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March 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

John H. Sloan v. Samuel P. Ambrose, Kiara C. Jenkins, Alfonso K. Carrera, and The City and County of Denver

District Court, D. Colorado

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:24-cv-00992

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (14)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (13.7K)

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Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Judge Charlotte N. Sweeney

Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-00992-CNS-KAS

JOHN H. SLOAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

SAMUEL P. AMBROSE,

KIARRA C. JENKINS,

ALFONSO K. CARRERA, and

THE CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER,

Defendants.

                       ORDER                                        

Before the Court are Plaintiff John H. Sloan’s objections, ECF No. 77, to the
Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Kathryn A. Starnella, ECF No. 101,
regarding Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint for
Violation of Civil Rights, ECF No. 62. Defendants filed a response to Plaintiff’s objection,
ECF No. 79. For the following reasons, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s objections,
AFFIRMS and ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation (Recommendation),
and GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend. In doing
so, the Court presumes the reader’s familiarity with the case’s factual and procedural
background, and the Recommendation. See, e.g., Glenwood Springs Citizens’ All. v.
United States Dep’t of the Interior, 639 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1174 (D. Colo. 2022) (explaining
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)); United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d
972, 975 (10th Cir. 2019) (explaining courts liberally construe pro se filings but do not
serve as advocates for pro se plaintiffs).

I. SUMMARY FOR PRO SE PLAINTIFF

You filed a motion for leave requesting to file a fourth amended complaint in this
action. The Magistrate Judge reviewed your motion and proposed amended complaint
and recommended that this Court grant your motion with respect to Claim Two (alleging
a Fourth Amendment violation against Defendant Carrera) but deny the motion with
respect to your remaining claims. You then filed objections to the Magistrate Judge’s
Recommendation. The Court has reviewed and considered your objections, but for the

reasons explained below, the Court does not agree. As a result, the objections are
overruled, and the Court adopts in full the Recommendations of the Magistrate Judge.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), this Court must
“review de novo the magistrate judge’s recommendation as to dispositive issues.”
Cassidy v. Millers Cas. Ins. Co. of Texas, 1 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1205 (D. Colo. 1998).1 In

1 The Court is unconvinced by Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s objections are too general and
conclusory to warrant de novo review of the Recommendation, and that the Recommendation should
instead be reviewed for clear error only. See ECF No. 79 at 4, 6, 7. Plaintiff’s objections, which the Court
construes liberally for a pro se litigant, are more robust than those proffered in other cases where courts
found that party waived de novo review of a magistrate judge’s recommendation by failing to object with
the required specificity. See, e.g., United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop., With Buildings,
Appurtenances, Improvements, & Contents, Known as: 2121 E. 30th St., Tulsa, Oklahoma, 73 F.3d 1057,
1060 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[A]n objection stating only ‘I object’ preserves no issue for review.”) (citing Lockert
v. Faulkner, 843 F.2d 1015, 1019 (7th Cir.1988)); Ziankovich v. Large, No. 17-cv-02039-CMA-NYW, 2019
WL 4463283, at *9 (D. Colo. Sept. 18, 2019) (finding plaintiff’s objection was “not sufficiently specific”
because “[r]ather than alert this Court to the factual and legal issues at the heart of the Recommendation,
Plaintiff's Objection is nothing more than a rehash of his arguments from his Response to the Motion to
Dismiss”).

reviewing objections, the District Court may “accept, reject, or modify the recommended
disposition, receive further evidence, or return the matter to the magistrate judge with
instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P 72(b)(3). “An objection to a recommendation is properly made
if it is both timely and specific.” Latimore v. Denver Hous. Auth. of City & Cnty. of Denver,
No. 1:22-cv-01979-CNS-KLM, 2022 WL 4103297, at *1 (D. Colo. Sept. 8, 2022) (citing
United States v. 2121 East 30th St., 73 F.3d 1057, 1059–60 (10th Cir. 1996)). “An
objection is sufficiently specific if it ‘enables the district judge to focus attention on those
issues—factual and legal—that are at the heart of the parties’ dispute.’” Id. (citing 2121
East 30th St., 73 F.3d at 1059).

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 15(a)(2), “[t]he court should freely give leave [to amend]

when justice so requires,” Fed. R. Civ. P 15(a)(2). “If the underlying facts or circumstances
relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an
opportunity to test his claim on the merits.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
Rule 15 provides litigants with “the maximum opportunity for each claim to be decided on
its merits rather than on procedural niceties.” Hardin v. Manitowoc-Forsythe Corp., 691
F.2d 449, 456 (10th Cir. 1982). Although Rule 15 is a “mandate [] to be heeded,” whether
to grant or deny leave to amend a complaint is within a court's discretion. Foman, 371
U.S. at 182. Denying leave to amend is generally justified only when there is “a showing
of undue delay, undue prejudice to the opposing party, bad faith or dilatory motive, failure
to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, or futility of amendment.” Frank

v. U.S. West, Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 1365 (10th Cir. 1993). “A proposed amendment is futile
if the complaint, as amended, would be subject to dismissal.” Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist.
v. Moody’s Inv.’s Servs., 175 F.3d 848, 859 (10th Cir. 1999).

As Plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court construes his filings liberally, Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam), but does not act as his advocate, see
Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1067 (10th Cir. 2009).

III. ANALYSIS

In the Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Starnella recommended that Plaintiff’s
motion for leave be granted in part with respect to Plaintiff’s proposed Claim Two (Fourth
Amendment violation against Defendant Alfonso Carrera), and denied in part with respect
to the remaining claims in Plaintiff’s proposed Fourth Amended Complaint, including

Claim One (Fourth Amendment violation against Defendant Samuel P. Ambrose), Claim
Three (Fourth Amendment violation against Defendant Kiarra C. Jenkins), and Claims
Four and Five (Fourth Amendment violations against Defendant City and County of
Denver). ECF No. 73 at 11. Below, the Court considers Plaintiff’s objections, which focus
on the recommended denial of his efforts to amend Claims One, Four and Five,2 ECF No.
77, and Defendant’s opposition to the objections, ECF No. 79. As explained below, the
Court overrules Plaintiff’s objections and affirms and adopts the Recommendation.

A. Claim One: Fourth Amendment Violation Against Defendant Ambrose

With respect to his first claim, Plaintiff moved for leave to amend based on
allegations that Defendant Ambrose violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights when

2 Although not styled as such, Plaintiff only partially objects to the Recommendation, as he raises no
objection to the Court’s recommendation that Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend Claim III (for a Fourth
Amendment violation alleged against Defendant Jenkins) be denied.

he completed a probable cause affidavit utilizing unverified information received from
Defendant Carrera to justify Plaintiff’s warrantless arrest. See ECF No. 62-3 at 5–6. The
magistrate judge recommended denying the motion as to Claim One because, under
Tenth Circuit precedent, amendment would be futile, as police officers like Defendant
Ambrose “are entitled to rely upon information relayed to them by other officers in
determining whether there is reasonable suspicion to justify an investigative detention or
probable cause to arrest,” ECF No. 73 at 7 (citing Oliver v. Woods, 209 F.3d 1179, 1190 (10th Cir. 2000)), and so long as an officer’s reliance on another’s statement was
“objectively reasonable,” “[a] police officer who acts ‘in reliance on what proves to be the
flawed conclusions of a fellow police officer may nonetheless be entitled to qualified

immunity,’” id. (citing Felders ex rel. Smedley v. Malcom, 755 F.3d 870, 882 (10th Cir.
2014)). The Recommendation also observed that “Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant
Ambrose’s reliance on Defendant Carrera’s report was in bad faith or unreasonable.” Id. With respect to Claim One, Plaintiff’s objection focuses on the Recommendation’s
reliance on Oliver v. Woods, which Plaintiff contends only extends qualified immunity to
officers in circumstances unlike those present in this case. Plaintiff argues that Oliver
stands for the proposition that an officer may rely on information from another officer when
determining that probable cause exists only where that determination is made “[d]uring
the heat of the moment” and while the officer is conducting an investigation at the scene
of an incident. ECF No. 77 at 3–4. Plaintiff reasons that in Oliver, “the Tenth Circuit wanted

to protect officers at the scene of an incident, where the situation is fluid, and the pressure
is on, where the decision has to be made, in short order, concerning probable cause,
based upon the information available at that time, be it good or flawed,” id. at 4, and
argues that same conclusion does not cover the instant situation because Defendant
Ambrose was not in the heat of the moment when he relied on Defendant Carrera’s
statement, was sitting in an office when he completed the PCS paperwork, and had “the
time and ability to validate said information being provided,” but failed to do so. Id. at 4.

Plaintiff’s arguments are unpersuasive. It is undisputed that “a police officer who
acts in reliance on what proves to be the flawed conclusions of a fellow police officer may
nonetheless be entitled to qualified immunity as long as the officer’s reliance was
objectively reasonable.” Stearns v. Clarkson, 615 F.3d 1278, 1286 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing
Baptiste v. J.C. Penney Co., 147 F.3d 1252, 1260 (10th Cir. 1998)). And Plaintiff’s

proposed allegations do not support an inference that Defendant Ambrose’s reliance on
Defendant Carrera’s statements to complete the probable cause affidavit was objectively
unreasonable or undertaken in bad faith. Plaintiff simply alleges that Defendant Carrera
provided Defendant Ambrose with information regarding his search and arrest of Plaintiff,
and that Defendant Ambrose used that information to complete the probable cause
affidavit without verifying the accuracy of what was conveyed to him. ECF No. 62-3 at 2.

But Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Ambrose had any objective reason to
assume that the information was inaccurate, unreliable, or inconsistent with his own
participation at the scene of Plaintiff’s arrest. Nor does he allege that Defendant Ambrose
acted in bad faith in completing the probable cause affidavit. Accordingly, the Court

overrules Plaintiff’s objection and affirms the magistrate judge’s conclusion that Plaintiff
failed to state a claim with respect to Claim One and thus, amendment would be futile.
See Rael v. Calkins, No. 20-cv-02250-CMA-MEH, 2022 WL 218621, at *6 (D. Colo. Jan.
25, 2022) (concluding that plaintiff failed to establish that officer’s reliance on another
officer’s statement in making a probable cause determination was “objectively
unreasonable” where the officer’s underlying observations were “consistent with the
physical evidence and with [the relying officer’s] own observations of the scene, and [the
relying officer] had no reason to doubt [the] veracity” of the statements on which he relied).
B. Claims Four and Five: Fourth Amendment Violations Against Defendant City
and County of Denver

With respect to Claims Four and Five, Plaintiff seeks leave to amend to bring
claims for municipality liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City and County of
Denver for their “longstanding and widespread practice of . . . having an officer, with no
first-hand knowledge of an arrest, complete a statement of probable cause for said
arrest.” ECF No. 62-3 at 7–8. Put another way, Plaintiff challenges the practice of allowing
officers with no firsthand knowledge of an arrest to rely on statements made by other
officers when completing a probable cause affidavit. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that,
pursuant to this municipal policy, Defendant Ambrose relied on false statements from

Defendant Carrera in preparing the probable cause affidavit, id. at 2–4, and as a result,
his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure was violated by Defendants
Ambrose, Carrera, and Jenkins (the latter of whom was allegedly involved in a
supervisory capacity), id. at 8.

In the Recommendation, the magistrate judge determined that the proposed
Fourth Amended Complaint failed to state a claim for municipal liability based on
Defendants Ambrose and Jenkins’ actions in accordance with the Defendant City and
County of Denver’s practice of allowing officers to rely on other officer’s statements when
preparing probable cause statements. ECF No. 73 at 10. The magistrate judge further
reasoned that Plaintiff also failed to state a claim against Defendant Carrera because
Plaintiff did not allege that the probable cause affidavit would have been different had that
practice not been in place and had Defendant Carrera filled out the affidavit himself. Id.
at 11. The magistrate judge concluded that because Plaintiff failed to plead that the
challenged practice resulted in any constitutional violations, municipal liability could not
be established and thus amendment would be futile. Id.

The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Starnella’s assessment. Plaintiff’s
proposed amended pleading does not state a claim against any Defendant for a

constitutional violation, save for Defendant Carrera, who Plaintiff alleges provided false
information that was subsequently incorporated into the probable cause affidavit prepared
by Defendant Ambrose. ECF No. 73 at 10. Indeed, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant
Carrera would have provided an accurate description of Plaintiff’s search and arrest if that
practice were not in place and he had been required to personally complete the probable
cause affidavit. Id. at 11. Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, it not reasonable to infer from
the allegation that “it is a felony to submit a statement of probable cause, to the [C]ourt,
knowing that said statement is materially false,” ECF No. 77 at 9 (citing ECF No. 62-3 at
18), that Defendant Carrera would have provided an accurate description of his search of
Plaintiff absent the aforementioned practice. Indeed, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

were aware of their various constitutional obligations but violated them anyway. See
generally ECF No. 62-3. The allegation Plaintiff identifies is no different and does not
reasonably support the conclusion he proposes. Accordingly, Plaintiff's objections to the
Recommendation with respect to Claims Four and Five are overruled.
IV. CONCLUSION
Consistent with the above analysis, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff's objections,
ECF No. 77, AFFIRMS and ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation, ECF No. 73, and GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Plaintiff's
motion for leave to amend, ECF No. 62. Additionally, the Court ORDERS Plaintiff to file
clean copy of the Fourth Amended Complaint that alleges Claim Two against Defendant
Carrera for a Fourth Amendment violation within 14 days.

DATED this 13th day of March 2026. 
                                    BY THE COURT: 
                                    Li pm □ 
                                    United States Distrief   Judge