Mandala v. NTT Data - Motion to Reconsider Denied, 30-Day Answer Deadline Ordered

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April 22, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

George Mandala, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. NTT Data, Inc.

District Court, W.D. New York

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 6:18-cv-06591

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (16)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (62.2K)

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Trial Court Document

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

GEORGE MANDALA, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, DECISION AND ORDER
vs.
18-CV-6591 (MAV)
NTT DATA, INC.,
Defendant.

INTRODUCTION
This matter is presently before the Court on Defendant NTT Data, Inc.’s
motion to reconsider the Court’s July 2025 Decision and Order granting in part and
denying in part Defendant's motion to dismiss. ECF No. 72. In the alternative,
Defendant asks the Court to amend its order to certify an issue for interlocutory
appeal to the Second Circuit and to stay proceedings while the interlocutory appeal
is pending. Jd. Plaintiff George Mandala! opposes Defendant’s motions. ECF No. 75.
For the reasons discussed below, Defendant's motions are denied, and Defendant
must answer the remaining claims in Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint (“FAC”)
on or before 30 days from the date of this order.
BACKGROUND
The Court assumes the reader’s familiarity with the facts and procedural

1 For the vast majority of the litigation in this case, there were two representatives of the putative
class: Mandala, and Charles Barnett. Barnett withdrew as a representative of the putative class on
September 30, 2025. ECF No. 78. For ease of discussion, the Court will refer to Plaintiff in the singular
in this decision rather the plural as in prior decisions.

history in this case, and therefore addresses only those facts and issues which bear
directly on the resolution of the motions presently before the Court.
The original complaint in this putative class action suit was filed on August
15, 2018. ECF No. 1. In July 2019, the Hon. Judge Charles J. Siragusa of this district
granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc., No. 18-CV-6591
CJS, 2019 WL 32387361 (W.D.N.Y. July 18, 2019). The judgment was subsequently
affirmed on appeal by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals (Mandala ID), and
Plaintiffs petition for a rehearing en banc was denied (Mandala IID). Mandala v. NTT
Data, Inc., 975 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2020); Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc., 988 F.3d 664 (2d
Cir. 2021).
Following the denial of the petition for a rehearing, Plaintiff filed a motion to
vacate judgment with the district court and sought to amend the complaint. ECF No.
35. After Judge Siragusa’s denial of Plaintiffs motion to vacate was reversed by the
Second Circuit, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) in March 2024.
ECF No. 49; see also Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc., No. 18-CV-6591 (CJS), 2021 WL
5771154 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2021), rev'd and remanded, 88 F.4th 353 (2d Cir. 2023).
The FAC alleges disparate impact claims under Title VII and the New York State
Human Rights Law “NYSHRL”), and claims under New York law alleging improper
use of a criminal background check. ECF No. 49.
As relevant here, the FAC alleges that Defendant NTT Data, Inc. is a global
IT services company employing over 110,000 people worldwide, including
approximately 18,000 people in North America and at least four offices in New York.

Id. 17, 105. In early 2017, Plaintiff George Mandala, an African-American, applied
for a position as a “Salesforce Developer” with Defendant, successfully completed two
phone interviews, and received a letter formally offering him the job on March 22,
2017. Id. J§ 15, 22-26. On March 28, 2017, Mandala accepted the offer and
“authorized a background check pursuant to Defendant’s policy, and Defendant
obtained a criminal background check on Mr. Mandala from a consumer reporting
agency.” Id. 28-29. Then, on March 30, 2017, Mandala was informed by phone
that “NTT had a policy not to hire persons with felonies! on their records.” Id. § 32.
On April 6, 2017, Mandala received a letter from Defendant withdrawing its job offer,
and stating that “[t]his action was influenced by information contained in a consumer
report... Id. | 33. On June 2, 2017, Mandala filed a Charge of Discrimination with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), which issued him a Right
to Sue letter on May 17, 2018. Id. § 38.
The FAC also alleges that statistics show that African Americans are arrested,
sentenced, and imprisoned for crimes at substantially higher rates than whites,
relative to their share of the national population. FAC 9 54—55 (citing reports from
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (2016) and the Census Bureau (2017), and
enforcement guidance from the EEOC (2012)). In addition, the FAC points to a study
published by the Russell Sage Foundation in 2006, which found that “Black men with
some college education have imprisonment risks that are seven (7) times greater than
white men with some college education.” Id. {| 58 (citing Bruce Western, Punishment

2 Mandala was convicted of Driving While Intoxicated in 2014. Id. ¥ 35.

and Inequality in America, Russell Sage Foundation: 2006). “This [pattern] is
consistent with the racial disparities that exist among individuals with lesser
educational attainment.” Jd. (again citing the Russell Sage Foundation study).
The FAC alleges that notwithstanding these disparities, Defendant has a
policy and practice of denying employment to individuals with criminal histories,
including felony convictions, and no process or policy to determine whether applicants
convicted of crimes have made positive changes in their lives after their respective
convictions. Id. §| 64-65. For instance, when posting for a “Network/Systems
Administrator in New York City,” Defendant listed as a “basic qualification” that the
applicant have “[n]o prior felony arrests.” Jd. § 37. Thus, Plaintiff infers that
Defendant’s policy and practice of denying job opportunities to individuals with non-
job-related convictions had and continues to have a significant and detrimental
impact on African American applicants based on their race, color and/or national
origin, as compared to white applicants. Id. at J 54.
In April 2024, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the FAC for failure to state
a claim and lack of jurisdiction. ECF No. 57. In July 2025, the Court issued a Decision
and Order granting Defendant’s motion in part, and denying it in part. ECF No. 71.
As relevant here, the Court deferred making a finding on Defendant’s statute of
limitations argument regarding Plaintiffs NYSHRL claim, and found that Plaintiff
has plausibly pleaded disparate impact claims under Title VII and the NYSHRL. Jd.
at 17. Soon thereafter, Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, motion to amend
the Decision and Order to certify an issue for interlocutory appeal, and motion to stay

proceedings while the appeal is pending. ECF No. 72. Those motions are presently
before the Court.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Defendant maintains that reconsideration of the Court’s Decision and Order is
warranted because it believes the Court committed “clear error” in two respects: (1)
declining to dismiss Plaintiffs NYSHRL disparate impact claim as barred by the
statute of limitations, and (2) allowing Plaintiffs disparate impact claims under both
Title VII and NYSHRL to proceed.
A. Legal Standard
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize a motion for
“reconsideration.” See Lopez v. Goodman, No. 10-CV-6413 CJS, 2013 WL 5309747, at
*1 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2018) (citing Hamilton v. Williams, 147 F.3d 367, 371 n. 10
(5th Cir. 1998)). However, “[m]Jotions for reconsideration may be filed under Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e), 54(b), or 60(b) ... .” Warr v. Liberatore, No. 13-CV-
6508P, 2018 WL 3237733, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. July 3, 2018) (quoting McAnaney v. Astoria
Fin. Corp., 2008 WL 222524, *3 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)). Here, because the Court’s decision
on Defendant’s motion to dismiss did not result in an appealable final judgment, Rule
54(b) governs this motion for reconsideration.
Rule 54(b), “Judgment on Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Parties,”
provides that:
When an action presents more than one claim for relief--whether as a
claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim--or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to
one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court

expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay. Otherwise,
any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer
than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the
parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may
be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all
the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Though this rule indicates that the district court has inherent
power to reconsider its own entries prior to the entry of a judgment adjudicating all
the claims, “[t]he Second Circuit has ‘limited district courts’ reconsideration of earlier
decisions . .. by treating those decisions as law of the case, which gives a district court
discretion to revisit earlier rulings in the same case, subject to the caveat that where
litigants have once battled for the court’s decision, they should neither be required,
nor without good reason permitted, to battle for it again.” Warr, 2018 WL 3237738,
at *2 (quoting Official Comm. of the Unsecured Creditors of Color Title, Inc. v. Coopers
& Lybrand, LLP, 322 F.3d 147, 167 (2d Cir. 2008)).
For these reasons, the Second Circuit has also stated that motions for
reconsideration should generally be denied “‘unless there is an intervening change of
controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct clear error or
prevent manifest injustice.” Warr, 2018 WL 3237738, at *2 (quoting Virgin Atl.
Airways, Ltd. v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506
U.S. 820 (1992)). “These criteria are strictly construed against the moving party so
as to avoid repetitive arguments on issues that have been considered fully by the
court.” Boyde v. Osborne, 2013 WL 6662862, *1 (W.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Griffin
Indus., Inc. v. Petrojam, Ltd., 72 F. Supp. 2d 365, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)).

B. Plaintiff's NYSHRL Claim and the Statute of Limitations
Defendant argues that the Court committed clear error by declining to find
that Plaintiffs NYSHRL claim was barred by the statute of limitations. In particular,
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff admitted in his opposition papers to the motion to
dismiss that his NYSHRL claim was barred by the statute of limitations unless tolled
under American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 38 (1974), and cites to
Second Circuit caselaw for the proposition that “[w]here the dates in the complaint
show that an action is barred by a statute of limitations, a motion to dismiss based
on the statute of limitations is properly treated as one under Rule 12(b)(6).” ECF No.
72-1 at 5-6 (quoting Cangemi v. United States, 13 F.4th 115, 1384-53 (2d Cir. 2021)).
Therefore, Defendant takes issue with the Court’s finding that dismissing the claim
would be premature because resolution of its statute of limitations argument requires
fact-specific evaluation. Id. at 6. “In short,” Defendant concluded, “this Court
undertook the analysis, didn’t like the result, and therefore declined to reach a
determination on the legal issue presented to it — whether American Pipe tolling
applies to Plaintiffs efforts to toll his own putative class action claim when it is first
asserted after the statute of limitations expires.” Jd. (emphasis in original).
As an initial matter, the Court does not reach decisions on particular issues
based on whether or not it “likes the result.” Further, the Court did not read Plaintiffs
opposition papers as conceding his claim is barred unless American Pipe applies. KCF
No. 64. Rather, the Court was unable to discern with certainty from the face of the
FAC whether the claim was actually barred, even in the absence of tolling under

American Pipe. ECF No. 71 at 10-12. Among the complicating factors was the
practice of the majority of courts in this Circuit to toll the statute of limitations while
the EEOC investigates the claim. Jd. Despite due consideration of Defendant’s
arguments in its motion to dismiss, the Court was unable to make a determination
and thus declined to bar the claim at this stage of the case. Id. In other words,
Defendant had not demonstrated to the Court that the FAC clearly showed that the
claim was not timely. See, e.g., Allen v. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc., 748 F. Supp. 2d
328, 354 (D. Vt. 2010) (“A statute of limitations analysis is generally riddled with
questions of fact which the Defendants must establish in order to bar Plaintiffs’
claims.”). The Court declines to find that its decision in this regard was clear error.
C. The Legal Sufficiency of Plaintiff's Disparate Impact Statistics
Defendant also argues that there were two clear errors in the Court’s ruling
that Plaintiff had sufficiently pleaded his disparate impact claims: (1) the Court
incorrectly considered unsupported facts, and (2) the Court incorrectly applied
irrelevant statistics. ECF No. 72-1 at 7-15.
t. Incorrectly Considered Unsupported Facts
Defendant maintains that the Court improperly relied upon allegations
regarding a job posting that Plaintiff did not apply for, and therefore that Plaintiff
has not shown actual harm to have standing to bring a claim. Id. at 8-9. Specifically,
Defendant cites to the Court’s reference to the FAC’s factual allegation regarding a
job posting for a “Network/Systems Administrator in New York City” that listed as a
requirement “[n]o prior felony arrests,” and argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege

any harm because he has not alleged that he applied for the position, or was deterred
from applying for the position. See ECF No. 71 at 8-9 (referencing FAC § 37).
Although it is not clear from Defendant’s papers whether it is challenging Plaintiffs
Article III standing or his class standing, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiffs
allegations in the FAC are sufficient to find both forms of standing at this stage.
A named plaintiffs Article III standing and a plaintiffs class standing “are
different issues that require separate consideration.” Holve v. McCormick & Co., Inc., 304 F. Supp. 3d 535, 544 (W.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting Reid v. GMC Skin Care USA Inc.,
No. 8:15-CV-277 (BKS/CFH), 2016 WL 403497, at *4 (N.D.N-Y. Jan. 15, 2016)
(citations omitted)). The “irreducible constitutional minimum” of Article IIT standing
for the named plaintiff is that he “must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is
fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (8) that is likely to be
redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” John v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 858
F.3d 732, 736 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016)).
Here, Plaintiff demonstrated Article III standing by plausibly alleging that his
employment offer for a position as a Salesforce Developer was rescinded following
Defendant’s discovery of his 2014 felony conviction, that Defendant’s conduct was
traceable to an allegedly discriminatory policy of denying employment to convicted
felons, and that this injury would be redressed by a judicial decision restoring
Plaintiff to his position and awarding backpay, or compensatory damages. FAC □
32-33, 117-18.
On the other hand, “in a putative class action, a plaintiff has class standing if

he plausibly alleges (1) that he personally has suffered some actual injury as a result
of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant, and (2) that such conduct implicates
the same set of concerns as the conduct alleged to have caused injury to other
members of the putative class by the same defendants.” Ret. Bd. of the Policemen’s
Annuity & Ben. Fund of the City of Chicago v. Bank of New York Mellon, 775 F.3d
154, 161 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting NECA-IBEW Health & Welfare Fund v. Goldman
Sachs & Co., 693 F.3d 145, 158 (2d Cir. 2012)). As indicated in the preceding
paragraph, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged the first element:
that he personally has suffered some actual injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the Defendant. See also ECF No. 71 at 5.
Moreover, when the factual allegation at the center of Defendant’s argument —
1.e., the allegation regarding a job posting for a “Network/Systems Administrator in
New York City” that listed as a requirement “[n]o prior felony arrests” (FAC § 37) —
is read together with such additional allegations as that Defendant’s policy “has
excluded many properly qualified persons, including disproportionate numbers of
African American applicants” (FAC § 66), the FAC plausibly alleges the second
element of class standing. That 1s, it plausibly alleges that the conduct which caused
Plaintiffs injury implicates the same set of concerns as the conduct alleged to have
caused injury to other members of the putative class by Defendant.
Accordingly, the Court finds no merit in Defendant’s primary argument
regarding the Court’s consideration of the alleged facts. Defendant also asserts that
the FAC is deficient because it contains no factual allegations to show “the pool of

qualified applicants” for this position. ECF No. 72-1. The Court finds this assertion
to be unpersuasive for the same reasons explained below regarding Defendant’s
arguments about the “incorrect application of irrelevant statistics.”
uw. Incorrectly Applied Irrelevant Statistics
Defendant maintains that the “Court committed clear error in failing to
scrutinize the proffered statistics alleged by Plaintiffs.” ECF No. 72-1 at 9-10. In
particular, Defendant argues that despite guidance from the Second Circuit decision
affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiffs original complaint, the Court “merely
accepted ‘as true every inference [Plaintiffs’] ask[ed] [it] to draw from those findings
no matter how attenuated.” Jd. at 11. In support of this argument, Defendant asserts
that “three of the five paragraphs” the Court relied upon “were already found
insufficient by the Second Circuit” Ud. at 11); that the FAC failed to create a causal
link between the general population statistics and the pool of applicants qualified for
the position at issue (/d. at 11-12); and that the Court relied upon statements from
the concurrence in the Second Circuit’s denial of Plaintiffs petition for a hearing en
banc “without any further analysis” Ud. at 12-15).
The Court is aware that the majority of the Second Circuit panel that affirmed
Judge Siragusa’s dismissal of the original complaint in Mandala IT found that it was
error for Plaintiff “to simply presume that population-level statistics will accurately
describe subgroups of that population.” Mandala IT, 975 F.3d at 211. The Court is
also aware that the majority found it fatal to Plaintiffs disparate impact claim that
he “offered no allegations to suggest that the general population statistics on which

[he] rel[ied] might accurately reflect [Defendant’s] pool of qualified job applicants,”
especially since the titles alone of the positions at issue “reflect that they require at
least some education or technical experience that is not shared by the general
population... .” Jd. at 11-12 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Nevertheless, in elaborating upon the reasoning behind Mandala IT, the
concurrence in Mandala IIT explained that the Mandala IT majority was drawing on
the panel’s “judicial experience and common sense” to determine Plaintiffs claim was
not plausible. Mandala IT, 988 F.3d at 667. In that regard, the panel found that
“common sense dictates that highly educated individuals can be expected to have
lower conviction rates than the general population.” Jd. Given this link between
education and a decrease in conviction rates, “the panel majority opinion simply
concluded that Plaintiffs were asking the district court to draw inferences that, based
on common sense, were too attenuated from the supplied statistics to be plausible.” Id. Thus, the panel majority stated that to render the national statistics relevant to
their claim, “Plaintiffs simply need ‘to provide additional allegations to explain why
their chosen national statistics are in fact likely to be representative of [the] qualified
candidate pool.” Id. at 668 (quoting Mandala IT, 975 F.3d at 212). “Here, that could
have taken the form of additional national statistics indicating that, even as
education levels increase, racial disparities between conviction rates remain.” Id. Neither Mandala IT nor Mandala III dismissed the national statistics in the
original complaint as uncredible or implausible per se. Rather, the Second Circuit
found that Plaintiff had not provided sufficient “connective tissue” between the

national statistics he originally offered, and the qualified labor pool in question.
Mandala IIT, 988 F.3d at 666. That “connective tissue” has been supplied in the FAC
in the form of the allegation that “[b]lack men with some college education have
imprisonment risks that are seven (7) times greater than white men with some
college education,” which “is consistent with the racial disparities that exist among
individuals with lesser educational attainment.” FAC §] 58. Whereas the original
complaint “simply presume[d] that population level statistics... accurately described
subgroups of the population,” Mandala IT, 975 F.3d at 212, the FAC provides support
for the proposition that there will be a disparity in African American and white
conviction rates even when controlling for educational attainment. Mandala ITT, 988
F.3d at 667-68.
In other words, the FAC alleged additional statistics that created a plausible
connection between the national statistics originally alleged and the qualified labor
pool. At this early stage of the case, when “Plaintiffs are undoubtedly working from
an informational disadvantage,” this is sufficient to allege “disparities between
populations that are relevant to the claim the plaintiff seeks to prove.” Mandala II, 975 F.3d at 210.
MOTION FOR § 1292(B) CERTIFICATION & MOTION FOR STAY
In the alternative to reconsidering its Decision and Order, Defendant asks the
Court to amend its decision to certify for interlocutory appeal to the Second Circuit
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b) the issue as to whether Plaintiffs disparate impact claim

was adequately pleaded. ECF No. 72-1 at 15-23. Additionally, Defendant seeks a stay
while the interlocutory appeal is pending. Jd. at 23-25.
A. Legal Principles
A district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss is not typically appealable.
Tanasi v. New All. Bank, No. 12-CV-646S, 2013 WL 12304559, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Dec.
17, 2013). Nevertheless, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b) provides the district court with the
discretion to certify a matter for interlocutory appeal where the district judge is:
of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as
to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that
an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation .... 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b).
As to the first element, a question of law is “controlling” if “reversal of the
district court’s opinion could result in dismissal of the action; reversal of the district
court’s opinion, even though not resulting in dismissal, could significantly affect the
conduct of the action, or; the certified issue has precedential value for a large number
of cases.” Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., No. 11 Civ. 6784(WHP), 2013 WL
5405696, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2013) (citations omitted). As to the second element,
“substantial ground for difference of opinion” exists where “(1) there is conflicting
authority on the issue, or (2) the issue is particularly difficult and of first impression
for the Second Circuit.” Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 972 F. Supp. 2d 537,
551 (S.D.N.Y.2018). “The possibility of a different outcome on appeal is not sufficient
to show a substantial ground for difference of opinion, nor is ‘the mere presence of a
disputed issue that is a question of first impression.” Segedie v. The Hain Celestial

44

Grp., Inc., No. L 4-CV-5029 NSR, 2015 WL 5916002, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2015)
(quoting In re Flor, 79 F.3d 281, 284 (2d Cir. 1996)).
“{I|nterlocutory appeals are strongly disfavored in federal practice.” Segedie, 2015 WL 5916002, at *2 (citing In re Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 693 F. Supp.
2d 241, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)). As a result, even when the elements of section 1292(b)
are satisfied, “the district court retains unfettered discretion to deny certification.”
Garber v. Office of the Com’ of Baseball, 120 F. Supp. 3d 334, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
B. Application
Even assuming a “controlling question of law” in this case, the Court declines
to certify this action for an interlocutory appeal because Defendant has not
demonstrated either conflicting authority on the issue, or that the issue is
particularly difficult and of first impression for the Second Circuit. Rather, Defendant
simply disagrees with the Court’s application of the Second Circuit's earlier rulings
in this case. While Defendant maintains that “the underlying premise” of the Second
Circuit’s Mandala IT decision was that the disparity between African American and
white individuals with a criminal history is inversely affected by education levels
(ECF No. 72-1 at 18 n.7), the Court’s understanding, as described above, is that the
Second Circuit simply sought a clearer connection between the national statistics and
the populations at issue.
The Court has reviewed Defendant's proffered example of the Second Circuit’s
application of the principles from its Mandala II ruling to the circumstances
presented in Moss v. Bd. of Educ. of Sachem Cent. Sch. Dist., and finds no conflict

qr

with the Court’s application of the principles here. Moss, No. 24-2096-CV, 2025 WL
946417 (2d Cir. Mar. 28, 2025). For a comparator pool, the plaintiff in Moss “relied
solely on census data reflecting that 4% of the District population, as a whole, was
Black... . without demonstrating that it ‘accurately reflect[s] the pool of qualified
job applicants for the position in question.” Moss, 2025 WL 946417, at *2 (quoting
Mandala, 975 F.3d at 211). This is precisely the issue the Second Circuit found with
Plaintiffs original complaint. However, as described above, the Court finds that
Plaintiffs addition of allegations to the FAC suggesting that a disparity in
imprisonment remains even after controlling for levels of education is sufficient to
“nudge” Plaintiffs disparate impact claim across the line from conceivable to
plausible. Therefore, the Court declines to certify this matter for interlocutory appeal.
Given the Court’s ruling on Defendant’s motion to amend its decision to certify
an issue for interlocutory appeal, Defendant’s motion for a stay pending appeal is
denied as moot.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant NTT Data, Inc.’s motion to reconsider,
motion to amend and certify for interlocutory appeal, and motion to stay proceedings
[ECF No. 72] are all DENIED. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that NTT shall
file and serve its answer on Plaintiff's remaining claims on or before thirty (80) days
from the date of this order. SO ORDERED.
Dated: April oie 2026 fo ff { tet foe.
Rochester, New York LL AAEM) PLLA
HON. MEREDITH A. VACCA
United States District Judge

112