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March 18, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Daniel Julio Dominguez v. State of Florida

District Court of Appeal of Florida

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1D2024-1250

• Disposition: Affirmed

• Opinion

• Authorities (12)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (3.5K)

• PDF

Disposition

Affirmed

Combined Opinion

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D2024-1250

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DANIEL JULIO DOMINGUEZ,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County.
Peter K. Sieg, Judge.

March 18, 2026

ROWE, J.

Daniel Julio Dominguez filmed a video of himself holding
what appeared to be an AR-15 style rifle and a handgun, while
making statements about targeting a nearby middle school. He
then posted the video to social media and to his personal website.
After a viewer reported the video to police, Dominguez was charged
with making a written or electronic threat to kill, do bodily injury,
or conduct a mass shooting or act of terrorism. After a jury trial,
Dominguez was convicted and sentenced on those charges. He now
argues that the trial court reversibly erred when it (1) denied his
motion for judgment of acquittal, (2) limited his questioning of the
jury panel, and (3) failed to instruct the jury on the specific violent
crime Dominguez threatened to commit. We affirm and write only
to address the ruling on the motion for judgment of acquittal.
I.

On October 19, 2023, Dominguez posted an approximately
four-minute video titled “Suicide Note #1” to his public Instagram
account and to his personal website. The video depicted
Dominguez sitting on the floor with what appears to be an AR-15
style rifle on one side of him and a handgun on the other.
Dominguez made the following statement on the video:

Hello there. My name is Daniel. I’m 31. I was born in
North Central Florida. And I have been an American
citizen my whole life. In my time here I have watched as
other people have a tremendous amount more
opportunities than me not based on their merit, but just
based off of the distribution of resources or their status,
wealth, that kind of thing.

I’ve done my best to play the game. And despite
having a significant amount of my childhood stolen from,
despite having my mother being chronically underpaid
and overworked, despite the fact that I’ve been told my
whole life that I am smart and special and capable and
I’m going to go on to do great things, America has only
insisted that I struggle.

When I was 27 and I did finally achieve middle class
status and became a professional, my starting salary was
equal to that of my mother’s who has been working her
whole life. I was also in the professional sphere with
$64,000 in student debt. My mother’s an immigrant, a
refugee from another country who put herself through
school and who lived under student debt and whose
student debt I lived under.

And so given that the conditions are so bad and that
the conditions even for social reproduction aren’t really
there, I’ve decided that my mind is better applied to doing
something useful than it is being a tool for the State and
an unhappy and atomized and lonely tool of them.

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I’ve decided to take up arms and attack [the] State. I
intend to target a middle school, particularly the middle
school I went to. It’s just right down the street there and
it’s convenient. I know the layout. I will be going on a
Saturday or a Sunday when no children are there. And
will m—with the intention of getting off as many NATO
5.56 rounds from my AR-l5 at the building. I will start by
shooting at the concrete walls that—that flank the
building and then I’ll finish by taking out the windowed
front office area.

I hope and expect the police to arrive on scene and to
shoot me at this point. However, should that I am able to
get off all the rounds from my rifle, I will not point the
rifle at the police because I have no intention of harming
anyone. But I do have this fake BB pistol Beretta that I
intend to point at them to provoke them to hopefully kill
me and send me to Valhalla or whatever.

What is there to say? This is the—product of what
this country is creating. The messages tell me that I feel
this way and that I should attack my brother. I hear that
loud and clear. However, I refuse. I acknowledge that the
enemy here is laid squarely at how wealth is distributed
and allocated within society and how that affects our lives
until the day we die. And so I’m a very real version of
that.

Thank you for listening. Life’s tough. Good luck to all
of you out there. I’m wishing you many moments of love,
rest, and laughter in the coming years. Bye.

Dominguez included the following disclaimer, which appeared
to the right of him on the video when viewed on a computer and
beneath him when viewed on a smartphone:

THIS IS AN ART PIECE. A WORK OF FICTION. I AM
NOT SUICIDAL, NOR AM I CONSIDERING ANY
ILLEGAL ACTIVITY. NEITHER AM I MAKING
THREATS. ART, THIS IS ART, IT FEELS STRONGLY

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BECAUSE THAT IS THE INTENTION. IT IS CLEARLY
INDICATED AT THE CLOSE.

So I like writing love letters, but then it occurred to
me that I should also like to write suicide notes. I,
personally, am not suicidal, but suicide notes are
powerful and honest and beautiful and sad and all those
interesting things. I like the video format, and while this
is just the first one, I hope to make more with different
scripting, edits, and reasons. Something about the
absurdity and resolve of people in this format is beautiful
and terrifying. It’s plenty of grist for the mind mill.

Anyway, I’m fine, everyone and everything is safe
and sound! Please don’t call the police or report my
account. I would like to enjoy my freedom of movement,
and to not go to jail for art. The video is also hosted on my
site, jic [just in case].

Sherri Estes, the principal of Kanapaha Middle School, saw
the Instagram post. She concluded that the school described in the
video was Kanapaha, and then immediately contacted the police.
Dominguez, who lived just down the street from Kanapaha, was
arrested and charged under section 836.10, Florida Statutes
(2023), with making a written or electronic threat to kill, do bodily
injury, or conduct a mass shooting or act of terrorism. Dominguez
rejected a plea offer, and the case went to trial.

At trial, Estes testified that she saw Dominguez’s video the
night it was posted. Based on the description of the school and the
front office area, she believed that Dominguez was talking about
her school. She later learned that Dominguez was a former
student. Estes explained that over one thousand students attended
Kanapaha. The campus was open to the public on the weekends,
and some buildings were rented out each weekend. On the
weekend after Dominguez made the video, the school was reserved
for a children’s sports group.

The State then presented testimony on Dominguez’s unusual
encounter with law enforcement a few months before he posted the
video and shortly after he bought the semi-automatic rifle

4
displayed in the video. Detective Summer Harrison testified that
Dominguez was riding a moped when he flagged her down. He told
her that he “wanted to let [the Detective] know that he’d just
bought an AR.” He provided Harrison with the model number of
the rifle and told her where he bought it. He made a point to tell
her that the rifle was not on his person and that he did not plan to
bring it to his workplace at a nearby university.

After his arrest, Dominguez told police that the rifle was at
his father’s home. Police searched that home and found a Ruger
AR-556 semi-automatic rifle and a replica Baretta handgun—the
guns depicted in the video. The police also found a fully functioning
Glock 43 handgun, ammunition, and a rifle scope.

Investigators recovered text messages from Dominguez’s cell
phone. The texts showed that Dominguez knew that his video
would cause problems. He told one friend, “Instagram is not going
to like my latest video,” and he said that his account might get
“nuked.”

Dominguez also maintained a personal webpage. There,
Dominguez advised others that a disclaimer should be placed
before or after writings to avoid any future legal issues. He advised
visitors to his webpage:

I use the following disclaimer so that fiction stays
fiction and doesn’t become evidence.

This is adult content for 13+ audience. I am not a
writer. This is a work of fiction. Names, characters,
business, events and incidents are the product of
imagination. Any resemblance to actual persons living or
dead or actual events is coincidental.

At the close of the State’s case, defense counsel moved for
judgment of acquittal. Defense counsel argued that the State failed
to show that Dominguez made a threat or that he intended any
threat he made to be a true threat. The jury found Dominguez
guilty as charged, and the court sentenced him to three years in
prison followed by ten years of probation. This timely appeal
follows.

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II.

Dominguez argues that the trial court erred when it denied
his motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was not
sufficient to show that he intended to commit violence against
another person, conduct a mass shooting, or conduct an act of
terrorism. He also argues that any threat made in the video was
not intended as a true threat.

Our review is de novo, and we will affirm the trial court’s
ruling if it is supported by competent, substantial evidence.
Johnson v. State, 238 So. 3d 726, 739 (Fla. 2018). Before a trial
court may grant a judgment of acquittal, “the evidence presented
by the State must have been so wanting ‘that no view which the
jury may lawfully take of it favorable to the opposite party can be
sustained under the law.’” Fogarty v. State, 403 So. 3d 1026, 1031
(Fla. 1st DCA 2024) (quoting Lynch v. State, 293 So. 2d 44, 45 (Fla.
1974)). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
State and consider whether the trier of fact could find the elements
of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. McInnis v.
State, 408 So. 3d 882, 886 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).

The State charged Dominguez, under section 836.10(2),
Florida Statutes, with making a written or electronic threat to kill,
do bodily injury, or conduct a mass shooting or act of terrorism. To
prove the offense, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt these four elements:

1. Dominguez made a threat to kill or do bodily harm to another person or conduct a mass shooting or conduct an act of terrorism in a writing or other record;
2. Dominguez sent, posted, or transmitted that writing or other record;
3. Dominguez did so in a manner in which it may be viewed by another person; and
4. Dominguez intended the threat to be a true threat.

§ 836.10(2), Fla. Stat.; Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 8.22.

Dominguez argued below that the State failed to prove the
first and fourth elements. His focus in the trial court and on appeal

6
is that his disclaimers—that he would not hurt anyone and that
the video was art—show that he did not (1) make a threat to harm
anyone or to conduct a mass shooting or an act of terrorism; and
(2) intend any threat made in the video as a true threat.

A.

As to the first element, the State had to prove that Dominguez
made a threat in writing or other record to do one of three things:
(1) kill or do bodily harm to another person; (2) conduct a mass
shooting; or (3) conduct an act of terrorism. § 836.10(2), Fla. Stat.
The State argued that Dominguez’s posting of the video to social
media qualified as a threat to conduct an act of terrorism.
Dominguez countered that he did not make a threat, pointing to
the disclaimers and his statements that he did not plan to harm
anyone other than himself. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State, there was sufficient evidence from which a
rational jury could conclude that Dominguez threatened to conduct
an act of terrorism.

Terrorism has two elements: (1) “a violent act or an act
dangerous to human life which is a violation of the criminal laws
of this state or of the United States,” and (2) “is intended to
intimidate, injure, or coerce a civilian population; influence the
policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or affect the
conduct of government through destruction of property,
assassination, murder, kidnapping, or aircraft piracy.” § 775.30(1),
Fla. Stat. (2023) (quotation modified); Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.)
8.22.

There is no dispute that there was sufficient evidence to
establish the first element of terrorism. Firing multiple rounds—
as many as Dominguez “could”—from a semi-automatic rifle into a
school building is violent and dangerous to human life. And doing
so is clearly illegal, even when the building is unoccupied. See
790.19, Fla. Stat. (prohibiting a person from shooting into a public
building regardless of whether the building is occupied). As to the
second element, Dominguez declared in the video that he would
“take up arms and attack the State.” He also threatened to destroy
school property by shooting at the concrete walls around the
building and “taking out the windowed front office area.”

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Dominguez complained about “how wealth is distributed and
allocated within society and how that affects our lives until the day
we die.” Taking reasonable inferences in favor of the State, this
and other statements Dominguez made in the video, along with his
display of a fully operational semi-automatic rifle, directed toward
a real, nearby school, demonstrated that Dominguez made a threat
to conduct an act of terrorism.

B.

Turning to the fourth element of the charged offense,
Dominguez argued below that the State failed to show that he
intended the video to be a true threat, pointing to the disclaimer
asserting that the video was a work of fiction.

Section 836.10 requires that the defendant intended the
threat to be a true threat. To prove this element of the offense, the
State must prove two things. First, there must be a true threat.
Second, the defendant must have intended to make a true threat.
We address both requirements in turn.

First, we address the true threat requirement of the statute.
The government is generally prohibited from restricting speech
based on “its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”
Romero v. State, 314 So. 3d 699, 703 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (quoting
Ashcroft v. Am. C.L. Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002)). Even so, the
government may ban speech when it communicates a “true threat.”
Id. (citing Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003)). “True
threats” have been described as “those statements where the
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent
to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or
group of individuals.” Black, 538 U.S. at 359; see also Fla. Std.
Jury. Instr. (Crim.) 8.22 (“A true threat is a serious expression of
an intent to commit an act of violence.”).

“[P]roof of scienter is necessary to guard against the
impermissible regulation of the lawful exercise of constitutionally
protected speech.” Romero, 314 So. 3d at 705. Otherwise, “remarks
made in jest or mere puffery, political hyperbole, or involuntary
communications could conceivably subject an accused to
prosecution.” Id. The Supreme Court has explained the difference

8
between a “true threat” and constitutionally protected expression
such as jests or hyperbole:

The “true” in that term distinguishes what is at issue
from jests, “hyperbole,” or other statements that when
taken in context do not convey a real possibility that
violence will follow (say, “I am going to kill you for
showing up late”). True threats are “serious
expression[s]” conveying that a speaker means to
“commit an act of unlawful violence.”

Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66, 74 (2023) (citations omitted).

To support a conviction under section 836.10, along with
showing that the defendant made a true threat, the State must
show that the defendant intended that the threat be a true threat.
§ 836.10(1), Fla. Stat. In considering the latter showing, Florida’s
district courts have reached different conclusions on whether
section 836.10 includes a mens rea element. Compare Saidi v.
State, 845 So. 2d 1022, 1027 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (holding that
section 836.10 did not require “the actual intent to do harm or the
ability to carry out the threat”), with T.R.W. v. State, 363 So. 3d
1081, 1085 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023) (holding that section 836.10 does
include a mens rea element); N.D. v. State, 315 So. 3d 102, 105
(Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (same); Smith v. State, 532 So. 2d 50, 52 (Fla.
2d DCA 1988) (same).

The United States Supreme Court has held that to support a
conviction for making a true threat, the government must
establish the mens rea of the defendant. Counterman, 600 U.S. 66
at 75. In Counterman, the Court reviewed a criminal conviction
under Colorado’s true-threat statute. Id. at 70. Counterman sent
hundreds of Facebook messages to C.W. suggesting that he may be
surveilling her, expressing anger, and envisaging harm befalling
her. Id. The Court considered what proof of intent was required
under the Colorado statute, asking whether “the First Amendment
. . . demands that the State in a true-threats case prove that the
defendant was aware in some way of the threatening nature of his
communications.” Id. at 72. The Court described a true threat as
an “historically unprotected category of communications.” Id. at 74
(quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003)). Despite their

9
unprotected status, the Court reasoned that “the First
Amendment may still demand a subjective mental-state
requirement shielding some true threats from liability.” Id. at 75.
To avoid chilling protected speech, the Court held that a subjective
element is required to support a conviction in a true-threats case.
Id. at 77. The Court went on to discuss the law of mens rea and to
consider which level of intent should apply in a true-threats case:
a conscious desire for a result, knowledge, or recklessness. Id. at
78–79. After considering the standard applied for other permitted
restrictions on the content of speech (laws regarding incitement,
defamation, and obscenity), the Court held that the recklessness
standard applies. “In the threats context, it means that a speaker
is aware that others could regard his statements as threatening
violence and delivers them anyway.” Id. at 79 (citation modified)
(quoting Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723, 746 (2015) (Alito,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).

Several district courts of appeal have considered whether
Florida’s true-threat statute similarly includes a mens rea
element. The Fourth District held that it does. See T.R.W., 363
So. 3d at 1084–85. That court considered several appellate court
decisions interpreting an earlier version of section 836.10. Id. at
1084. But that version of the statute lacked the requirement that
the defendant intended to make a true threat. Id. District courts
construing the earlier version of the statute evaluated whether the
defendant made a true threat based on how the defendant’s
statement impacted the recipient of the alleged threat. Id. at 1084
(citing Smith v. State, 532 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), and Puy
v. State, 294 So. 3d 930, 933 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020)). But turning to
the text of the current version of the statute—which expressly
requires an element of intent—the Fourth District reasoned that
“a mens rea element must be read into section 836.10.” T.R.W., 363
So. 3d at 1088. The Fourth District then held that to support a
conviction under the current version of the statute, “[a] defendant
must have intended to make a true threat, namely that he made a
communication with the knowledge that it will be viewed as a
threat.” Id.

Here, the parties both argued at a pretrial hearing that
section 836.10 included a mens rea element. There was no
argument below that the recklessness standard discussed in

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Counterman should apply. And despite their agreement that the
statute includes a mens rea element, the parties never addressed
below the required standard for establishing the defendant’s state
of mind. See U.S. v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403–04 (1980) (explaining
the movement away from the common law dichotomy of intent to
“an alternative analysis of mens rea” that replaces “intent” with a
hierarchy of states of mind in descending order of culpability:
purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence).

On appeal, Dominguez points out that neither party argued
below whether the recklessness standard discussed in Counterman
should be used to establish the intent required under section
836.10. And Dominguez presents no argument on which standard
should apply—specific intent, general intent, or recklessness.

Based on the arguments of the parties below and the issues
raised by Dominguez on appeal, we need not address whether the
statute includes a mens rea element or if it does, what level of
culpability must be proven as to the defendant’s intent. See
Tillman v. State, 471 So. 2d 32, 35 (Fla. 1985) (“In order to be
preserved for further review by a higher court, an issue must be
presented to the lower court and the specific legal argument or
ground to be argued on appeal or review must be part of that
presentation if it is to be considered preserved.”); see also I.R. v.
State, 395 So. 3d 567, 570 (Fla. 6th DCA 2024) (declining on
preservation grounds to address whether section 836.10 requires
specific intent or general intent).

But whatever level of culpability may be required for the State
to prove whether the defendant intended to make a true threat,
the question of intent is for the jury and not a matter for judgment
of acquittal. See King v. State, 286 So. 3d 850, 856 (Fla. 1st DCA
2019) (explaining that a motion for judgment of acquittal is rarely
granted on the issue of intent); N.H. v. State, 358 So. 3d 477, 483
(Fla. 5th DCA 2023) (“[D]etermining the defendant’s intent is a
question reserved for the trier of fact.”). Rarely can the State
establish intent with direct evidence; the jury must consider the
surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence. See Mooney v.
State, 403 So. 3d 407, 411 (Fla. 1st DCA 2025) (holding that
circumstantial evidence can prove intent); Toole v. State, 456 So.
2d 1268, 1269 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (holding that intent is often

11
proven through circumstantial evidence). If the jury could
reasonably infer from the evidence presented at trial that
Dominguez intended his threat to be a true threat, the trial court
did not err when it denied the motion for judgment of acquittal and
allowed the jury to determine whether Dominguez had the
requisite intent.

We hold that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for
the jury to reasonably infer that Dominguez intended the
statements in the video to be a true threat. He chose to select and
identify in the video a real-world, plausible, and proximate target.
He stated, “I intend to target a middle school, particularly the
middle school I went to, just down the street.” Dominguez then
conveyed his desire “to take up arms and attack the State.” And he
described his plan of attack, including the time and precise
location. He stated that he knew “the layout” and that he would be
“going on a Saturday or a Sunday” with “the intention of getting
as many [ ] rounds from my AR at the building.” He would start by
“shooting at the concrete walls that flank the building” and then
he would “finish by taking out the windowed front office area.”
Dominguez hoped the police would arrive on the scene so he could
point his fake Baretta at the police “to provoke them to kill [him]
and send [him] to hell.” The video was referenced with tags
including “AR15,” “schoolshooter,” and “suicide.” Throughout the
video, titled “Suicide Note 1,” Dominguez conspicuously
displayed—not a fake gun—but a fully operable semi-automatic
rifle that he had recently purchased.

Dominguez does not dispute that he made these statements
in the video. But he maintains that his disclaimers show that he
lacked the intent required to make a true threat. But mere
disclaimers will not shield a person from prosecution. See Helms v.
State, 38 So. 3d 182, 184–86 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). In Helms, this
court considered whether a disclaimer made by a defendant in a
prosecution for prostitution negated intent. Id. Helms was charged
with deriving support from the proceeds of prostitution and
transporting another individual for the purposes of prostitution.
Id. at 183. Advertisements for Helms’ escort service depicted
scantily clad women stating that “[m]oney exchanged is for time,
companionship, and legal services such as nude modeling, erotic
dancing, []body rub[.]”, etc.” Id. But Helms included a disclaimer

12
stating that, “Anything else that may occur is between two
consenting adults and has not been promised or contracted for!” Id.
After he was convicted of prostitution, Helms argued that the State
failed to prove that he knew or had reasonable cause to believe that
prostitution would occur. Id. at 184. He argued that the disclaimer
proved he lacked the requisite intent to commit prostitution and
that the trial court should have granted his motion for judgment
of acquittal. This court rejected Helms’ argument because the jury
was not required to accept the disclaimer at face value. Id. at 185.
Instead, the court explained that the jury could have relied on the
disclaimer as proof that the escort service’s primary purpose was
prostitution or designed to be a defense if the defendant was ever
arrested. Id. If a defendant could rely on a disclaimer to rebut any
claim of intent as a matter of law, then “any defendant, by
planning ahead, could avoid a conviction for any crime requiring
proof of a certain state of mind.” Id. at 186.

As in Helms, the jury here could have viewed the disclaimers
Dominguez made in the video as a veiled attempt to hide his true
motives—to target his former middle school and then die at the
hands of a police officer. Moreover, the evidence that Dominquez
previously advised others through his webpage to use disclaimers
to avoid their writings becoming evidence also supports the
conclusion that the disclaimer on the video was no more than an
effort to avoid prosecution.

Dominguez’s conduct and statements before he recorded the
video also undermine his disclaimers. After buying the rifle
depicted in the video, he had an unusual encounter with a
detective where he flagged her down and told her he bought the
rifle. Dominguez’s text messages with friends showed that they
were concerned about his purchase of the rifle. Dominguez even
characterized their response: “everyone lost their minds.” And
after he recorded the video, but before he was taken into custody,
Dominguez sent a text message, “Instagram is not going to like my
latest video.”

The central question in this case was whether Dominguez
intended the threat he made in the video to be a true threat.
Although there was evidence to support the defense’s theory, there
was legally sufficient evidence to support the State’s argument and

13
for the jury to reasonably infer that Dominguez intended to make
a true threat. Thus, the question was one for the jury to decide.
And the trial court did not err when it denied the motion for
judgment of acquittal. The judgment and sentence are AFFIRMED.

M.K. THOMAS, J., concurs; KELSEY, J., concurs in result.

---

Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.

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Robert Ralph Berry, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Julian Markham,
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

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