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March 18, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State of Indiana v. David E. Watson

Indiana Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25A-CR-01789
• Panel: Edward W. Najam Jr., Nancy H. Vaidik
• Judges: Vaidik, Najam SR, Scheele

• Disposition: Reversed and Remanded

• Opinion

• Authorities (13)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (16K)

• PDF

Disposition

Reversed and Remanded

Combined Opinion

                        by [Edward W. Najam Jr.](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/7270/edward-w-najam-jr/)

FILED
Mar 18 2026, 9:15 am

CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana
State of Indiana,
Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.

David E. Watson,
Appellee-Defendant.

March 18, 2026

Court of Appeals Case No.
25A-CR-1789

Appeal from the
Perry Circuit Court

The Honorable
M. Lucy Goffinet, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.
62C01-2208-F4-446

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1789 | March 18, 2026 Page 1 of 13
Opinion by Senior Judge Najam
Judges Vaidik and Scheele concur.

Najam, Senior Judge.

Statement of the Case
[1] The State brings this interlocutory appeal, challenging the trial court’s order

ruling that evidence of the alleged victim’s prior accusations against others of

sexual misconduct and rape could be introduced in the prosecution against her

uncle, David E. Watson. The State charged Watson with four counts of sexual

misconduct with a minor and two counts of child exploitation as to M.S., his

niece, the complaining witness. Concluding that M.S.’s prior accusations were

neither recanted nor shown to be demonstrably false, we reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History
[2] In 2019, M.S., who was thirteen or fourteen years old, and her minor cousin,

Austin, exchanged lewd text messages about proposed future sexual conduct

between the two. And, after that incident, also in 2019, M.S. was caught

having inappropriate conversations with and sending nude photographs of

herself to adult men. Watson, her uncle, discovered those communications and

notified M.S.’s parents. M.S. was disciplined by Watson, and her aunt, Diane.

And she was disciplined by both of her parents. One of the disciplinary

measures used was denying M.S. cellphone privileges.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1789 | March 18, 2026 Page 2 of 13
[3] After receiving her discipline for that behavior, M.S. alleged that sometime in

2019, when M.S. was thirteen or fourteen years old, Austin inappropriately

touched her under her pants while they were sleeping in the same room at his

house. M.S. stated that Austin touched her under her clothing while she was

sleeping on a couch. Brett, M.S.’s brother, was allegedly sleeping on the same

couch, approximately three to ten steps from M.S. when this incident was

alleged to have happened.

[4] Next, on May 4, 2022, M.S. made accusations to law enforcement officers that

Watson had inappropriately touched her on two occasions. The State filed

charges against Watson, alleging that between October and December 2020,

Watson sexually abused M.S., his fifteen-year-old niece, on two separate

occasions by touching and fondling and penetration of her vagina with his

finger. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, pp. 14-15. The State further alleged that

sometime between October 1, 2020 and May 4, 2022, Watson disseminated

nude photos of M.S. to her brother and to her female friend, Emily. Id. at 44-

45.

1
[5] After deposing M.S., Watson’s counsel filed a “Notice of Intent To Offer

Evidence Of Alleged Victim’s History Of Accusing Third Parties Of Sexual

Misconduct And/Or Rape.” Id. at 54. In a span of eight years, including the

allegations against Watson, M.S. had accused four different boys or men of

1
M.S.’s deposition testimony is not part of the record of this appeal.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1789 | March 18, 2026 Page 3 of 13
sexual misconduct by the time she was fifteen years old. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 35. A

hearing was held during which M.S. testified.

[6] M.S. was nineteen years old at the time of the hearing. At that hearing, she

described her family life. She stated that when she was seven or eight, she and

Brett, her then nine-year-old brother, lived with their father. M.S. and her

brother spent every Friday and Saturday with Watson and Diane. They

continued to visit Watson and Diane, her uncle and aunt, every weekend until

M.S.’s allegations against him. She said the most frequent discipline used when

she was between the ages of eleven and fifteen was the denial of cellphone

privileges.

[7] In addition to the testimony acknowledging her prior accusation against Austin,

she described two additional prior incidents. M.S. testified that when she was

seven or eight, a person named Kyle stayed at her father’s home for a week.

M.S. testified that there were three bedrooms at her father’s apartment. Kyle

and her father slept downstairs, and she and her brother slept in separate

bedrooms upstairs. She said that although she could not provide a specific date

or year, on one occasion, Kyle inappropriately touched her by touching her

vagina one night for around five minutes. She said the light was on in her

bedroom at the time and that Kyle stopped the behavior on his own. M.S.

reported the incident to her father four days later and around two days after

Kyle left. M.S. stated that her father’s response was “he’s not allowed to come

over anymore.” Id. at 11. The incident was not reported to the Department of

Child Services or to the police.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1789 | March 18, 2026 Page 4 of 13
[8] M.S. further testified that she believed the next incident happened in 2018 when

she was twelve years old. She met a sixteen-year-old boy named Patrick

through her friendship with a girl named Emily. On the second of three

occasions she was around him, she played hide and seek outside at night with

him and other children. M.S. testified that Patrick told her to find him first, and

when she did, they went into an alley where he pushed her down near a bush

and raped her. M.S. additionally testified that the only person she told about

the alleged rape was Watson, and she told him around two weeks after the

alleged event. According to M.S., Watson was upset when she told him about

the event. M.S. saw Patrick one more time after the alleged rape, but it was a

brief encounter in Emily’s kitchen and the two did not speak to each other.

[9] At the hearing she acknowledged her deposition testimony, in which she

recalled hiding behind a bush and that Patrick found her. And she conceded

that she did not include in her earlier deposition testimony any of the

statements she attributed to him during her hearing testimony. Further, she

agreed that in her deposition, she stated she did not report the alleged rape to

Watson, her friends, parents, the police, or the Department of Child Services.

[10] After the hearing, the trial court issued an order ruling that M.S.’s prior

allegations against others could be introduced in Watson’s trial. The State

appeals from that decision.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1789 | March 18, 2026 Page 5 of 13
Discussion and Decision
[11] The State argues that the trial court erred by ruling that M.S.’s prior allegations

would be admissible at trial, contending their admission would violate the Rape

Shield Rule as they were not shown to be demonstrably false. Appellant’s Br.

p. 6.

[12] Typically, we review the trial court’s decision to admit or to exclude evidence

for an abuse of discretion. Wilson v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1265, 1272 (Ind. 2002).

“An abuse of discretion occurs when the court’s decision either clearly

contravenes the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances” before it, or the

court “misinterprets the law.” Nardi v. King, 253 N.E.3d 1098, 1103 (Ind. 2025)

(quotation marks omitted).

[13] However, in Candler v. State, 837 N.E.2d 1100, 1103 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), a

panel of this court observed that “[a]s a general rule, when the admission of

evidence is predicated on a factual determination by the trial court, we review

under a clearly erroneous standard of review.” We concluded that “the clearly

erroneous standard appears semantically to be more correct than the abuse of

discretion standard when applied to factual determinations of the trial court.”

Id. at 1104. Quoting our Supreme Court’s opinion in Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d

90, 104 (Ind. 2005), we explained,

Trial courts do not, however, have “discretion” to make findings.
Rather, trial courts are to use their best judgment to arrive at the
correct result. They are bound by the law and the evidence and it
is usually an error, not an “abuse” if the appellate court

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1789 | March 18, 2026 Page 6 of 13
disagrees. Trial courts must of course exercise judgment,
particularly as to credibility of witnesses, and we defer to that
judgment because the trial court views the evidence first hand
and we review a cold documentary record. Thus, to the extent
credibility or inferences are to be drawn, we give the trial court’s
conclusions substantial weight. But to the extent a ruling is based on
an error of law or is not supported by the evidence it is reversible, and the
trial court has no discretion to reach the wrong result.

Candler, 837 N.E.2d at 1104 (emphasis added). Thus, we will apply the clearly

erroneous standard of review because we are reviewing the trial court’s ruling

on whether the evidence may be introduced.

[14] Additionally, “[e]ffective January 1, 1994, the Indiana Supreme Court adopted

the Indiana Rules of Evidence.” Graham v. State, 736 N.E.2d 822, 824 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2000), trans. denied. “Indiana Evidence Rule 412, commonly referred to as

the Rape Shield Rule, embodies the basic principles of Indiana’s Rape Shield

Statute[.]” Id. In Graham, we followed our Supreme Court’s decision in State v.

Walton, which said,

[I]nquiry into a victim’s prior sexual activity is sufficiently
problematic that it should not be permitted to become a focus of
the defense. Rule 412 is intended to prevent the victim from
being put on trial, to protect the victim against surprise,
harassment, and unnecessary invasion of privacy, and,
importantly, to remove obstacles to reporting sex crimes.

Id. at 825 (quoting State v. Walton, 715 N.E.2d 824, 826 (Ind. 1999)).

“However, Evid. R. 412 was not adopted verbatim from the Rape Shield

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1789 | March 18, 2026 Page 7 of 13
2
Statute.” Graham, 736 N.E.2d at 825. “To the extent there are any

differences, Evid. R. 412 controls.” Id.

[15] Evidence Rule 412(a) prohibits the admission of evidence offered to prove that

a victim or witness engaged in other sexual behavior to prove a victim’s or

witness’s sexual predisposition in a criminal proceeding involving alleged

sexual misconduct. However, evidence of specific instances of a victim’s or

witness’s sexual behavior is admissible if offered to prove that someone else was

the source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence, or to prove consent, and

exclusion of that evidence would violate the defendant’s constitutional rights.

Evid. R. 412(b).

[16] Significant to our discussion here is the common-law exception that survived

the adoption of the Indiana Rules of Evidence. See Walton, 715 N.E.2d at 826 -

1. “This exception provides that evidence of a prior accusation of rape is

admissible if: (1) the victim has admitted that her prior accusation of rape is

false; or (2) the victim’s prior accusation is demonstrably false.” Graham, 736

N.E.2d at 825. “In presenting such evidence, the defendant is not probing the

complaining witness’s sexual history.” Id. “Rather, the defendant proffers the

evidence for impeachment purposes to demonstrate that the complaining

witness has previously made false accusations of rape.” Id. “Viewed in this

light, evidence of prior false rape accusations is more properly understood as

2
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-4 (2018) (Rape Shield Statute).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1789 | March 18, 2026 Page 8 of 13
verbal conduct, not sexual conduct.” Id. “Consequently, its admission does

not run afoul of the Rape Shield Rule.” Id.

[17] “It is important to note, however, that prior true accusations of rape do

constitute evidence of the complaining witness’s prior sexual conduct.” Id.

“Such evidence is therefore inadmissible under the Rape Shield Rule.” Id. We

further note, as discussed in Graham, that the statutory procedural requirements

of written notice of intent to offer such evidence and a hearing to determine if

that evidence is admissible under Evidence Rule 412(c) are still required even if

the evidence involves the common law exception and not a statutory exception.

Id. at 825-26.

[18] Defining “demonstrably false,” has proven to be elusive. “False” is a term

readily understood as being untrue. But what does it mean to be “demonstrably

false?” In State v. Luna, a panel of this Court considered what it means for a

claim to be demonstrably false, when the complaining witness has not admitted

the falsity of the prior accusations. 932 N.E.2d 210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). We

noted that the decision in Candler v. State leads to the conclusion that the lack of

criminal charges does not, by itself, equate to the conclusion that a prior

allegation is demonstrably false. Id. at 214-15 (discussing Candler v. State, 837

N.E.2d 1100, 1104 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)). And we observed that in Williams v.

State, the existence of an inference that the prior accusation is false without

more is not enough to establish a prior accusation is demonstrably false. Luna,

932 N.E.2d at 215 (discussing Williams v. State, 779 N.E.2d 610 (Ind. Ct. App.

2002)).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1789 | March 18, 2026 Page 9 of 13
[19] The Merriam Webster Dictionary defines “demonstrable” as “capable of being

demonstrated.” Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/demonstrable [https://perma.cc/4DZS-A8N6] (last

visited March 6, 2026). And it provides synonyms for the word

“demonstrable,” which include the words “verifiable,” “confirmable,” and

“empirical.” Id.

[20] On transfer in State v. Walton, our Supreme Court acknowledged our earlier

observation in that case that “while ‘no bright line rule can be established’ for

determining whether a prior accusation is demonstrably false, the demonstrably

false standard is ‘more stringent than a mere credibility determination.’” 715

N.E.2d at 828 (quoting State v. Walton, 692 N.E.2d 496, 501 (Ind. Ct. App.

1998) (vacated on transfer)).

[21] We note that, in the present case, the trial court did not provide an explanation

for its determination that the prior accusations were demonstrably false, just

that Watson had met his burden. And we will not speculate as to the court’s

rationale. But we pause now to note how the facts of this case differ from the

ones discussed above and explain why the trial court’s decision must be

reversed.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1789 | March 18, 2026 Page 10 of 13
[22] Here, Watson seeks the introduction of M.S.’s three prior allegations of sexual

abuse, involving sexual misconduct and rape. 3 The record before us reveals that

M.S. did not admit that her prior accusations were false. And Watson offered
4
no evidence to suggest that her accusations were demonstrably false.

[23] In Candler, the complaining witness testified that she misinterpreted her step-

father’s intentions when he touched her. 837 N.E.2d at 1104. Thus, she did

not admit her accusation was false and the accusation was not proven

demonstrably false by her clarification. Id. In Graham, the alleged victim’s

prior accusation that she was sexually assaulted while she was intoxicated was

inadmissible because she did not admit it was false, and the fact charges were

not filed did not render her accusation demonstrably false. 736 N.E.2d at 826.

[24] Here, unlike in Walton, there was no other evidence to show that the prior

accusations were demonstrably false. See e.g., Walton, 715 N.E.2d at 825 (where

two witnesses testified complaining witness made rape accusation and

complaining witness testified she did not make accusation and prior rape did

not occur, prior accusation was demonstrably false); Williams, 779 N.E.2d at

614 (complaining witness never admitted prior accusation was false, and

3
“The common law exception to prior false accusations of rape has been interpreted to apply not only to
rape, but also to prior false allegations of sex crimes.” State v. Luna, 932 N.E.2d 210, 213 (Ind. Ct. App.
2010).
4
A non-exhaustive list of ways to establish that the prior accusations are demonstrably false include: (1)
exculpatory DNA evidence; (2) verification that the accused could not have been present at the location of
the incident; and (3) eyewitness testimony to the contrary at the time the incident is alleged to have occurred.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1789 | March 18, 2026 Page 11 of 13
independent witness’s contradictory testimony about whether complaining

witness made accusation to him did not make her prior accusation

demonstrably false). M.S. was the sole witness who testified at the hearing.

Absent other evidence, a determination of her credibility alone cannot support a

ruling that her prior accusations were demonstrably false. Walton, 715 N.E.2d

828.

[25] Under Indiana Law, “[p]rior accusations are demonstrably false where the

victim has admitted the falsity of the charges or they have been disproved.”
5
Fugett v. State, 812 N.E.2d 846, 849 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). According to our

case law, and our review of the record, Watson has not met his burden of

establishing that the claims are demonstrably false, and we must reverse the

trial court’s preliminary evidentiary ruling.

5
Other states handle the admissibility determination differently. For example, in Kentucky, a defendant may
meet his or her burden of establishing that a prior accusation is demonstrably false by showing “that the prior
accusation had a distinct and substantial probability of being false. We reiterate that this does not require
absolute proof of falsity.” Perry v. Commonwealth, 390 S.W.3d 122, 130 (Ky. 2012). The court observed that
“[e]ven the Commonwealth is only required to prove its case against a defendant beyond a reasonable doubt,
which is less than absolute proof (or proof beyond any and all doubt).” Id. And in Iowa, “a criminal
defendant wishing to admit such evidence must first make a threshold showing to the trial judge outside the
presence of the jury that (1) the complaining witness made the statements and (2) the statements are false,
based on a preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Alberts, 722 N.W.2d 402, 409 (Iowa 2006) (emphasis added).
The Iowa Supreme Court followed the New Jersey Supreme Court’s determination that the preponderance of
the evidence standard “strikes the right balance, placing an initial burden on the defendant to justify the use
of such evidence while not setting an exceedingly high threshold for its admission.” State v. Guenther, 854
A.2d 308, 324 (N.J. 2004).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1789 | March 18, 2026 Page 12 of 13
Conclusion
[26] The trial court’s determination that Watson had met his burden of establishing

the admissibility of M.S.’s prior accusations of sexual abuse and/or rape was

clearly erroneous because Watson did not show that M.S. admitted that they

were false or that the prior accusations were demonstrably false. Accordingly,

we must reverse the trial court’s decision and remand this matter for further

proceedings.

[27] Reversed and remanded.

Vaidik, J., and Scheele, J., concur.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana

Samuel J. Dayton
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Walter R. Hagedorn, II
Tell City, Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1789 | March 18, 2026 Page 13 of 13