Martinez v. Bullock — Habeas Corpus Petition Denied

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April 23, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Roger Saborit Martinez v. Christopher Bullock

District Court, W.D. Tennessee

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2:26-cv-02324

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (6)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION

ROGER SABORIT MARTINEZ,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 2:26-cv-2324-MSN-tmp

CHRISTOPHER BULLOCK,

Respondent.

ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK TO MODIFY THE DOCKET,
DENYING EMERGENCY MOTION FOR AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND FOR
EXPEDITED BRIEFING SCHEDULE,
DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
AND DIRECTING CLERK TO SEND COPIES TO UNITED STATES

This matter is one of the hundreds of habeas cases filed in this district and nationwide that
challenge a change in policy and statutory interpretation at the Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”) regarding Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (“ICE”) authority to detain aliens
present in—but not lawfully admitted to—the United States. The pivotal question in these matters
is whether these aliens are “applicants for admission” who must be detained without bond under
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), or if they are instead
subject to Section 1226 of the INA, which provides for discretionary bond hearings.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner, Roger Saborit Martinez, is an alien detained at the West Tennessee Detention
Facility in Mason, Tennessee, who has filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. (ECF No. 2,
“Petition.”) He is a citizen of Cuba and entered the United States “in 2023 via a CBP One
appointment, after which he was paroled into the interior under INA § 212(d)(5).” (Id. at PageID
4.) He has a pending application for permanent residence and was detained on November 17,
2025, during a regularly scheduled ICE check-in appointment. (Id. at PageID 5.) The Petition
contains no other information about Petitioner, the terms of his parole under INA § 215(d)(5), or
any removal proceedings.

Petitioner generally argues that he has been erroneously classified as an “applicant for
admission” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (b)(2)(A), which mandates detention. (ECF No.
2 at PageID 6–8, 11.) Petitioner seeks immediate, unconditional release from custody. He asserts
that he is entitled to relief for a variety of reasons, including that the Government has incorrectly
interpreted and applied the relevant statutory framework, that his continued detention violates due
process, and that this Court is bound by the decisions of the district court in the Central District of
California in Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, Case No. 5:25-cv-1873. (See ECF No. 2 at PageID
9–12.)
ANALYSIS
To start, there are two preliminary issues. First, the proper respondent in a habeas matter

is the ICE District Director for the district in which the alien is being detained. See Roman v.
Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314, 320–22 (6th Cir. 2003). The proper respondent in this case is Christopher
Bullock, the New Orleans Field Office Director for ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations.
The Clerk is ORDERED to substitute Christopher Bullock for Scott Ladwig as the Respondent.
Second, the legal arguments and factual circumstances in this matter are indistinguishable
from those addressed in the Court’s prior decision in Gonzalez v. Ladwig, No. 2:26-cv-02017-
MSN-atc, 2026 WL 413602 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 13, 2026).1 It therefore appears from the Petition

1 Unlike the petitioner in Gonzalez, Petitioner in this matter was previously paroled
pursuant to INA § 212(d)(5), but he does not assert any claims related to his parole, and it is not
clear whether the term of his parole had expired at the time he was detained.
that Petitioner is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243. Because of that,
although the Court has previously issued orders to show cause in similar cases, it exercises its
discretion to forgo that step here. See id. Petitioner’s Emergency Motion for an Order to Show
Cause and for Expedited Briefing Schedule is (ECF No. 7) is DENIED.

Turning to the merits, for the reasons stated in Gonzalez, the Court has jurisdiction in this
matter, and it will not require Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies. 2026 WL 413602,
at *2–3 (citations omitted). However, Petitioner is not entitled to relief as requested in his Petition.
As explained in Gonzalez, Petitioner is an “applicant for admission,” who falls into the “catchall”
category described in § 1225(b)(2)(A), and he is therefore subject to mandatory detention pending
completion of removal proceedings under § 1229a. See id. at *3–10 (citations omitted). And this
remains so, even though Petitioner was previously paroled into the United States pursuant to INA
§ 212(d)(5), codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (d)(5).
“The parole of aliens seeking admission is simply a device through which needless
confinement is avoided while administrative proceedings are conducted,” and “[i]t was never

intended to affect an alien’s status . . . .” Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 190 (1958).
Section 1182(d)(5)(A) is explicit that parole “shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien,”
and that when such parole is terminated, the alien “shall continue to be dealt with in the same
manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.” So, despite his parole
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (d)(5)(A), Petitioner remains an applicant for admission who is not clearly
and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted and is subject to the mandatory detention provision in
§ 1225(b)(2)(A).
Second, because Petitioner has not been lawfully admitted to the United States, he is
considered to still be “on the threshold of the border, regardless of his literal physical location.”
Gonzalez, 2026 WL 413602 at *11 (citing Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103,
140 (2020)). And, again, even though Petitioner was “paroled elsewhere in the country for years
pending removal,” he continues to be “‘treated’ for due process purposes ‘as if stopped at the
border.’” Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 139 (citing first, Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215 (1953), then Leng May Ma, 357 U.S. at 188–90 and Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S.
228, 230–31 (1925)). As “an alien seeking initial admission to the United States,” he “requests a
privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his application.” Gonzalez, 2026 WL 413602 at *11 (citing Landon v. Plascentia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982)). He is, however, “entitled to the full
panoply of statutory rights and procedures authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, because that is what
has been afforded by Congress.” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (b)(2)(A)). But there is nothing in the
record indicating that this process is not being afforded, so Petitioner’s due process claim also fails.
See generally id. at *11–12.
Finally, in Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, the court granted class certification and
declaratory relief to a “Bond Eligible Class” of individuals situated similarly to Petitioner,

Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-1873, 2025 WL 3288403, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
25, 2025) (“Class Cert. Order”), and then entered a partial final judgment, Maldonado Bautista v.
Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-1873, 2025 WL 3713982, at *6–7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025) (“Partial
Judgment”). The declaratory relief that was purportedly extended to all class members was “an
individualized bond hearing or release [ ] from detention.” Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, No.
5:25-CV-1873, 2025 WL 3713987, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025) (“Consolidated Order”). The
court also indicated its intention to grant “classwide vacatur of the unlawful DHS policy.”
Maldonado Bautista (Partial Judgment), 2025 WL 3713982, at *4. However, as this Court
previously concluded, “the Maldonado Bautista relief, to the extent it purported to be universal,
was ultra vires. Thus this Court is not precluded from arriving at contrary conclusions of law and
is not required to grant the relief that the Maldonado Bautista court believed appropriate.”
Gonzalez, 2026 WL 413602, at *13. As explained above, Petitioner is not entitled to relief, and
the Partial Judgment in Maldonado Bautista providing otherwise is not binding on this Court. See id. CONCLUSION
As the Court expressed in Gonzalez, DHS’s policy shift is, without a doubt, a difficult
change for Petitioner and the multitude of other similarly situated individuals nationwide. The
Court is sensitive to the impact this has on them, their families, and the ties that many of them
have developed in this country. But courts are not policymakers, nor are they empowered to
unilaterally change the plain text of a statute to avoid an outcome the law demands. And whether
DHS’s policy shift “is the best or wisest use of executive enforcement priorities, or whether it is
in line with the priorities of prior Administrations, simply is not the remit of an Article III court.”
Gonzalez, 2026 WL 413602, at *13 (citing Cabanas v. Bondi, No. 4:25-CV-04830, 2025 WL

3171331, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2025)).
For the reasons set forth above, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 2) is
DENIED. A judgment will be entered accordingly.
The Clerk is ORDERED to provide a copy of this Order and the judgment via email to the
following: (1) the United States Attorney for the Western District of Tennessee at
michael.dunavant@usdoj.gov, and (2) the Civil Chief of the United States’ Attorney’s Office at
stuart.canale@usdoj.gov.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 23rd day of April, 2026.
s/ Mark S. Norris
MARK S. NORRIS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE