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March 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Keenah Taylor v. State of Indiana

Indiana Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25A-CR-02032
• Judges: Foley, Weissmann, Tavitas

• Disposition: Affirmed, Reversed and Remanded

• Opinion

• Authorities (12)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (35.6K)

• PDF

Disposition

Affirmed, Reversed and Remanded

Combined Opinion

                        by Judge Tavitas

FILED
Mar 19 2026, 8:40 am

CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana
Keenah Taylor,
Appellant-Defendant

v.

State of Indiana,
Appellee-Plaintiff

March 19, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
25A-CR-2032
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court
The Honorable Angela Dow Davis, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49D27-2409-F3-25405

Opinion by Chief Judge Tavitas
Judges Weissmann and Foley concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2032 | March 19, 2026 Page 1 of 17
Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Case Summary
[1] Keenah Taylor appeals his convictions and sentence for rape, a Level 3 felony;

robbery, a Level 5 felony; and criminal confinement, a Level 5 felony. After

Taylor made multiple calls to the victim in violation of a no contact order, the

victim did not appear at trial, and the trial court admitted the victim’s

deposition and statements to law enforcement into evidence. On appeal,

Taylor challenges the trial court’s admission of these statements by the victim,

the sufficiency of the evidence to support his rape conviction, and the trial

court’s denial of pretrial good time credit. We conclude that the trial court

properly admitted the victim’s deposition and statements to law enforcement,

and the evidence is sufficient to sustain Taylor’s conviction for rape. The State

concedes, however, that the trial court was statutorily required to hold a

hearing regarding the deprivation of Taylor’s pretrial good time credit and

failed to do so. The State, thus, has waived its opportunity to object to Taylor’s

pretrial good time credit. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and

remand with instructions that the trial court award Taylor pretrial good time

credit.

Issues
[2] Taylor raises three issues, which we restate as:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting
the victim’s deposition and statements to law enforcement.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2032 | March 19, 2026 Page 2 of 17
II. Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain Taylor’s
conviction for rape.

III. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by failing to
hold a hearing before depriving Taylor of pretrial good
time credit.

Facts
[3] Taylor and L.D. were previously in a dating relationship, but in 2024, the

relationship ended. In August 2024, Taylor appeared at L.D.’s residence and

knocked on the door. When L.D. answered the door, she discovered Taylor,

who was angry about something L.D. posted on Facebook. Taylor

immediately began screaming and yelling at L.D. and punched L.D.’s face.

L.D. tried to calm Taylor down and then ran into her bedroom. Taylor

followed L.D. and began kicking and stomping on her. L.D. retreated into her

closet, but Taylor followed and continued hitting her. Taylor then told L.D.,

“Get your punk a** in here,” and “I wanna get off.” Ex. Vol. I p. 122. L.D.

said, “No. You know I don’t mess with you like that any more.” Id. L.D.,

however, performed oral sex “just to calm him down just so he could just

leave.” Id. at 123. Taylor slapped L.D. twice during the oral sex. Taylor

stopped the oral sex, started crying, took L.D.’s phone, and then left her

residence.

[4] Officer Brian Nall with the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department

arrived at L.D.’s residence in response to a 911 call. Officer Nall found that

L.D. was “extremely upset” and had “visible injuries.” Tr. Vol. II p. 20. L.D.’s

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2032 | March 19, 2026 Page 3 of 17
residence was in “disarray” with doors opened and “items strewn about.” Id. at

1. L.D. told Officer Nall that Taylor beat her, kicked her, stomped on her, and

made her “suck his d**k.” State’s Ex. 1 at 4:36. When asked if Taylor

threatened her, L.D. said that Taylor punched her on her face, “made [her] do

it,” and threatened to kill her if she contacted the police. Id. at 6:06.

[5] A sexual assault nurse examiner (“SANE”) examined L.D. at Eskenazi

Hospital’s Center of Hope. L.D. was “scared, she was crying, [and] she was in

a lot of pain.” Tr. Vol. II p. 61. L.D. told the SANE that Taylor said, “get over

here right now and give me some head.” Tr. Vol. II p. 54. Taylor kept hitting

L.D. and said, “You better do it right.” Id. The examination revealed that

L.D. had cracked ribs on both sides, a black eye, a bite mark, extensive

bruising, and was “sore all over.” Ex. Vol. I p. 130.

[6] On September 3, 2024, the State charged Taylor with rape, a Level 3 felony;

robbery, a Level 3 felony; criminal confinement, a Level 5 felony; intimidation,

a Level 6 felony; and two counts of battery, Class A misdemeanors. The trial

court issued an order prohibiting Taylor from contacting L.D.

[7] L.D.’s deposition was taken on December 19, 2024. When asked during the

deposition whether she felt she had a choice about giving Taylor oral sex, L.D.

responded, “I did it because I felt like in that situation that I’m like I don’t

know if - - if this can escalate worser [sic], or if I do this, would it initially –

would it calm him down?” Ex. Vol. I p. 132. She indicated that she did not

want to give Taylor oral sex. Id. at 140.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2032 | March 19, 2026 Page 4 of 17
[8] A bench trial was set for April 24, 2025. Between March 19, 2025, and April

24, 2025, Taylor made nearly two dozen calls to L.D. using Taylor’s assigned

jail PIN number. On April 24, 2025, the day of the scheduled bench trial,

Taylor called L.D. at 3:41 a.m., and L.D. did not appear for the trial. The trial

court advised Taylor to immediately stop calling L.D. and continued the bench

trial to May 15, 2025. Taylor called L.D. again using a jail PIN number

belonging to someone else and said, “They postponed until May the 15th, you

hear me? May. Hey, do the same thing, you hear me?” Appellant’s App. Vol.

II p. 113. Between April 24, 2025, and May 15, 2025, Taylor made sixteen

additional calls to L.D. encouraging L.D. to not participate in the May trial.

The May bench trial was later rescheduled to June 26, 2025, due to a medical

emergency, and Taylor continued calling L.D.

[9] On June 26, 2025, L.D. did not appear for the bench trial. The State filed a

motion for unavailability and forfeiture by wrongdoing pursuant to Indiana

Evidence Rule 804(b)(5). The State reported that it had made multiple

unsuccessful attempts to secure L.D.’s attendance at the bench trial. The State

argued that the admission of L.D.’s statements would not violate the

constitutional right to confrontation because “one who obtains the absence of a

witness by wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to confrontation.”

Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 113 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36

(2004)).

[10] Taylor conceded that L.D. was “unavailable” but did not concede “forfeiture

by wrongdoing.” Tr. Vol. II p. 11. The trial court granted the State’s motion

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2032 | March 19, 2026 Page 5 of 17
and found forfeiture by wrongdoing. The trial court found that L.D.’s

deposition was admissible. As for L.D.’s other statements, the trial court found

they would be inadmissible unless hearsay exceptions applied. Regarding the

body camera recording of L.D.’s statements to Officer Nall, Taylor objected,

and the trial court overruled the objection and admitted the recording based on

“forfeiture by wrongdoing.”1 Id. at 26.

[11] The trial court found Taylor guilty of rape, a Level 3 felony; robbery, a Level 5

felony, as a lesser included offense; criminal confinement, a Level 5 felony, and

battery, a Class A misdemeanor, but not guilty of intimidation and one of the

battery charges. The trial court did not sentence Taylor on the battery guilty

finding.2

[12] Taylor was sentenced to six years in the Department of Correction with 325

days executed in the Department of Correction, 770 days executed on

community corrections home detention, and three years of probation. The trial

court did not give Taylor good time credit for his pretrial detention because he

1
Taylor objected to the Center of Hope records on grounds that they were not properly certified, which the
trial court overruled. Taylor did not object to the admission of L.D.’s statements to the SANE on hearsay
grounds, and Taylor makes no argument regarding L.D.’s statements to the SANE on appeal.
2
Although the abstract of judgment states “conviction merged” regarding the battery guilty finding, our
review of the record does not reveal that the trial court actually entered judgment of conviction on the battery
guilty finding. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 146; see, e.g., Green v. State, 856 N.E.2d 703, 704 (Ind. 2006)
(noting that “a defendant's constitutional rights are violated when a court enters judgment twice for the same
offense, but not when a defendant is simply found guilty of a particular count”).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2032 | March 19, 2026 Page 6 of 17
failed to follow the trial court’s orders regarding the no contact order. Taylor

now appeals.

Discussion and Decision
I. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting L.D.’s
deposition or her statements to Officer Nall.

[13] Taylor first challenges the trial court’s admission of L.D.’s deposition and

L.D.’s statements to Officer Nall. We review challenges to the admission of

evidence for an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. Combs v. State, 168 N.E.3d

985, 990 (Ind. 2021). We will reverse only where the decision is clearly against

the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party’s

substantial rights. Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259-60 (Ind. 2013). “The

effect of an error on a party’s substantial rights turns on the probable impact of

the impermissible evidence upon the jury in light of all the other evidence at

trial.” Gonzales v. State, 929 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Ind. 2010); see Ind. Trial Rule 61;

Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A). “[W]hen a defendant contends that a constitutional

violation has resulted from the admission of evidence, the standard of review is

de novo.” Scott v. State, 139 N.E.3d 1148, 1153 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans.

denied.

[14] On appeal, Taylor argues that the admission of L.D.’s deposition and her

statements to Officer Nall were inadmissible under Indiana Evidence Rule

804(b)(5) and violated Taylor’s rights to confrontation under the Sixth

Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2032 | March 19, 2026 Page 7 of 17
Indiana Constitution.3 Our Court has noted that “the forfeiture by wrongdoing

doctrine under the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay exception are very

similar in theory.” Scott, 139 N.E.3d at 1155. And Indiana Evidence Rule

804(b)(5) “incorporates the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine.” Quiroz v. State,

265 N.E.3d 574, 580 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025).

A. Indiana Evidence Rule 804

[15] We begin by addressing the admissibility of the statements under Evidence Rule

804(b)(5), which provides that the following is not “excluded by the hearsay

rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness”: “A statement offered against a

party that has engaged in or encouraged wrongdoing that was intended to, and

did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness for the purpose of

preventing the declarant from attending or testifying.”

[16] At trial and now on appeal, Taylor does not challenge L.D.’s unavailability.

Instead, Taylor argues that L.D.’s unavailability was not due to Taylor’s

wrongdoing. But “[w]e may infer a defendant’s intent to silence a witness ‘from

a defendant’s conduct and the natural consequences thereof.’” Doyle v. State,

223 N.E.3d 1113, 1121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Smoots v. State, 172

N.E.3d 1279, 1287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)). “The timing of a defendant’s actions

is probative of his or her intent on this issue.” Id. at 1122. The State must only

3
The parties make no argument that L.D.’s statements to Officer Nall were admissible under other Rules of
Evidence.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2032 | March 19, 2026 Page 8 of 17
show that “the defendant was motivated at least partially by a desire to silence

the witness with his wrongdoing.” Carr v. State, 106 N.E.3d 546, 554 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2018), trans. denied. “The State was required to establish the exception by

a preponderance of the evidence.” Id.

[17] L.D. initially cooperated in the prosecution of Taylor; she informed law

enforcement of Taylor’s actions, and she submitted to a deposition just a few

months later in December 2024. A few weeks before the April 2025 trial date,

Taylor began calling L.D. from the jail. The focus of the calls was Taylor

“telling [L.D.] what to do in relation to [the] bench trial and not appearing.”

Tr. Vol. II p. 7. Taylor told L.D., “do not appear. This is the date, this is the

time, go to sleep. Don’t answer the door, they’re going to try to call you.” Id.

After the April 2025 trial date was reset for May 2025, Taylor started calling

L.D. again as the May trial approached. The May trial was reset for June 2025

due to a medical emergency, and the calls continued. Taylor called L.D. more

than forty times, and L.D. failed to appear for the June 2025 bench trial.

Despite this evidence, Taylor claims that L.D. did not appear for health reasons

and her desire not to relapse after undergoing cancer treatments.

[18] L.D. told prosecutors that she was not going to appear at the first scheduled

bench trial because of her health and her desire not to have a relapse of her

cancer. This explanation, however, came after Taylor had already called L.D.

almost two dozen times and told her not to appear at the first scheduled bench

trial. As the State notes, Taylor had already severely beaten and sexually

assaulted L.D. just for sending a Facebook message to a friend. We cannot find

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2032 | March 19, 2026 Page 9 of 17
that the trial court abused its discretion by finding that L.D.’s absence at trial

was due to Taylor’s wrongdoing. See, e.g., Doyle, 223 N.E.3d at 1122 (holding

that “there was sufficient evidence to establish that it was Doyle’s

communications that caused Sweet’s absence”). Taylor engaged in wrongdoing

that was intended to, and did, procure L.D.’s unavailability as a witness at

Taylor’s bench trial. Accordingly, L.D.’s statements during her deposition and

her statements to Officer Nall were admissible pursuant to Indiana Evidence

Rule 804(b)(5).4

B. Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution

[19] Next, Taylor claims that his rights under the Sixth Amendment were violated

by the admission of L.D.’s statements. The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation

Clause provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right

. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI.

“This right allows the admission of an absent witness’s testimonial out-of-court

statement only if the witness is unavailable and the defendant has had a prior

4
The State also argues that the deposition was admissible under Indiana Evidence Rule 804(b)(1), which
provides the following is not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
Testimony that:
(A) was given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, whether given during the
current proceeding or a different one; and
(B) is now offered against a party who had--or, in a civil case, whose predecessor in interest had-
-an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross-, or redirect examination.
Taylor argues that this rule was not asserted as a basis for admission of the statement. We may, however,
affirm a trial court’s hearsay ruling “on any legal basis apparent in the record.” Beverly v. State, 801 N.E.2d
1254, 1259 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Regardless, L.D.’s statements were admissible under Rule
804(b)(5), and we need not address Rule 804(b)(1).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2032 | March 19, 2026 Page 10 of 17
opportunity to cross-examine the witness.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59. A

defendant, however, may forfeit his right to confrontation where his own

wrongdoing caused the declarant to be unavailable to testify at trial. Scott, 139

N.E.3d at 1153 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62). “In order for a defendant to

have forfeited his confrontation rights by wrongdoing, the defendant must have

had in mind the particular purpose of making the witness unavailable.” Id. at

1154 (citing Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 367 (2008)). “The burden of proof

for showing forfeiture by wrongdoing is a preponderance of the evidence

standard.” Id.

[20] The State demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Taylor’s

repeated calls to L.D. telling her not to attend the scheduled bench trials were

designed to prevent L.D. from testifying against him. Due to Taylor’s

wrongdoing, he forfeited his right to confront L.D.’s statements. Accordingly,

Taylor’s Sixth Amendment rights were not violated by the admission of L.D.’s

statements. See, e.g., id. at 1155 (holding that “Scott’s wrongdoing forfeited his

right to confront Cook’s statements to law enforcement and, as a result, his

Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was not violated by the admission of

Cook’s prior statements at trial”).

C. Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution

[21] Next, Taylor argues that the admission of L.D.’s statements violated his rights

under Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution. Article 1, Section 13 of

the Indiana Constitution provides that “in all criminal prosecutions, the

accused shall have the right to . . . meet the witnesses face to face. . . .” Like the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2032 | March 19, 2026 Page 11 of 17
Sixth Amendment, the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine also applies to Article

1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution. See Galloway v. State, 188 N.E.3d

493, 499 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (holding that “we see no reason to differentiate

between the federal and state constitutions regarding the forfeiture by

wrongdoing doctrine”), trans. denied.

[22] Taylor’s argument fails for the same reason that this argument under Indiana

Evidence Rule 804(b)(5) and the Sixth Amendment failed. Taylor’s

wrongdoing forfeited his right to confront L.D.’s statements. Accordingly,

Taylor’s rights under Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution were not

violated.5 See id. at 500 (holding that “Galloway’s wrongdoing forfeited his

right to confront Baker’s statement to law enforcement and, as a result, his

confrontation rights under the . . . Indiana Constitution were not violated by the

admission of Baker’s statement at trial”).

II. The evidence is sufficient to sustain Taylor’s conviction for rape.

[23] Next, Taylor challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his rape

conviction. Sufficiency of the evidence claims warrant a deferential standard of

5
In Galloway, we noted that the Indiana Constitution guarantees “face to face” confrontation of witnesses,
not declarants. 188 N.E.3d at 499. We also held that “the witnesses who recounted Baker’s out-of-court
statements was the detective who testified under oath and whom Galloway confronted face to face.” Id. In
his appellant’s brief, Taylor focuses on the reasons for L.D.’s absence from the bench trial and makes no
argument that he was denied “face to face” confrontation of the witnesses. In his reply brief, however,
Taylor argues that he did not have the opportunity to confront L.D. face to face at her deposition. It is well-
settled, however, that a party may not raise an argument for the first time in his reply brief. See Akin v.
Simons, 180 N.E.3d 366, 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (“[T]he law is well settled that grounds for error may only
be framed in an appellant’s initial brief and if addressed for the first time in the reply brief, they are waived.”).
Accordingly, this argument is waived.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2032 | March 19, 2026 Page 12 of 17
review in which we “neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility,

instead reserving those matters to the province of the jury.” Hancz-Barron v.

State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024). A conviction is supported by

sufficient evidence if “there is substantial evidence of probative value

supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could

have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. In conducting

this review, we consider only the evidence that supports the jury’s

determination, not evidence that might undermine it. Id. We affirm the

conviction “‘unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the

crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the

evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is

sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the

verdict.’” Sutton v. State, 167 N.E.3d 800, 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting

Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007)).

[24] The trial court found Taylor guilty of rape, a Level 3 felony. Indiana Code

Section 35-42-4-1(a) provides:

[A] person who knowingly or intentionally has sexual intercourse
with another person or knowingly or intentionally causes another
person to perform or submit to other sexual conduct (as defined
in IC 35-31.5-2-221.5) when:

(1) the other person is compelled by force or imminent threat of
force;

---

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2032 | March 19, 2026 Page 13 of 17
commits rape, a Level 3 felony.

“Other sexual conduct” includes an act involving “a sex organ of one (1) person

and the mouth . . . of another person.” Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2 -221.5(1).

Accordingly, the State was required to prove that Taylor knowingly or

intentionally caused L.D. to perform other sexual conduct while L.D. was

compelled by force or the imminent threat of force.

[25] On appeal, Taylor argues only that the State failed to prove that L.D. was

compelled by force or the imminent threat of force. “The ‘force necessary to

sustain a rape conviction need not be physical, but . . . it may be inferred from

the circumstances.’” Morales v. State, 227 N.E.3d 183, 189 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024)

(quoting Bryant v. State, 644 N.E.2d 859, 860 (Ind. 1994)), trans. denied. “The

presence or absence of force is determined from the victim’s perspective, not the

defendant’s.” Id. (citing Tobias v. State, 666 N.E.2d 68, 72 (Ind. 1996)). “‘This

test is subjective and looks to the victim’s perception of the circumstances

surrounding the incident in question.’” Id. (quoting E.S. v. State, 198 N.E.3d

701, 703 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022)).

[26] The State presented sufficient evidence that Taylor used physical force and

verbal threats to coerce L.D. to perform oral sex. The evidence demonstrated

that L.D. did not want to perform oral sex on Taylor, but L.D. did—so that

Taylor would stop beating her. Taylor’s argument to the contrary is merely a

request that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. The evidence is

sufficient to sustain Taylor’s conviction for rape, a Level 3 felony.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2032 | March 19, 2026 Page 14 of 17
III. The trial court failed to hold a hearing regarding the deprivation of
Taylor’s pretrial good time credit.

[27] Finally, Taylor challenges the trial court’s denial of his good time credit. Pre-

sentence jail time credit is a matter of statutory right, and trial courts generally

have no discretion in awarding or denying such credit. Jones v. State, 269

N.E.3d 862, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025).

[28] Indiana Code Section 35-50-6-3.1 provides that a defendant is entitled to good

time credit for time spent in confinement awaiting trial or sentencing.

Defendants imprisoned in a penal facility may be deprived of good time credit

for a violation of one or more rules of the penal facility. Ind. Code § 35-50-6 -

5(a)(2). Indiana Code Section 35-50-6-5(b), however, provides:

Before a person may be deprived of educational credit or good
time credit, the person must be granted a hearing to determine
the person’s guilt or innocence and, if found guilty, whether
deprivation of earned educational credit or good time credit is an
appropriate disciplinary action for the violation. In connection
with the hearing, the person is entitled to the procedural
safeguards listed in section 4 of this chapter. The person may
waive the person’s right to the hearing.

[29] The State concedes that Taylor was entitled to a hearing before the trial court

deprived him of pretrial good time credit. The State, thus, argues that we

should remand for a hearing on this issue. Taylor, however, argues that

because the statutory procedures were not followed, the State has waived the

opportunity to seek deprivation of Taylor’s pretrial good time credit.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2032 | March 19, 2026 Page 15 of 17
[30] We addressed a similar situation in Harness v. State, 246 N.E.3d 1271, 1276

(Ind. Ct. App. 2024), and held:

[O]ur statutes require that, before a person may be deprived of
pretrial home detention credit time, the person must, in
accordance with Indiana Code Section 35-50-6-4, be given
written notice of pretrial home detention violations, and a
hearing must be held to determine whether deprivation of credit
time is appropriate. Here, the State never gave written notice
that Harness violated the conditions of his pretrial home
detention by failing to pay fees, and no hearing was held on the
matter. The statutory procedures for the deprivation of credit
time, thus, were not followed in this case. See Tumbleson v. State,
706 N.E.2d 217, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that trial
court erred in depriving defendant of good time credit, in part,
because no hearing was held on the alleged violations).

Because the State and the trial court did not follow the statutory
procedures for the deprivation of credit time, the trial court erred
in depriving Harness of pretrial credit time. Additionally,
because the State never sought a hearing on the grounds that
Harness violated the conditions of his home detention by failing
to pay fees, the State has waived the opportunity to seek
deprivation of Harness’ pretrial credit time on this basis. Cf. Clark
v. State, 958 N.E.2d 488, 495 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that
trial court erred by failing to dismiss untimely probation violation
allegation). Accordingly, we reverse and remand with
instructions that the trial court award Harness 245 days of
accrued time and eighty-two days of good time credit for a total
of 327 days.

Given our holding in Harness, we agree with Taylor that the State has waived its

opportunity to object to Taylor’s pretrial good time credit. Accordingly, we

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2032 | March 19, 2026 Page 16 of 17
reverse and remand with instructions that the trial court award Taylor pretrial

good time credit.

Conclusion
[31] The trial court properly admitted L.D.’s statements from her deposition and to

Officer Nall, and the evidence is sufficient to sustain Taylor’s conviction for

rape. The State concedes, however, that the trial court was statutorily required

to hold a hearing regarding the deprivation of Taylor’s good time credit and

failed to do so. And because the State did not request a hearing, the State has

waived its right to object to pretrial good time credit. Accordingly, we affirm in

part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions that the trial court award

Taylor pretrial good time credit.

[32] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

Weissmann, J., and Foley, J., concur.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Jan B. Berg
Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana

Jesse R. Drum
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2032 | March 19, 2026 Page 17 of 17