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March 23, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Grace Solis v. Citibank, N.A.

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25-12082
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Nature of Suit: NEW

• Opinion

• Authorities (11)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (61)

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Combined Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-12082 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 03/23/2026 Page: 1 of 6

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

No. 25-12082
Non-Argument Calendar

GRACE D. SOLIS,
SHIRLEY SOLIS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus

CITIBANK, N.A.,
CENLAR SERVICING,
ROBERTSON, ANSCHUTZ, SCHNEID, CRANE &
PARTNERS, LLC,
KIM STEVENS,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:24-cv-21356-KMW

USCA11 Case: 25-12082 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 03/23/2026 Page: 2 of 6

2 Opinion of the Court 25-12082

Before JORDAN, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Grace Solis and Shirley Solis (“the Solises”) appeal from the
district court’s grant of the defendants’ joint motion to dismiss their
second amended complaint (“SAC”) alleging violations of the Flor-
ida Consumer Collection Practices Act (“FCCPA”), the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act (“TCPA”), and a Florida criminal witness tampering
statute. The Solises’ lawsuit arises out of acts the defendants alleg-
edly committed related to a state foreclosure proceeding (based on
an alleged default on a home equity line of credit) on the Solises’
homestead property.
On appeal, the Solises argue that the district court abused its
discretion in dismissing their SAC as a shotgun pleading without
affording them an opportunity to amend their complaint a third
time. They also argue that the district court erred by inde-
pendently finding that some of their claims were barred by res ju-
dicata. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I
We review de novo a district court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, accepting the allegations in the complaint as
true and construing them in the light most favorable to the plain-
tiff. See Henley v. Payne, 945 F.3d 1320, 1326 (11th Cir. 2019). We
review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to dis-
miss a complaint as a shotgun pleading. See Barmapov v. Amuial,
986 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 2021).
USCA11 Case: 25-12082 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 03/23/2026 Page: 3 of 6

25-12082 Opinion of the Court 3

“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than
pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally con-
strued.” Henley, 945 F.3d at 1327 (quoting Tannenbaum v. United
States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998)). However, this leni-
ency does not give us “license to serve as de facto counsel for a party,
or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an
action.” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th
Cir. 2014) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d
1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998)).
Complaints that are shotgun pleadings violate Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2), 10(b), or both. See Barmapov, 986 F.3d at 1324. Rule
8(a)(2) “requires the complaint to provide ‘a short and plain state-
ment of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’” and
Rule 10(b) “requires a party to ‘state its claims or defenses in num-
bered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set
of circumstances.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) & 10(b)).
The purpose of these pleading rules is “to require the pleader to
present his claims discretely and succinctly, so that[ ] his adversary
can discern what he is claiming and frame a responsive pleading.”
Id. (quoting Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313,
1320 (11th Cir. 2015)).
“Shotgun pleadings ‘are flatly forbidden by the spirit, if not
the letter, of these rules’ because they are ‘calculated to confuse the
“enemy,” and the court, so that theories for relief not provided by
law and which can prejudice an opponent’s case, especially before
the jury, can be masked.’” Id. (quoting Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1320).
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4 Opinion of the Court 25-12082

Such pleadings “waste scarce judicial resources, inexorably
broaden the scope of discovery, wreak havoc on appellate court
dockets, and undermine the public’s respect for the courts.” Id.
(quoting Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir.
2018)).
We have identified four basic types of shotgun pleadings.
The first type “is ‘a complaint containing multiple counts where
each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts, causing
each successive count to carry all that came before and the last
count to be a combination of the entire complaint.’” Id. at 1324-25
(quoting Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321). The second type “is a com-
plaint that is ‘replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts
not obviously connected to any particular cause of action.’” Id. at
1325 (quoting Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1322). “The third is a complaint
that does not separate ‘each cause of action or claim for relief’ into
a different count.” Id. (quoting Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323). The
fourth and final type of shotgun pleading “is a complaint that ‘as-
sert[s] multiple claims against multiple defendants without specify-
ing which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omis-
sions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought against.’” Id.
(quoting Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323).
The Solises do not take issue with the district court’s dismis-
sal of the SAC as a shotgun pleading. We note, in any event, that
the court did not abuse its discretion because the SAC was a shot-
gun pleading of at least the first and fourth types described above.
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25-12082 Opinion of the Court 5

Instead, the Solises contend that the district court should
have granted them leave to amend for the third time. We disagree.
The Solises—who had already amended their complaint twice—
did not separately move for leave to amend, and did not provide
the substance or content of what the amended pleading would look
like. We have explained that “where a request for leave to file an
amended complaint simply is imbedded within an opposition
memorandum, the issue has not been raised properly.” Pop v. Luli-
Fama.com LLC, 145 F.4th 1285, 1298 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting New-
ton v. Duke Energy Fla., LLC, 895 F.3d 1270, 1277 (11th Cir. 2018)).
“In such a case, the request for leave to amend ‘possesse[s] no legal
effect’” and is null. See id. (quoting Newton, 895 F.3d at 1277). Be-
cause the matter of further amendment was not properly placed
before the district court, the Solises cannot show reversible error.
II
Our precedents on the applicable standard of review for res
judicata determinations are somewhat muddled. As one of our re-
cent cases explained, we apply clear error review to the matter of
privity and de novo review as to the other elements of res judicata.
See Rodemaker v. City of Valdosta Bd. of Ed., 110 F.4th 1318, 1326-27
(11th Cir. 2024). “In considering whether to give preclusive effect
to state-court judgments under res judicata or collateral estoppel,
the federal court must apply the rendering state’s law of preclu-
sion.” Cmty. State Bank v. Strong, 651 F.3d 1241, 1263 (11th Cir.
2011).
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6 Opinion of the Court 25-12082

The Solises argue that the district court erroneously con-
cluded that, due to the Florida state court foreclosure judgment
against them, res judicata barred their claims in Counts I, II, and IV
of their SAC. The Solises, however, do not address the elements of
res judicata under Florida law. Nor do they point to any asserted
errors in the court’s analysis. Their only argument on this issue
seems to be that because they filed their original complaint in this
federal action before the final judgment of foreclosure was entered
against them in Florida state court, res judicata cannot bar their
claims.
That argument lacks merit. In Florida, the judgment in the
prior proceeding need not become final before the commencement
of the latter suit in order for res judicata to apply. Instead, res judi-
cata will still bar a lawsuit if the judgment on the merits in the other
action becomes final while the lawsuit in question is pending. See
Zikofsky v. Marketing 10, Inc., 904 So. 2d 520, 525 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)
(citing cases).
III
We affirm the district court’s order of dismissal.
AFFIRMED.