In re Committed Intimate Relationship of Walker Hammond & Renee Kinnick

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April 7, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In the Matter of the Committed Intimate Relationship of: Walker Hammond & Renee Kinnick

Court of Appeals of Washington

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 40463-3

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (11)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (49)

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Lead Opinion

FILED
APRIL 7, 2026
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE

In re the Committed Intimate Relationship ) No. 40463-3-III
of )
)
WALKER HAMMOND, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
Respondent, )
)
and )
)
RENEE KINNICK,

Appellant.

HILL, J. — Renee Kinnick and Walker Hammond were in a committed intimate

relationship (CIR). When they separated, the court characterized a home Kinnick

purchased with her separate funds as community-like property. The court ordered

Kinnick to make an equalization payment to Hammond reflecting his share of the

community equity in the home.

On appeal, Kinnick argues the trial court’s findings do not support its conclusion

that the home was community-like property. We agree. We reverse the trial court’s

finding that the home was a community-like asset with community equity and the court’s

order requiring Kinnick to make an equalization payment. We remand to the trial court

to enter an amended order consistent with this opinion and then to consider property

distribution in light of the home’s recharacterization.
No. 40463-3-III
In re the Committed Intimate Relationship of Hammond v. Kinnick

BACKGROUND

Kinnick and Hammond met in 2016. They engaged in an on-again-off-again

relationship until November 2017, when the two reconciled and Hammond moved in

with Kinnick at her Olympia home. Kinnick was awarded the Olympia home in a

previous divorce. Kinnick and Hammond moved to Spokane in the middle of August

1. Kinnick used money from the sale of her Olympia home as a down payment on a

home in Spokane in the fall of 2018. Hammond did not contribute any funds toward the

purchase of the home. Although Hammond tore up and replaced some of the floors in the

home, he did not complete the work.

In June 2022, Kinnick and Hammond separated. Sometime thereafter, Hammond

initiated a CIR action, and the case proceeded to trial where the above facts were

established. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court explained in its oral ruling that it

found the parties were in a CIR from November 2017 to June 2022. Important to this

appeal, the court ruled that the Spokane home was a community-like asset, reasoning:

Here’s where credibility comes in. Mr. Hammond has credibility
issues based upon his child support circumstances. When Ms. Kinnick
comes before this Court to say I don’t have a committed intimate
relationship, that goes to her credibility. Therefore, when I’m analyzing
whether there is enough testimony to call this home, and the intent behind
the purchasing of it, her separate property, I can’t. The presumption has not
been overcome, so I am characterizing the home a community-like asset. It

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No. 40463-3-III
In re the Committed Intimate Relationship of Hammond v. Kinnick

will be awarded to her. There is a separate interest in it because of the down
payment made.

Rep. of Proc. at 692.

Ultimately, the court determined that Kinnick’s down payment was her

separate property but the equity was community-like property. The court awarded

Kinnick the home but ordered that she make an equalization payment to

Hammond reflecting his community interest in the equity. The court calculated

the community equity in the home at $94,058 after finding the home’s value to be

$460,000 and subtracting the amount still owed on the mortgage and Kinnick’s

down payment.

Kinnick appeals.

ANALYSIS

Kinnick does not challenge the court’s finding that she and Hammond were in a

CIR. Instead, she argues the trial court erred by concluding the Spokane home was

community-like property and awarding Hammond a portion of the equity. Hammond

offers only a brief reply, arguing that the trial court had the authority to distribute all the

property equitably upon finding the existence of a CIR, regardless of its character.

A committed intimate relationship “is a stable, marital-like relationship where

both parties cohabit with knowledge that a lawful marriage between them does not exist.”

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No. 40463-3-III
In re the Committed Intimate Relationship of Hammond v. Kinnick

Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wn.2d 339, 346, 898 P.2d 831 (1995). Washington courts

acknowledge that two individuals in a CIR might both possess an interest in property

acquired during their relationship even though the title rests in only one person’s name.

In re Committed Intimate Relationship of Muridan, 3 Wn. App. 2d 44, 55, 413 P.3d 1072

(2018). Courts may equitably divide property following a CIR in a manner similar to

dividing property in a marital dissolution proceeding. Id.

A trial court’s designation of property as separate or community is a mixed

question of law and fact. In re Marriage of Schwarz, 192 Wn. App. 180, 191-92, 368

P.3d 173 (2016). We review the court’s factual findings supporting its characterization

of the property as community or separate for substantial evidence. Id. at 192. We review

de novo the court’s conclusion as to the property’s character. Id. We review the trial

court’s property division for abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Byerley, 183 Wn.

App. 677, 684-85, 334 P.3d 108 (2014). A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision

is manifestly unreasonable, adopts a position no reasonable judge would take, is based on

untenable grounds, or misapplies the law. Muridan, 3 Wn. App. 2d at 54; In re Parenting

& Support of L.H., 198 Wn. App. 190, 194, 391 P.3d 490 (2016).

Courts presume that property acquired during a CIR is community-like property.

Muridan, 3 Wn. App. 2d at 56. This presumption is rebuttable because property retains

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No. 40463-3-III
In re the Committed Intimate Relationship of Hammond v. Kinnick

the character of the funds used to purchase it, meaning that property purchased by one

partner with their separate funds during a CIR is that partner’s separate property.

Morgan v. Briney, 200 Wn. App. 380, 390, 403 P.3d 86 (2017). The party asserting that

an asset acquired during the CIR is their separate property bears the burden of proving it

was acquired with separate funds. Id.; In re Marriage of Skarbek, 100 Wn. App. 444,

449, 997 P.2d 447 (2000), abrogated on other grounds by In re Marriage of Watanabe,

199 Wn.2d 342, 350-51, 506 P.3d 630 (2022).

The trial court found that Kinnick traced the down payment on the Spokane home

to her separate funds while Hammond contributed nothing. Neither party challenges

these findings on appeal. These findings created a presumption that the home

“‘remained separate property in the absence of sufficient evidence to show an intent to

transmute the property from separate to community property.’” Schwarz, 192 Wn. App.

at 190 (quoting In re Est. of Borghi, 167 Wn.2d 480, 484, 219 P.3d 932 (2009) (plurality

opinion)). Despite this presumption, the court found Kinnick’s “claim that the [home] is

her separate property fails due to her credibility issues in denying that a CIR relationship

existed.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 22. While we defer to the trial court on Kinnick’s

credibility, there is no evidence in the record to show Kinnick intended to transmute the

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No. 40463-3-III
In re the Committed Intimate Relationship of Hammond v. Kinnick

home into a community asset, and the court never made such a finding. Therefore, it was

error for the court to conclude the equity was a community-like asset.

The court’s equalization payment was based on the home’s equity less Kinnick’s

down payment. However, “[t]here is a presumption that any increase in the value of

separate property is likewise separate in nature.” In re Marriage of Lindemann, 92 Wn.

App. 64, 69-70, 960 P.2d 966 (1998). Kinnick is entitled to the increase in value of her

separately owned property, except to the extent to which Hammond can show that the

increase was attributable to community contributions. See id. While the court found

Hammond “worked on the home” it made no finding that the increase in the home’s

value was attributable to this work. CP at 22. The court likewise did not find that

Hammond made any mortgage payments from his separate property, or that there were

any community contributions.

Finally, while Hammond is correct that a trial court is not required to award

property based on its classification as separate or community, the court must have in

mind the correct character and status of the property before the property can be divided.

Schwarz, 192 Wn. App. at 191. When a trial court mischaracterizes property, we will

remand the matter for further consideration if “(1) the trial court’s reasoning indicates

that its division was significantly influenced by its characterization of the property, and

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No. 40463-3-III
In re the Committed Intimate Relationship of Hammond v. Kinnick

(2) it is not clear that had the court properly characterized the property, it would have

divided it in the same way.” In re Marriage of Shannon, 55 Wn. App. 137, 142, 777 P.2d

8 (1989). Such is the case here. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s finding that the

home was a community-like asset with community equity and the court’s order requiring

Kinnick to make an equalization payment (finding of fact 4.20, conclusions of law 5 and

6, and section 9(1)). We remand to the trial court for the entry of an amended order

recharacterizing the home and equity and for the court to make any further property

distribution in consideration of this opinion.

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to

RCW 2.06.040.

---

Hill, J.

WE CONCUR:

---

Staab, C.J. Murphy, J.

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