Justin Follett v. Philadelphia Department of Prisons-CFCF

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Feb. 18, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Justin Follett v. Philadelphia Department of Prisons-CFCF

District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2:26-cv-00214

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (15)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (15.7K)

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Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JUSTIN FOLLETT, : CIVIL ACTION
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : NO. 26-214
:
PHILADELPHIA DEPARTMENT :
OF PRISONS-CFCF, :
Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM

MURPHY, J. February 18, 2026
Justin Follett, a prisoner incarcerated at FCI Tucson, filed this civil rights action
concerning an incident that allegedly occurred while he was a pretrial detainee at Curran
Fromhold Correctional Facility in Philadelphia. The only named defendant is the Philadelphia
Department of Prisons-CFCF (“PDP-CFCF”). Mr. Follett also seeks leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. For the following reasons, leave to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted, PDP-
CFCF will be dismissed as a defendant and the two Correctional Officers that Mr. Follett
mentions in the complaint will be added as defendants so that the case can proceed.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS1
Mr. Follett alleges that his constitutional rights were violated when he arrived at the jail
on or about October 1, 2025 and officers told inmates about the nature of the charges for which
he was being held, putting his life in danger. DI 1. He was given a bottom bunk pass, but forced
to sleep on a top bunk by Correctional Officers Bradfordt and Cashmir. Id. at 4-5. Correctional

1 The factual allegations are taken from Mr. Follett’s complaint and the attached materials
(DI 1), to which the court adopts the sequential pagination assigned by the CM/ECF docketing
system. The court deems the entire submission to constitute the complaint. Where the court
quotes from the complaint, punctuation, spelling, and capitalization errors will be cleaned up as
needed.
Officers Bradfordt and Cashmir both refused to provide him with a bottom bunk saying that Mr.
Follett “was a sex offender and had to suffer the consequences of [his] criminal actions, and
proceeded to tell other inmates in general population” about his charges. Id. at 5. He was told he
could sleep on the floor but his cellmate threatened his life when he attempted to do so, and he

“crawled up to the top bunk.” Id. Mr. Follett ultimately fell from the top bunk. Id. After he
fell, the cellmate punched him in the face for waking him up. Id. He had to go to the hospital
due to a concussion, contusions, and other injuries. Id. He further alleges CFCF officers,
presumably Correctional Officers Bradfordt and Cashmir, told him that they hoped he “would be
attacked by other inmates in general population, putting my life in danger.” Id. at 4. Mr. Follett
seeks money damages for negligence and deliberate indifference to his needs and classification
as a sex offender, stating that he should have been placed in protective custody. Id. at 5.
Attached to the complaint is an inmate grievance form Mr. Follett submitted to prison
officials complaining that Correctional Officers Bradfordt and Cashmir both refused to provide
him with a bottom bunk despite his pass. DI 1-1 at 1. He also attached a United States

Department of Justice complaint form asserting the same facts (although he spelled Correctional
Officer Bradfordt’s name differently), stating that he requested to be placed in protective
custody. Id. at 2-7.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court grants Mr. Follett leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that
he is incapable of paying the fees to commence this civil action.2 Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. §
1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the court to dismiss the complaint if it fails to state a claim. Whether a

2 Because Mr. Follett is a prisoner, he will be required to pay the $350 filing fee for this
case in installments as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act.
complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard
applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher
v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the court to determine whether
the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted); Talley v.
Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275, 286 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021). At this early stage of the litigation, the court will
accept the facts alleged in the pro se complaint as true, draw all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff’s favor, and ask only whether the complaint contains facts sufficient to state a plausible
claim. See Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021), abrogation on other
grounds recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d Cir. 2024). Conclusory
allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Because Mr. Follett is proceeding pro se, the
court construes his allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing
Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)).
III. DISCUSSION

Mr. Follett asserts negligence and constitutional claims. The vehicle by which federal
constitutional claims may be brought in federal court is 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim
under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws
of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person
acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
A. PDP-CFCF
Mr. Follett only names the PDP-CFCF as a defendant in his complaint. To the extent Mr.
Follett seeks to name the jail, his constitutional claim is not plausible because a jail is not a
“person” under § 1983. Cephas v. George W. Hill Corr. Facility, No. 09-6014, 2010 WL
2854149, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 2010); Miller v. Curran-Fromhold Corr. Facility, No. 13-7680, 2014 WL 4055846, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2014) (citing Mitchell v. Chester Cnty. Farms
Prison, 426 F. Supp. 271 (E.D. Pa. 1976). To the extent he seeks to name the Philadelphia
Department of Prisons, the constitutional claim is also not plausible because City agencies have

no separate legal existence and are not suable entities under § 1983. See Vurimindi v. City of
Philadelphia, No. 10-88, 2010 WL 3169610, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 10, 2010) (citing 53 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 16257 (“no such department shall be taken to have had . . . a separate corporate existence,
and hereafter all suits growing out of their transaction . . . shall be in the name of the City of
Philadelphia”)); Vangjeli v. City of Philadelphia, No. 15-1566, 2015 WL 5793926, at *3 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 30, 2015), aff’d, 655 F. App’x 132 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that the Free Library is not
an entity subject to suit since no department or agency of the City of Philadelphia has a separate
corporate existence) (quoting 53 Pa. C.S.A. § 16257); Bush v. City of Phila. Police Dep’t, 684 F.
Supp. 2d 634, 636 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (dismissing the Philadelphia Police Department as a matter of
law because it is not a legal entity separate from the City of Philadelphia). Finally, to the extent

that Mr. Follett asserts a negligence claim against PCP-CFCF, it is barred by the Pennsylvania
Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (the “PPSTCA”), which provides, with limited exceptions
that are inapplicable here, that “no local agency shall be liable for any damages on account of
any injury to a person or property caused by any act of the local agency or an employee thereof
or any other person.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 8541, 8542(b) (listing the following eight
exceptions: (1) vehicle liability; (2) care, custody, or control of personal property; (3) real
property; (4) trees, traffic controls, and street lighting; (5) utility service facilities; (6) streets; (7)
sidewalks; and (8) care, custody, or control of animals). See, e.g., Momot v. City of Philadelphia,
No. 11-7806, 2012 WL 1758630, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 16, 2012) (holding that the City of
Philadelphia was immune from state-law negligence claim); Van Der Leer v. City of
Philadelphia, No. 03-4324, 2004 WL 1336315, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 15, 2004) (“The Act
immunizes the City of Philadelphia and its employees from most state law claims. . . .
Exceptions to the Act are to be strictly construed.”); Guy v. Bristol Borough, No. 16-1557, 2018

WL 3141429, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 2018) (dismissing negligence claim in case for damages
arising from municipality’s demolition of property); Wilson v. Norristown Area Sch. Dist., 783
A.2d 871, 876 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001) (holding that student’s negligence claim against school
did not fall within an exception to PPSTCA, and therefore was barred). Accordingly, Mr.
Follett’s claims against the PDP-CFCF are not plausible and will be dismissed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii).
B. Correctional Officers Bradfordt and Cashmir
Although not listed as defendants in the caption of the complaint, the court understands
Mr. Follett to be asserting his constitutional and state law negligence claims against Correctional
Officers Bradfordt and Cashmir. “Courts have found that it can be an Eighth Amendment3

violation where an inmate has a serious medical need requiring him to use the bottom bunk, but
prison officials are deliberately indifferent to that need.” Saunders v. GEO Grp., Inc., No. 19-
2322, 2019 WL 5558659, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2019) (quoting Whitehead v. Wetzel, No. 14-

3 Although he was a federal prisoner when he was transferred to Philadelphia to face
charges, it appears that Mr. Follett was a pretrial detainee on those charges at the time of the
events in question. Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment governs his claims even though he cites
the Eighth Amendment. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 166 (3d Cir. 2005). However, it
is a distinction without a difference since the standard under the Eighth Amendment and
Fourteenth Amendment for deliberate indifference claims are essentially the same for purposes
of the analysis. See Parkell v. Morgan, 682 F. App’x 155, 159 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam); see
also Moore v. Luffey, No. 18-1716, 2019 WL 1766047, at *3 n.2 (3d Cir. Apr. 19, 2019)
(declining to address whether a new standard applies to claims raised by pretrial detainees based
on issues related to medical care).
51, 2016 WL 356809, at *7 (W.D. Pa. June 2, 2016)); see also Wall v. Bushman, 639 F. App’x 92,
95 (3d Cir. 2015) (reversing grant of summary judgment where disputed issue of material fact
existed from which a rational factfinder could conclude that prison doctor recklessly disregarded
prisoner’s need for a lower-bunk assignment or denied the lower-bunk assignment for non-

medical reasons); Guilfoil v. Pierce, No. 06-493, 2009 WL 688957, at *5 (D. Del. Mar. 16, 2009)
(“Refusal of prison officials to assign an inmate with a herniated disc to a bottom bunk may
constitute deliberate indifference if the inmate’s condition is sufficiently serious.”). Since he
asserts that he had a bottom bunk pass and the two Correctional Officers were deliberately
indifferent to his need for a bottom bunk due to his status as an alleged sex offender, which
resulted in his fall and assault by his cellmate, the court will direct the Clerk to add Correctional
Officers Bradfordt and Cashmir as named defendants and direct service of the complaint for a
responsive pleading.
An appropriate Order will be entered.