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March 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Maria J. Prkic v. Sezzle, Inc.

District Court, D. Colorado

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:24-cv-02624

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (6)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (505)

• PDF

Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Judge Philip A. Brimmer

Civil Action No. 24-cv-02624-PAB-NRN

MARIA J. PRKIC, an individual,

Plaintiff,                                                           

v.

SEZZLE, INC., a publicly traded financial technology company,

Defendant.                                                           

                        ORDER                                        

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Objection to Magistrate Judge’s 

Minute Order Setting Status Conference [Docket No. 161].1

I. BACKGROUND

Maria J. Prkic filed this action against Sezzle, Inc. (“Sezzle”) on September 23,
2024. Docket No. 1. Plaintiff’s claims arise from her employment with and termination
from Sezzle. Docket No. 114 at 5-8, ¶¶ 29-57. Plaintiff brings claims for a violation of
the Colorado Equal Pay for Equal Work Act, for wrongful termination, and for breach of
contract. Id.

On February 6, 2026, Ms. Prkic filed a motion to compel discovery. Docket No.
150. On March 9, 2026, Ms. Prkic filed a motion for a jury trial, arguing that the Court
should set a jury trial in this case as soon as practicable. Docket No. 154. In the

1 Because Ms. Prkic is proceeding pro se, the Court construes her filing liberally 

without serving as her advocate. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.
1991).

motion, Ms. Prkic requests that Sezzle’s dispositive motions be denied and that the jury
should be sequestered. Id. at 3. On March 10, 2026, Magistrate Judge N. Reid
Neureiter issued a minute order setting a telephonic status conference for March 19,
2026. Docket No. 158. Ms. Prkic timely objected to Judge Neureiter’s March 10, 2026
minute order on March 11, 2026. Docket No. 161. Ms. Prkic included a screenshot of

an email in her objection indicating that, on March 10, 2026, at 11:51 a.m., Sezzle
requested that Judge Neureiter set a status conference to resolve open motions.

Docket No. 161 at 4. Sezzle also indicated it would be filing a motion for extension of
time related to the dispositive motion deadline. Id. Sezzle filed that motion on March
11, 2026. Docket No. 159. Ms. Prkic included another screenshot of an email in her
objection indicating that, on March 10, 2026, at 11:10 a.m., Sezzle conferred with Ms.
Prkic regarding the motion for an extension of time, and indicated that its purpose was
to allow time for a status conference. Docket No. 161 at 3.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The district court reviews a magistrate judge’s order on a non-dispositive motion

under a “clearly erroneous or contrary to law” standard. 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(A); Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(a). Under this standard of review, a magistrate judge’s finding should not
be rejected merely because the district court would have decided the matter differently.

See Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). The clearly erroneous
standard requires a district court to affirm a magistrate judge’s decision unless, “on the
entire evidence[, the district court] is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed.” Ocelot Oil Corp. v. Sparrow Indus., 847 F.2d 1458, 1464 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948));
see also Allen v. Sybase, Inc., 468 F.3d 642, 658 (10th Cir. 2006). “Under the ‘contrary
to law’ standard, the reviewing court sets aside the magistrate order only if it applied an
incorrect standard or applied the appropriate legal standard incorrectly.” Swan Glob.
Invs., LLC v. Young, No. 18-cv-03124-CMA-NRN, 2019 WL 2171457, at *3 (D. Colo.
May 17, 2019) (internal quotations, alterations, and citations omitted). Ms. Prkic does
not argue that Judge Neureiter’s minute order is dispositive, and the Court does not find

it to be. Thus, the Court will review the minute order under the clearly erroneous
standard.

III. ANALYSIS

Ms. Prkic argues that Judge Neureiter’s March 10, 2026 minute order “is clearly
erroneous and contrary to law because it ignores Plaintiff’s pending Motion for Jury Trial
. . ., which demands denial of dispositive motions and immediate jury trial.” Docket No.
161 at 1. Ms. Prkic also argues that Sezzle’s request for a status conference “was
improper under D.C.COLO.LCivR. 7.1(a) which requires meaningful good-faith conferral
before filing motions. Defense emailed Plaintiff at 11:10 AM on March 10 seeking
position on extension (Exhibit A), then 41 minutes later emailed chambers requesting

conference without Plaintiff’s response or formal motion filing.” Id. Plaintiff requests
that the Court modify or set aside the minute order, vacate the March 19, 2026 status
conference, and set a jury trial as soon as practicable. Id. at 2. Moreover, Ms. Prkic
informs the Court that she does not intend to participate in the March 19, 2026 status
conference. Id. The Court finds Ms. Prkic’s arguments unavailing. First, Judge Neureiter’s March
10, 2026 order does not ignore Ms. Prkic’s pending motion for a jury trial. In fact, the
purpose of the status conference appears to be to the resolution of pending motions. Id. at 4. Ms. Prkic can raise her motion for a jury trial during the status conference,
assuming that Judge Neureiter wants to hear argument on it. Moreover, to the extent
Ms. Prkic argues that the status conference delays her right to a jury trial, the Court
rejects it. Judge Neureiter has discretion to set hearings to manage his docket. Harris
v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., No. 24-cv-01508-PAB-MDB, 2025 WL 295014,
at *3 (D. Colo. Jan. 24, 2025) (“It is within a magistrate judge’s discretion to hold a

status conference.”); Bralich v. Gayner, No. 20-cv-3800-RMR-STV, 2021 WL 12150704,
at *3 (D. Colo. Dec. 8, 2021) (“Plaintiff’s challenge to the Court’s authority to conduct
status conferences is frivolous.”). Here, Judge Neureiter decided to set a status
conference at the request of Sezzle. Docket No. 161 at 4. Plaintiff identifies no error in
him doing so.

Next, the Court does not find that it was clearly erroneous or contrary to law for
Judge Neureiter to schedule a status conference even though Sezzle did not file a
formal motion or confer with Ms. Prkic before making the request. Ms. Prkic points to
no case law stating that a status conference must be set through the filing of a motion,

and the Court is aware of none. “[D]istrict courts have the inherent authority to manage
their dockets and courtrooms with a view toward the efficient and expedient resolution
of cases.” Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 47 (2016). The Court also does not find that
Judge Neureiter’s March 10, 2026 order was clearly erroneous or contrary to law due to
the alleged lack of good-faith conferral. Plaintiff includes in her motion an email from
Sezzle to Judge Neureiter and Ms. Prkic that requests a status conference. Docket No.
161 at 4. Judge Neureiter has discretion to act on a request for a status conference
without applying Local Rule 7.1(a).

Finally, in regard to Ms. Prkic’s statement that she does not plan to attend the
status conference, Ms. Prkic is warned that “[t]he Tenth Circuit has repeatedly
recognized that a court has authority to impose the sanction of dismissal for . . . failing
to obey court orders.” Preacher v. Wiley, No. 09-cv-00278-CMA-MEH, 2009 WL
6409350, at *3 (D. Colo. Nov. 20, 2009), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL
1753324 (D. Colo. Apr. 29, 2010). “[A]lthough Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, [she] is not
immune from Rule 41(b) or 11 sanctions.” /d. (citations omitted).
IV. CONCLUSION
Therefore, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff's Objection to Magistrate Judge’s Minute Order Setting
Status Conference [Docket No. 161] is OVERRULED.

DATED March 13, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
Ka of
PHILIP A. BRIMMER
United States District Judge