Jump To

Top Caption Trial Court Document The text of this document was obtained by analyzing a scanned document and may have typos.

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Richard L. Jackson, et al. v. William Burton Jones, in his personal capacity, and in his official capacity as the Lieutenant Governor of Georgia, et al.

District Court, N.D. Georgia

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:26-cv-00782

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (32)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (17.6K)

• PDF

Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

ATLANTA DIVISION

RICHARD L. JACKSON, et al.,

 Plaintiffs,                                                      

      v.                     CIVIL ACTION FILE                    

                             NO. 1:26-CV-782-TWT                  

WILLIAM BURTON JONES, in his

personal capacity, and in his official

capacity as the Lieutenant Governor of

Georgia, et al.,

 Defendants.                                                      

   OPINION AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ORDER                       

This is a civil rights action. It is before the Court on Plaintiffs Richard
L. Jackson and Jackson for Governor, Inc.’s Emergency Motion for Preliminary
Injunction [Doc. 12] and Defendant WBJ Leadership Committee, Inc.’s
(“WBJLC’s”) Oral Motion to Stay the Preliminary Injunction made at the

March 13, 2026 hearing on the Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for Preliminary
Injunction (the “PI Hearing”). For the reasons that follow as well as those
stated on the record at the PI Hearing, the Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for
Preliminary Injunction [Doc. 12] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part

and Defendant WBJLC’s Oral Motion to Stay the Preliminary Injunction is
GRANTED.

I. Background

This case addresses yet another constitutional challenge to O.C.G.A.
§ 21-5-34.2 (the “LC Statute”). 2026 is an election year in Georgia for the

position of Governor. Candidates for state-wide offices are generally subject to
certain contribution limits imposed by Georgia law. Specifically, Georgia law
provides that a candidate and their campaign committees may not “receive
from any [person, corporation, political committee, or political party]
contributions . . . which in the aggregate for an election cycle exceed” $8,400
for the primary election and $4,800 for the primary runoff election. O.C.G.A.

§ 21-5-41(a); ( Compl. ¶¶ 10, 10 n.1, 50 [Doc. 1]).

But in 2021, the Georgia Legislature passed a law allowing certain
candidates to circumvent the limits imposed by O.C.G.A. § 21-5-41. Ga.
Laws 2021, Act. 219 eff. July 1, 2021. Now codified as the LC Statute, the law
allows for the creation of “leadership committees” to operate within certain
Georgia statewide elections, subject to regulations. O.C.G.A. § 21-5-34.2.
A “leadership committee” may only be created by and chaired by the Governor,

the Lieutenant Governor, or the nominee of a political party for Governor or
Lieutenant Governor. O.C.G.A. § 21-5-34.2(a); ( Compl. ¶ 9). These
“leadership committees” may receive contributions and make contributions
toward certain candidates’ election campaigns without any dollar limitation

                          2                                       

that would otherwise be imposed by O.C.G.A. § 21-5-41. O.C.G.A.
§ 21-5-34.2(d), (e); ( Compl. ¶¶ 11-12).1

In the 2026 Georgia gubernatorial election, Defendant William Burton

Jones, the current Lieutenant Governor of Georgia, is seeking the Republican
nomination for Governor.2 ( Compl. ¶ 28). In 2022, Defendant Jones
organized a leadership committee, Defendant WBJ Leadership Committee,

Inc. (“WBJLC”). ( ¶ 14). Since the creation of Defendant WBJLC, the
leadership committee has been permitted to raise unlimited contributions from
donors. ( ). As of June 30, 2025, Defendant WBJLC reported a $14,299,337.43

ending monetary balance. ( ¶ 14 n.3). Furthermore, Defendant WBJLC has
received multiple contributions of $100,000. ( ). Defendant Jones has been
tapping into the funds collected by Defendant WBJLC to facilitate his
campaign for Governor. ( ¶ 15). Plaintiff Richard L. Jackson is a new

1 Of note, State Senator Colton Moore has drafted and submitted a bill,
titled the “Anti-Corruption Act,” that, in part, amends the LC Statute.
S.B. 378, 158th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2025). The proposed
legislation repeals much of the LC Statute and almost wholly replaces the code
with the following provision: “[l]eadership committees shall be prohibited, and
any leadership committee in existence on July 1, 2026, shall be prohibited from
making further expenditures, return all contributions to the persons who made
such contributions, and upon disposing of all assets dissolve its legal
existence.” S.B. 378(b), 158th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2025). Since April
4, 2025, the bill has not been referred to any committee.

2 Defendant Brian Kemp, the current Governor of Georgia, is ineligible
for re-election. Ga. Const. Art. V, § 1.

3

entrant to the Republican primary in the last month. ( ¶¶ 15, 21). As a
candidate for Governor, Plaintiff Jackson is subject to the contribution limits
imposed by O.C.G.A. § 25-1-41 and is not entitled to create a “leadership

committee” as a private citizen. ( ¶ 16).

To remedy this alleged inequality, the Plaintiffs filed this Complaint
with the Court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments against the Defendants. ( ¶¶ 57-72).

Specifically, the Plaintiffs argue that the LC Statute is unconstitutional
because it imposes an unequal playing field within the Republican primary,

where Defendant Jones may circumvent contribution limits while Plaintiff
Jackson is still subject to them. ( ). A day later, the Plaintiffs filed an
Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction. ( Pls.’ Emergency

Mot. for Prelim. Inj. [Doc. 12]). The motion requested the Court to issue a
preliminary injunction (1) enjoining the enforcement of the LC Statute as
applied unequally to Plaintiff Jackson, (2) enjoining political fundraising and
spending by Defendant WBJLC and (3) enjoining Defendant Burt Jones for

Georgia, Inc. from receiving contributions from Defendant WBJLC. ( at 1).
The Plaintiffs then filed their Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
before the Court due to an alleged increase in spending by Defendant WBJLC
after the filing of the Complaint. ( Pls.’ Mot. for Temp.

                          4                                       

Restraining Or. [Doc. 14]). The Court held a hearing on the temporary
restraining order (the “TRO Hearing”) and granted the Plaintiffs’ motion from
the bench. The written order, filed a week later, enjoined Defendant WBJLC

from raising or spending any money in support of Defendant Jones’s Georgia
gubernatorial campaign and the Defendants were ordered to either (1) cancel
any advertising contracts of any kind entered into by Defendant WBJLC that
support Defendant Jones’s campaign or (2) have those advertising contracts
assumed by Defendant Jones’s official candidate committee, Defendant Burt
Jones for Georgia, Inc., within 14 days. (Op. & Temp. Restraining Or., at 31-

32 [Doc. 48]).

Two weeks later, the Court conducted the PI Hearing. There, the Court
granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs’ motion from the bench. After
doing so, Defendant WBJLC orally moved to stay the preliminary injunction
pending an appeal to the Eleventh Circuit. After hearing arguments from both
parties, the Court granted Defendant WBJLC’s oral motion from the bench.
This written order follows.

                II.  Legal Standards                              

A. Motion for Preliminary Injunction

“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to
be granted unless the movant clearly establishes the burden of persuasion as

                          5                                       

to the four requisites.” , 879 F.3d 1282, 1287 (11th Cir. 2018)

(citation modified). The movant must show (1) a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury; (3) that the

threatened injury to the movant outweighs any potential harm that might
result to the opposing party; and (4) that granting the injunction will not
disserve the public interest.

B. Oral Motion to Stay the Preliminary Injunction

“A stay of a preliminary injunction requires the exercise of [a court’s]
judicial discretion, and the party requesting the stay must demonstrate that

the circumstances justify the exercise of that discretion.”

, 915 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2019). The standard to
stay a preliminary injunction substantially overlaps with the factors governing
preliminary injunctions. “A court considering whether to issue a stay
‘considers four factors: (1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong
showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant
will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will

substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4)
where the public interest lies.’” , 958 F.3d 1081, 1088 (11th Cir.

2020) (quoting , 556 U.S. 418, 426 (2009) (internal quotation

marks omitted)). Because the test is so similar to the four-part test for

                          6                                       

establishing entitlement to preliminary injunctive relief, courts rarely stay a
preliminary injunction pending appeal unless exceptional circumstances exist.
, 785 F. Supp. 3d 1086, 1106 (N.D. Fla.

2025). However, the standards are not the same. , 556 U.S. at 434 (“There is substantial overlap . . . not because the two are one and the same,
but because similar concerns arise”).

III. Discussion

A. Motion for Preliminary Injunction

1. Standing

Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to
actual cases or controversies.

, 858 F.3d 1362, 1365 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing U.S. Const. Art. III,
§ 2). This means that any plaintiff filing a complaint in federal court must
establish that they have standing to sue within the complaint. at 1365-66
(quoting , 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997)). A plaintiff must
demonstrate three elements to establish Article III standing: “[t]he plaintiff

must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the
challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a
favorable judicial decision.” at 1366 (quoting , 578

U.S. 330, 338 (2016)).

                          7                                       

“The strength of proof required differs at separate stages of the
litigation; at the preliminary injunction stage, the plaintiff must make a clear
showing that she is likely to establish each element of standing.”

                  , 147 F.4th 1207, 1215 (11th Cir. 2025),        
,                                                     , 160 F.4th 1282 (11th Cir. 2025) (citation modified). “Standing is not dispensed 

in gross.” , 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008) (citation

modified). “Rather, ‘a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he
seeks to press’ and ‘for each form of relief’ that is sought.” (citation

modified).

As an initial matter, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have not met
their burden in establishing standing for any injunctive relief against
Defendants James D. Kreyenbuhl, Rick Thompson, Joseph Cusack, Stan Wise,
and Dana Diment, in their official capacities as members of the Georgia State
Ethics Commission, and Defendant Christopher M. Carr, in his official
capacity as the Attorney General of the State of Georgia (collectively, the “State

Defendants”). Nowhere in the Plaintiffs’ Complaint is any relief requested
against the State Defendants. In fact, the only time the Plaintiffs request any
relief against the State Defendants is within their reply briefing to this Court.
( Reply Br. in Supp. of Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj., at 5 [Doc. 63]). There, the

                          8                                       

Plaintiffs explain that “[b]ut for the LC Statute, [Plaintiff] Jackson would file
a complaint with [the] State Defendants asking them to enforce state
contribution limits [under O.C.G.A. § 21-5-41]” and that “[a]n injunction

barring the State Defendants from enforcing the LC Statute would allow

[Plaintiff] Jackson to prosecute such a complaint.” ( ). It is a well-established
rule that “arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are not properly
before a reviewing court.” , 397 F.3d 1338, 1342 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation modified). Because the Plaintiffs have provided no
other evidence, the Court concludes that the Plaintiffs do not have Article III

standing to seek injunctive relief from the State Defendants.

This conclusion does not defeat the Plaintiffs’ motion entirely. The
Plaintiff still seeks injunctive relief against Defendant Burt Jones for Georgia,
Inc. (“Jones Committee”) and Defendant WBJLC. Accordingly, the Court looks
to whether the Plaintiff can establish Article III standing against the
remaining Defendants.

a. Injury in Fact

“To establish an injury in fact, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he
suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized; and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’”
, 996 F.3d 1110, 1113 (11th Cir. 2021)

                          9                                       

(quoting , 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). “An injury is

particularized when it ‘affects the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.’”
(quoting , 504 U.S. at 560 n. 1). “To be concrete, the injury must be

‘real, and not abstract.’” (quoting , 578 U.S. at 340).

Here, the injury in fact alleged in the Complaint arises out of a violation
of the First Amendment as recognized in . In , the Supreme Court

considered a constitutional challenge to Section 319(a) of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, otherwise known as the “Millionaire’s
Amendment.” , 554 U.S. at 729. The Millionaire’s Amendment

provided that, when a candidate used personal funds in excess of $350,000 in
their campaign, an opposing candidate could receive individual contributions
three times the normal limit and could accept coordinated party expenditures
without any limit. In considering whether the candidate had standing

to challenge the Millionaire’s Amendment, the Supreme Court found that he
satisfied the injury in fact element of standing because the operation of the
statute would allow “his opponent to receive contributions on more favorable

terms” after he had declared his candidacy. at 734.

Similarly, the Court is satisfied that the Plaintiffs have met their
burden in showing that they have suffered injury in fact. On similar challenges
to the LC statute, every court addressing a candidate-plaintiff’s standing

                          10                                      

concludes that he suffers a qualifying injury when he is confronted with an
uneven electoral playing field between incumbents and non-incumbents.

, 601 F. Supp. 3d 1291, 1302 (N.D. Ga. 2022) (relying on

to hold an injury in fact exists when one candidate can establish a 

leadership committee under the LC Statute while the other candidate may not
and is subject to the traditional contribution limits); , 584 F.

Supp. 3d 1310, 1319 (N.D. Ga. 2022) (relying on to hold the same as to
primary elections); , 634 F. Supp. 3d 1343, 1351-52 (N.D. Ga.

2022), , , [110 F.4th

1239](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10028905/ryan-graham-v-attorney-general-state-of-georgia/) (11th Cir. 2024) (relying on to hold the same as to general
elections); , No. 25-cv-4426-VMC, at 10-14

(N.D. Ga. Aug. 28, 2025), ECF No. 22 (relying on and to

conclude the same).

The Defendants argue for a narrower reading of , arguing that an

injury in fact only exists if a candidate is penalized for exercising his own First
Amendment rights like . ( Def. Jones Committee’s Br. in Opp’n to Pls.’

Mot. for Prelim. Inj., at 5-8 [Doc. 51]; Def. WBJLC’s Br. in Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot.
for Prelim. Inj., at 14-15 [Doc. 52]). But the Court finds no reason to depart
from previous holdings in this District. The Court’s interpretation of on
this issue comports with the reasons enumerated in and .

                          11                                      

Therefore, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient injury in
fact.

b. Traceability

“To satisfy the traceability requirement, a plaintiff must establish a
‘causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of.’”
, 57 F.4th 916, 926 (11th Cir. 2023)
(quoting , 540 U.S. at 560). “Proximate causation is not a requirement of
Article III standing.” , 941 F.3d 1116, 1125 (11th

Cir. 2019) (quoting , [572

U.S. 118](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2672209/lexmark-intl-inc-v-static-control-components-inc/), 134 n. 6 (2014) (citation modified)). “A plaintiff therefore need not
show (or, as here, allege) that ‘the defendant’s actions are the very last step in
the chain of causation.’” at 1126 (quoting , 520 U.S. 154,

168-69 (1997)).

The Court holds that the traceability requirement has been satisfied
under the reasoning found in . In , the plaintiff, a candidate for

the Georgia Republican gubernatorial primary election, brought a

constitutional challenge against the LC Statute and sought a preliminary
injunction against a leadership committee established by Governor Kemp,
prohibiting the committee from making future expenditures. , 584

F. Supp. 3d at 1315-17. When considering the traceability requirement of

                          12                                      

Article III standing, Judge Cohen held that the plaintiff satisfied this element
because the LC Statute permitted Governor Kemp to take advantage of an

“inequitable scheme” and raise funds “not subject to the individual

contribution limits established by O.C.G.A. § 21-5-41(a), while [the plaintiff]
remains subject to those limits in the same primary election.” at 1320. Like
, the facts in this case show a primary challenger in a gubernatorial
race hamstrung by the “inequitable scheme” created by the LC Statute, where
Defendant Jones can raise money for his campaign without restriction through
Defendant WBJLC while Plaintiff Jackson is subject to the contribution limits

imposed by O.C.G.A. § 21-5-41(a).

The Defendants disagree with this decision on two grounds. First, the
Defendants urge the Court to look to Judge Calvert’s decision in to

support their position that the Plaintiffs’ injuries cannot be traceable to the
Defendants because WBJLC is the only party to the motion. (Def. Jones
Committee’s Br. in Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj., at 9). This approach
misconstrues Judge Calvert’s decision in . There, the Attorney General of

Georgia, in his personal capacity, brought suit as a candidate in the Republican
primary for governor against only Defendants Jones, WBJLC, and Burt Jones
for Georgia, Inc. challenging the LC Statute. , No. 25-cv-4426-VMC, at 7.
Judge Calvert held that the traceability requirement was not satisfied because

                          13                                      

the complaint failed to include any government officials or any claim that the
LC Statute should be invalidated. at 15-16. Indeed, part of the reason
the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the traceability requirement was because the

defendants were doing exactly what Georgia law allowed them to do. at 14.
This is not the case here. The Plaintiffs have sued the three Defendants
in along with the State Defendants, who are in charge of enforcing the LC
Statute. Those State Defendants are still part of this action, even if the
Plaintiffs are not seeking injunctive relief against them.

Second, the Defendants argue that, under , 594 U.S. 220 (2021), the Plaintiffs’ injuries cannot be traceable to the Defendants because
they did not engage in any unlawful conduct. (Def. Jones Committee’s Br. in
Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj., at 9 (quoting at 222); Def. WBJLC’s Br.
in Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj., at 16 (quoting at 243)). But the
Defendants again take case law out of context. The Supreme Court did hold
that the “relevant inquiry [for traceability] is whether the plaintiffs’ injury can
be traced to ‘allegedly unlawful conduct’ of the defendant, not to the provision

of law that is challenged” for constitutional claims. , 594 U.S. at 243.
But the provision of law challenged as unconstitutional was in relation to the
structure of a federal institution and its lawful operation. at 235
(“Second, they asserted that because the [Federal Housing Finance Agency] is

                          14                                      

led by a single Director who may be removed by the President only ‘for cause,’
its structure is unconstitutional.”). Applying this same logic here, Defendant
WBJLC operated lawfully under the LC Statute, but the Plaintiffs may satisfy

traceability because it is Defendant WBJLC’s actions, in the Plaintiffs’ as-
applied constitutional challenge, that created the injury to the Plaintiffs.
Accordingly, traceability is satisfied.

c. Redressability

“Finally, [the Court] address[es] redressability, the third and final
requirement of Article III standing. To satisfy this requirement, a plaintiff

needs to show that ‘it must be likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that
the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’” , 57

F.4th at 927 (quoting , 540 U.S. at 561 (citation modified)).

The Court again is persuaded by Judge Cohen’s decisions in and

on the issue of redressability. In both cases, Judge Cohen held that
enjoining the leadership committees from spending more money in favor of
Governor Kemp’s campaign would redress the plaintiffs’ injury and place the

parties on a level playing field where both candidates are subject to the
statutory maximum for contributions. , 584 F. Supp. 3d at 1320;

, 601 F. Supp. 3d at 1303-04. Entering a preliminary injunction against
Defendant WBJLC enjoining further expenditures in favor of Defendant

                          15                                      

Jones’s gubernatorial campaign will have the same effect.

It is irrelevant to the issue before the Court whether other leadership
committees are capable of harming the Plaintiffs as the Defendants contend.

( Def. Jones Committee’s Br. in Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj., at 11).
The continued spending of Defendant WBJLC in favor of Defendant Jones’s
campaign in excess of the proscribed limits imposed by O.C.G.A. § 21-5-41(a)
is the harm remedied by the entry of an injunction. Ultimately, if the Plaintiffs
succeed in obtaining their declaratory and injunctive relief, the harm posed by
the LC Statute will cease. Thus, the Plaintiffs’ Complaint demonstrates that

they have satisfied all three elements necessary for Article III standing to seek
injunctive relief against Defendant WBJLC.

2. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

To establish a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits, a
plaintiff must “demonstrate a likelihood of success at trial as to both its
case and the affirmative defenses asserted by the defendant.”

, 519 F. Supp. 3d 1129, 1134

(S.D. Fla. 2021) (citation modified).

a. Defendant WBJLC as a State Actor

Section 1983 imposes liability on “every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . causes to be

                          16                                      

subjected . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim for relief in
an action brought under § 1983, plaintiffs must establish that they were

deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,
and that the alleged deprivation was committed .”

, 344 F.3d 1263, 1276-

77 (11th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added) (quoting

, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999) (citation modified)). “Like the state-action
requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, the under-color-of-state-law

element of § 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter
how discriminatory or wrongful.” at 1277 (quoting

, 526 U.S. at 50 (quotation marks omitted)).

Under guidance from the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit has set
forth three primary tests to determine whether a private party is involved in
state action for the purposes of Section 1983: “(1) the public function test;
(2) the state compulsion test; and (3) the nexus/joint action test.” (citation

omitted). “The nexus/joint action test applies where the state has so far
insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the private party that
it was a joint participant in the enterprise.” (citation modified). “[A court]
must determine on a case-by-case basis whether sufficient state action is

                          17                                      

present from a non-state actor (defendant) to sustain a section 1983 claim.”

(citation omitted). “To charge a private party with state action under this
standard, the governmental body and private party must be intertwined in a

symbiotic relationship. The Supreme Court has indicated that the symbiotic
relationship must involve the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.”
at 1278 (citation modified). “Only in rare circumstances can a private party
be viewed as a state actor for section 1983 purposes.”

, 241 F.3d 1341, 1347 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation modified).

Judge Cohen’s holding in is instructive in determining whether

state action exists under the nexus/joint action test. There, Judge Cohen was
confronted with the issue of whether Governor Kemp’s leadership committee
was a state actor for the purposes of the plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim. After
reviewing the LC Statute, the court concluded that the operation of the
leadership committee satisfied the nexus/joint action test. , 601 F.

Supp. 3d at 1308-09. Specifically, Judge Cohen noted that the LC Statute
required a leadership committee to be chaired by the Governor in the case of

Governor Kemp, and, if he left his position, Governor Kemp would be required
to effectively dissolve the leadership committee. at 1308 (citing
O.C.G.A. §§ 21-5-34.2(a), (c)). Because Governor Kemp’s leadership committee
required him to chair the committee, Judge Cohen concluded that Governor

                          18                                      

Kemp had “so far insinuated himself into a position of interdependence with
the [leadership committee] that he [was] a joint participant in the enterprise.”
(quoting , 241 F.3d at 1348 (citation modified)).

Similarly, Defendant WBJLC contains all the hallmarks of satisfying
the nexus/joint action test. At this stage in the Republican primary election,
the only candidate in the election permitted to form a leadership committee is
Defendant Jones, as Lieutenant Governor of the State of Georgia. Without
Defendant Jones chairing Defendant WBJLC, the leadership committee would
be required to dissolve and transfer its assets to another leadership committee.

O.C.G.A. § 21-5-34.2(c). Alternatively, the LC Statute requires Defendant
Jones to name another eligible person as the new chairperson for Defendant
WBJLC. But the only other individual who could chair Defendant

WBJLC at this stage of the election is Governor Kemp, because there will not
be official nominees for any party until the conclusion of the primary elections
on May 9, 2026. Thus, the Court concludes that Defendant WBJLC is a state
actor for the purposes of the Plaintiffs’ claims under Section 1983.

        b.  Substantive Arguments                                 

Under the Complaint, the Plaintiffs allege two Section 1983 counts
against the Defendants. ( Compl. ¶¶ 57-72). The first count requests
declaratory and injunctive relief under the First Amendment, as applied to the

                          19                                      

states by the Fourteenth Amendment. ( ¶¶ 57-65). The second count

asserts an equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. (

¶¶ 66-72). The Court need not address the second count because the Court

concludes that the Plaintiffs have a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits of their First Amendment claim.

The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law . . .

abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const. amend. I. The First Amendment
applies to Georgia through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. , 370 F.3d 1252, 1268 (11th

Cir. 2004) (citing , 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931)). “The First
Amendment has its fullest and most urgent application to speech uttered
during a campaign for political office.” , 584 F. Supp. 3d at 1322 (quoting
, 480 U.S. 214, 223 (1989)

(citation modified)). “Spending for political ends and contributing to political
candidates both fall within the First Amendment’s protection of speech and
political association.” (quoting

             , [533 U.S. 431, 440](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118456/federal-election-commission-v-colorado-republican-federal-campaign/#440) (2001)). But the Supreme Court   

routinely sustains “the facial constitutionality of limits on discrete and
aggregate individual contributions and on coordinated party expenditures.”
, 554 U.S. at 737.

                          20                                      

When confronted with such a statute that implicates First Amendment
interests, the Supreme Court has held that the statute cannot stand unless it
is “closely drawn” to serve a “sufficiently important interest,” such as

preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption. This standard is
considered to be less exacting than strict scrutiny, allowing “a measure of
deference to the judgment of the legislative body that enacted the law.” ;
, 838 F.3d 1057, 1063 (11th Cir.

2016). The burden of this showing is on the State, not the Plaintiff.

, 838 F.3d at 1063.

Here, Defendant WBJLC fails to make any such showing within their

response brief, instead repeating its standing arguments. ( Def. WBJLC’s
Br. in Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj., at 19-20).3 But even if Defendant

3 The Defendants, including Defendant WBJLC, repeatedly raise the

argument that the Plaintiffs should not challenge the LC Statute, but should
have instead challenged the contribution limits under O.C.G.A. § 21-5-41
because the challenge should be to the law restricting speech. ( Def.

WBJLC’s Br. in Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj., at 4). Such a challenge has
already been rejected as improper by a court in this District. Indeed, Judge
Ross rejected another primary candidate’s challenge to O.C.G.A. § 21-5-41
because of the “unconstitutional scheme” created by the LC Statute, finding
that an injunction would impermissibly privilege the Raffensberger and Jones’
campaigns while other campaigns would still be subject to the law.

, 1:25-cv-6985-ELR, at 14-16 (N.D. Ga.

Jan. 27, 2026), ECF No. 20, , No. 26-10312 (11th Cir. Jan. 29,

2026).

21

WBJLC had attempted to carry their burden, the Court is bound by .

There, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that the court “ha[s] never upheld
the constitutionality of a law that imposes different contribution limits for

candidates who are competing against each other.” , 554 U.S. at 738. The
Supreme Court further remarked that “imposing different contribution and
coordinated party expenditure limits on candidates vying for the same seat is
antithetical to the First Amendment.” at 743-44. The three prior cases
within this District addressing the constitutionality of the LC Statute all apply
to ultimately conclude that the statute likely runs afoul of the First

Amendment. , 584 F. Supp. 3d at 1321-27; , 601 F. Supp.

3d at 1304-07; , 634 F. Supp. 3d at 1354-56.

The Court sees no reason to depart from Judge Cohen’s prior holdings.
The LC Statute creates the exact scheme the Supreme Court has explicitly
disavowed by imposing different contribution limits for candidates vying for
the Republican nomination for Governor of Georgia. Defendant Jones may take
advantage of leadership committees, while Plaintiff Jackson is subject to the

stricter campaign contribution limits imposed by O.C.G.A. § 21-5-41(a).
Furthermore, Defendant WBJLC can point to no underlying purpose behind

the LC Statute arising out of a need to combat corruption because the statute
has no such purpose. Therefore, the Court concludes that the LC Statute is

                          22                                      

likely unconstitutional as applied to the Plaintiffs.

3. Irreparable Harm

“A showing of irreparable injury is ‘the sine qua non of injunctive relief.’

” , 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (citation modified).
“[E]ven if [the] Plaintiffs establish a likelihood of success of the merits, the
absence of a substantial likelihood of irreparable injury would, standing alone,
make [ ] injunctive relief improper.” “An injury is irreparable ‘if it cannot
be undone through monetary remedies.’ ” , 612 F.3d 1279, 1295 (11th Cir. 2010). “[T]he asserted irreparable injury ‘must be neither remote nor

speculative, but actual and imminent.’ ” , 234 F.3d at 1176-77 (citation
omitted).

Not every violation of constitutional rights constitutes irreparable harm.
at 1177. Nonetheless, violations of the First Amendment often satisfy this
standard. In , 427 U.S. 347 (1976), the Supreme Court explicitly
held that “[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of
time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” at 373. Applying this

standard, the Eleventh Circuit has held that violations of the First
Amendment constitute irreparable harm to the Plaintiffs where there is an
“imminent likelihood that pure speech will be chilled or prevented altogether.”
, 234 F.3d at 1178. This is because “chilled free speech . . . , because of

                          23                                      

its intangible nature, could not be compensated for by monetary damages; in
other words, plaintiffs could not be made whole.” , 612 F.3d at 1295 (citation modified).

Because the Court has found that the Plaintiffs are substantially likely
to succeed on their First Amendment claim, the Plaintiffs have demonstrated
irreparable harm. The continued expenditures of Defendant WBJLC in favor
of Defendant Jones’s campaign are only permitted under the LC Statute and
would be barred by the campaign finance rules of O.C.G.A. § 21-5-41(a). The
operations of Defendant WBJLC, permitted by the LC Statute, have violated

and continue to violate the Plaintiffs’ First Amendment right of free speech.
Therefore, there is a very real and imminent likelihood that the Plaintiffs’
speech will be chilled under the LC Statute. , 234 F.3d at 1178.

Yet, Defendant WBJLC argues that any such harm is purely speculative
because the Plaintiffs are only concerned that Defendant WBJLC may outraise
them. ( Def. WBJLC’s Br. in Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj., at 20-21).
This argument misses the mark and mischaracterizes the alleged harm. While

it is true that part of the harm to the Plaintiffs is speculative, there is a very
real and continued harm imposed by operation of the LC Statute. While the
Plaintiffs are subject to certain contribution limits, Defendant Jones is not
through Defendant WBJLC.

                          24                                      

One of the only ways for Plaintiff Jackson to circumvent the unequal
operation of the LC Statute is by self-financing his campaign, which he has
done. And here, the Court finds no reason to penalize Plaintiff Jackson for the

exercise of his First Amendment right to contribute to his own campaign.
Indeed, previous decisions by the Supreme Court have emphasized “the
fundamental nature of the right to spend personal funds for campaign speech.”
, 554 U.S. at 738-39 (discussing , 424 U.S. 1, 52-54 (1976) and finding that the decision emphasized the fundamental right to
spend personal funds on a campaign). Furthermore, if the LC Statute is later

declared unconstitutional as to its application to Defendant Jones’s campaign,
it may reduce the necessity for Plaintiff Jackson to spend on his own campaign
because Defendant Jones would be subject to the same requirements as to his
campaign. Therefore, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have satisfied the
irreparable harm factor.

4. Balance of Harms

The third factor requires a court to “weigh whether the defendant is

harmed more by the issuance of injunctive relief than the plaintiff is harmed
by not entering an injunction.” , 241 F. Supp.

3d 1208, 1231 (N.D. Ala. 2017); , 958 F.3d at 1090-91 (discussing

the lower court’s application of the factor and finding error in the balancing

                          25                                      

test where the lower court balanced harm to the plaintiff generally, instead of
harm to the plaintiff without an injunction).

Defendant WBJLC argues that the harm to Defendant Jones’s campaign

upon entry of the preliminary injunction outweighs any harm to the Plaintiffs.
( Def. WBJLC’s Br. in Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj, at 21-22). First,
Defendant WBJLC notes that the Plaintiffs have “raised and reserved
substantially more advertising time than [Defendant] WBJLC during this

election cycle.” ( at 21). Indeed, at the TRO Hearing, the Defendants
emphasized this point, showing that the Plaintiffs were responsible for around

76% of total ad buy expenditures, while Defendant WBJLC was only
responsible for 24%.

But once again, Defendant WBJLC’s argument mischaracterizes the

harm. The Plaintiffs are harmed by the unconstitutionality of the LC Statute
and Defendant WBJLC’s lawful operation under that statute. Such harm is
irreparable, and the injury would continue as Defendant WBJLC continues to
make expenditures in support of Defendant Jones’ campaign for governor.

Thus, there is an actual, imminent, and continuing harm to the Plaintiffs
without the entry of an injunction against Defendant WBJLC.

Defendant WBJLC also argues that the entry of an injunction would

unduly burden the Jones campaign because enjoining the leadership

                          26                                      

committee from fundraising or expending funds would restrict a political
committee in the midst of a contested primary with less than two months
remaining until voting occurs. ( Def. WBJLC’s Br. in Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for

Prelim. Inj, at 21-22). Furthermore, they liken the entry of the preliminary
injunction to a gag order and prior restraint. ( at 23-25). But this

argument rewrites the operation and the purpose of the injunction. As Judge
Cohen explained in , the requested injunction restores Defendant
Jones’s campaign to the status quo that would have existed prior to the
operation of the LC Statute. , 584 F. Supp. 3d at 1327. Furthermore,

there is no prohibition on Defendant WBJLC from spending its contributions
during the general election. , 601 F. Supp. 3d at 1309.

In effect, Defendant Jones’s campaign can still receive contributions and
spend money on advertising without any restriction imposed by the Court as
long as Defendant WBJLC is not a participant in the campaign. This effectively
requires both Plaintiff Jackson and Defendant Jones to conduct their campaign
finances under the same restrictions imposed by O.C.G.A. § 21-5-41(a). There

is no restriction on Defendant Jones spending his own money to fund his
campaign, just as Plaintiff Jackson has been doing for his own.

It is true that preliminary injunctions of legislative enactments must
only be granted “reluctantly and only upon a clear showing that the injunction

                          27                                      

before trial is definitely demanded by the Constitution and by the other strict
legal and equitable principles that restrain courts.”

Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1342 (11th Cir. 1994) (citation modified); (

Def. WBJLC’s Br. in Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj, at 22). But the Plaintiffs
have done so here. The balance of the harms favors the Plaintiffs.

5. Public Interest

The fourth factor requires a court to consider whether granting the
preliminary injunction will disserve the public interest.

, 742 F.3d at 1329. “[T]he public, when the state is a party asserting

harm, has no interest in enforcing an unconstitutional law.” , 612 F.3d at
1297. “Similarly, a preliminary injunction is not contrary to the public interest
because it is in the public interest to protect First Amendment rights.”
, 94 F.4th 1272, 1283 (11th Cir. 2024).

Defendant WBJLC still contends that the public interest disfavors an
injunction because this Court will be required to resolve “deeply technical
questions about campaign finance” and that federal courts “ought not ‘inject

[themselves] into the most heated partisan issues.’” (Def. WBJLC’s Br. in
Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj, at 22 (quoting , 588

U.S. 684, 704 (2019)). But a campaign finance law that is unconstitutional in
its application on First Amendment grounds is exactly the scenario where this

                          28                                      

Court should act. This is not a partisan question; it is a legal question where
federal courts must act to protect liberties enshrined by the Constitution.
Therefore, the requested relief under the preliminary injunction would not

disserve the public interest. Because the Plaintiffs have made an adequate
showing on all four factors, the Court finds preliminary injunctive relief proper
against Defendant WBJLC.

B. Oral Motion to Stay the Preliminary Injunction

After the Court’s ruling from the bench during the PI Hearing, the Court
allowed Defendant WBJLC to make an oral motion to stay the preliminary

injunction. ( PI Hearing at 90:25-91:7 [Doc. 65]; Def. WBJLC’s Br.

in Opp’n to Pls.’ Br. for Prelim. Inj., at 5 n. 2 (improperly requesting in a
footnote that, if the Court enters a preliminary injunction, it stay the
preliminary injunction pending appeal)). Defendant WBJLC accepted the
opportunity to do so, and the parties made arguments for and against the stay.
( PI Hearing at 91:23-97:24). Ultimately, the Court found that there were
exceptional circumstances warranting a stay of its own preliminary injunction

pending appeal. ( at 97:25-99:8). The reasoning follows.

1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The first factor asks whether the stay applicant has demonstrated a
strong likelihood of success on the merits of their appeal.

                          29                                      
     , [915 F.3d at 1318](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4591259/democratic-executive-committee-of-florida-v-laurel-m-lee/#1318). “It is not enough that the chance of success 

on the merits be ‘better than negligible.’” , 556 U.S. at 434 (citation
omitted).

For the reasons explained within the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, the Court believes that controls the issue and that the
Plaintiffs, not Defendant WBJLC, have a substantial likelihood of success on
the merits of their First Amendment claim against the Defendants. But the
Court still will proceed to the second factor because the traditional four-factor
standard for granting a stay is not wholly rigid.

                  , [32 F.4th 1363, 1370](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6466276/league-of-women-voters-of-florida-inc-v-florida-secretary-of-state/#1370) (11th Cir. 2022). One such 

scenario where courts relax the necessity of the first factor is when the balance
of equities “weighs heavily in favor of granting the stay.” (citation modified).
In such cases, a stay may be granted “upon a lesser showing of a substantial
case on the merits.” (citation modified).

This is the Northern District of Georgia’s seventh attempt to resolve the
Constitutionality of Georgia’s LC Statute as applied to both primaries and the

general election. , 584 F. Supp. 3d 1310; , 601 F.

Supp. 3d 1291; , 634 F. Supp. 3d 1343,

, No. 24-cv-3154-MHC (N.D. Ga. Sep. 19, 2024), ECF No. 23; , No.

25-cv-4426-VMC; , No. 25-cv-6985-ELR; ,

                          30                                      

No. 26-cv-782-TWT (N.D. Ga. Feb. 27, 2026), ECF No. 48. Each of these cases
have tackled challenges related to the LC Statute on their understanding of
judicial precedent laid out by the Eleventh Circuit and the Supreme Court.

Further, the majority of these decisions have been appealed to the Eleventh
Circuit without a decision on the merits.

, 2022 WL 16631279 (11th Cir. Aug. 2,

2022); , 2022 WL 18959697 (11th Cir. Dec. 15, 2022); , 110 F.4th 1239; , No. 25-cv-6985-ELR

(N.D. Ga. Jan. 29, 2026), ECF No. 23 (pending with the Eleventh Circuit).

The problem with this procedural posture is that “leadership committees
. . . have no analogue.” , No. 26-cv-782-TWT, at 15. As

Defendant WBJLC implicitly acknowledges, the Georgia legislature is
nowhere near remedying any potential defect with the LC Statute. ( PI

Hearing at 92:1-92:6). Although the Court is steadfast in its decision on the
likelihood of success on the merits, the Court acknowledges that the Eleventh
Circuit’s guidance in interpreting the Supreme Court’s decisions is necessary

to prevent a patchwork of decisions from impacting Georgia’s election finance
law. Therefore, the Court holds that the chance of success for Defendant
WBJLC on the merits is “more than negligible,” and the showing is enough to
survive the first factor. , 556 U.S. at 434 (citation omitted).

                          31                                      
  2.  Irreparable Harm                                            

The second factor requires a court to consider whether a stay applicant
will suffer irreparable injury absent a stay.

, 915 F.3d at 1326. On this factor, the Court acknowledges that its
imposition of a preliminary injunction on Defendant WBJLC carries First
Amendment implications that cannot be ignored. By enjoining Defendant
WBJLC from accepting contributions or spending money on the candidate of
their choosing, the preliminary injunction, in effect, limits otherwise lawful
spending pursuant to the LC Statute.

Three Supreme Court decisions shape this finding. First, under

, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), there is little difference
between the First Amendment rights of an individual and a corporation. at
365. Accordingly, laws (or judicial action) that suppress political speech on the
basis of the speaker’s corporate identity are unconstitutional. Second, under
, 572 U.S. 185 (2014), levelling the
playing field is not an acceptable governmental objective “[n]o matter how

desirable it may seem.” at 207. While that case involved a federal law that
imposed contribution limits on individuals contributing to federal candidates
for office, at 193-96, the preliminary injunction entered by the Court does
restrict Defendant WBJLC from making expenditures to level the playing field

                          32                                      

between the Jackson and Jones campaigns. Third, under , the Supreme

Court held that “[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal
periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” [427 U.S. at

373](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109517/elrod-v-burns/#373); , 234 F.3d at 1178 (holding that violations of the First
Amendment constitutes irreparable harm to the Plaintiffs where there is an
““imminent likelihood that pure speech will be chilled or prevented
altogether”).

Here, Defendant WBJLC is a duly incorporated nonprofit corporation
under the laws of Georgia. ( Def. Jones’ Br. in Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim.

Inj., Ex. 1, at 2-4 [Doc. 50-1]). If the Court’s preliminary injunction were to take
effect, the effect would result in a chilling of Defendant WBJLC’s speech
guaranteed under the First Amendment because it would be unable to raise or
spend any money. Such harm is irreparable and even if this were a close call,
free speech should reign out. ( PI Hearing at 94:17-94:20).. Thus, Defendant
WBJLC has met its burden in demonstrating irreparable harm.

3. Balance of Harms

The third factor asks whether the issuance of the stay will “substantially
injure the other parties interested in the proceeding” and asks a reviewing
court to balance the harms. , 915 F.3d at 1317;

, 958 F.3d at 1090-91 (discussing the lower court’s application of the

                          33                                      

factor and finding error in the balancing test where the lower court balanced
harm to the plaintiff generally, instead of harm to the plaintiff without an
injunction). Here, the continued operation of the preliminary injunction would

have a massive asymmetric effect on the Jackson and Jones campaigns. The
Defendants have provided ample evidence throughout the PI Hearing and the
TRO Hearing that shows that the Jackson campaign is outspending the Jones
campaign by a large margin. On the date of the TRO Hearing, the Jackson
campaign had already spent or planned to spend $29.08 million on television
advertising, which was less than $10 million away from the total spend on

television advertisements in the 2022 Republican gubernatorial primary. (
TRO Hearing at 30:06-30:13 [Doc. 43]). Even with Defendant WBJLC’s
operations under the LC Statute, the Jackson campaign outspent the Jones
campaign at nearly a 3-to-1 ratio in media advertising at the time of the TRO
Hearing.

There is no indication that the Jackson campaign plans to cease its level
of advertising spending in the near future. Additionally, there is no indication

that the Jackson campaign intends to breach the contribution limits imposed
by O.C.G.A. § 21-5-41. The Jackson campaign will continue to solicit and accept
contributions while Plaintiff Jackson continues to self-fund his campaign. The
preliminary injunction does not affect the Jackson campaign directly in any

                          34                                      

way.

But the preliminary injunction has a massive effect on the Jones
campaign. Unlike the facts underlying and , the Jones campaign

is competing for the Republican nomination against a self-funded candidate
who has been continuing to spend large sums of money in support of his own
campaign. Removing Defendant WBJLC’s ability to fundraise on behalf of the
Jones campaign would exacerbate the media spend disparity and leave the
Jones campaign likely unable to compete in the media space. While the parties
can rightfully claim that their First Amendment rights would be violated with

or without the injunction, a large factual inequity still exists.

But the Plaintiffs argue that the Eleventh Circuit will likely not reach a
decision before the conclusion of the Republican gubernatorial primary and
that keeping the injunction would force the Eleventh Circuit to act out of time
sensitivity. ( PI Hearing at 95:5-95:12, 96:16-97:3). The Court is
unpersuaded by the argument. First, the Defendants have stated that they
intend to appeal to the Eleventh Circuit on an emergency basis as soon as

possible. ( at 97:10-97:14). Second, as the Defendants noted, the
Eleventh Circuit has acted in the time period required for the Plaintiffs to
potentially obtain relief. ( at 97:15-97:19). And third, the entry of any
stay by this Court can be immediately appealed to the Eleventh Circuit by the

                          35                                      

Plaintiffs if they feel that the Defendants are taking too long. The Plaintiffs
themselves know this option, as in the time it took for the Court to issue its
written order, the Plaintiffs have already filed an appeal with the Eleventh

Circuit. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs’ arguments fail and the third factor strongly
favors Defendant WBJLC.

4. Public Interest

Finally, the Court asks whether granting the stay would disserve the
public interest. , 915 F.3d at 1317. As

previously discussed within the analysis for a preliminary injunction, “the

public, when the state is a party asserting harm, has no interest in enforcing
an unconstitutional law.” , 612 F.3d at 1297. Further, it is in the public
interest to protect First Amendment rights. , 94 F.4th

at 1283 (11th Cir. 2024). Because Defendant WBJLC has made a strong
showing that the effect of the preliminary injunction will result in a reduction
of its First Amendment rights, the Court holds that the fourth factor favors the
grant of a stay.

In sum, while Defendant WBJLC cannot make a showing that it will

substantially succeed on the merits of the Plaintiffs’ claims, the remaining
factors strongly counsel for stay relief because of the substantial negative
impact on Defendant WBJLC’s First Amendment rights and the Jones

                          36                                      

campaign’s ability to remain competitive in the Republican gubernatorial
primary. While it is rare for a district court to stay its own injunction, this is
one such exceptional circumstance where such a stay is necessary to protect

the Constitutional rights of all parties. Accordingly, the Court will exercise its
discretion and stay its own preliminary injunction.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons as well as those stated on the record at the PI
Hearing, the Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Doc. 12]
is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part and Defendant WBJLC’s Oral

Motion to Stay the Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED.

As to the Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Doc.
12], Defendant WBJLC is hereby ENJOINED from soliciting contributions and
making any expenditures in support of Defendant Jones’ Georgia

gubernatorial campaign until Defendant Jones becomes the nominee of the
Republican Party or further order of this Court, whichever comes first. This
injunction applies only to Defendant WBJLC and no other party in this action.

All other injunctive relief requested by the Plaintiffs is DENIED.

As to Defendant WBJLC’s Oral Motion to Stay the Preliminary
Injunction, the preliminary injunctive relief entered against Defendant
WBJLC is hereby STAYED pending appeal to the Eleventh Circuit. The stay

                          37                                      

entered by this Court shall continue until the Eleventh Circuit rules on the
merits of the appeal or the Republican candidate for Governor has been
nominated, whichever comes first.
SO ORDERED, this 19th day of March, 2026.

                                   Atemee  □□□ Ae  fh 
                                    THOMAS W. THRASH, JR. 
                                    United States District Judge 

                                38