by police officers.” Id. at

p. 14, 377 So.3d at 834.

Continuing Nexus Requirement

For a search pursuant to a warrant to be valid, the warrant also needs to

“establish a probable continuing nexus between the place sought to be searched

and the property sought to be seized.” Id. at p. 13, 377 So.3d at 834 (quoting

Casey, 1999-0023, p. 4, 775 So.2d at 1028). This is because La. C.Cr.P. art. 162(C)

requires the “search warrant [to] particularly describe the person or place to be

searched, the persons or things to be seized, and the lawful purpose or reason for

the search or seizure.” The continuing nexus requirement is met when one can

logically infer the evidence sought would be found in the place(s) officers seeks to

26
search. Randolph, 2023-0690, p. 14, 377 So.3d at 834 (quoting U.S. v. Edwards,

124 F.Supp.2d 387, 421 (M.D. La. 2000)).

Presumption of Validity

Courts are to presume the validity of an affidavit supporting a search

warrant; and if a defendant alleges the representations in the affidavit are false,

then the defendant has the burden of proving this. State v. Williams, 2020-46, p. 51

(La. App. 5 Cir. 12/30/20), 308 So.3d 791, 830 (first citing State v. Shiell, 2016-

447, p. 4 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/7/16), 204 So.3d 1213, 1217; and then citing State v.

Dee, 2009-712, p. 11 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/23/10), 34 So.3d 892, 899). To meet his

burden of proof, the defendant must demonstrate “by a preponderance of the

evidence that the affidavit contains intentional misrepresentations.” Id. (citing

Shiell, 2016-447, p. 4, 204 So.3d at 1217). If the defendant meets this burden of

proof, the reviewing court will invalidate the warrant and suppress the items seized

because “[a] material and intentional misrepresentation made in an affidavit

presented to a magistrate constitutes a fraud upon the court.” Id.

Analysis

With these principles in mind, we consider their application to the matter sub

judice. The affidavit submitted in support of a search warrant for Mr. McFarland’s

vehicle explained that (1) an NOPD detail officer heard multiple shots fired at

Xavier and then observed several people who had been shot; (2) video surveillance

of the crime scene revealed [Mr. McFarland] standing in the threshold of a vehicle,

with multiple individuals involved in the shooting incident running toward and

getting inside said vehicle subsequently driven away by Mr. McFarland; and (3)

officers learned during the investigation of the shooting that the vehicle contained

a firearm. Under the totality of the circumstances, the magistrate correctly found

27
probable cause to issue the search warrant for Mr. McFarland’s vehicle and a

continuing nexus between the items sought and the location. The affiant explained

an offense occurred (the shooting) and demonstrated that evidence of same

(particularly the firearm(s) used in the shooting) might be found in Mr.

McFarland’s vehicle in light of his presence at the scene and individuals involved

in the altercation entering his vehicle immediately after the shooting. The

information was not conclusory in nature but based on officer observation and

corroborated by surveillance evidence. Accordingly, the magistrate did not err in

finding probable cause existed to issue the search warrant for Mr. McFarland’s

vehicle. Further, while Mr. McFarland contends the officers misled the magistrate

by referring to the “unrelated homicide/shooting incident,” Mr. McFarland offered

no evidence to meet his burden of proving this. For example, Mr. McFarland

offered nothing to demonstrate that officers knew at the time they sought the

search warrant that he was not involved in the shooting incident and that no

evidence of same would be in his vehicle.

Subsequently, after the search of Mr. McFarland’s vehicle yielded evidence

of multiple crimes, including illegal possession of firearms and possession of

illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia, the investigating officers sought another

search warrant for Mr. McFarland’s cell phone to obtain information related to

suspected drug dealing activity. Detective Jones’ affidavit for the search warrant

for Mr. McFarland’s cell phone established that, pursuant to a lawful search of Mr.

McFarland’s vehicle, officers discovered a handgun with an extended magazine

and no serial number (a privately made firearm commonly known as a “ghost

gun”); 1.5 pounds of marijuana; pills (believed to be illicit drugs); and

paraphernalia related to drug dealing, such as a digital scale and packaging

28
material. The affidavit explained that, based on officer knowledge of the common

way modern drug transactions occur, additional evidence of drug trafficking was

likely on Mr. McFarland’s cell phone. The foregoing established probable cause

and a continuing nexus sought between the location of the search (Mr.

McFarland’s cell phone) and the information sought (drug dealing activity).

Then, Detective Jones authored the affidavit for the search warrant for Mr.

McFarland’s residence. Therein, Detective Jones explained what officers had

already seized from Mr. McFarland’s car and what he and his fellow detectives had

gleaned from Mr. McFarland’s phone. In this latter regard, Detective Jones

explained Mr. McFarland admitted in cell phone conversations that he owned the

ghost gun and narcotics seized by officers from his vehicle and had attempted to

hide this evidence from police. Further, Detective Jones’ affidavit detailed

evidence of drug dealing activity discovered by detectives on Mr. McFarland’s

phone. Detective Jones explained they were likely to discover additional narcotics,

firearms, and electronics used by Mr. McFarland in the distribution of narcotics in

his home. The foregoing established probable cause and a continuing nexus sought

between the location of the search (Mr. McFarland’s home) and the evidence

sought (drugs, electronics used to deal drugs, and illegal firearms).

In sum, we find all three search warrants met the required probable cause

and continuing nexus requirements. Thus, the district court did not err in denying

Mr. McFarland’s Motion to Suppress on this basis. Mr. McFarland’s third

assignment of error is without merit.

29
Assignment of Error Number Four: Whether the District Court Erred in
Failing to Suppress All Evidence Under the “Fruit of the Poisonous Tree”
Doctrine

In his fourth and final assignment of error, Mr. McFarland asserts the district

“court erred in failing to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the search

warrant of Mr. McFarland’s vehicle, cell phone, and residence because all the

seized evidence constitutes ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’” More particularly, Mr.

McFarland argues that “because the initial seizure and search of Mr. McFarland’s

vehicle lacked probable cause, such search was illegal; therefore, any evidence

ascertained as a result of the search and subsequent evidence must be suppressed

because all the evidence (gun and drugs) were obtained as a direct result of the

illegal seizure and search of Mr. McFarland’s vehicle.” The State counters that Mr.

McFarland’s assignment of error is without merit because he “has failed to

demonstrate any deficiencies in any of the warrants upon which the searches were

based.” Further, the State reiterates that “exigent circumstances existed to seize

[Mr. McFarland]’s property and that property was not searched until after law

enforcement obtained valid search warrants.” We agree with the State.

As this Court recently delineated:

“the [fruit of the poisonous tree] doctrine serves to exclude from
evidence the direct and indirect products of illegal violations of the
Fourth Amendment” to the United States Constitution. Also known as
“[t]he exclusionary rule,” it “bars, as illegal ‘fruit of the poisonous
tree,’ any physical and verbal evidence obtained either during or as a
direct result of an unlawful invasion.” Not only does “[t]he rule
extend[] to . . . primary evidence obtained during or as a direct result
of an illegal search or seizure,” but also to “evidence later discovered
and found to be a derivative of illegality.” However, as this Court has
further explained, “[w]hen there is no primary illegality, the ‘fruit of
the poisonous tree theory’ does not apply.” Accordingly, a trial court
should not suppress evidence or statements subsequently obtained if
the initial interaction with the defendant was not illegal.

30
Hill, 2025 -0316, pp. 18-19, 418 So.3d at 1132 (footnote omitted) (internal citations

omitted) (alterations in original). In this latter regard, as we explained previously,

the exigent circumstances exception “excus[es] an otherwise unconstitutional

intrusion.” Warren, 2005-2248, p. 11, 949 So.2d at 1224-25 (citation omitted).

That is, when the exigent circumstances exception applies, a warrantless seizure is

not unconstitutional or illegal. Likewise, as explained by the Louisiana Fifth

Circuit Court of Appeal, “evidence collected pursuant to a valid search warrant is

patently not an unlawful invasion” and “evidence retrieved pursuant to a valid

search warrant is not considered an illegality or fruit of the poisonous tree.”

Williams, 2020-46, p. 50, 308 So.3d at 830.

In a preceding section of this Opinion, we found there was no initial

illegality in the officers’ warrantless seizure of Mr. McFarland’s vehicle due to the

exigent circumstances and because the officers had probable cause to seize the

vehicle. Then, in the prior section of this Opinion, we also found the officers had

probable cause to obtain the search warrants for Mr. McFarland’s vehicle and cell

phone. Because there was no initial illegality, the fruit of the poisonous tree

doctrine does not apply to the evidence subsequently obtained by the officers.

Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Mr. McFarland’s Motion to

Suppress on that basis. This assignment of error is without merit.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we hold the district court did not err in denying

Mr. McFarland’s Motion to Suppress. Accordingly, we affirm Mr. McFarland’s

convictions and sentences.

AFFIRMED

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