Eric Ralls v. Plantsnap Inc. - Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Denied

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April 10, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In re: Eric Ralls v. Plantsnap, Inc.

United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Texas

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 24-06044

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (28)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (18.3K)

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Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT EOD
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
TYLER DIVISION
04/10/2026
IN RE: §
§
ERIC RALLS § Case No. 24-60504
§
§
Debtor § Chapter 7

PLANTSNAP, INC. §
§
Plaintiff §
§
v. § Adversary No. 24-06044
§
ERIC RALLS §
§
Defendant §
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On this date the Court considered “Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment” (the “Motion”) filed by Plantsnap, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) on May 30, 2025, together
with the related response filed by Eric Ralls (“Defendant” or “Debtor”). Plaintiff asks
this Court to enter summary judgment that a judgment debt owed by Defendant is
nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523 (a)(2), (a)(4), or (a)(6). After consideration of
the pleadings, proper summary judgment evidence, and the relevant legal authorities the
Court concludes that genuine issues of material fact remain. For the reasons explained in
this memorandum, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED.
I. Jurisdiction
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 (a) and

157(a). This Court has authority to enter final orders in this adversary proceeding
because it statutorily constitutes a core proceeding as contemplated by 28 U.S.C. §
157 (b)(2)(A), (I), and (O), and meets all constitutional standards for the proper exercise
of full judicial power by this Court.

II. Factual and Procedural Background1
Plaintiff, PlantSnap, is a company based in Colorado. Defendant, Eric Ralls,
resides in Tyler, Texas. In 2016, Ralls formed PlantSnap, Inc. to develop a mobile
application that allows users to identify plants using their device. In 2017, DEJ Partners,

LLC (“DEJP”), a California limited liability company loaned funds to PlantSnap. When
PlantSnap defaulted, DEJP executed its contractual right under its loan to take ownership
of shares in PlantSnap. In so doing, DEJP became the majority shareholder in PlantSnap,
and Ralls was removed as a director and officer of PlantSnap in 2021.2

On March 17, 2021, Plaintiff sued Eric Ralls and his related entities in Colorado
state court in PlantSnap Inc. v. Ralls et. al, No. 2021CV30005 (Colo. Dist. Ct. San

1 The facts presented are those which stand uncontested between the parties and are presented
only as a general factual background to the legal claims asserted in this case. This section is not intended
to resolve any disputed or contested facts between the parties.
2 Pl.’s Complaint, ECF No. 1; Def.’s Answer, ECF No. 8. DEJ Partners has since filed its own
adversary proceeding against Ralls on similar facts. See DEJ Partners, LLC v. Ralls, No. 24-6047.
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Miguel Cty. Mar. 17, 2021) (“the PlantSnap Colorado case”).3 In the PlantSnap
Colorado case, Plaintiff asserted various state law claims against Ralls, including that he

“knowingly and intentionally made false statements of material fact, breached his
fiduciary duties to PlantSnap, and committed civil theft when he entered into
unauthorized loans and transferred PlantSnap’s property to himself and his related
entities.”4

On April 19, 2023, prior to the trial date set in state court, Ralls filed a bankruptcy
under Subchapter V of Chapter 11 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District
of Colorado.5 On May 8, 2023, Plaintiff sought relief from the automatic stay to liquidate
its claim in the PlantSnap Colorado case.6 On July 19, 2023, the bankruptcy court

granted stay relief for Plaintiff.7 On July 24, 2023, Plaintiff initiated an adversary
proceeding against Ralls, seeking a nondischargeable judgment pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§
523 (a)(2), (a)(4), and (a)(6). On August 11, 2023, Ralls moved to dismiss his Colorado
bankruptcy case, and it was dismissed on October 17, 2023.8

3 Pl.’s Mot. (“Mot.”), at 2, ECF No. 13.
4 Mot., at 2, ECF No. 13; Mot., Ex. 2, Ex. 3, ECF No. 13.
5 Mot., Ex. 4, Ex. 5, ECF No. 13; In re Ralls, No. 23-11620-TBM (Bankr. D. Colo. Apr. 19,
2023).
6 Mot., Ex. 4, at 4, ECF No. 13.
7 Mot., Ex. 6, ECF No. 13.
8 Mot., Ex. 4, at 13, ECF No. 13.
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The PlantSnap Colorado action proceeded to trial. In January 2024, the state court
partially granted Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion.9 In February 2024, the state

court granted Plaintiff’s motions in limine.10 The parties then notified the state court they
had reached a settlement, memorialized in a Binding Term Sheet dated February 19, 2024
(“the Settlement Agreement”).11 The Settlement Agreement included the following:
7. The Ralls Parties shall deliver a Confession of Judgment (a
pocket judgment) for conversion, civil theft, fraud, and fraudulent
transfer with the agreement that the confessed judgment shall not be
recorded or executed upon except in the event of a default or filing
of bankruptcy, with accompanying language and terms in the
Settlement Agreement to provide for a non-dischargeable obligation.
The agreed upon form of the Confession of Judgment is attached
hereto and signed by Ralls and the Ralls Entities.12

Eric Ralls defaulted on the Settlement Agreement,13 and on July 31, 2024, the
state court entered the consent judgment (the “Judgment”).14 The Judgment stated that:
The Claims, and the resulting Confession of Judgment, were
predicated on Ralls’ and the Entities’ intent to cause willful and
malicious injuries to PlantSnap.
The Claims all occurred while Ralls acted in a fiduciary capacity as
an officer and director of PlantSnap.
9 Mot., Ex. 8, ECF No. 13.
10 Mot., Ex. 2, at 7, ECF No. 13.
11 Mot., Ex. 9, ECF No. 13; Mot., Ex. 10, at 3, ECF No. 13.
12 Mot., Ex. 10, at 3, ECF No. 13.
13 Mot., Ex. 11, ECF No. 13.
14 Mot., Ex. 12, at 2, ECF No. 13.
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The Claims, and the resulting Confession of Judgment, relate to
Ralls’ and the Entities’ intentional acts and false representations, that
they knew were false at the time they made them, and Ralls and the
Entities acknowledge that his representations were made with the
intention and purpose of deceiving PlantSnap, that PlantSnap relied
on the representations, and sustained damages based on his
misrepresentations.
The Claims, and the resulting Confession of Judgement, are also
based on Ralls’ and the Entities’ civil theft of PlantSnap property,
and Ralls’ and the Entities’ acknowledge taking and depositing funds
belonging to PlantSnap, exerting control or possession over those
funds, with the intention to permanently deprive PlantSnap of its
property, and Ralls’ and the Entities’ acknowledge that their actions
were willful, wanton, and malicious.15
The Judgment also purported to make findings that the conduct of Eric Ralls met
the nondischargeability standards under 11 U.S.C. § § 523(a)(2), (a)(4), (a)(6), and
(a)(19), specifically:
The Claims were based on Ralls’ and the Entities’ taking money,
property, and/or services obtained by false pretenses, false
representations, and actual fraud, and Ralls and the Entities agree
that such conduct, and the resulting Confession of Judgment, meets
the standards set forth in 11 U.S.C. §§ 523 (a)(2).
Ralls and the Entities acknowledge that the Claims, and the resulting
Confession of Judgment, are non-dischargeable by Ralls and/or the
Entities, as they relate to a debt for fraud and/or defalcation while
Ralls was acting in a fiduciary capacity, and Ralls agrees that such
conduct meets the standards set forth as outlined in 11 U.S.C. §§
523 (a)(4).
The Claims, and the resulting Confession of Judgment, are
non-dischargeable by Ralls and/or the Entities as they relate to the
15 Id. at 2.
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willful and malicious injuries caused to PlantSnap’s property, and
Ralls and the Entities agree that such conduct meets the standards set
forth as outlined in 11 U.S.C. §§ 523 (a)(6).
The Claims, and the resulting Confession of Judgment, also relate to Ralls’
and the Entities’ common law fraud, deceit, or manipulation in connection
with the sale of securities, and Ralls and the Entities agree that such conduct
meets the standards set forth as outlined in 11 U.S.C. §§ 523 (a)(19).16
On August 18, 2024, Eric Ralls initiated his second bankruptcy case, filing under
Subchapter V of Chapter 11.17 On April 21, 2025, his case was converted from Chapter
11 to Chapter 7.18 On November 22, 2024, Plaintiff initiated this adversary proceeding
seeking a nondischargeable judgment against Defendant/Debtor under 11 U.S.C. §§
523 (a)(2), (a)(4), (a)(6), and (a)(19).19 A scheduling order was entered on March 5,
2025.20 On May 30, 2025, Plaintiff timely moved for partial summary judgment seeking
to declare the consent Judgment nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523 (a)(2), (a)(4),

16 Id. at 3.
17 See In re Ralls, No. 24-60504 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2024). For context, one of Ralls’
entities involved in the Colorado bankruptcy had already filed a second bankruptcy under Subchapter V
of Chapter 11 in this Court. See In re EarthSnap, Inc., No. 24-60363 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2024). This Court
entered an order granting joint administration of the bankruptcy estates on October 17, 2024. See Ralls,
No. 24-60504, ECF No. 21 and EarthSnap, No. 24-60363, ECF No. 50.
18 No. 24-60363, ECF No. 167; see also In re EarthSnap, Inc., 670 B.R. 49 (Bankr. E.D. Tex.
2025).
19 Case No. 24-06044, ECF No. 1.
20 ECF No. 11.
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or (a)(6).21 Defendant timely responded.22 Plaintiff replied.23
III. Summary Judgment Standard

A court may grant summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catlett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)

(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)). FED. R. BANKR. P. 7056 incorporates FED. R. CIV. P. 56 so
as to apply to adversary proceedings. Thus, if summary judgment is appropriate, the
Court may resolve the case as a matter of law.
The moving party always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of

the basis for its motion and producing evidence which it believes demonstrates the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. How the necessary
summary judgment showing can be made depends upon which party will bear the burden

of proof at trial. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1076 n.16 (5th Cir. 1994).
“A fact is material only if its resolution would affect the outcome of the action.” Wiley v.
State Farm Fire and Cas, Co., 585 F.3d 206, 210 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Renwick v.
PNK Lake Charles, LLC, 901 F.3d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 2018). “All reasonable inferences

21 Mot., ECF No. 13.
22 ECF No. 15.
23 ECF No. 16.
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must be viewed in the light most favorable” to the nonmoving party, and “any doubt must
resolved in favor of the nonmoving party.” In re Louisiana Crawfish Producers, [852

F.3d 456, 462](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4378859/in-re-louisiana-crawfish-producers/#462) (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. V. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). An actual controversy of fact exists where both parties
have submitted evidence of contradictory facts. Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185
F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1999).

Courts may accept the moving party’s version of the facts as undisputed. Alvarez
v. United Parcel Serv. Co., 398 F. Supp. 2d 543, 548-49 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (overruled on
other grounds); cf. F.D.I.C. v. Foxwood Mgmt. Co., No. 92-2434, 1994 WL 24911, at *6 (5th Cir. Jan. 14, 1994) (citing cases for the proposition that courts can accept the
contents of a conclusory affidavit as true if they are unchallenged). This comports with

the notion that courts need not hunt through the record searching for a genuine issue of
material fact. See Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998);
Savers Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass’n v. Reetz, 888 F.2d 1497, 1501 (5th Cir. 1989). Once the
movant has met its burden, the nonmovant may not rest upon allegations in the pleadings

and still survive summary judgment. Triple Tee Golf, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 485 F.3d 253,
261 (5th Cir. 2007). The Court does not, “in the absence of any proof, assume that the
nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts.” Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d at
1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990)).
The nonmovant must evince more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material

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facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). If
the nonmoving party were to present these factual disputes at trial, they must be such that
a rational act finder might find in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. at 587.

IV. Discussion
Plaintiff’s Motion rests upon the application of collateral estoppel24 from the
PlantSnap Colorado case to establish the elements of nondischargeability under 11 U.S.C.
§§ 523 (a)(2)(A), (a)(4), and (a)(6).25 Plaintiff asserts that the consent Judgment

establishes conclusively that Defendant owes a nondischargeable debt.
An agreed final judgment or settlement agreement does not, on its own, however,
preclude a debtor from arguing issues of dischargeability in bankruptcy court. In re
Brass, 641 B.R. 139, 143-46 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2022) (citing Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S.
127, 133-35 (1979)); see also Carbaidwala v. Gerleman (In re Gerleman), No. 22-41821, 2024 WL 4428201, at *4 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2024); Coffman v. Deuel (In re
Deuel), No. 19-43056, 2022 WL 2240363, at *8 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. June 22, 2022).
Rather, Plaintiff must prove its claims of nondischargeability by a preponderance of the
evidence. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991). All exceptions to discharge
under 11 U.S.C. § 523 “are strictly construed against a creditor and liberally construed in

favor of a debtor so that the debtor may be afforded a fresh start.” Hudson v. Raggio

24 Collateral estoppel and issue preclusion are the same concept, and both terms are used
interchangeably.
25 Mot., at 1, ECF No. 13.
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(Matter of Hudson), 107 F.3d 355, 356 (5th Cir. 1997). This liberality is not unlimited
and this Court must balance the fresh start against protecting victims of fraud. Tummel v.
Quinlivian (In re Quinlivan), 434 F.3d 314, 318-319 (5th Cir. 2005).

Under the standards enumerated, the Court finds that the Judgment does not
establish nondischargeability and that genuine issues of material fact exist warranting trial
on the merits and denial of the Motion.
A. Collateral Estoppel

Collateral estoppel means that once “an issue of ultimate fact has been determined
by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same
parties in any future lawsuit.” Gerleman, 2024 WL 4428201, at *3 (quoting Schiro v.
Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 232 (1994)). In the bankruptcy dischargeability context, parties
may invoke collateral estoppel “in certain circumstances to bar relitigation of issues

relevant to dischargeability.” Id. (quoting Raspanti v. Keaty (In re Keaty), 397 F.3d 264,
270 (5th Cir. 2005)). While issue preclusion applies to dischargeability litigation, the
bankruptcy court retains exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a debt is
dischargeable. Id. (citing Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 284 n. 11 (1991)). For
collateral estoppel to apply in this context, the first court must have “made specific,

subordinate, factual findings on the identical dischargeability issue in question—that is,
an issue which encompasses the same prima facie elements as the bankruptcy issue.” Id. at *4 (quoting Matter of Dennis, 25 F.3d 274, 277-78 (5th Cir. 1994)).

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Because Plaintiff argues issue preclusion applies from a state court Judgment
obtained in Colorado, this Court is required to apply Colorado law concerning issue
preclusion. See In re Horne, No. 10-42625, 2012 WL 1205796, at *3 (Bankr. E.D. Tex.

Apr. 11, 2012). Under Colorado law, issue preclusion applies where:
(1) the issue sought to be precluded is identical to an issue actually
determined in the prior proceeding;
(2) the party against whom estoppel is asserted has been a party to or
is in privity with a party to the prior proceeding;
(3) there is a final judgment on the merits in the prior proceeding; and
(4) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding. Id. (citing Sunny Acres Villa, Inc. v. Cooper, 25 P.3d 44, 47 (Colo. 2001)); see also Marin
Metro. Dist. v. Colorado Bondshares, No. 24CA1092, 2025 WL 1660319, at *3 (Colo.
App. June 12, 2025), cert. denied, No. 25SC474, 2026 WL 199811 (Colo. Jan. 26, 2026).
The Plaintiff bears the burden to demonstrate that the elements of collateral estoppel are
satisfied under the record. Horne, 2012 WL 1205796 at *3 (citing Baker v. Seriki (In re

Seriki), 2012 WL 266926, at *2 (Bankr. D. Colo., Jan. 30, 2012)).
Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s consent to entry of the Judgment is sufficient
to make issue preclusion principles of Colorado law applicable because the issues are

“identical” to the elements of nondischargeability.26 However, as this Court and the Fifth
Circuit have both stated:
26 Mot. at 2, 3-18.
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[a] consent judgment does not ordinarily give rise to issue
preclusion because the issues underlying the judgment are
neither actually litigated nor necessary and essential to the
judgment. However, consent judgments will be given
preclusive effect if the parties manifest such an intention.
Howard v. Eckerd, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 3273, at *22 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2019).
(quoting Hughes v. Santa Fe Intern. Corp., 847 F.2d 239, 241 (5th Cir. 1988)).
These precedents are consistent with Colorado issue preclusion law. See In re
Huack, 489 B.R. 208, 213-14 (D. Colo. 2013), aff'd, 541 F. App’x 898 (10th Cir. 2013).27
This is also consistent with the “widely-accepted” prohibition and principle of public

policy that a debtor may not contract away the right to a discharge in bankruptcy. Eckerd, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 3273, at *15-18 (citing In re Franchise Services of N. Am., Inc., 891
F.3d 198, 207 (5th Cir. 2018)). Therefore, although provisions purporting to waive the

27 Colorado courts have not decided whether a settlement agreement and a consent decree (a
consent judgment) meets the definition of “actually determined by the adjudicatory body,” but Colorado
courts rely on The Restatement (Second) of Judgments in formulating collateral estoppel principles under
Colorado law. See Nichols v. Bd. of Cnty. Com'rs of Cnty. of La Plata, Colo., 506 F.3d 962, 968 (10th
Cir. 2007) (citing Bebo Constr. Co. v. Mattox & O'Brien, P.C., 990 P.2d 78, 84 (Colo. 1999) and Bennett
College v. United Bank of Denver, Nat'l Ass'n, 799 P.2d 364, 368 (Colo. 1990)). “The Restatement
clarifies that:
‘[i]n the case of a judgment entered by confession, consent, or default, none of the issues
is actually litigated. Therefore, the rule of this Section does not apply with respect to any
issue in a subsequent action. The judgment may be conclusive, however, with respect to
one or more issues, if the parties have entered an agreement manifesting such an
intentention.’” Id. at 968-69 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgements § 27, cmt. e (1982)).
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dischargeability of a debt are unenforceable, a sufficient stipulation of facts could support
a finding of nondischargeability.

B. Actually Litigated?
When evaluating whether issues raised in a matter resulting in the entry of a

consent judgment can be considered to have been “actually litigated” for purposes of
collateral estoppel, this Court examines the Judgment and the Settlement Agreement
together. This is because:

...[I]t is appropriate to examine the agreed judgment and the settlement
agreement together in order to determine whether the earlier resolution was
based upon the parties’ consent or upon some factual determination or
acknowledgment. If the settlement language is inconclusive, the general
rule against the application of a preclusive effect should apply.
Id. at *22 (citing Hughes, 847 F.2d at 241). Courts applying Colorado issue preclusion
law have followed a similar rationale. See Huack, 489 B.R. at 213-15; Nichols, 506 F.3d
at 968-69.
In Eckerd, the Court found a consent judgment and settlement agreement
unenforceable because that judgment and the related agreement lacked sufficient
recitation of facts regarding the Defendant’s conduct. Instead they only purported to

waive Defendant’s bankruptcy discharge or render amounts in the Eckerd agreed
judgment nondischargeable.

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... [T]he state court issued no factual determinations, nor is there any
manifestation that the parties intended for the Agreed Judgment or the
Settlement Agreement to have a preclusive effect. Absent the void
provisions, the summary judgment record documents only a compromise of
claims. Accordingly, the Court concludes that no factual issue was
“actually litigated” in the State Court Litigation and that the Agreed
Judgment should be interpreted solely as a consent judgment with no issue
preclusion ramifications.
Eckerd, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 3273, at *23-24 (citations omitted). As in Eckerd, the
Settlement Agreement and the Judgment in this case do not manifest intent that they have
preclusive effect as required for application of collateral estoppel.28
Nevertheless, the Judgment may yet be enforceable if it contains specific fact
findings on identical dischargeability issues actually litigated before the state court,
whether actual fraud, embezzlement or larceny, or willful or malicious injury. Gerleman, 2024 WL 4428201, at *4; see also In re Newman, No. 17-42515, 2019 WL 989483, at
*11 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2019).
PlantSnap’s Judgment contains no such findings. The Judgment does not appear

premised on any analysis of the substantive nondischargeability issues but rather on
Defendant’s breach of the terms of the Settlement Agreement with Plaintiff. See
Gerleman, 2024 WL 4428201, at *4. Not referencing specific facts, the Judgment
provides only conclusory statements of the elements that the claims in the Judgment are

28 See Ex. 10, 12, ECF No. 13.
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“predicated on,” “based on,” or “related to.”’’ Conclusory statements, without specific
factual findings, are not enough to establish that an identical nondischargeability issue
was actually litigated. See id.; see also In re Gonzalez, No. 6:21-AP-00157-TPG, 2023
WL 415567, at *4 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2023); In re Gawrys, No. AP 14-5006, 2015
WL 2198050, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May 8, 2015).

Accordingly, the Court finds that the summary judgment evidence, read in the light
most favorable to Defendant, is insufficient for a finding of nondischargeability under 11
U.S.C. §§ 523 (a)(2), (a)(4) and (a)(6) and summary judgment should be denied.

V. Conclusion

Based upon the Court’s consideration of the pleadings, the proper summary
judgment evidence submitted therewith, the relevant legal authorities, and for the reasons
set forth herein, the Court concludes that the “Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment” filed by Plaintiff, PlantSnap, Inc., is hereby DENIED. Plaintiff failed to
demonstrate entitlement to judgment as a matter of law regarding dischargeability raised
under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523 (a)(2)(A), (a)(4), and (a)(6). An appropriate order consistent with
this opinion shall be entered by the Court.
Signed on 4/10/2026

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
Ex. 12, at 2-3, ECF No. 13.
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