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March 18, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Commonwealth v. Donald Williams.

Massachusetts Appeals Court

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25-P-0201

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (16)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-201

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

DONALD WILLIAMS.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, Donald Williams, appeals from an order

denying his motion for a new trial. The defendant asserts that

the motion judge erred in concluding that (1) the conditions on

court room entry did not amount to a closure of the court room,

and thus did not constitute a structural error; (2) the trial

judge properly determined that the defendant had not established

a prima facie case of discrimination in the prosecution's use of

peremptory challenges; and (3) "newly available evidence"

submitted by the defendant did not warrant a new trial. For the

reasons herein, we affirm.

1. Background. On December 18, 2008, the defendant was

indicted for assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon
causing serious bodily injury, in violation of G. L. c. 265,

§ 15A (c) (i); armed assault with intent to murder, in violation

of G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b); unlawful possession of ammunition, in

violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h) (1); carrying a firearm

without a license (second offense), in violation of G. L.

c. 269, § 10 (a) & (d); and unlawful possession of a loaded

firearm, in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n). Trial

commenced on April 1, 2011.

a. Conditions of court room entry. On the first day of

trial, the prosecutor requested that a court officer be placed

outside the court room to check entrants' identification, and to

sign in entrants as they entered the court room, citing concerns

about witness intimidation. Defense counsel objected on grounds

that such conditions would violate the defendant's right to a

public trial, and furthermore, that the conditions might lead to

the defendant's family members being excluded from the court

room if they could not produce identification. After

considering defense counsel's objection, the trial judge granted

the Commonwealth's request, noting,

"Based on the history of this case, based on what I find to
be egregious witness intimidation, I'm going to grant the
Commonwealth's request. The defendant has made affirmative
steps to reach out to people on the other side to
intimidate witnesses, and I’m not going to have that in my
courtroom.

"To the extent that there's a family member or someone who
doesn't have a picture ID, I'd ask that defense counsel

2
personally identify that person to the court officer . . .
"And then we'll allow them in. . . . If the court is open,
and if you're saying this issue regarding the possession of
[a] picture ID is a problem, I'll address it and people
will be allowed in with the representation by defense
counsel that this person is who this person is."

b. Jury selection. During jury empanelment, the

prosecutor used a peremptory challenge on juror 196. Defense

counsel objected on the grounds that juror 196 was "the second

Black female the Commonwealth ha[d] challenged." The following

exchange ensued:

THE JUDGE: "I don't find any pattern that would raise a
concern. There have been other African-Americans or people
of color selected to be on the jury."

DEFENSE COUNSEL: "I don't think that the test is whether or
not there are other black jurors that were seated . . .
it's whether the Commonwealth's challenges in and of
themselves are race-based."

THE JUDGE: "I'm aware of the legal standard . . . and I
know that one person can be a pattern, but I don't detect
any pattern whatsoever. The last juror that was chosen was
a black female. I don't find there to be any pattern."

DEFENSE COUNSEL: "Just note my objection."

c. Trial, conviction, and postconviction motions. At

trial, the Commonwealth offered evidence to show that the

defendant shot T.S., a fellow member of the gang to which the

defendant belonged. The Commonwealth presented T.S.'s testimony

recounting the events leading up to the shooting, the shooting

itself (where T.S. identified the defendant as the shooter), and

the events after the shooting where T.S. once again identified

3
the defendant as the shooter. The defendant, in turn, offered

evidence that undermined T.S.'s testimony regarding the events

that occurred before the shooting.

Ultimately, the jury convicted the defendant on all counts. 1

The defendant appealed from his convictions, whereupon a panel

of this court affirmed the judgments in Commonwealth v.

Williams, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 1135 (2014). Further appellate

review was subsequently denied, 468 Mass. 1102 (2014).

In February of 2023, the defendant filed a motion for a new

trial wherein he argued, for the first time, that structural

error arose from the prosecution's peremptory challenges, and

from the judge's conditions on court room entry. After a

nonevidentiary hearing, a Superior Court judge denied the

defendant's motion for a new trial. The defendant appeals.

1. Discussion. a. Standard of review. Pursuant to Mass.

R. Crim. P. 30, as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), a judge

may grant a new trial "if it appears that justice may not have

been done." We review the denial of a motion for a new trial to

determine whether there has been a significant error of law or

other abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Benson, 453 Mass.

90, 99 (2009). "Where, as here, the motion judge was not the

1 The unlawful possession of ammunition charge as well as
the subsequent offense portion of the forth charge were
dismissed following trial at the request of the Commonwealth.

4
trial judge and the motion judge did not make credibility

determinations arising from an evidentiary hearing, we consider

ourselves in as good a position as the motion judge to review

the trial record" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Vaughn,

471 Mass. 398, 404 (2015). "Motions for a new trial are granted

only in extraordinary circumstances." Commonwealth v. Comita,

441 Mass. 86, 93 (2004).

b. Peremptory challenge. "The use of peremptory

challenges to exclude potential jurors solely because of their

race is prohibited by the equal protection clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution."

Commonwealth v. Grier, 490 Mass. 455, 458 (2022), citing Batson

v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). "Article 12 of the

Massachusetts Declaration of Rights similarly proscribes the

'use of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors

solely by virtue of their membership in, or affiliation with,

particular, defined groupings in the community.'" Grier, supra,

quoting Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 486 (1979).

When a party challenges the constitutionality of a

peremptory strike, they "must rebut the presumption that the

strike is constitutionally proper by making out a prima facie

case that the purpose for the strike is discriminatory." Grier,

490 Mass. at 458. "If the judge finds that a prima facie case

of discrimination has been established, the burden shifts to the

5
party seeking to exercise the peremptory strike to provide a

group-neutral explanation for the challenged strike." Id.

Here, defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's use of a

peremptory challenge to strike juror 196, a Black woman.

Defense counsel argued that the Commonwealth had also struck

juror 138, a Black woman, making juror 196 the second Black

woman for which the Commonwealth had used a peremptory

challenge. In response to the objection, the trial judge stated

that he found no "pattern" of discrimination and did not require

the prosecutor to state a non-discriminatory reason for the

challenge. We review the trial judge's determination for abuse

of discretion, and when doing so, "we do not ask 'whether the

judge was permitted to find that the presumption [of

constitutional propriety] had been rebutted,' but rather

'whether [the judge] was required to have so found'" (emphasis

omitted). Grier, 490 Mass. at 459, quoting Commonwealth v.

Issa, 466 Mass. 1, 10 (2013).

In assessing whether a party has established a prima facie

case for discrimination, the judge should consider "the totality

of relevant facts," guided by the following factors:

"(1) the number and percentage of group members who have
been excluded; (2) the possibility of an objective group-
neutral explanation for the strike or strikes; (3) any
similarities between excluded jurors and those, not members
of the allegedly targeted group, who have been struck; (4)
differences among the various members of the allegedly
targeted group who were struck; (5) whether those excluded

6
are members of the same protected group as the defendant or
the victim; and (6) the composition of the jurors already
seated" (citation omitted).

Grier, supra.

In light of the factors above, and on this record, we

discern no error or other abuse of discretion in the trial

judge's determination. First, given the incomplete information

available about the demographics of the jury pool, we cannot

determine whether a disproportionate number or percentage of

Black, female jurors was excluded from the jury. See Grier, 490

Mass. at 460 (record was insufficient to support whether strikes

disproportionately targeted Black jurors).

Second, viewing the prosecution's strikes in the context of

the entire empanelment, an objective, group-neutral explanation

emerges: concern regarding the potential jurors' impartiality

given that they had close relatives who were recently

prosecuted. Juror 138 disclosed that, a year prior, her son had

been prosecuted and convicted in the same court house.

Similarly, juror 196 revealed that her brother had recently been

charged and convicted by the Suffolk County District Attorney's

office, the same office prosecuting the defendant, and that he

had been incarcerated for "half his life."

Third, the record reveals no similarities between jurors

138 and 196, and the other two potential jurors struck by the

prosecutor. Fourth, we discern no differences between jurors

7
138 and 196 relevant to our analysis. Fifth, jurors 138 and

196, who are Black women, are of the same protected racial group

as the defendant and T.S., who are Black men. However, where

"the defendant shares the group membership of the jurors whose

exclusion is challenged as discriminatory, and the victim was

also a member of the protected group . . . this factor 'does

little to tip the balance in either direction.'" Grier, 490

Mass. at 462, quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 477 Mass. 307, 322

n.27 (2017).

Lastly, regarding the composition of the members of the

jury already seated, the trial judge noted that there were other

people of color on the jury, and that the last juror seated was

a Black female. Although this factor cannot be the sole basis

for the judge's determination, see Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 485

Mass. 491, 512 & n.16 (2020), it is nonetheless relevant to the

"totality of the relevant facts" considered by the judge,

Grier, 490 Mass. at 459.

Thus, based on the above factors, we conclude that the

trial judge did not abuse his discretion in determining that

defense counsel had failed to raise a prima facie case for

discrimination. 2

2 The defendant also asserts ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel for failing to raise the issue of the
Commonwealth's peremptory challenges. Given our conclusion
here, it follows that the defendant's appellate counsel did not

8
c. Conditions on entry to court room. Next, the defendant

asserts that the motion judge erred in concluding that the

conditions imposed by the trial judge on court room entry did

not amount to constitutional court room closure. In

Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 466 Mass. 742, 751 (2014), the

Supreme Judicial Court held, in factual circumstances similar to

those at issue here, that a trial judge's order requiring

spectators to show identification and sign in before entering

court was not a constitutional closure. In so holding, the

court provided a framework for analyzing the propriety of such

conditions, stating,

"Although we conclude that the conditions imposed by the
judge of signing in and showing identification fell short
of a constitutional closure, that does not mean that they
may be imposed without justification or that they are
exempt from judicial review. . . . [I]dentification may be
required of spectators only where a judge sets forth on the
record the reasons that justify imposing this condition on
entry based on the special circumstances of the case and
only where the conditions are no broader than needed to
accomplish their purpose."

Id. at 751-752.

Here, the trial judge explicitly set forth his

justification for imposing the conditions on the record, stating

he had found "egregious witness intimidation," and that the

"fail[] to raise a significant and obvious issue . . . which
. . . may have resulted in a reversal of the conviction, or an
order for a new trial" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v.
Sowell, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 229, 232 (1993).

9
defendant had taken "affirmative steps . . . to intimidate

witnesses." Given the trial judge's concerns and the gang-

related nature of the crime, we conclude that he acted within

his discretion to require entrants to show identification and

sign in. See Maldonado, 466 Mass. at 752 ("A judge may

recognize that, when a member of a gang is alleged to have

committed a shooting, there is a risk that others associated

with the gang may attempt to intimidate witnesses to cause them

to exculpate, or at least avoid incriminating, the accused").

Moreover, where there had already been attempts to intimidate

witnesses, the trial judge acted within his discretion in

imposing the conditions despite defense counsel's statement that

"anyone that the Commonwealth was worried about . . . [was] in

custody." See id. at 753 ("A judge need not wait for a witness

to be intimidated, the court room to be disrupted, or a specific

threat before taking appropriate steps to address the risk of

such misconduct").

The defendant attempts to distinguish this case from

Maldonado, arguing that the alleged presence of a Boston police

officer, in addition to court officers, at the door of the court

room shows that the conditions had an "investigative purpose" --

namely, that the police must have been comparing names of

entrants against a list and set of photographs to "screen" their

connections to the defendant. In support of this argument, the

10
defendant submitted affidavits from three individuals recounting

their experiences as they approached the court room. Two of the

individuals averred that upon seeing an officer at the door,

they decided not to enter so as to avoid interaction with law

enforcement. The other affiant averred that she entered the

court room but was "aware" that a member of the defendant's

family was told by an officer that they were not permitted to

enter due to an outstanding warrant. 3 Upon reviewing the

affidavits, we agree with the motion judge that they merely

"establish that officers were checking identification and

requiring spectators to sign in before entering the court room."

Contrary to the defendant's characterization, the affidavits do

not show that the police were "using a list of names and

photographs from a law enforcement database to screen court room

entrants." Rather, the affidavits, at best, explain why the

affiants, upon seeing an officer at the door checking IDs and

requiring entrants to sign in, decided not to enter. Cf.

Commonwealth v. Andrade, 488 Mass. 522, 542 (2021) ("That some

spectators who were unable to produce identification were barred

from entry, as the defendant contends, does not change the

analysis").

3 The judge properly concluded that the affiant's statement
about the alleged exclusion of a family member was inadmissible
hearsay. The defendant does not argue otherwise.

11
We conclude that the motion judge acted within her

discretion in determining, without an evidentiary hearing, that

the conditions neither amounted to a closure nor were imposed in

error. 4 See Commonwealth v. Goodreau, 442 Mass. 341, 348-349

(2004) ("If the theory of the motion [for a new trial], as

presented by the papers, is not . . . persuasive, holding an

evidentiary hearing . . . will accomplish nothing"). 5

d. Newly available proposed testimony. Lastly, the

defendant asserts that the motion judge erred in not granting a

new trial based on newly available evidence, which purportedly

undercuts the "core aspects" of T.S.'s testimony.

"In a motion for a new trial based on new evidence, the

defendant must show that the evidence is either 'newly

discovered' or 'newly available' and that it 'casts real doubt'

on the justice of the defendant's conviction" (footnote

4 Given our conclusion that the affidavits did not give rise
to an apparently meritorious claim, we also conclude that the
motion judge did not err in denying the defendant's request for
postconviction discovery. See Commonwealth v. Daniels, 445
Mass. 392, 407 (2005) ("In requesting [postconviction]
discovery, the defendant must make a sufficient showing that the
discovery is reasonably likely to uncover evidence that might
warrant granting a new trial").

5 Because we conclude that there was no error or other abuse
of discretion in the trial judge's ruling on the Commonwealth's
peremptory challenges or in his imposition of conditions on
entry (which did not amount to a closure), we need not opine as
to whether the issues were waived as a result of defendant's
appellate counsel's failure to raise the same issues on direct
appeal.

12
omitted). Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 469 Mass. 340, 350 (2014).

"The standard is not whether the verdict would have been

different, but whether the evidence probably would have been a

'real factor' in the jury's deliberations." Id. at 350-351.

"We will reverse a judge's ruling on appeal only if the decision

is 'manifestly unjust'" (citation omitted). Id. at 351.

Here, the defendant submitted affidavits from M.L. and M.F.

-- witnesses who asserted their Fifth Amendment privilege at

trial -- that contradict T.S.'s account of the events leading up

to the shooting. 6 After considering the affidavits, the motion

judge concluded that the proffered testimony did not "cast[]

real doubt on the justice of the conviction" for two reasons:

(1) the proffered testimony would have contradicted T.S.'s

testimony regarding events that occurred solely before the

shooting, therefore leaving T.S.'s identification of the

defendant intact, and (2) this testimony would be cumulative of

evidence already presented at trial.

Based on the record, we discern no error in the motion

judge's conclusion and rationale. First, because the

6 M.F. -- who pleaded guilty to witness intimidation before
trial -- averred that there was no "hang out" at his house prior
to the shooting, and that in any event, he was in North Carolina
at the time of the shooting. M.L.'s affidavit stated, contrary
to T.S.'s testimony, that he was not present at a gathering at
M.F.'s house prior to the shooting, and that he did not drive
T.S. to the location of the shooting.

13
prosecution's case relied primarily on T.S.'s identification of

the defendant as his shooter -- both moments after the shooting

and upon being shown a photo array -- the proffered testimony,

while serving an impeachment purpose, only undermines T.S.'s

testimony as to collateral events which occurred before the

shooting. Contrast Commonwealth v. Drayton, 479 Mass. 479, 483,

490-491 (2018) (new evidence not only impeached witness but also

contradicted testimony that he saw murder and "undermine[d] the

Commonwealth's entire case against the defendant").

Furthermore, the proffered testimony treads the same ground as

evidence presented by the defendant at trial. At trial, the

defendant introduced records that showed M.L. had checked into a

hotel in South Boston on the night of the shooting, and that

M.F. had obtained a Greyhound bus ticket to North Carolina

several days before the shooting. Thus, the proffered

testimony, providing the witnesses' first-hand accounts of these

time frames, "carries less weight than new evidence different in

kind." Commonwealth v. Cintron, 435 Mass. 509, 518 (2001). See

Commonwealth v. McGee, 467 Mass. 141, 150 (2014) ("Newly

discovered evidence that tends to merely impeach the testimony

of a witness does not ordinarily warrant a new trial" [citation

omitted]).

14
We therefore conclude that the motion judge properly denied

the defendant's motion for a new trial based on newly available

evidence.

Order denying motion for a
new trial affirmed.

By the Court (Shin, Walsh &
Allen, JJ. 7),

Clerk

Entered: March 18, 2026.

7 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

15