Jose Carlos Revilla Patricio v. Christopher Bullock - Habeas Corpus Petition Denied

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April 24, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Jose Carlos Revilla Patricio v. Christopher Bullock, Field Office Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, New Orleans Field Office

District Court, W.D. Tennessee

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2:26-cv-02456

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (12)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION

JOSE CARLOS REVILLA PATRICIO,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 2:26-cv-02456-BCL-tmp
CHRISTOPHER BULLOCK,
Field Office Director of U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, New Orleans
Field Office,

Respondent.

ORDER DENYING § 2241 PETITION

Petitioner Jose Carlos Revilla Patricio has filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2241, by which he challenges his detention without a bond hearing. Doc. 1, at 5.
As a preliminary housekeeping matter, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit has held that the “district director”—now the Field Office Director—for the place of
confinement is the proper respondent to a Section 2241 petition filed by an alien challenging his
confinement. See Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314, 320–21 (6th Cir. 2003). Here, that is now
Christopher Bullock, Field Office Director for the New Orleans Field Office, United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement. The Clerk is therefore DIRECTED to modify the docket
to replace DHS with Christopher Bullock. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
As to the merits of the Petition for habeas corpus, the Petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED for the
reasons that follow.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner, who was born in Mexico, and entered the United States in August of 2017. Doc.
1, at 3. Petitioner has resided in the United States since then. Id. On February 20, 2026, Petitioner was arrested while appearing in court for a traffic-related
citation. Id. Petitioner has remained detained and claims he is denied a meaningful opportunity for

release, “including the denial of an individualized bond hearing.” Id. at 4.
LEGAL STANDARD
Section 2241 authorizes a court to issue a writ of habeas corpus when an individual “is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 (c)(3). An alien seeking to challenge his detention relating to removal proceedings may in
some circumstances seek relief through a Section 2241 petition. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678, 687 (2001). Section 2243 directs the judge entertaining an application for a writ of habeas
corpus to “forthwith award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why
the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person

detained is not entitled thereto.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. The last clause of Section 2243 imposes “a
duty to screen out a habeas corpus petition which should be dismissed for lack of merit on its face,”
as where “the necessary facts can be determined from the petition itself without need for
consideration of a return.” Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970).
ANALYSIS
The Court denies the Petition. The exhaustion doctrine bars review of Petitioner’s statutory
claims. Moreover, Petitioner’s detention without a bond hearing does not violate the Immigration
and Nationality Act, or the Constitution.
I. Petitioner’s Claims challenging application of 8 U.S.C. § 1225 fail.
A. The Exhaustion Doctrine bars review of Petitioner’s statutory claims.
The Supreme Court “long has acknowledged the general rule that parties exhaust
prescribed administrative remedies before seeking relief from the federal courts.” McCarthy v.
Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992). That requirement makes obvious sense when Congress
requires exhaustion. It arguably makes less sense when, as in Section 2241, Congress has not done
so. Perhaps the so-called prudential exhaustion doctrine—a matter of “sound judicial discretion,”
id.—can be explained as an aspect of ripeness, the idea being that there is no ripe dispute if the

Executive Branch has not had its final say. Or perhaps it is a shirking of the federal courts’
“virtually unflagging” duty to exercise jurisdiction in cases properly before them. Lexmark Int’l,
Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 126 (2014) (quoting Sprint Commc’ns, Inc.
v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 77 (2013)).
In any event, both the Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit have embraced the doctrine,
which is thus binding on this Court. See, e.g., McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 144; see also Shearson v.
Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 593–94 (6th Cir. 2013). Exhaustion gives an agency “the opportunity to
correct its own mistakes with respect to the programs it administers”; “discourages disregard of
the agency’s procedures”; promotes efficiency because “[c]laims generally can be resolved much
more quickly and economically before an agency”; and “may produce a useful record for

subsequent judicial consideration.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006) (quotation marks and
citations omitted).
True, the exhaustion requirement can be excused if exhaustion would be futile. But, as the
Sixth Circuit has recently explained, in determining whether exhaustion would be futile, “the
crucial inquiry [is] whether the agency can provide the relief requested if the argument succeeds,
not whether it is likely to succeed.” Smith v. United States Securities & Exchange Commission, -
-- F.4th --, 2026 WL 850806, at *7 (6th Cir. 2026).1 And, here, the Immigration Judge or Board
of Immigration Appeals could certainly grant petitioner a bond hearing or release on bond if he
were to prevail on his claims; indeed, the whole theory of his claims is that the law compels the IJ
to give him such a hearing (and not, say, that the federal courts should be stepping in to run bond
proceedings on a categorical basis). Petitioner’s statutory claims are thus barred by the exhaustion

doctrine. However, Petitioner’s constitutional claims are not barred by the exhaustion requirement
because “the BIA cannot adjudicate the constitutionality of the statutes it administers.” (citing
Bangura v. Hansen, 434 F.3d 487, 494 (6th Cir. 2006)).
In sum, Petitioner’s statutory claims are barred by the exhaustion doctrine, and are due to
be rejected for that reason alone.
B. Under the governing statutes, Petitioner is an “applicant seeking
admission” subject to mandatory detention.
Even if he were not barred by the exhaustion doctrine, Petitioner’s statutory claims fail on
the merits. Petitioner’s statutory eligibility for a bond hearing is determined by whether his
detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (b)(2) or 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (a). Section 1225(b)(2) provides:
Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of an alien who is an applicant
for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien
seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the
alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title. 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (b)(2)(A). In contrast, Section 1226(a) provides, in relevant part:
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained
pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.

1 Smith addressed the futility exception in the context of an express exhaustion requirement
that excepted situations in which “there was reasonable ground for … failure to” exhaust. Id. at *5
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78y(c)(1)). That makes no difference: There is no logical reason for treating
the concept of futility differently in the context of a prudential rule than in the context of a statute
with a generally worded exception that encompasses the concept of futility.
Except as provided in subsection (c) and pending such decision, the Attorney
General--
(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) may release the alien on--
(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing
conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General; or
(B) conditional parole . . . . 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (a)(1)–(2).
Petitioner is an “applicant for admission” subject to mandatory detention under Section
1225(b)(2). “Congress defined ‘applicant for admission’ broadly in Section 1225(a)(1) to include
all ‘alien[s] present in the United States who have not been admitted.’” Buenrostro-Mendez v.
Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 504 (5th Cir. 2026); see 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (a)(1) (“An alien present in the
United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a
designated port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to the United States after having
been interdicted in international or United States waters) shall be deemed for purposes of this
chapter an applicant for admission.”).2 That definition encompasses Petitioner because he has not
been legally admitted. See Doc. 1, at 3-4; Avila v. Bondi, No. 25-3248, 2026 WL 819258, at *4
(8th Cir. Mar. 25, 2026). The passage of time makes no difference. Unless and until Petitioner is
granted authorization and lawfully admitted into the United States, he remains an “applicant for

admission.” As such, the Petitioner’s detention is mandatory under Section 1225(b)(2).

2 Statutory language underscores the point in providing that “‘admission’. . . mean[s], with respect to an
alien, the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an
immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(13) (emphasis added). Until his entry into the United States is
lawful, Petitioner remains an “applicant for admission,” and thus his detention during removal proceedings
is mandatory under Section 1225(b)(2). See Avila v. Bondi, No. 25-3248, 2026 WL 819258, at *2 (8th Cir.
Mar. 25, 2026).
II. Subjecting Petitioner to mandatory detention as required by a faithful
interpretation of Section 1225 does not violate the Due Process Clause.
Petitioner also claims that his detention without a bond hearing violates the Due Process
Clause. Doc. 1, at 4. “[T]he Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation
proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) (citing The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 100–101 (1903)). But, when a noncitizen has not been lawfully admitted to the United
States, “the decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within powers expressly
conferred by Congress, are due process of law” because such noncitizens have “only those rights
regarding admission that Congress has provided by statute.” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v.
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 138, 140 (2020). This is the result of “the so-called ‘entry fiction’
theory of immigration law,” under which “[a]liens who have not ‘entered the United States within

the meaning of the law,’ i.e., who were never lawfully admitted and do not have leave to remain,
are ‘still in theory of law at the boundary line,’” Gonzalez v. Ladwig, No. 2:26-cv-02017-MSN-
atc, 2026 WL 413602, at *11 (W.D. Tenn. 2026) (Norris, J.) (quoting Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S.
228, 230–31 (1925)), where they have only those rights provided by Congress. See Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 140. And, here, Congress did not provide a right to a bond hearing. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225 (b)(2)(A).
Neither the governing statutes, nor the Constitution guarantee Petitioner an individualized
bond hearing in connection with removal proceedings. Those claims therefore cannot support the
Petition. Accordingly, it is apparent from the application that Petitioner is not entitled to the writ. 28 U.S.C. § 2243.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is DENIED.
The Clerk is DIRECTED TO CLOSE THIS CASE.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 24th day of April, 2026.
s/ Brian C. Lea
BRIAN C. LEA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE