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March 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Baez, G. v. Torres, C.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 320 MDA 2025
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: McLaughlin

• Opinion

• Authorities (4)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (2.9K)

• PDF

Lead Opinion

                        by McLaughlin

J-A28023-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

GINA BAEZ : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
CRISTIAN TORRES :
:
Appellant : No. 320 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 14, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County Civil Division at No(s):
2024-AB-0030

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: MARCH 19, 2026

Cristian Torres appeals from the judgment of sentence entered following

his conviction for indirect criminal contempt of a Protection from Abuse order

(“PFA Order”).1 Torres argues the Commonwealth failed to present evidence

he willfully violated the PFA and that the court erred when it considered his

violations of a prior PFA when imposing sentence. We affirm.

The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history as follows:

On January 25, 2024, Gina Baez (“Plaintiff”) initiated a
[PFA] action against [Torres]. A temporary PFA [o]rder was
entered on January 26, 2024. [Torres] was charged with
violating the temporary Order on February 7, 2024. On
February 16, 2024, a hearing was held on the alleged
violation and for the final PFA Order. The Court found
[Torres] in violation and entered a final Order. [Torres] was
charged with violating the final PFA Order on March 3, 2024,
and again on March 10, 2024. At a hearing on March 15,
2024, [Torres] admitted to both violations. On July 15,

---

1 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6114(a).
J-A28023-25

2024, Plaintiff filed a Petition to Withdraw the PFA Order. On
July 26, 2024, Plaintiff’s Petition was granted and the PFA
Order was vacated.

On November 14, 2024, Plaintiff initiated another PFA
action against [Torres]. A final Order (the “PFA Order”) was
entered on November 22, 2024. The PFA Order provided
that [Torres] was not to abuse harass, stalk, threaten, or
attempt or threaten to use physical force against Plaintiff. It
further provided that [Torres] was not to contact Plaintiff,
either directly or indirectly, by telephone or other means,
including through third persons. One exception to this
restriction was granted authorizing [Torres] to contact
Plaintiff via text message regarding their minor child.

On January 25, 2025, [Torres] was charged with an
alleged violation of the PFA Order. A hearing on the alleged
violation was conducted on February 14, 2025. Plaintiff and
Plaintiff’s mother testified regarding the events of January
25, 2025. [Torres] testified on his own behalf.

Trial Ct. Op, filed April 24, 2025, at 1-2 (footnote omitted).

At the hearing, Plaintiff testified that she lived with her mother Myriam

Hernandez and that Torres is the father of Plaintiff’s child. N.T., 2/14/2025, at

3-4. She testified Torres sent her text messages threatening her and accusing

her of “being with another guy,” and that she received some of the messages

“during the period around January 25[, 2025.]” Id. at 5-6. In addition, Plaintiff

testified she saw Torres on January 25, 2025, from the porch of her house.

Id. at 6. She stated he “just walks by, just does weird stuff.” Id. at 7. When

he walked past the house, he did not say anything or look at her. Id.

On cross-examination, Plaintiff testified Torres provided her with diapers

and wipes for their child and that the threatening text messages were not from

his phone number, but were from a TextNow phone number, which anyone

can create. Id. at 9-10. On re-direct examination, Plaintiff stated she knew

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J-A28023-25

the messages were from Torres because of “[h]ow he types and what he says,

it just goes with how he talks,” he had made similar threats before, and no

one else had ever sent her threatening messages. Id. at 11-12.

Plaintiff’s mother, Hernandez, testified that Plaintiff lived with her. Id.

at 13. She stated that on January 25, 2025, Torres was in front of her house,

in his car, “screaming, yelling, threatening.” Id. at 14. She testified Plaintiff

was not home, but Plaintiff’s car was there. Id. She stated that Torres

threatened that “if she’s with another guy or if he catches her with a guy in

the car, he’s going to kill the guy.” Id. at 15.

Torres testified that he did not remember the morning of January 25,

2025, but “around noon [he] had business to attend to,” and “it was a normal

day to [him],” where he worked. Id. at 21. He stated that he worked so he

could provide financially for his child, including diapers, wipes, and lotion. Id.

at 22. Torres testified he did not text Plaintiff from a TextNow number. Id. at

1. He testified that sometime during the week of January 25, 2025, he

requested that the police conduct a welfare check on Plaintiff and his child

because he alleged no one could locate Plaintiff. Id. at 24-25. Torres stated

he did not recall if he was at Plaintiff’s house on January 25, 2025, and testified

he did not make the alleged threats. Id. at 26.

The trial court found Torres violated the PFA Order. The court sentenced

Torres to pay a fine of $400 and to undergo a five-month period of

incarceration in the Lebanon County Correctional Facility. It also extended the

PFA Order for the maximum term of three years. Torres filed a timely appeal.

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J-A28023-25

He raises the following issues:

1. Did the Commonwealth fail to meet its burden of proof
   that [Torres] violated the [PFA] Order?

2. Did the trial court err, abuse its discretion, or commit an
   error in law in finding [Torres] was in violation of his order
   for Protection and Abuse?

3. Did the trial court err, abuse its discretion, or commit an
   error of law when considering [Torres’s] previous violations
   when the original petition was dismissed and Plaintiff filed a
   new petition of abuse?

Torres’s Br. at 2.

We will address Torres’s first two issues together. Torres first claims the

Commonwealth failed to establish that he violated the PFA Order. He admits

the order was definite, clear, and specific and that he had notice of it. He

further admits that the Commonwealth established a volitional act. He claims,

however, that he did not act with wrongful intent. He points out that Plaintiff

testified that Torres did not talk to her, threaten her, or look at her on January

25, 2025. He argues that however he “may or may not have acted out to

[Plaintiff’s] mother,” Plaintiff’s mother was not a protected party on the PFA.

Therefore, he argues, even if he did “become verbally combative or harassing

in violation of the PFA Act,” he did so to a non-protected party. Torres’s Br. at

1. He therefore claims the Commonwealth could not establish he acted with

wrongful intent to violate the PFA.

To determine whether the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction

“we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable

inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the

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J-A28023-25

Commonwealth as verdict winner, is sufficient to prove every element of the

offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 288 A.3d

126, 131 (Pa.Super. 2022) (citation omitted). This Court “may not re-weigh

the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder.” Id.

(citation omitted). “Any question of doubt is for the fact-finder unless the

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of

fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances.” Id. (citation omitted).

PFA orders are enforced by prosecution for indirect criminal contempt.

See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6114; Commonwealth v. Bartic, 303 A.3d 124, 131

(Pa.Super. 2023). To prove indirect criminal contempt, the Commonwealth

must present evidence sufficient to establish that “the court’s order was

definite, clear, specific, and leaving no doubt in the person to whom it was

addressed of the conduct prohibited; the contemnor had notice of the order;

the act constituting the violation was volitional; and the contemnor acted with

wrongful intent.” Commonwealth v. McMullen, 961 A.2d 842, 849 (Pa.

2008). Whether the defendant acted with wrongful intent should be

determined using common sense and considering the context.

Commonwealth v. Reese, 156 A.3d 1250, 1258 (Pa.Super. 2017).

Here, Torres claims the Commonwealth failed to prove he acted with

wrongful intent. The trial court concluded that Plaintiff and her mother

“testified credibly regarding the events of January 25, 2025.” Trial Ct. Op. at

1. It found Plaintiff’s testimony established that she received messages from

an unknown number and that the messages “in both style and content,

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matched messages Plaintiff ha[d] previously received from [Torres.]” Id. The

court pointed out that Torres also “appeared at Plaintiff’s residence and made

threatening statements to Plaintiff’s mother,” and that the statements

“corresponded to the threats conveyed by the unknown number to Plaintiff.”

Id. The court concluded that “it was reasonable to infer that [Torres] was in

fact the author of the messages to Plaintiff.” Id. It further concluded that

“there was sufficient evidence to sustain a finding that [Torres] willfully

violated the clear terms of the PFA Order prohibiting him from threatening or

communicating with Plaintiff about anything other than their minor child.” Id.

We agree. The Commonwealth’s evidence that Torres sent threatening

text messages to Plaintiff, sat in his car outside her home and made threats,

and walked past her home while she was outside was sufficient to establish

wrongful intent.

In his second issue, Torres argues the court erred in considering the

violations of the first PFA order after it had been dismissed. He claims such

violations were similar to prior arrests, which a court may not consider when

imposing sentence. See Torres’ Br. at 9-10 (citing Commonwealth v. Berry,

323 A.3d 641, 649 (Pa. 2024)). He maintains that the current violation was

of a new PFA Order and “therefore any findings of indirect criminal contempt

should be only considered for the current PFA in effect.” Id. at 10.

In Berry, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that a sentencing

court may not consider a defendant’s “record of prior arrests, which did not

result either in juvenile adjudications or adult convictions, as a factor at

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J-A28023-25

sentencing.” 323 A.3d at 643. It reasoned that “arrests without conviction

‘happen[] to the innocent as well as the guilty’” and therefore “they offer

nothing probative about a defendant’s background at sentencing.” Id.

(footnote citation omitted) (alteration in original). Torres’s violations of a

previous PFA order were not like an arrest without a finding of guilt. Torres’s

prior violations resulted in findings that he was in violation, rendered after

hearings. The court could properly consider them when imposing a sentence

for contempt of the PFA Order. Accordingly, we affirm.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/19/2026

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