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March 12, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Hannaweeke

New Mexico Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: Unknown

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (4)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Combined Opinion

This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in
the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the
citation of unpublished decisions. Electronic decisions may contain computer-
generated errors or other deviations from the official version filed by the Court of
Appeals.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-43196

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

GILBERT HANNAWEEKE,

Defendant-Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF MCKINLEY COUNTY
Bradley L. Keeler, District Court Judge

Raúl Torrez, Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
Michael J. Thomas, Assistant Solicitor General
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellant

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellee

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MEDINA, Chief Judge.

{1} This matter was submitted to the Court on the brief in chief pursuant to the
Administrative Order for Appeals in Criminal Cases from the Second, Eleventh, and
Twelfth Judicial District Courts in In re Pilot Project for Criminal Appeals, No. 2022-002,
effective November 1, 2022. Having considered the brief in chief, concluding the briefing
submitted to the Court provides no possibility for reversal, and determining that this
case is appropriate for resolution on Track 1 as defined in that order, we affirm for the
following reasons.
{2} The State appeals from the district court’s order that suppressed all evidence
obtained as a result of Defendant’s arrest without probable cause. [BIC 1] We observe
that the State’s challenge to the district court’s authority to address the suppression
motion focuses on an interpretation of our Rules of Criminal Procedure, which raises “a
question of law that we review de novo.” See State v. Ruiz, 2025-NMCA-031, ¶ 9, 577
P.3d 232. Our review of the substance of the district court’s suppression order presents
a mixed question of fact and law whereby this Court reviews factual matters with
deference to the district court’s findings if substantial evidence exists to support them,
and it reviews the district court’s application of the law de novo. See State v. Williams,
2011-NMSC-026, ¶ 8, 149 N.M. 729, 255 P.3d 307.

{3} We begin with the State’s challenge to the district court’s authority to consider the
suppression motion. The State asserts that, in hearing Defendant’s motion to suppress
evidence, the district court erroneously “revisited” the magistrate court’s determination
that there was sufficient evidence presented at the preliminary hearing to establish
probable cause to bind over the criminal charges. [BIC 7-13] In support of this
contention, the State relies on State v. Ayon, 2023-NMSC-025, 538 P.3d 66, and State
v. Ruiz, 2025-NMCA-031, 577 P.3d 232. [Id.] As the State correctly explains in its brief
in chief, see Ruiz, 2025-NMCA-031, ¶ 1, 7, 13-15, it is established that “a district court,
as a matter of law, does not have authority to review a magistrate court’s prior finding of
probable cause at a preliminary examination hearing, just as a district court cannot
review a probable cause finding made by a grand jury.” [BIC 8] The State continues,
arguing that this conclusion in Ruiz was a natural progression from that of Ayon, 2023-
NMSC-025, ¶¶ 1-2, 15-18, where our Supreme Court concluded that “a district court at
a preliminary hearing is without authority to determine that evidence was unlawfully
obtained, and is therefore without authority to exclude such evidence at such a hearing.”
[BIC 8] As a result, the State contends, the district court was similarly restricted from
considering Defendant’s suppression motion. [Id.]

{4} While the State is correct about the general holdings from Ayon and Ruiz, it errs
in its application of this precedent to the district court’s order on Defendant’s
suppression motion. The argument by the State appears to erroneously conflate the
probable cause showing that a law enforcement officer must establish to justify a lawful
arrest and the probable cause showing that a prosecutor must establish to justify a bind
over of felony charges to a district court. Compare N.M. Const. art. II, § 10 and State v.
Ochoa, 2004-NMSC-023, ¶ 9, 135 N.M. 781, 93 P.3d 1286 (explaining that under the
probable cause requirement for a lawful arrest, a law enforcement officer must establish
“facts and circumstances [that] warrant a belief that the accused had committed an
offense, or is committing an offense”), with N.M. Const. art. II, § 14 and Ayon, 2023-
NMSC-025, ¶ 16 (explaining that the probable cause requirement for a bind over of
felony charges is based on the concept that “[a] defendant in New Mexico cannot be
made to answer for a serious criminal offense unless there has first been a
determination of probable cause by a grand jury or a judge at a preliminary hearing”).

{5} We observe that our Supreme Court in Ayon directly addressed whether its
conclusion barring a district court from considering suppression issues at a preliminary
hearing could affect a later suppression challenge. In addressing the dissent’s
concerns, our Supreme Court noted that its majority opinion “simply reserves any
question regarding the legality by which the evidence was obtained for a later date than
the preliminary hearing when the matter can be carefully considered.” Ayon, 2023-
NMSC-025, ¶ 33. Our Supreme Court further explained that “[d]efendants have an
existing pretrial mechanism to vindicate their right to be free from unconstitutional
searches and seizures: a motion to suppress. Today’s ruling does nothing to diminish
this remedy.” Id. ¶ 34 (citation omitted). “The better path is for [suppression] issues to
receive a full, fair, and focused suppression hearing, with the benefit of briefing,
sufficient time, and a fully developed record.” Id. ¶ 39. Therefore, because the district
court properly considered the admissibility of the seized evidence, rather than
reconsider the sufficiency of evidence presented at the preliminary hearing, at the
suppression hearing, we find no error by the district court.

{6} The State further challenges the district court’s application of State v. Cotton,
2011-NMCA-096, 150 N.M. 583, 263 P.3d 925. [BIC 9-11] Specifically, the State
contends that the district court’s reliance on the case was misplaced because the
evidence against Defendant was stronger than that of the defendant in Cotton, because
“Defendant assertedly told the officer that he drank alcohol and then drove to the
location at which he was found.” [BIC 9-10] Additionally, the State challenges the district
court’s conclusion that the totality of the circumstances failed to establish probable
cause to arrest Defendant. [BIC 11-12] We are unpersuaded by the State’s arguments.

{7} The district court’s conclusion turned on whether the State established that at the
time of Defendant’s arrest there was probable cause that Defendant operated a motor
vehicle while impaired by alcohol. [RP 97] Evidence was presented including
Defendant’s purported statement that he drank alcohol prior to driving to the location,
that the vehicle had remained stationary for at least an hour, and the empty alcohol
containers were located inside the vehicle. [RP 96] The district court also acknowledged
a lack of evidence regarding Defendant’s driving prior to stopping. [Id.] The totality of
these circumstances raised a legitimate question of whether the State established
probable cause that Defendant drove his vehicle while impaired by alcohol or if the
impairment, if any, occurred after he had stopped driving. [Id.] As a result, the district
court concluded that the “lack of overlap of driving and impairment” established only an
impermissible speculation of driving while impaired that was insufficient pursuant to
Cotton, 2011-NMCA-096, ¶¶ 14-15. [RP 97] In other words, “[t]he State . . . failed to
establish that Defendant drove after he had consumed alcohol and after alcohol
impaired his ability to drive to the slightest degree,” see id. ¶ 14, just as the State failed
to prove in Cotton, notwithstanding Defendant’s purported admission.

{8} We are similarly unpersuaded by the State’s related challenge to the applicability
of Cotton because this Court in Cotton addressed the sufficiency of evidence presented
in support of a DWI conviction following trial, whereas the district court applied Cotton in
addressing Defendant’s probable cause challenge. [BIC 10-11] As we explained earlier,
a probable cause determination for a lawful arrest requires a law enforcement officer to
establish “facts and circumstances [that] warrant a belief that the accused had
committed an offense, or is committing an offense.” Ochoa, 2004-NMSC-023, ¶ 9. Thus,
the conclusion from Cotton, 2011-NMCA-096, ¶¶ 14-15, that evidence is insufficient to
establish the requisite connection between driving and impairment when it relies on
impermissible speculation, is directly relevant to whether the State established probable
cause that Defendant had committed DWI. [RP 97] As a result, we find no error in the
district court’s reliance on Cotton, nor in its conclusion that the totality of the
circumstances failed to establish probable cause to arrest Defendant for DWI.

{9} Lastly, we briefly address the State’s succinct contention that the district court
erred in the scope of its suppression order in suppressing “all” of the deputy’s
observations including those prior to Defendant’s unlawful arrest. [BIC 11 n.5] The
record does not support this contention. The district court’s order contained language
that properly limited the suppression to “all evidence obtained as a result of the arrest of
[Defendant] . . . including but not limited to, all of [the deputy’s] observations of
[Defendant], any statements made by [Defendant] after the arrest, and the breathalyzer
results.” [RP 97] We conclude that this language properly delineates the suppression of
all evidence that had been improperly obtained. See Rule 5-212 (A)-(B) NMRA
(explaining that “[a] person aggrieved by a search and seizure may move for the return
of the property and to suppress its use as evidence” and “[a] person aggrieved by a
confession, admission or other evidence may move to suppress such evidence”).

{10} For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s order suppressing all evidence
obtained as a result of Defendant’s arrest for DWI without probable cause.

{11} IT IS SO ORDERED.

JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Chief Judge

WE CONCUR:

SHAMMARA H. HENDERSON, Judge

KATHERINE A. WRAY, Judge