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March 18, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Roger Rodriguez, Jr. v. State of Indiana

Indiana Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25A-CR-00623
• Panel: Paul D. Mathias, Nancy H. Vaidik
• Judges: Mathias, Vaidik, Pyle III

• Disposition: Affirmed

• Opinion

• Authorities (10)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (15.8K)

• PDF

Disposition

Affirmed

Combined Opinion

                        by [Paul D. Mathias](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/7268/paul-d-mathias/)

FILED
Mar 18 2026, 9:09 am

CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana
Roger Rodriguez, Jr.,
Appellant-Defendant

v.

State of Indiana,
Appellee-Plaintiff

March 18, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
25A-CR-623
Appeal from the Madison Circuit Court
The Honorable Angela Warner Sims, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
48C01-2307-MR-2144

Opinion by Judge Mathias
Judges Vaidik and Pyle concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-623 | March 18, 2026 Page 1 of 15
Mathias, Judge.

[1] Roger Rodriguez, Jr. appeals his convictions for murder and Level 3 felony

robbery. 1 Rodriguez raises two issues for our review, which we restate as

follows:

1. Whether Rodriguez waived appellate review of the admission
   of certain evidence when, despite an appropriate and prior
   objection, he later informed the court that he had no objection to
   that evidence.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it instructed
   the jury on self-defense.

[2] We clarify that, under the current version of Indiana Evidence Rule 103, a

defendant preserves a continuing objection to the admission of evidence for

appellate review simply by making a timely objection to that evidence during

trial, identifying the specific ground for the objection, and receiving the trial

court’s definitive ruling on the objection on the record at trial. 2 There is no

1
Rodriguez does not specifically appeal his adjudication as a habitual offender.
2
As explained below, our Supreme Court’s January 1, 2014, amendment to Indiana Evidence Rule 103
superseded our Court’s case law on the procedure required to preserve a continuing objection for appellate
review. Similarly, effective July 1, 2026, our Supreme Court has further amended Indiana Evidence Rule
103(b) to read as follows:
(b) Not Needing to Renew an Objection or Offer of Proof.
Once the court rules definitively on the record—either before trial or at trial— a party
need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal. This
includes a ruling on a motion in limine.
Ex. A, Order Amending Rules of Evidence, No. 26S-MS-8 (Ind. Mar. 6, 2026). Especially notable in the
most recent amendment is the expansion of the “at trial” requirement to “either before trial or at trial” for
cases heard on or after July 1, 2026.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-623 | March 18, 2026 Page 2 of 15
magic language required under Evidence Rule 103 to preserve appellate review

over an objection, even a continuing objection, that otherwise hits those marks.

However, our case law has long made clear that, despite a prior, preserved

objection, a defendant waives appellate review of the admission of evidence if

he later informs the court that he has no objection to that same evidence. That

is what happened here, so Rodriguez’s evidentiary challenge on appeal is

waived. As for the jury instructions, the trial court did not err.

[3] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History
[4] Rodriguez and Demarcus Davis 3 have been friends since 2020. In June 2023,

Rodriguez lived in an upstairs room at a home owned by his second cousin,

Mary Vasquez, on 13th Street in Anderson. On June 22, Rodriguez and Davis

exchanged messages in which they both lamented their need “to get some

money.” Tr. Vol. 5, p. 9.

[5] Five days later, Rodriguez met with a friend named Derrick, and the two

played “[c]ards and dominos” on Vasquez’s front porch. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 42.

Derrick noticed that Rodriguez was on his phone frequently. Around 7:11 p.m.,

Rodriguez texted Davis “[t]hirty thousand,” followed by, “[b]ring the strap.”

Tr. Vol. 5, p. 10. Davis responded: “Let me pop out on him.” Id. at 11. An

3
Davis was Rodriguez’s codefendant. His appeal is before our Court in case number 25A-CR-622.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-623 | March 18, 2026 Page 3 of 15
investigating officer later testified that those messages were “indicative of a

robbery being set up.” Tr. Vol. 5, p. 20.

[6] Shortly after Davis’s response, Tim Kates arrived at Vasquez’s residence in a

large black vehicle. Rodriguez texted Davis, “[h]e here.” Id. at 11. Davis

immediately responded: “On my way!” Id.

[7] Kates exited his vehicle with a black pouch (“like a child’s pencil bag for

school”). Tr. Vol. 3, p. 200. Kates, Rodriguez, and Derrick chatted for a few

minutes, and then Davis arrived. Rodriguez went out to meet Davis at Davis’s

vehicle; as he did so, Kates took some money out of the black pouch and put it

in his pockets. Rodriguez and Davis then arrived on the front porch, and Davis

and Kates then went inside Vasquez’s residence together. Rodriguez joined

them inside the residence about one minute later.

[8] About two minutes after that, Davis exited the residence, went to his vehicle for

a moment, and then went back inside the residence. Before the front door had

closed behind him, Derrick, who was still on the front porch, heard at least six

“[r]apid” gunshots “[g]rouped together.” Id. at 49, 203. Derrick immediately

fled. Davis exited the residence a few seconds later. As he exited, he was

holding a handgun, and his pockets were stuffed with money. Rodriguez exited

a few seconds after Davis; as he did so, he was holding “a handful of money”

that he was “shoving” into his pocket, and he “picked up a bill” that Davis had

dropped. Id. at 207-08.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-623 | March 18, 2026 Page 4 of 15
[9] Davis promptly left the scene in his own vehicle. Rodriguez, meanwhile, stayed

on the front porch for about an hour. He then went to Kates’s vehicle, removed

a tote and a rifle, and then “wip[ed] the doors and door handles” with his

clothing. Id. at 209. Rodriguez placed the tote and rifle inside the residence and

then returned to the front porch, where he started “counting [the] cash.” Id. at

211.

[10] Late that evening, Vasquez received a call that the front door to her residence

was sitting open. Vasquez went to the residence, and, upon entering it, she

observed Kates’s body. He had been shot six times and had died as a result of

his wounds; he likely died several minutes after he had been shot, and all of the

bullets entered his body from either the back or the side. Vasquez’s daughter

called local law enforcement.

[11] Investigating officers located ten spent 9mm shell casings inside the residence.

Eight were found on the opposite side of the room from Kates’s body; one was

lying near his body; and one ended up in an adjacent room near the other eight

casings. See Ex. Vol. 1, p. 44. Seven of the shell casings were for Federal-brand

bullets; those seven bullets had been fired from the same firearm. Officers also

observed a 9mm handgun lying near Kates’s body; none of the bullets recovered

from the scene had been fired from that handgun. Kates’s black pouch was

empty, but he had some cash in his clothing.

[12] Officers also learned that Vasquez had four security cameras around the

residence, one for each side. The officers seized that equipment and identified

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-623 | March 18, 2026 Page 5 of 15
Davis and Rodriguez as suspects. Indiana officers apprehended Rodriguez in

mid-July, and Mississippi officers apprehended Davis shortly thereafter.

[13] The State ultimately charged both Davis and Rodriguez with the same offenses:

murder, felony murder, Level 3 felony robbery, and for being habitual

offenders, and the trial court held their joint trial in January 2025. Vasquez,

Derrick, and investigating officers testified during the State’s case-in-chief. The

State also had Vasquez’s home surveillance system and recordings from the

time of Kates’s murder admitted into evidence.

[14] When the State first sought to admit the video-recording system at trial, which

was prior to the recordings themselves, Rodriguez objected to the admission of

any recorded evidence that showed him removing the tote and rifle from

Kates’s car. Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 214-16.4 The trial court overruled Rodriguez’s

objection. Rodriguez did not specifically ask for a “continuing” objection and

did not thereafter object to the evidence introduced at trial regarding his

removal of the tote and rifle from Kates’s car. See Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 208-09. In fact,

when the State sought to have the specific recording that showed Rodriguez

removing the tote and rifle admitted into evidence, the trial court asked

Rodriguez if he had any objection, and Rodriguez responded: “No objection.”

Id. at 32.

4
Specifically, Rodriguez objected at trial to recordings from “after the actual incident,” i.e., the shooting, for
the reasons “previously made” at a pretrial hearing on his motion in limine. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 214. The trial court
acknowledged the substance of Rodriguez’s objection. Id. at 214-15.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-623 | March 18, 2026 Page 6 of 15
[15] Davis and Rodriguez did not present any evidence in their own defenses, yet

they sought and received a self-defense instruction on the theory that Kates’s

apparent possession of a handgun may have supported a justified shooting. In

particular, they sought to have the court instruct the jury with Indiana’s pattern

self-defense instruction, which does not explicitly state that self-defense in

Indiana must be measured by both a subjective and an objective standard. Thus,

the State sought to add the following paragraph to the self-defense instruction:

“Self-defense is measured by both a subjective and [an] objective standard; the

defendant must have actually believed deadly force was necessary to protect

himself, but his belief must also be one that a reasonable person would have

held under the circumstances.” Tr. Vol. 5, p. 107. Rodriguez joined in Davis’s

objection to that language, but the trial court overruled the objection and

instructed the jury accordingly.

[16] Thereafter, the jury found Rodriguez guilty in relevant part of murder and

Level 3 felony robbery. Rodriguez then admitted to being a habitual offender,

and the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of ninety-six years in the

Department of Correction.

[17] This appeal ensued.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-623 | March 18, 2026 Page 7 of 15
1. Rodriguez waived appellate review of the post-shooting
video-recording evidence when he told the court he had no
objection to that evidence.
[18] On appeal, we first address Rodriguez’s challenge to the trial court’s admission

of the video-recording evidence that shows him removing the tote and rifle from

Kates’s car after the shooting. The State argues that Rodriguez’s appeal has not

been preserved for our review both because Rodriguez did not follow the proper

procedure for preserving a continuing objection and also because he told the

court, later at trial, that he had no objection to the video recording.

[19] We disagree with the State’s first theory of waiver. It is historically true that

Indiana’s case law has required the following steps for the preservation of a

continuing objection:

Indiana recognizes continuing objections. Robert Lowell Miller,
Jr., 12 Indiana Practice, § 103.110 at 63 (3d. ed.2007); see also
Smith v. State, 565 N.E.2d 1059, 1061 (Ind.1991) (“the Hobson [v.
State (1986[)], Ind. App., 495 N.E.2d 741 ] court expressly
approved of using the device of a continuing objection.”))
(quotation omitted), overruled in part; Simmons v. State, 760
N.E.2d 1154, 1159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (“We have not expressly
disapproved continuing objections.”). This is because continuing
objections serve a useful purpose in trials. That is, they avoid the
futility and waste of time inherent in requiring repetition of the
same unsuccessful objection each time evidence of a given
character is offered. Miller, § 103.110 at 62.

However, as this case illustrates, there are dangers to using
continuing objections. As such, the proper procedure must be
carefully followed if attorneys wish to use continuing objections

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-623 | March 18, 2026 Page 8 of 15
and still properly preserve the admission of specific evidence as
an issue on appeal. First, objecting counsel must ask the trial
court to consider the same objection to be made and overruled
each time a class of evidence is offered. Id. It is within the trial
court’s discretion to grant counsel a continuing objection. If the
trial court grants the continuing objection, then counsel does not
have to object each time the class of evidence is subsequently
offered. Miller, § 103.110 at 62. This is an exception to the
general rule that a party must continue to object and obtain a
ruling for each individual instance of inadmissible evidence. 75
Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 325 (2008). If, however, the trial court does
not specifically grant the right to a continuing objection, it is
counsel’s duty to object to the evidence as it is offered in order to
preserve the issue for appeal. Id.

If the class of evidence to which the continuing objection is
lodged is sufficiently defined, the trial court is satisfied that
repeated objections to the evidence would be futile, and the trial
court grants the continuing objection, presentation of the
evidence is enhanced and frustration and impatience is reduced.
See Miller, § 103.110 at 62-63. Objecting counsel must ensure,
however, that the continuing objection fully and clearly advises
the trial court of the specific grounds for the objection. Id. at 63-
64; see also Simmons, 760 N.E.2d at 1159; Sullivan v. State, 748
N.E.2d 861, 864 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); 75 Am. Jur. 2d at § 325. If
so, the issue is sufficiently preserved for appeal. Sullivan, 748
N.E.2d at 864.

Hayworth v. State, 904 N.E.2d 684, 691-92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (footnotes

omitted; some alterations original to Hayworth); see also Hutcherson v. State, 966

N.E.2d 766, 770 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Hayworth), trans. denied. Thus,

under the rule articulated in Hayworth, trial counsel must not only lodge a

contemporaneous objection with a specifically identified ground for the

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-623 | March 18, 2026 Page 9 of 15
objection but also must expressly request, and expressly receive, recognition of

the objection as a “continuing” one. 904 N.E.2d at 691-92.

[20] However, there has been a split in our Court regarding whether such magic

language survived an amendment to Indiana Evidence Rule 103(b), which had

an effective date of January 1, 2014. Indiana Evidence Rule 103(b) simply

states: “Once the court rules definitively on the record at trial a party need not

renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal.” At

least two panels of our Court, citing Rule 103(b), have concluded that a claim

of error in the admission of evidence is preserved for appellate review under

Rule 103(b) by simply “renewing” a pretrial motion to suppress at trial and

having the court definitely state that it is “denying” that objection. K.G. v. State,

81 N.E.3d 1078, 1080 n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Ind. Evidence Rule

103(b)); see also Bailey v. State, 131 N.E.3d 665, 676 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (stating

that a claim of error in the admission of evidence was preserved for appellate

review where, after the defendant objected at trial, the trial court stated that it

would treat that objection as a Rule 103(b) objection, which the court then

denied), trans. denied. A third panel has concluded that Rule 103(b) required

“supplement[ing]” Hayworth by noting that a request for a continuing objection

“should ideally specify that it is pursuant to Evidence Rule 103(b).” Hostetler v.

State, 184 N.E.3d 1240, 1246 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (emphasis added), trans.

denied.

[21] At least one published opinion of our Court, and numerous unpublished

memorandum decisions, have relied on the Hayworth language for determining

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-623 | March 18, 2026 Page 10 of 15
whether an objection to evidence was properly preserved for appellate review

despite the trial having occurred after the effective date of the amendment to

Indiana Evidence Rule 103(b). Namely, in Hornsby v. State, a panel of our Court

concluded that the appellant had failed to preserve appellate review of the

admission of evidence when he “failed to procure” express recognition from the

trial court of a continuing objection. 202 N.E.3d 1135, 1148 (Ind. Ct. App.

2023) (citing Hayworth, 904 N.E.2d at 692), trans. denied. The Hornsby panel thus

subjected the appellant’s arguments to fundamental-error review. Id. The

opinion makes no mention of Indiana Evidence Rule 103(b). See id.

[22] We conclude that the language of Evidence Rule 103, especially in light of its

March 6, 2026 amendment that becomes effective July 1, 2026, speaks for itself

and controls. To preserve appellate review of a continuing objection to the

admission of evidence at trial, the objecting party must “timely object” to the

evidence, “state[] the specific ground” for the objection unless that ground is

already “apparent,” and receive the trial court’s “definitive[]” ruling on the

objection “on the record at trial.” 5 Evid. R. 103(a), (b). The Rule does not

require the objecting party to specifically identify his or her objection to the

admission of evidence as a “continuing” one, and it says nothing about

requiring the trial court to specifically identify the objection as a “continuing”

one. See id.

5
Again, beginning July 1, 2026, the “at trial” language has been amended to also capture pretrial requests to
exclude evidence.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-623 | March 18, 2026 Page 11 of 15
[23] This reading of Evidence Rule 103 is consistent with the purposes of the rule

that an issue is waived for appellate review if it is not presented to the trial court

first:

This rule exists because trial courts have the authority to hear
and weigh the evidence, to judge the credibility of witnesses, to
apply the law to the facts found, and to decide questions raised
by the parties. Appellate courts, on the other hand, have the
authority to review questions of law and to judge the sufficiency
of the evidence supporting a decision. The rule of waiver in part
protects the integrity of the trial court; it cannot be found to have
erred as to an issue or argument that it never had an opportunity
to consider. . . .

GKC Ind. Theatres, Inc. v. Elk Retail Invs., LLC, 764 N.E.2d 647, 651 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2002) (citations omitted). The purpose of Evidence Rule 103 is to ensure

that the reviewing court is in fact reviewing an issue the trial court has ruled on.

Thus, as Evidence Rule 103, including its 2026 amendment, does not require

any magic language to preserve appellate review of a continuing objection, we

reject the State’s first theory of waiver.

[24] As for the State’s second theory of waiver, our case law is unambiguous. On

this point, the Hostetler panel made clear that other language from Hayworth

survived the amendment to Indiana Evidence Rule 103(b):

. . . The [Evidence Rule 103(b)] amendment did not change or
overrule the existing case law explaining that a defendant can
waive a continuing objection by affirmatively stating that he has
no objection when evidence is introduced and admitted at trial.
We take this opportunity to echo and supplement the Hayworth

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-623 | March 18, 2026 Page 12 of 15
Court’s clarification regarding the “proper procedure” for a
defendant who seeks to rely upon a continuing objection, which
is now set forth under Evidence Rule 103(b). Upon a defendant’s
“timely” and “sufficiently specific objection to a particular class
of evidence” at trial, the defendant’s request for a continuing
objection should ideally specify that it is pursuant to Evidence
Rule 103(b). . . .Thereafter, “during the subsequent admission of
that class of evidence” to which the defendant sought the
continuing objection under Evidence Rule 103(b), the “proper
procedure” is for the defendant to “remain silent[.]” Hayworth,
904 N.E.2d at 686, 694. If the defendant were to make a
statement to the admission of the evidence, especially where a
trial court asks if the defendant has any objection, the
recommended procedure would be for the defendant to simply
state that he is relying upon his continuing objection under
Evidence Rule 103(b).

184 N.E.3d at 1246. As our Supreme Court has made clear, an “appellant

cannot on the one hand state at trial that he has no objection to the admission

of evidence and thereafter in this Court claim such admission to be erroneous.”

Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 679 (Ind. 2013) (quotation marks omitted).

[25] We thus agree with the State’s second theory of waiver here. After Rodriguez

had properly objected to the admission of evidence showing him removing the

tote and rifle from Kates’s car after the shooting, he then affirmatively told the

trial court that he had “[n]o objection” to the admission of the specific video

recording that showed him removing those items from Kates’s car. Tr. Vol. 3,

p. 32. Accordingly, and for that reason, we conclude that Rodriguez waived his

previously preserved objection. Hostetler, 184 N.E.3d at 1246-47. As

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-623 | March 18, 2026 Page 13 of 15
Rodriguez’s evidentiary challenge is not properly before us, we do not consider

it.

1. The trial court properly instructed the jury. [26] Rodriguez also argues on appeal that the trial court erred when it instructed the

jury on self-defense. As our Supreme Court has made clear:

Instructing a jury is left to the sound discretion of the trial court
and we review its decision only for an abuse of discretion. We
undertake a three-part analysis in determining whether a trial
court has abused its discretion. First, the reviewing court should
determine whether the tendered instruction is a correct statement
of the law. Second, it examines the record to determine whether
there was evidence present to support the tendered instruction.
Finally, it determines whether the substance of the tendered
instruction was covered by another instruction or instructions.

Washington v. State, 997 N.E.2d 342, 345-46 (Ind. 2013) (citation modified).

[27] Rodriguez does not dispute that the language added by the court to his

proffered jury instruction, regarding both the subjective and objective standards

for self-defense, was correct as a matter of law. 6 See id. at 349. Rather, his only

argument on appeal is that the trial court’s addition of that language created

confusing surplusage. We discern neither confusion nor surplusage in the

6
Much of Rodriguez’s brief on this issue appears to have been copied and pasted from our Supreme Court’s
opinion in Washington, albeit without attribution. Compare Appellant’s Br. at 12-17 with Washington, 997
N.E.2d at 346-49.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-623 | March 18, 2026 Page 14 of 15
court’s jury instruction on self-defense. We therefore reject Rodriguez’s

argument.

Conclusion
[28] For all of these reasons, we affirm Rodriguez’s convictions.

[29] Affirmed.

Vaidik, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Paul J. Podlejski
Anderson, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
Jodi Kathryn Stein
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-623 | March 18, 2026 Page 15 of 15