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March 20, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Earl Parris, Jr. v. 3M Company, et al.

District Court, N.D. Georgia

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 4:21-cv-00040

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (15)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (49.3K)

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Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

ROME DIVISION

EARL PARRIS, JR.

Individually, and on behalf of a Class of

persons similarly situated,

 Plaintiff,                                                       

      v.                     CIVIL ACTION FILE                    
                             NO. 4:21-CV-40-TWT                   

3M COMPANY, et al.,

 Defendants.                                                      

                 OPINION AND ORDER                                

This is an environmental contamination action. It is before the Court on
Defendants 3M Company (“3M”), E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company (“du

Pont”), the Chemours Company (“Chemours”), and Daikin America, Inc.’s
(“Daikin’s”) Motion to Exclude Opinions of Steven Amter [Doc. 863]. For the
reasons stated below, the Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Opinions of Steven
Amter [Doc. 863] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. Background

This case arises out of the contamination of surface waters and drinking
water in Chattooga County, Georgia, with per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances
known as “PFAS.” (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 1 [Doc. 280]). The facts of this case are
well known to the parties by this point, and the Court will not belabor them
here. In essence, Plaintiff sEarl Parris, Jr., alleges that the Defendants have
contaminated his water with PFAS. Parris is a resident of Summerville,
Georgia, who receives running, potable water to his home from the
Summerville Public Works and Utilities Department. ( ¶ 21.) The City of

Summerville—which has intervened in this case—uses Raccoon Creek, a
tributary of the Chattooga River, as the main source of its municipal water
supply. ( ) Parris alleges that Raccoon Creek and—consequently, his
household water—have been contaminated with PFAS by the Defendants. ( )
At present, the Defendants jointly move to exclude the opinion testimony of
the Plaintiffs’ expert, Steven Amter.

Amter is the President and Senior Researcher at Disposal Safety

Incorporated (“Disposal Safety”) in Washington, DC. (Br. in Supp. of Defs.’
Mot. to Exclude Testimony of Steven Amter, Ex. A (“Amter Expert Report”), at
1 [Doc. 866-1]). Disposal Safety is a corporation that specializes in evaluating
past, current, and the potential for groundwater and soil contamination by
hazardous chemical and radioactive wastes. ( at 2). In Amter’s work at
Disposal Safety, he has analyzed and reviewed hundreds of sites contaminated

by chemical and radioactive wastes. ( ). He has also conducted evaluations of
more than a dozen Superfund investigations and remediations. ( ).
Additionally, he has designed groundwater flow models and systems to monitor
and sample groundwater, soil, and air. ( ). Amter has been hired by the U.S.
Department of Justice to analyze, coordinate, and negotiate the technical
aspects of environmental cases involving a large chemical company and an
electronics and circuit board manufacturer. ( ).

Amter graduated from the State University of New York as

Departmental Scholar of the Geology Program with a Bachelor of Science

degree in 1980. ( at 1). In 1987, Amter was awarded a Master of Science
degree in Hydrology and Water Resources, magna cum laude, from the
University of Arizona, with a concentration in contaminant hydrogeology and
unsaturated flow. ( ). While attending the University of Arizona, he
conducted research on a new method of sampling contaminated soil water from
the unsaturated zone under a grant provided by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, which later became his thesis topic. ( ).

Since 1980, Amter has worked for the government and in private
consulting. ( ). His work has encompassed analyzing contaminated sites,
companies’ operations, management decisions, and waste disposal practices for
a variety of commercial, non-profit, legal, and governmental clients. From 1980
through 1983, Amter was an environmental hydrogeologist working for the

Environmental Protection Bureau of the New York State Law Department. As
part of his job, he participated in, designed, and sometimes conducted
environmental, soil, and groundwater monitoring investigations at a variety of
sites. ( ). Amter further researched the past operations and waste disposal
practices of companies and negotiated on behalf of the New York
Environmental Protection Bureau with companies conducting investigations
and clean-ups at their sites. ( ). Finally, he inspected sites and interviewed
past and present employees about operations and waste disposal practices.
( ).

From 1986, Amter has worked as a consultant to a variety of clients.
( ). He worked part time as a hydrogeologist for a groundwater consulting
company in Arizona. ( ). There, his work involved constructing and
monitoring well networks, collecting groundwater samples contaminated with
chemicals, and testing the properties of the aquifer. ( ). Since the early 1990s,
Amter conducted research on the history of groundwater contamination. ( ).
Significant portions of this research involved contamination arising out of

heavy metals, perchlorates, and chlorinated, fluorinated, or halogenated
hydrocarbons, and the past knowledge, practices, and standards in connection
with the use, disposal, and contamination by such chemicals. ( ). Amter has
also published peer-reviewed journal articles and a peer-reviewed book on
these subjects. ( ).

Amter is no stranger to the courts. Since 1993, he has testified as an

expert witness eleven times across nine states in both federal and state court.
( at 3). Amter has also offered expert deposition testimony in more than 20
other cases. ( ). He has been qualified as an expert by state in federal courts
(1) in hydrogeology and the movement of contaminants through various media,
(2) on historic operations at industrial sites, and on the history of pollution and
(3) the standard of care in preventing or responding to environmental
pollution. ( ). These general topics have touched on (1) the movement of
contaminants through soil, groundwater, soil gas, and building structures, (2)
chlorinated, fluorinated, and halogenated solvents and chemicals, PFAS,

dioxin, and heavy metals, (3) waste handling and waste disposal practices, and
(4) the standard of care with products and waste management to prevent

environmental contamination in the chemical, petroleum, aerospace,
electronics, transformer, metal fabrication, and smelting industries. ( ).
II. Legal Standard

“Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, expert testimony is admissible if
(1) the expert is qualified to testify regarding the subject of the testimony;
(2) the expert’s methodology is sufficiently reliable as determined by the sort
of inquiry mandated in ; and (3) the expert’s testimony will assist the
trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determining a fact at issue.”
, 766 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir.

2014) (citation modified). Courts perform a “gatekeeping role” in excluding
expert testimony that does not satisfy these qualification, reliability, and
helpfulness requirements. , 509 U.S. 579,

597 (1993). “This gatekeeping role, however, is not intended to supplant the
adversary system or the role of the jury” in determining the persuasiveness of
an expert’s testimony. , 730 F.3d 1278, 1282 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation modified). Rather, the goal is to “make certain that

an expert . . . employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that
characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.”

, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quoting

, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999)).

“The proponent of the expert testimony always bears the burden” of
establishing qualification, reliability, and helpfulness. (citation modified).
An expert’s qualification may be based on “knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education.” at 1261 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Fed. R.
Evid. 702). Regarding reliability, a variety of factors may be relevant, but, “in
cases,” the Court must find the testimony “properly grounded,
well-reasoned, and not speculative before it can be admitted.” at 1262

(quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment). The
focus of the reliability inquiry is on the expert’s “principles and methodology,”
rather than his or her ultimate conclusions.

, 526 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1367 (N.D. Ga. 2021) (quoting

, 509 U.S. at 595). Lastly, the helpfulness of an expert’s opinions to a
trier of fact speaks “primarily to relevance,” which is a “liberal” standard.

                   , [813 F.3d 983, 988](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3177831/seamon-ex-rel-estate-of-seamon-v-remington-arms-co/#988) (11th Cir. 2016) (citations 

omitted). “Expert testimony which does not relate to any issue in the case is
not relevant and, ergo, non-helpful.” , 509 U.S. at 591 (citation
omitted).

                III.  Discussion                                  

The Defendants argue for the exclusion of Amter’s testimony for several
reasons. First, they argue that Amter cannot testify to the intent, motives, or
state of mind of a corporation. ( Br. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Exclude

Testimony of Steven Amter, at 10-13 [Doc. 863]). Second, they argue that
Amter is not qualified to testify about corporate history. ( at 14-20).
Third, the Defendants argue that Amter’s opinions regarding “responsibilities”
and “duties” are inadmissible legal conclusions and should therefore be
excluded. ( at 20-23). Finally, the Defendants argue that Amter is not
qualified to offer testimony on subjects like (1) the interpretation and analysis
of blood tests, (2) chemistry and analytical chemistry, and (3) sufficiency of the

Material Safety Data Sheets (the “MSDS”). The Court addresses each
argument in turn.

A. State of Mind

Testimony proffered by an expert witness that speaks to the state of

mind of a person or entity is inadmissible only if such testimony invades the
province of a jury. , 177 F. App’x 59, 63 n.5 (11th Cir.

2006) (affirming a district court’s determination that an expert witness’s
testimony regarding the state of mind of another person is inadmissible);
, 2021 WL 3603374, at *6-7 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 13, 2021)

(holding certain expert testimony inadmissible because it offered speculation
as to an individual’s state of mind prior to his fall);

   , 2019 WL 1254763, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2019) (“Because   

science has not invented a way to read minds, inferences about the intent or
motive of parties or others lie outside the bounds of expert testimony. Instead,
juries must answer questions of intent with the lay tools that they always

have.” (citation modified)).

Courts balance a fine line in allowing tangential state-of-mind
testimony where it does not invade the province of the jury. Where a properly
qualified expert testifies to what information was available to a corporation,
such testimony will not be considered inadmissible.

, 2018 WL 3954858, at *6 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 16, 2018) (finding expert
testimony by a historian on the knowledge of pigment manufacturers

admissible even when the expert’s report stated that the manufacturers
“should have known” certain information because it was within the scope of a
historian’s expertise to draw inferences about historical actors’ knowledge and
beliefs); , 169 F. Supp. 3d 396, 479-80 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (excluding expert testimony where it directly opines on an
employee’s state of mind but allowing testimony opining on what the

corporation knew based on what information was in their possession or was
clearly indicated in public documents). Indeed, in a similar proceeding, a
federal court permitted a public health historian to testify about what was
knowable at the relevant times about the dangers of polychlorinated biphenyl
chemicals. , 2023 WL 4014294, at *8-9 (W.D.

Wash. Jun. 15, 2023).

Amter’s report contains certain quasi-state-of-mind testimony. His
report finds that the Defendants “knew or should have known” (1) that PFAS
chemicals were incapable of adequate treatment or disposal by conventional

methods or by any method employed by Trion, Georgia, (2) that PFAS
chemicals were very likely entering the environment, (3) that PFAS chemicals
were capable of polluting the environment and human body, (4) that they were
making, supplying, using, or disposing of PFAS chemicals, (5) that the PFAS
chemicals contained within their products were incapable of inadequate
treatment or disposal by conventional methods or by those employed by Trion,
Georgia, (6) that Trion allowed inadequately treated wastewater to be

discharged to its wastewater treatment plant and (7) that PFAS chemicals
have detrimental effects to human health and the environment and were

present in the streams and rivers of North Georgia. ( Amter Expert Report
at 7-8). Furthermore, Amter’s report finds that Defendants 3M, du Pont,
Chemours, Huntsman, and Daikin individually had knowledge or should have
had knowledge of certain information relevant to the litigation. ( at 10-

23).

The question, then, is whether such testimony is admissible at trial. The
case law demonstrates that three elements must be shown for quasi-state-of-
mind testimony to be admitted. First, an expert must be qualified to “draw
inferences about [the individual’s] knowledge and beliefs based on evidence
about the availability of information at a given [ ] moment in combination with
contextual knowledge of that moment’s general practices and mechanisms

regarding information dissemination.” , 2023 WL 4014294, at *9

(quoting , 2018 WL 3054858, at *6 (quotation marks omitted));

             , 644 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1343 (N.D. Ga. 2022) (holding 

that certain statements in an expert report were not state of mind testimony,
in part, because the expert had “decades of experience working with mesh
slings”). Second, the testimony given by the expert must be in the scope of the
expert’s knowledge. , 169 F. Supp. 3d at 479-80. Third,

the testimony must assist the jury in their role as the trier of fact and must
not make determinations for the jury. , 177 F. App’x at 63 n.5;

   , 644 F. Supp. 3d at 1341 (holding that certain statements in an 

expert report were not state of mind testimony because the conclusions speak
generally to the mesh devices’ developments instead of the defendant’s mental
state).

To the first element, “experts may be qualified in various ways.” , 387 F.3d at 1260. “While scientific training or education may provide possible

means to qualify . . . expert status may be based on ‘knowledge, skill,
, training, or education.’” at 1260-61 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702
(emphasis in original)). When looking to whether an expert is qualified to
testify to a certain subject area, “courts generally look to evidence of the
witness’s education and experience and ask whether the subject matter of the
witness’s proposed testimony is sufficiently within the expert’s expertise.”
, 711 F. Supp.

2d 1348, 1367 (M.D. Ga. 2010) (citing , 253 F.3d 641, 665 (11th

Cir. 2001)).

The Plaintiffs offer Amter as an expert on the history of corporate
knowledge related to environmental contamination and prevailing chemical
industry standards. (Pls.’ Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Exclude Testimony of
Steven Amter, at 7 [Doc. 974]). The Plaintiffs argue that Amter’s testimony on
what the Defendants knew or should have known amounts to “evidence-based
historical analysis” and is not “speculation.” ( at 20).

The Defendants disagree. They argue that Amter has (1) never worked

for a company that manufactures PFAS compounds or other chemicals, (2)

never worked for the Environmental Protection Agency, the Agency for Toxic
Substances and Disease Registry, the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, or any
Georgia governmental agency, (3) never worked in any capacity where he had
responsibility for Toxic Substances Control Act compliance or reporting, (4)

never worked as an industrial hygienist and has never advised a company on
industrial hygiene, and (5) no non-litigation PFAS experience. (Br. in Supp. of
Defs.’ Mot. to Exclude Testimony of Steven Amter, at 6-7). Furthermore, the
Defendants also point to the fact that Amter was never “trained in the
interpretation and synthesis of historical documents.” (Reply Br. in Supp. of
Defs.’ Mot. to Exclude Testimony of Steven Amter, at 9 [Doc. 1010]).

The Court finds that Amter is sufficiently qualified as an expert on the
history of corporate knowledge related to environmental contamination and
prevailing chemical industry standards. As another court put it, “Mr. Amter

has spent more than three decades working in both the private and public
sectors as a scientist and investigator of environmental contamination,
including some of the largest projects in American history.”

, 345 F. Supp. 3d 897, 920 (S.D. Ohio

2015);

, 2013 WL 7802172, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Sep. 9, 2013) (finding
Amter qualified in the field of environmental history).

But the Defendants are correct to argue that the question of whether
Amter is qualified to testify in the instant action is a question for this Court.
( Reply Br. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Exclude Testimony of Steven Amter,
at 2-3). They are also correct to argue that solely experience developed as a
professional expert witness is insufficient to qualify as an expert and that only
experience obtained in a practical context is relevant. ( at 3 (citing

                  , 2022 WL 824239, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 18,      

2022))). Nonetheless, the Court concludes that Amter is qualified.

Ignoring all litigation experience, Amter has significant work and
research experience related to groundwater and soil chemical contamination.
( Amter Expert Report, at 1-3). For nearly four decades, Amter has worked
at Disposal Safety, where he performs both scientific and historical research
at numerous sites. ( at 2). He has completed in-depth evaluations for more
than a dozen Superfund investigations and remediations conducting similar
research. ( ). Amter is also a published author on the topic of environmental

history. ( ). The Court acknowledges that Amter lacks any educational
training in conducting a historical analysis. But surely decades of practical
experience outweigh the need for formal training. While Amter has not directly
worked within the chemical industry specifically, Amter has worked closely
with the industry throughout his career. , 644 F. Supp. 3d at 1343

(“Knowledge of an industry’s business practices can be ‘gleaned from years of
working within the industry and with its professionals.’” (quoting

        , [599 F.3d 1241, 1249](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/250/united-states-v-robert-jenning/#1249) (11th Cir. 2010))).                 

The remaining points the Defendants raise against Amter’s

qualification are best suited for cross-examination at trial.

, 2020 WL 6870852, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2020) (“Any gaps
in Dr. Rosenzweig’s knowledge go to his credibility, not his admissibility as an
expert.” (citation modified)); , 2013

WL 7802172, at *2 (“The soundness of the factual underpinnings of the expert’s
analysis and the correctness of the expert’s conclusions based on that analysis
are factual matters to be determined by the trier of fact.” (citation modified)).
Accordingly, Amter is qualified as a general expert on the history of corporate
knowledge related to environmental contamination and prevailing chemical
industry standards.

Turning to the second element, the Court asks whether any testimony
provided by the expert falls outside the scope of the expert’s qualifications.
After all, “[a]n expert in one field cannot express an opinion relying on data

that requires expertise in another field.” , 2023 WL 4014294, at

*8. Courts generally will not admit any testimony that speaks to the state of
mind of a defendant that lacks any basis in the expert’s qualifications.

at *8-10 (admitting testimony from a historian about what was knowable

during the relevant times, but disallowing testimony about what the defendant
could have done); , 169 F. Supp. 3d at 466 (admitting

testimony where the expert opined on what the reviewed documents mean but

rejecting testimony where the expert opined on what the defendant would have
done).

Reviewing Amter’s report, all of his testimony falls within the scope of
his qualifications. Amter reviewed documents provided by the Defendants,
along with scientific, historical, and industrial literature to make specific
conclusions about what the Defendants knew or should have known based on

his personal expertise. ( Amter Expert Report, at 7). The conclusions
provide commentary on information available to the Defendants at the
relevant times of the injury as to the PFAS chemicals. , 644 F. Supp.

3d at 1341; , 2018 WL 3954858, at *6 ; , 2023 WL 4014294,

at *9 (“Dr. Markowitz is not directly testifying as to Monsanto’s intent, motive,
or state of mind . . . [his] testimony instead addresses what was knowable at
relevant times in this case”). Thus, Amter’s testimony falls within its proper
scope.

Turning to the third element, “expert testimony is admissible if it

concerns matters that are beyond the understanding of the average lay
person.” , 387 F.3d at 1262. “Proffered expert testimony generally will
not help the trier of fact when it offers nothing more than what lawyers for the
parties can argue in closing arguments.” at 1262-63. “[R]elevant testimony
from a qualified expert is admissible only if the expert knows of facts which
enable him to express a reasonably accurate conclusion as opposed to
conjecture or speculation.” , 861 F.2d 655, 662 (11th

Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). “Speculative state of mind statements are not
admissible as expert testimony because they are legal conclusions as to another
person’s state of mind and thus are not of the type of evidence that a jury needs
the assistance of an expert to understand.” , 644 F. Supp. 3d at 1343

(quoting , 177 F. App’x at 63 n.6 (citation modified)). But testimony
arising out of an expert’s knowledge of an industry’s business practices is

admissible. Applying these standards, the court in excluded

expert testimony purporting that an individual “absolutely” knew certain
information as state-of-mind testimony. at 1342-43.

Here, all of Amter’s opinions are purported to be based on his knowledge
of the chemical industry and information available to the Defendants. (
Amter Expert Report at 7). Indeed, courts have found that testimony from a
historian finding that a defendant knew or should have known certain
information based on the information available to them was not inadmissible
state-of-mind testimony. , 2018 WL 3954858, at *3, 6

(“[R]ather, I take the phrase as indicating an opinion that [ ] is reasonable to
infer from the historical record that the defendants had actual knowledge of
the information.”).

But the Court takes issue with the statements by Amter stating that
individual Defendants unequivocally “knew” (without the qualifier of “or
should have known”) certain information. Such statements cannot be
admissible because “science has not invented a way to read minds.”

, 2019 WL 1254763, at *13. Amter effectively offers “legal conclusions”
that supplant the role of the trier of fact and are not the “type of evidence that
a jury needs the assistance of an expert to understand.” , 644 F. Supp.
3d at 1343 (quoting , 177 F. App’x at 63 n.6 (citation modified)). Thus,
the Court excludes all state-of-mind testimony from Amter’s expert report that
claim, without any qualifiers, that the Defendants “knew” certain information

or any other testimony that provides conclusive commentary on what the

Defendants could have done or could not have done.

B. Corporate History

The Defendants next argue for the exclusion of Amter’s testimony on
corporate history. ( Br. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Exclude Testimony of

Steven Amter, at 14-20). First, the Defendants argue that Amter’s testimony
amounts to a narration of the Defendants’ corporate documents. ( at 14-
17). It is true that “[a]s a general matter, it is inappropriate for experts to
become a vehicle for factual narrative.” , 2019 WL

4439606, at *12 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 25, 2019) (citation modified). But “as opposed
to providing a mere factual narrative, an expert is allowed to articulate the
factual underpinning upon which he bases his opinion.” (citation modified).
“[T]he synthesizing of voluminous historical texts is the type of expertise courts
regularly acknowledge historians possess.” , 2023 WL 4014294,

at *8. The Defendants’ argument fails on its face because, as discussed earlier,
Amter’s role as a historian permits him to make inferences on what the

Defendants should have known. Some of those inferences remain after the
Court’s exclusion. Any discussion of the facts underlying his expert opinion is
accordingly admissible.

Second, the Defendants argue that the underlying methodology used by
Amter in his report is unreliable. ( Br. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Exclude
Testimony of Steven Amter, at 17-20). In coming to this conclusion, the

Defendants mechanically apply the factors. ( ). This application

is erroneous. “The trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a
particular case how to go about determining whether particular expert
testimony is reliable.” , 766 F.3d at 1305 (quoting , 526 U.S. at 152 (citation modified)). “As gatekeeper for the expert evidence
presented to the jury, the judge must do a preliminary assessment of whether
the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid
and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the
facts in issue.” at 1306 (citation modified). “It is proper and necessary for

the trial judge to focus on the reliability of a proffered expert’s sources and
methods.” (citation modified).

But “in non-scientific cases such as this one, ‘the relevant reliability
concerns may focus on an expert’s personal knowledge or experience.’”

, 288 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1366 (N.D. Ga. 2017) (quoting
, 526 U.S. at 150). “Courts have found that gathering and

analyzing multiple sources to reach conclusions about historical facts is an

accepted historical methodology for expert witnesses.”

, 2020 WL 13561776, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 4, 2020). Indeed,
courts generally depart from the mechanical application of every

factor in assessing the reliability of non-scientific expert witnesses.
at *5-7; , 288 F. Supp. 3d at 1366-67; , 2025 WL 3567284, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 6, 2025);

          , 2023 WL 3116763, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2023) (“But 

these [ ] factors are poorly suited to terrorism experts, who are often
security experts, social scientists, accountants, or .” (emphasis
added)).

Reviewing Amter’s report, he delineates five general steps he took when
arriving at his conclusions. First, he “examine[s] a company’s corporate
history, technical sophistication, and environmental knowledge.” (Amter
Expert Report at 5). Second, he “construct[s] an environmental historical
narrative that is relevant to the case at hand.” ( ). Third, he “perform[s] an

analysis of a company’s potential responsibilities with respect to relevant
prevailing standards that may apply.” ( ). Fourth, he “construct[s] a
historical narrative and analysis of specific company knowledge and actions
based on case-specific documents,” giving greater weight to evidence and
documents that are primary sources, speak directly to the topic of interest, are
the kind of historical documents that would routinely be created in the field
under scrutiny, are logically consistent with other evidence and documents,

and lead to historical narratives that are supported by multiple lines of
evidence and lead to conclusions and opinions that are coherent and
reasonable. ( at 6). Fifth, he “perform[s] an analysis of a company’s potential
responsibilities with respect to relevant prevailing standards that may apply.”
( at 6). Amter states that the procedure he used was “the standard method
of constructing a two-pronged narrative of the [Defendants’] knowledge and

decisions.” ( at 4).

These steps appear consistent to the process approved by the court in
as reliable. 2020 WL 13561776, at *6. The court there

concluded that “historians may reasonably rely on a combination of primary
and secondary sources while maintaining sound methodology.” Further, the
court gave weight to the expert’s statement that the methodology used was
standard for historians and political scientists in his field of expertise.”

Just like the court in ultimately concluded that the

expert’s methods were reliable, the Court does so here as well. Throughout the
expert report, Amter identifies key documents used in coming to his conclusion.
While Amter may not provide a full list of sources, the sufficiency of the factual
underpinnings of an expert witness’s report is best addressed in cross-
examination, not here for exclusion. at *7;

, 2013 WL 7802172, at *2. Thus, the Court will not exclude
Amter’s testimony on this basis.

C. Responsibilities and Duties

As discussed earlier, Amter’s report discusses the standards of care
applicable to the companies he analyzes. ( Amter Expert Report at 5-6). The
parties dispute whether such discussion on the standards of care amount to

legal or factual conclusions. ( Br. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Exclude
Testimony of Steven Amter, at 20-23; Pls.’ Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Exclude
Testimony of Steven Amter, at 21-23). “An opinion is not objectionable just
because it embraces an ultimate issue.” Fed. R. Evid. 704(a). But the question
of whether such testimony should be excluded is a difficult one.

, 744 F.2d 1467, 1473 (11th Cir. 1984). Ultimately, the key
difference between an impermissible legal conclusion and a permissible factual

conclusion on the issue of standard of care is one of breadth.

, 2021 WL 426217, at *8-10 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 8, 2021) (quoting

, 698 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 1983)). While conclusory
statements in a report without explanation will likely be legal conclusions, in-

depth reasoning will be determined to be a factual conclusion.

Here, Amter’s report makes several statements pertaining to the
“responsibilities” and “duties” of the Defendants. While such statements alone
would amount to legal conclusions, Amter’s statements are based off ample
reasoning and reputable sources. Not only does Amter explain in his report
that his methods involve the application of the prevailing standards of a
certain industry, but he also goes into sufficient detail as to where those

standards are derived from. ( Amter Expert Report at 5-6, 27-41, 112-14);
. , 309 F. Supp. 2d 531, 557-58 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(holding standard of care testimony by a doctor inadmissible, in part, because
the doctor’s testimony lacked foundation and were instead “thinly-disguised
legal or quasi-legal principles”). Such sources arise out of guidance issued by
national organizations or by the company itself. Amter is qualified to offer

these factual opinions in his role as a historian.

But Amter cannot conclusively state that such organizations establish
the applicable standard of care for the chemical industry. None of the
organizations cited by Amter within his report carry any apparent force of law
or regulation, nor does it conclusively establish the applicable standard of care.
, 2021 WL 426217, at *11 (holding, in a trucking accident case, that
an expert may not be able to testify that the Model Commercial Driver License
Manual or the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations establish the
standard of care for truckers because the sources do not carry the force of law

or regulation and that neither establishes the standard of care for truckers).
Any assertion that such organizations conclusively establish the standard of
care would encroach upon the jury’s role as trier of fact. Accordingly, Amter
may testify to whether practices complied with the standard of care as
referenced within his report, but he cannot testify that guidance issued from
such organizations conclusively establish the standard of care within the
chemical industry.

D. Additional Qualification Challenges

Finally, the Defendants make three brief arguments related to Amter’s
qualifications to testify to certain areas of expertise. First, they argue that
Amter cannot opine on certain blood studies in the late twentieth century and

apply them to the Defendants because Amter has no “medical, toxicological, or
epidemiological background or experience.” (Br. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to
Exclude Testimony of Steven Amter, at 24). Second, they argue that Amter
cannot testify to (1) “the chemistry on which [the] Defendants’ products are
based;” (2) “characterizations and descriptions of the chemical processes and
reactions by which [the] Defendants’ products are produced;” (3) “predictions
regarding the properties of chemicals under certain conditions,” and (4) “the

makeup and nature of chemicals” because Amter lacks a degree in chemistry,
chemical engineering, or analytical chemistry.” Ud. at 24-25). Third, they argue
that Amter cannot testify to the sufficiency of the MSDS used by the
Defendants because “Amter has never authored an MSDSI,] has never been
employed by a chemical manufacturerl,] and lacks expertise and training in
industrial hygiene and toxicology.” (Jd. at 25).
The Court disagrees. Amter’s extensive interdisciplinary work
experience, research, and education more than qualify him to testify to such
matters before the Court. To the extent Amter has any deficiencies in his
knowledge on these subjects, the Defendants may freely cross-examine his
testimony or provide testimony of their own contradicting the findings of
Amter. Accordingly, the Court will not exclude Amter’s testimony on this basis.

                    IV.    Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Opinions 

of Steven Amter [Doc. 863] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

SO ORDERED, this 20th day of March, 2026. 

                                    THOMAS W. THRASH, JR. 
                                    United States District Judge 

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