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March 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Federal Home Loan Mortgage v. Sanchez, S.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1350 EDA 2025
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Sullivan

• Opinion

• Authorities (4)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (4.4K)

• PDF

Lead Opinion

                        by Sullivan

J-S44041-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

FEDERAL HOME LOAN : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
CORPORATION, AS TRUSTEE FOR : PENNSYLVANIA
THE BENEFIT OF THE FREDDIE MAC :
SEASONED LOANS STRUCTURED :
TRANSACTION TRUST, SERIES 2018- :
2 :
:
:
v. : No. 1350 EDA 2025
:
:
SOLANGE K. SANCHEZ, DANIEL D. :
SANCHEZ, AND HOUSE OF SANCHEZ :
MINISTRY TR, A TRUST :
:
:
APPEAL OF: SOLANGE K. SANCHEZ :

Appeal from the Judgment Entered May 8, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Civil Division at No(s):
005924-CV-2024

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., DUBOW, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED MARCH 19, 2026

Solange K. Sanchez (“Sanchez”)1 appeals, pro se, from the judgment

entered May 8, 2025, in favor Federal Home Loan Corporation, as trustee for

the beneficiary of the Freddie Mac Seasoned Loans Structured Transaction

Trust, Series 2018-2 (“Appellee”) in this mortgage foreclosure action.

Because we conclude the trial court lacked jurisdiction to reconsider its denial

---

1 Defendants Daniel D. Sanchez and House of Sanchez Ministry, TR are not

parties to the instant appeal.
J-S44041-25

of Sanchez’s motion for leave to file a Rule 1925(b) statement nunc pro tunc,

and because Sanchez did not file a timely Rule 1925(b) statement, we affirm.

We briefly note the following procedural history. In September 2024,

Appellee filed a mortgage foreclosure action against Sanchez, alleging she had

not made any payments on the subject property since April 2023. In

December 2024, Sanchez filed an answer and new matter. In March 2025,

Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment. Sanchez did not file a

response to the motion, instead filing what she labeled a “brief.” The trial

court subsequently granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment.

On May 22, 2025, Sanchez filed a timely notice of appeal in this Court.

That same day, the trial court directed Sanchez to file a concise statement of

errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) no later than

June 12, 2025. Sanchez did not comply. Instead, on June 13, 2025, she filed

a motion for leave to file her Rule 1925(b) statement nunc pro tunc. See

Motion for Leave to File Concise Statement, 6/13/25, at 1-2 (unnumbered).

Sanchez claimed she had been unable to file a timely Rule 1925(b) statement

“[d]ue to unexpected personal hardship[.]” Id. at 1 (unnumbered). The trial

court denied the motion and issued an opinion finding Sanchez had waived all

issues on appeal because of her failure to timely comply with Rule 1925. See

Trial Court Opinion, 6/17/25, at 1-3.

On June 26, 2025, this Court issued a rule to show cause as to why we

should not dismiss the appeal because of Sanchez’s failure to file a Rule

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J-S44041-25

1925(b) statement. See Order, 6/26/25, at 1. We gave Sanchez fourteen

days to file a response; she did not comply. See id; see also Order, 7/28/25

at 1.

On July 3, 2025, while her appeal was still pending in this Court,

Sanchez filed a motion in the trial court seeking reconsideration of the court’s

denial of her motion to file her Rule 1925(b) statement nunc pro tunc. See

Motion for Reconsideration, 7/3/25, at 1-2 (unnumbered). In that motion,

Sanchez claimed, for the first time, that on the afternoon of June 12, 2025,

she attempted to file her Rule 1925(b) statement but could not do so because

the filing system was “inoperable.” Id. at 1 (unnumbered). On July 7, 2025,

the trial court scheduled a hearing on Sanchez’s motion for July 14, 2025,

despite the fact Sanchez’s appeal was pending in this Court. See Order,

7/7/25, at 1-2 (unnumbered). After a hearing on July 14, 2 the trial court

granted Sanchez’s motion, and she immediately filed her Rule 1925(b)

statement. See Order, 7/14/25, at 1 (unnumbered); Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

Statement, 7/14/25, at 1-3 (unnumbered).

On July 28, 2025, we dismissed Sanchez’s appeal because of her failure

to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 1925 and the trial court’s June 17, 2025, order

denying Sanchez’s motion to file the Rule 1925(b) statement nunc pro tunc.

---

2 The notes of testimony from the hearing are not contained in the certified

record.

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J-S44041-25

On July 29, 2025, the trial court authored a supplemental opinion. See

Supplemental Statement Pursuant to Rule 1925(a), 7/29/25, at 1-6. The trial

court did not address whether it had jurisdiction to rule on Sanchez’s motion

for reconsideration while her appeal was pending in this Court, nor did it find

Sanchez had demonstrated good cause for her failure to file a timely Rule

1925(b) Statement. See id.

Thereafter, Sanchez filed an application seeking reinstatement of her

appeal. See Motion, 7/28/25, at 1-4 (unnumbered). We reinstated the appeal

but noted our ruling was not binding upon the merits panel. See Order,

8/22/25, at 1.

On appeal, Sanchez raises five issues challenging the trial court’s grant

of summary judgment in favor of Appellee. See Sanchez’s Brief at 4

(unnumbered).

Prior to reaching the merits of Sanchez’s appeal, we must determine

whether the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain Sanchez’s motion for

reconsideration and overturn its prior decision to deny leave to file a Rule

1925(b) statement nunc pro tunc. Because a trial court’s order pursuant to

Rule 1925(b) triggers an appellant’s obligation to comply with the rule, we

initially evaluate whether the language in the trial court’s order complied with

Rule 1925(b). See In re Estate of Boyle, 77 A.3d 674, 676 (Pa. Super.

2013).

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J-S44041-25

Here, the trial court directed Sanchez to file and serve her concise

statement “no later than June 12, 2025,” directed her to both file the

statement of record and serve it on the trial judge at a listed address, and

expressly warned Sanchez “[a]ny issue not properly included in the statement

timely filed and served pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) shall be deemed

waived.” Order, 5/22/25, at 1-2. Thus, the trial court’s order fulfilled all the

requirements of Rule 1925(b)(3).

This Court has long held an appellant’s “failure to comply with the

minimal requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)[,]” including the failure to

timely file a concise statement of errors, “will result in automatic waiver

of the issues raised.” Greater Erie Industrial Development Corp. v.

Presque Isle Downs, Inc., 88 A.3d 222, 224 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc)

(internal quotes and citations omitted; emphasis in original). Thus, “it is no

longer within this Court’s discretion to review the merits of an untimely Rule

1925(b) statement based solely on the trial court’s decision to address the

merits of those untimely raised issues.” Id. at 225.

Despite this limitation on our ability to consider the merits of an untimely

statement of matters complained of on appeal, Rule 1925 permits us to

remand a civil case for the filing, nunc pro tunc, of a Rule 1925(b) statement:

“[u]pon application of the appellant and for good cause shown, an appellate

court may remand in a civil case for the filing nunc pro tunc of a Statement

or for amendment or supplementation of a timely filed and served Statement

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J-S44041-25

and for a concurrent supplemental opinion.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(2) (emphasis

added). The Note following Rule 1925 clarifies nunc pro tunc relief is only

available in limited circumstances:

In general, nunc pro tunc relief is allowed only when there has
been a breakdown in the process constituting extraordinary
circumstances.3 Courts have also allowed nunc pro tunc relief
when “non-negligent circumstances, either as they relate to
appellant or his counsel[,]” occasion delay. However, even when
there is a breakdown in the process, the appellant must attempt
to remedy it within a “very short duration” of time.

Note to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(2) (citations omitted; emphases and footnote

added).

Moreover, the Rules of Appellate Procedure strictly limit the actions a

trial court may take following an appeal. The Rules provide “[e]xcept as

otherwise prescribed by these rules, after an appeal is taken . . ., the trial

court . . . may no longer proceed further in the matter.” Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a)

(emphasis added). The rule has exceptions, including a provision that, after

an appeal, the trial court may “[t]ake any action directed or authorized by an

appellate court.” Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(5).

As noted above, in civil cases the Rules do not permit an appellant to

ask the trial court for leave to file a Rule 1925(b) statement nunc pro tunc

after an appeal has been taken. Instead, the Rules require an appellant to

---

3 Such circumstances include fraud or the wrongful or negligent act of a court

official. See In re Canvass of Absentee Ballots of Nov. 4, 2023 Gen.
Election, 843 A.3d 1223, 1234 (Pa. 2004).

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J-S44041-25

ask an appellate court for such permission. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(2).

Reading Rule 1925(c)(2) together with Rule 1701, leaves no doubt that trial

courts lack jurisdiction in civil cases to entertain motions for leave to file Rule

1925(b) statements nunc pro tunc once an appeal is taken. Only appellate

courts have such jurisdiction. If a proper application is filed with an

appellate court which demonstrates good cause, an appellate court may grant

nunc pro tunc relief to permit an appellant to file a concise statement with the

trial court and for the trial court then to file a supplemental opinion. See

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c).

Here, Sanchez filed a notice of appeal, the trial court ordered her to file

a Rule 1925(b) statement by a specific date. However, Sanchez filed an

untimely motion for leave to file her Rule 1925(b) statement nunc pro tunc in

the trial court, and the court denied the motion. This Court ordered Sanchez

to show cause as to why her appeal should not be dismissed for failure to

comply with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Sanchez failed to respond to our order.

Instead, Sanchez filed a motion in the trial court for leave to file a Rule

1925(b) statement nunc pro tunc, not an application in this Court

demonstrating good cause to request that we remand for the filing of a nunc

pro tunc statement. Despite this, the trial court granted reconsideration,

allowed Sanchez to file a nunc pro tunc statement, and issued a supplemental

Rule 1925(a) statement.

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J-S44041-25

The trial court violated Rules 1701 and 1925 and acted beyond its

jurisdiction by entertaining Sanchez’s initial motion for leave to file her Rule

1925(b) statement nunc pro tunc, and by hearing and granting Sanchez’s

motion for reconsideration while her civil appeal was pending in this Court.

Thus, the trial court’s order granting reconsideration is a legal nullity and we

concluded Sanchez waived all issues on appeal by failing to file a timely Rule

1925(b) statement.4

We acknowledge Sanchez is proceeding pro se in this matter.

Although this Court is willing to construe liberally materials filed
by a pro se litigant, pro se status generally confers no special
benefit upon an appellant. A pro se litigant must comply with the

---

4 Even if Sanchez had filed an application in this Court, she has not
demonstrated either non-negligent or extraordinary circumstances that would
support a grant of nunc pro tunc relief by this Court. As noted above, in her
first motion for leave to file a statement nunc pro tunc, Sanchez vaguely
alluded to personal hardships prevented her from filing a timely Rule 1925(b)
statement. Then, for the first time in her motion for reconsideration, Sanchez
alleged she attempted the file her statement on the afternoon of June 12,
2025, but was unable to do so because of problems with the court’s filing
system. Sanchez did not attach any exhibits to her petition to support her
claim and as noted above, did not have the notes of testimony from the
reconsideration hearing transcribed. Additionally, in its supplemental opinion,
the trial court did not point to any objective evidence supporting Sanchez’s
suggestion of a breakdown at the trial court and simply noted her testimony
“the system did not allow to file [her statement].” Thus, it is not clear whether
the system was experiencing technical problems or Sanchez did not use it
correctly. In any event, technical problems are foreseeable and Sanchez has
not provided any explanation as to why she waited until the latest possible
moment to attempt to file her Rule 1925(b) statement. Albeit in slightly
different circumstances, this Court has not found good cause to excuse a late
filing in these circumstances. See Lobos Management v. Powell, 330 A.3d
438, 444 (Pa. Super. 2025) (pro se litigant did not show good cause for filing
an untimely notice of appeal from a magisterial district justice proceeding
where she alleged confusion and personal hardships).

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J-S44041-25

procedural rules set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of the Court.
Any layperson choosing to represent himself or herself in a legal
proceeding must, to some reasonable extent, assume the risk that
his or her lack of expertise and legal training will prove his or her
undoing.

Smithson v. Columbia Gas of PA/NiSource, 264 A.3d 755, 760 (Pa. Super.

2021) (citations and brackets omitted).

Therefore, we are constrained to find Sanchez waived her issues on

appeal by failing to file a timely concise statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) after being ordered to do so by the lower court. Thus, we may not

review the merits of her arguments and must affirm the entry of judgment.

Judgment affirmed.

Date: 3/19/2026

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