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March 18, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In the Matter of the Appeal of the Denial of Mikhail Polatov's Application for a Firearms Purchaser Identification Card, Etc.

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division

• Citations: None known

• Docket Number: A-3720-23

• Opinion

• Authorities (10)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (9K)

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Combined Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3720-23

IN THE MATTER OF
THE APPEAL OF THE DENIAL
OF MIKHAIL POLATOV'S APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
APPLICATION FOR A March 18, 2026
FIREARMS PURCHASER
APPELLATE DIVISION
IDENTIFICATION CARD AND
PERMIT TO PURCHASE A
HANDGUN.

---

Submitted November 18, 2025 – Decided March 18, 2026

Before Judges Sumners, Chase and Augostini.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. GPA-0018-
23.

Evan F. Nappen Attorney at Law PC, attorney for
appellant Mikhail Polatov (Robert B. Bell, of counsel
and on the briefs).

Mark Musella, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney for
respondent State of New Jersey (Deepa S. Jacobs,
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

SUMNERS, JR., C.J.A.D.

In this case of first impression, we must interpret recent amendments to

N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5). The statute previously prohibited the issuance of a
permit to purchase a handgun (PPH) and a firearms purchaser identification

card (FPIC) "[t]o any person where the issuance would not be in the interest of

the public health, safety or welfare." In 2022, the Legislature amended the

statute by concluding it with the phrase: "because the person is found to be

lacking the essential character of temperament necessary to be entrusted with a

firearm." L. 2022, c. 131, § 2.

Mikhail Polatov appeals a June 13, 2024 Law Division order denying his

application for a FPIC and a PPH under the recent amendment. The trial court

denied his application because he lacked "the essential character of

temperament necessary to be entrusted with a firearm" under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-

3(c)(5). The trial court reasoned that Polatov was not truthful to the court

about the disposition of and circumstances surrounding a 2011 shoplifting

offense in New York that was resolved through an administrative dismissal.

We reverse. Polatov's PPH and FPIC application should have been

granted because the trial court's reliance on its credibility determination

regarding the 2011 offense, which does not disqualify his application, is not a

basis under the amended N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5) to deny the application.

I.

Polatov is a fifty-year-old Russian-born Bergen County resident. He is

married with two children, has a master's degree in computer science, and has

A-3720-23
2
worked in software development for over ten years. He has no history of

disqualifying factors: felony convictions, domestic violence, juvenile

delinquency adjudications, disorderly persons convictions, alcoholism,

substance abuse, mental health illness, or being on a terrorist watchlist.

Polatov has extensive firearm training from his time in the Polish Military.

A. July 2020 FPIC and PPH Application

On July 9, 2020, Polatov applied online to the Demarest Police

Department for an FPIC and ten PPHs. Sergeant Anthony Dimitriadis, a

twenty-one-year veteran of the police department, investigated Polatov's

application. A criminal background check revealed that in September 2001,

Polatov was arrested and charged with driving a motor vehicle while impaired

in Iowa City. Polatov pled guilty to an amended charge for consumption of an

alcoholic beverage and paid a fine; he served no jail time. The background

check also revealed Polatov's arrest in New York but did not specify the

offense.

Polatov's application did not mention the New York arrest. The

application only requires the disclosure of "a crime in New Jersey or a criminal

offense in another jurisdiction where [the applicant] could have been sentenced

to more than six months in jail that has not been expunged or sealed." After

unsuccessful efforts to obtain more information about the arrest from New

A-3720-23
3
York officials, Sergeant Dimitriadis contacted Polatov but Polatov did not

want to discuss the matter. Sergeant Dimitriadis explained to Polatov that he

could not legally purchase ten guns with one permit. See N.J.S.A. 2C:58-

2(a)(7). Polatov thus amended his request to purchase two guns. Sergeant

Dimitriadis recommended Polatov's amended application be denied.

Demarest Police Chief Christopher Bianchi accepted Sergeant

Dimitriadis' recommendation. The chief sent a letter to Polatov "denying

[Polatov's] permit request . . . as per [N.J.S.A.] 2C:58-3(c)" because he "failed

to disclose the [New York] incident on [his] application." Polatov retained

counsel and appealed to the Law Division.

On August 12, 2021, the trial court held a de novo hearing to determine

whether good cause existed for the denial of Polatov's application. Defendant

testified that in 2011, he was arrested in New York for shoplifting a wallet

from a department store. He claimed that it was an "honest mistake" because

he did not need the wallet and he must have inadvertently walked out with it

because he was leaving the store in a hurry after receiving a call from his wife.

After explaining that the charges were resolved with adjournment in

contemplation of dismissal (ACD), 1 the following colloquy occurred:

1
ACDs are temporary adjournments granted prior to the entry of a guilty plea
or trial "with a view to ultimate dismissal of the accusatory instrument in

A-3720-23
4
THE COURT: All right. So, in New York, when this
case was resolved, did you get up before a judge like
you did with me, raise your hand under oath, and
admit that you took that wallet and tried to leave the
store without paying? Did you admit that to a judge?

POLATOV: From what I remember, I did.

THE COURT: You did?

THE COURT: So, you got up, under oath, and you
swore to tell the truth to the judge, and you told the
judge that you took that wallet and tried to leave the
store without paying, knowing that you had that
wallet. You admitted to that ––

POLATOV: I don't remember the specifics of the
New York court case. It was handled by the lawyer.

THE COURT: Hold on now. Hold on now. When
the case was resolved –– I'm going to ask you again.
Did you go to the court, get up in front of a judge,
swear to tell the truth, and admit that you tried to steal
the wallet?

POLATOV: I did.

THE COURT: You did. Okay. So, let me ask you.
This is very important, now, okay? So, were you
telling the truth to the judge when you raised your
hand under oath and said that you were trying to steal
the wallet?

POLATOV: I did.

---

furtherance of justice" if the case is not restored within a certain period. N.Y.
Crim. Proc. Law § 170.55 (McKinney 2015).

A-3720-23
5
THE COURT: You were telling the truth.

THE COURT: Okay . . . here's what I don't
understand. You're telling me that you told the judge
in New York the truth when you admitted that you
tried to steal the wallet. But now, you're telling me
that you weren't trying to steal the wallet. It was an
honest mistake. So, who are you telling the truth to?

At the hearing's conclusion, the court placed its decision on the record

denying Polatov's application. The court first noted that the Iowa intoxication

offense "carr[ied] absolutely no weight" in its decision, and that Polatov was

"under no obligation to disclose" the Iowa and New York offenses in his

application. The court, however, denied the application because it found that

he "either lied to the judge in New York or is lying to [the court] today. And

for that reason, [the court] [drew] a negative inference from his testimony, and

[it] [did] not find his testimony credible." The court determined that "there

would be risk and a concern that it would not be in the interest of the public

health, safety, and welfare to grant th[e] appeal." The next day, the court

memorialized the denial of Polatov's application in an order. Polatov did not

challenge the order to this court.

B. October 2023 FPIC and PPH Application

After moving to Harrington Park, Polatov submitted another online

application for a FPIC and a PPH on October 16, 2023, to the Harrington Park

A-3720-23
6
Police Department. In response to the application's question about whether he

"ever had a [FPIC,] . . . [PPH], or any other firearms license or application

refused or revoked in New Jersey or any other state," Polatov responded

"Yes." He attributed the denial to his failure to disclose his Iowa intoxication

charge but did not mention the New York conviction, nor the 2021 hearing.

Harrington Park Police Patrolman James LaVigna investigated the

application. His report noted the trial court's 2021 denial of Polatov's FPIC

and PPH application to the Demarest police department. It also stated:

Polatov's application did not contain any information
regarding his denied appeal in Bergen County
Superior Court . . . . I consulted with [Bergen County]
Assistant Prosecutor Tom Osadnik, who was also
mentioned as appearing on behalf of the State of New
Jersey along with his legal intern, Keith Bendul on
[the court's] order. AP Osadnik recommended
denying Polatov based on [the trial court's] previous
ruling which described Polatov to be unfit.

In an undated letter, Harrington Police Chief Robert Murphy advised

Polatov that his FPIC and PPH application was denied. The letter stated, "the

issuance would not be in the interest of the public health, safety, or welfare

because the person is found to be lacking the essential character o[f]

temperament necessary to be entrusted with a firearm." Polatov appealed to

the Law Division.

A-3720-23
7
On June 5, 2024, the same trial court which held the August 2021

hearing conducted a de novo hearing to determine whether good cause existed

for the denial of Polatov's application with Harrington Park. 2 Polatov testified

that he did not disclose his New York arrest "because there was no

conviction." Polatov maintained that leaving the department store without

paying for the wallet was an honest mistake. Yet, when presented with his

2021 hearing testimony about whether he admitted guilt before the New York

judge, Polatov stated that he did not "recall admitting anything to [the] New

York judge. To my best recollection all I had to do [was] . . . say my first, my

last name . . . [a]nd I [did not] have to admit nor deny any guilt."

The colloquy regarding Polatov's clarification of his 2021 hearing

testimony concerning the New York offense followed:

THE STATE: Is it your testimony now that the
testimony that you gave [the court] in 2021 was not
truthful?

POLATOV: As I said[,] I think it was a
misunderstanding because I do not remember
admitting any guilt to [the] New York judge.

....

2
The hearing also addressed denial of the FPIC and PPH applications by
Polatov's wife. The couple agreed to joint legal representation, waiving
potential conflicts of interest claims. The denial of her application is not
before us.

A-3720-23
8
[THE STATE]: What did you not understand when
[the court] said did you go in front of a judge in New
York and admit that you were telling the truth?

POLATOV: Because I couldn't admit any guilt to
[the] New York judge. I was given [ACD] which [is]
neither [an] admission nor conviction of guilt.

[THE STATE]: So[,] is it your testimony that now,
three years later, now you're remembering what
happened in the New York case more clearly?

....

POLATOV: I see, I did answer some questions to
[the] [j]udge not the way that I should have. Because
I admitted [to] the [j]udge, I had to admit that I
admitted the guilt to [the] New York judge which
(indiscernible) didn't happen.

[THE STATE]: You're saying that did not happen?

....

POLATOV: It did not, it did not happen. I could
[not] have admitted the guilt because I was offer[ed]
[ACD].

THE COURT: But in the next breath you tell me you
don't recall exactly what happened.

At the hearing's conclusion, the court issued an oral decision denying

Polatov's application. The court declined to deny Polatov's application based

on a false statement, finding that the State had not met its burden to establish

that Polatov had knowingly falsified information on his application, N.J.S.A.

2C:58-3(c)(3). However, the court found that Polatov demonstrated "a

A-3720-23
9
continued dishonesty, lack of candor, contradiction and minimization of what

occurred in 2011 . . . but [is] now attempting to back off from it." The court

thus denied Polatov's application under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5) for "lacking the

essential character of temperament necessary to be entrusted with a firearm."

On June 13, 2024, the court issued an order memorializing its oral

decision. This appeal followed.

II.

Polatov argues that the trial court abused its discretion and erred as a

matter of law by disqualifying him for a FPIC and PPH under N.J.S.A. 2C:58 -

3(c)(5) on the sole basis that it found his testimony regarding his New York

offense to be dishonest. Polatov argues there is no case law supporting the

trial court's denial of his application. He further avers, denials under N.J.S.A.

2C:58-3(c)(5) are reserved for "individuals who engaged in 'repetitive

misconduct'" and are "currently unfit," not credibility determinations arising

from an application's evidentiary hearing.

Polatov also contends that N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5) is facially

unconstitutional under New York State Rifle & Pistol Assoc., Inc. v. Bruen,

597 U.S. 1 (2022), because it is overly discretionary and not "narrow,

objective, and definite" as the Second Amendment requires, and under United

States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), because it "far more nebulous and

A-3720-23
10
vague than claiming an [applicant] is not responsible" to obtain a gun permit.

For the first time on appeal, Polatov contends, that as applied, N.J.S.A. 2C:58 -

3(c)(5) permanently disarms him in contradiction of Rahimi.

The State asserts the trial court properly denied Polatov's application

based on N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5) because it "operates in conjunction" with the

statute's "falsification disqualifier to prohibit giving false testimony at the

firearm permit application hearing." The falsification disqualifier states that a

FPIC or PPH shall not be issued to "any person who knowingly falsifies any

information on the application form for a handgun purchase permit or [FPIC]."

N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(3). The State relies on caselaw showing instances where

"the facts do not quite rise to the level of [N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3's] disabling

conditions," In re M.U.'s Application, 475 N.J. Super. 148, 179-80 (App. Div.

2023), but disqualification was held proper under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5)

because denial was nonetheless in the interest of the public health, safety, or

welfare. The State argues that although Polatov "may not have explicitly

falsified his application form as prohibited under [N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(3)], . . .

falsely providing testimony in connection with the application" should

nonetheless disqualify him under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5).

As for Polatov's constitutional arguments, the State contends N.J.S.A.

2C:58-3(c)(5) is constitutionally permissible because it correctly disqualifies

A-3720-23
11
an applicant from obtaining a gun permit who poses a threat to the public. The

State also maintains this court should not address Polatov's as-applied

challenge because it was not raised before the trial court. Alternatively, it

argues this court rejected a similar disarmament argument in the Matter of

M.G., No. A-1249-23 (App. Div. June 19, 2025) (slip op. at 13-15), where we

held that Rahimi did not foreclose the possibility of permanent disarmament

simply because it sanctioned temporary disarmament of dangerous individuals.

III.

"In order to lawfully acquire a firearm in New Jersey, one must have

first secured a [FPIC] and, in the case of a handgun, a [PPH]." In re Winston,

438 N.J. Super. 1, 6 (App. Div. 2014). Acquiring these documents is governed

by N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3, which lists several disqualifying circumstances. In re

Z.L., 440 N.J. Super. 351, 356 (App. Div. 2015). Most disqualifications

"focus on the applicant's background or suitability to possess a firearm." In re

R.W.T., 477 N.J. Super. 443, 466 (App. Div. 2023). For example, N.J.SA.

2C:58-3(c)(1) disqualifies individuals with felonies or certain disorderly

persons offenses; N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(2) and (3) disqualifies individuals

"presently confined for a mental disorder" or those "suffer[ing] from a physical

defect or disease which would make it unsafe for that person to handle

firearms"; and N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(6) disqualifies those who have "violated a

A-3720-23
12
temporary or final restraining order issued pursuant to the 'Prevention of

Domestic Violence Act of 1991, [N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35].'"

Prior to 2022, N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5), disqualified "any person where

the issuance would not be in the interest of the public health, safety or

welfare." This provision explicitly addresses an "applicant's background or

suitability to possess a firearm." R.W.T., 477 N.J. Super. at 466.

The State correctly points out that N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5) has been used

"in conjunction with the specific disabilities identified under various

subsections of N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)." M.U., 475 N.J. Super. at 179-80. For

example, we affirmed an applicant's denial of a PPH and FPIC under N.J.S.A.

2C:58-3(c)(5) based on his "unlawful activities" such as vandalizing property

and stealing a trailer, although the incidents were not "criminal convictions

that would be specifically disabling under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(1)." Id. at 196.

In a different context, our Supreme Court found that though an applicant did

not suffer from a "diagnosable disorder" sufficient to disqualify him under

N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(2) and (3), he could "nonetheless be disqualified under

N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5) because of . . . elements of 'narcissistic, anti-social, or

paranoid personality disorder' as explained by [an expert witness]." In re

Forfeiture of Pers. Weapons & Firearms Identification Card Belonging to

F.M., 225 N.J. 487, 513 (2016). We have also denied an application under

A-3720-23
13
N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5) due to allegations of domestic abuse, where there has

been "a judicial declaration that [an applicant] poses a threat to the public

health, safety or welfare . . . [based upon] an assessment of the threat [an

applicant] may impose to the general public." State v. Cordoma, 372 N.J.

Super. 524, 535 (App. Div. 2004).

In 2022, the Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5). Previously,

the provision only stated that a FPIC and a PPH must be denied to "any person

where the issuance would not be in the interest of the public health, safety or

welfare." N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5). The amendment added to the end of the

provision "because the person is found to be lacking the essential character of

temperament necessary to be entrusted with a firearm." L. 2022, c. 131, §2.

Since the amendment, no caselaw has defined the meaning of "essential

character of temperament." Therefore, we look to the terms' common

meaning. See N.J. Election Law Enf't Comm'n v. DiVincenzo, 451 N.J. Super.

554, 576 (App. Div. 2017) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)

("We give the statutory words their ordinary meaning and significance, and

read them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the

legislation as a whole.").

"Essential" can be defined as "something basic." Merriam-Webster's

Collegiate Dictionary 558 (12th ed. 2026). "Character" is defined as "the

A-3720-23
14
aggregate of distinctive qualities characteristic of something," id. at 279, and

"temperament" as "mode of emotional response," id. at 1619. Considering

these definitions, we conclude that essential character of temperament means

the basic defining qualities of a person's emotional response. To lack the basic

qualities of one's emotional response means to have no stable or consistent

emotional core necessary for responsible action—in other words, to be so

volatile that armament would endanger "the interest of the public health, safety

or welfare." N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5). Moreover, this interpretation accords

with N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5)'s "focus on whether the applicant, armed with a

firearm, poses a danger to the public." Koons v. Platkin, 673 F. Supp. 3d 515,

563 (D.N.J. 2023) (analyzing N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5) as amended).

Unlike the other provisions in N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c) discussed above,

which focus on the individual fitness of the applicant, the falsification

provision "does not impose substantive limitations on who is qualified to

obtain a firearm." R.W.T., 477 N.J. Super. at 466. Its concern is with

safeguarding the process of the gun licensing scheme—not inquiring into

individual fitness. By contrast, N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5) is explicitly about

whether the applicant has "the essential character of temperament necessary to

be entrusted with a firearm." Thus, N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5) does not expand

the reach of the application's falsification provision.

A-3720-23
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IV.

We disagree with the trial court's order denying Polatov's FPIC and PPH

application because he lacked the essential character of temperament necessary

to be entrusted with a firearm due to his dishonesty about the 2011 shoplifting

incident.

We do not find fault with the court's finding that Polatov lied during his

2021 and 2024 hearing testimony concerning the ACD resolution of his 2011

New York shoplifting charge; specifically, his admission of theft and not being

able to recall his 2021 hearing testimony at his 2023 hearing. We defer to the

court's factual finding. See Nelson v. Elizabeth Bd. of Educ., 466 N.J. Super.

325, 336 (App. Div. 2021) (citation and internal quotations omitted) ("We . . .

review a trial court's determinations, premised on the testimony of witnesses

and written evidence at a bench trial, in accordance with a deferential

standard.").

However, based upon our de novo review of the interpretation of

N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5), see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Northfield Med. Ctr., P.C., 228

N.J. 596, 619 (2017), we part company with the court's determination that

issuing Polatov a FPIC and a PPH risks the public health, safety or welfare as

prescribed in the statute. While our courts have certainly considered an

applicant's credibility at the evidentiary hearing into, we find no situation

A-3720-23
16
where it was used as the primary or sole basis for disqualification under

N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5)––either pre- or post-2022 amendment. As we noted in

M.U., while the trial court did not find the applicant's testimony to be credible,

the denial of his application was based solely on his "unlawful activities" and

evidence that he was "not a law-abiding, responsible citizen." 475 N.J. Super.

at 196.

We conclude the court erred in its interpretation of N.J.S.A. 2C:58-

3(c)(5) to deny Polatov's application due to the conflicting testimony he gave

concerning the pretrial disposition of his 2011 New York shoplifting charge.

The determinative factor under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5) "focus[es] on whether

the applicant, armed with a firearm, poses a danger to the public." Koons, 673

F. Supp. 3d at 563. Polatov's contradictory testimony about whether he pled

guilty in 2011 to an offense, does not support the court's finding that he lacks

the essential character of temperament necessary to be entrusted with a firearm

because he would be a public danger. There is no evidence that Polatov

exhibited behavior––criminal conduct, aggressive behavior, threats of

violence, emotional instability, alcoholism, substance abuse, or mental health

concerns––that establishes he could not be entrusted with a firearm. Likewise,

there is no indication in the record that Polatov's lack of credibility correlated

to the absence of the essential character of temperament that would make him

A-3720-23
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more likely than not to be a danger to public health, safety, or welfare if he had

a firearm.

Polatov's argument that disqualification under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5)

requires sustained or repetitive conduct is without merit. While this court

found that N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5) disqualified the applicant in M.U., 475 N.J.

Super. at 197, in part, because of his repetitive misconduct, it does not

necessarily follow that repetitive misconduct is a prerequisite to

disqualification under that provision. In Matter of Sbitani, we held the

applicant should not be issued a FPIC under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5) because of

a single disorderly persons offense that denied him a weapon under a different

statute. 216 N.J. Super. 75, 76-77 (App. Div. 1987).

Finally, we decline to address Polatov's constitutional challenges to

N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5) as they are not "imperative to the disposition" of this

matter. Randolph Town Ctr., L.P. v. Cnty. of Morris, 186 N.J. 78, 80 (2006);

see also Bell v. Twp. of Stafford, 110 N.J. 384, 389 (1988) ("Generally, [New

Jersey] courts will adjudicate the constitutionality of legislation only if a

constitutional determination is absolutely necessary to resolve a controversy

between parties."). Our conclusion that Polatov's FPIC and PPH application

should have been granted because there is no evidence he is disqualified under

A-3720-23
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the statute, makes it unnecessary to determine his arguments that the statute is

unconstitutional.

Reversed and remanded for issuance of a FPIC and a PPH to Polatov.

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