Enbridge v. Nessel: Equitable Tolling Unavailable for Removal Deadline

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BPetitioners are Enbridge Energy, LP, Enbridge Energy Co., Inc., and1

Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P. For simplicity, the Court refers to them together as Enbridge.

4 ENBRIDGE ENERGY, LP v. NESSEL

state court against Enbridge to enforce the notice, bringing state-law claims very similar to those in the Attorney Gen- eral's lawsuit. Instead of litigating the Governor's suit in state court, Enbridge timely removed that action to federal court, arguing that the Federal District Court had jurisdic- tion under §1331 because the case involved a substantial federal question. See Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v.

Darue Engineering & Mfg., 545 U. S. 308, 314 (2005) (rec-

ognizing a limited category of state-law claims that support federal-question jurisdiction because they necessarily raise substantial questions of federal law). Enbridge did not re- move the Attorney General's suit at that time; instead, the parties agreed to hold the Attorney General's case (that is, this case) in abeyance while federal proceedings progressed in the Governor's suit. The Governor moved to remand her case to state court, arguing that the case did not raise a significant federal is- sue. Soon after, the Government of Canada submitted ami-

cus filings arguing that shutting down Line 5 would impli-

cate a 1977 treaty between Canada and the United States and impair foreign relations between the two countries. On November 16, 2021, the District Court denied the Gover- nor's motion to remand, concluding that federal-question jurisdiction was satisfied because the claims necessarily implicated substantial federal questions under two federal statutes and the 1977 treaty. The Governor voluntarily dis- missed her lawsuit not long after that ruling. 2 On December 15, 2021, following the District Court's fa- vorable remand ruling in the Governor's suit, Enbridge re- moved this action to federal court. At that point, 887 days

------------ Similar issues remain pending in another federal action. In Novem-2 ber 2020, Enbridge sued the Governor seeking affirmative relief, and in December 2025, the District Court granted summary judgment to Enbridge, concluding that the Governor's efforts to shut down Line 5 were preempted. See Enbridge Energy, LP v. Whitmer, 2025 WL 3707609, *7 (WD Mich.).

5 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)

had elapsed from when Enbridge received the Attorney General's complaint. The Attorney General moved to re- mand, arguing, as relevant here, that removal was un- timely under §1446(b)'s 30-day deadline. The District Court denied the motion, holding that equitable principles justified excusing Enbridge's untimely removal. It then cer- tified its order denying remand for interlocutory appeal un- der §1292(b). After accepting the interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Cir- cuit reversed. 104 F. 4th 958 (2024). Enbridge, the Circuit held, unquestionably missed the 30-day removal deadline. As for the District Court's conclusion that §1446(b)(1)'s deadline should be equitably tolled, the Circuit held that although statutes of limitations are presumptively subject to such tolling, several features of §1446(b)(1) and the over- all removal scheme rebutted that presumption. Section 1446(b)(1) thus could not be equitably tolled, and the law- suit had to be remanded to the Michigan state court. Enbridge filed a timely petition for a writ of certiorari, seeking review of the Sixth Circuit's holding that §1446(b) is not subject to equitable tolling. Other Courts of Appeals have held that equitable tolling is available under §1446(b)(1) in at least some circumstances. See Gillis v.

Louisiana, 294 F. 3d 755, 759 (CA5 2002); Loftin v. Rush,

767 F. 2d 800, 805 (CA11 1985). This Court granted certi- orari to resolve the divide among the Courts of Appeals. 606

1. S. 930 (2025). II Enbridge's argument proceeds in three steps, each criti- cal to prevailing here. First, it contends that §1446(b)(1)'s 30-day removal deadline is not jurisdictional. Second, be- cause the deadline is nonjurisdictional, Enbridge argues that it is presumptively subject to equitable tolling. Third, according to Enbridge, nothing rebuts the presumption that this deadline can be equitably tolled.

6 ENBRIDGE ENERGY, LP v. NESSEL

At the first step, there is rightly no dispute. "No one con- tends that [§1446(b)(1)] is jurisdictional," given that "it 'does not expressly refer to subject-matter jurisdiction or speak in jurisdictional terms.'" McIntosh v. United States,

601 U. S. 330, 337 (2024); see 104 F. 4th, at 969 (explaining

why §1446(b)(1) is not jurisdictional). That much is crucial for Enbridge's case, as "[j]urisdictional requirements can- not be waived or forfeited, must be raised by courts

sua sponte, and, as relevant to this case, do not allow for equitable exceptions." Boechler v. Commissioner, 596 U. S. 199, 203 (2022). "The mere fact that a time limit lacks ju- risdictional force, however, does not render it malleable in every respect." Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert, 586 U. S. 188, 192 (2019). Some nonjurisdictional rules remain "mandatory" and "are not susceptible of the equitable ap- proach" that Enbridge urges. Ibid. That brings us to steps two and three in Enbridge's argu- ment. The Attorney General argues that, at each step, Enbridge confronts an independent reason why §1446(b)(1), though nonjurisdictional, is not subject to equitable tolling. First, she disagrees that any presumption of equitable toll- ing applies to §1446(b)(1). This Court "ha[s] only applied [the presumption of equitable tolling] to statutes of limita- tions." Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U. S. 1, 13-14 (2014); see Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U. S. 20, 27 (1989). According to the Attorney General, §1446(b)(1) is not a statute of limitations because it does not "extinguis[h]

a tardy claim (the function of a statute of limitations)," Arel-

lano v. McDonough, 598 U. S. 1, 7 (2023), and instead ad-

dresses "a forum issue that arises only after a claim for re- lief has been brought." Brief for Respondent 28; see Young

1. United States, 535 U. S. 43, 47 (2002) (explaining that a limitations period "prescribes a period within which certain rights . . . may be enforced"). Second, the Attorney General argues that even if §1446(b)(1) is a statute of limitations to which the presumption of equitable tolling applies, the

7 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)

presumption is rebutted here because such tolling conflicts with §1446(b)(1)'s text, structure, and context. As in prior cases, the Court need not parse whether §1446(b)(1) qualifies as a statute of limitations subject to a presumption of equitable tolling because the result, even if the presumption applies, "is straightforward." Arellano, 598 U. S., at 7; see United States v. Brockamp, 519 U. S. 347, 350 (1997). "The presumption is rebutted if 'there [is] good reason to believe that Congress did not want the equi- table tolling doctrine to apply.' " Arellano, 598 U. S., at 7

(alteration in original). Here, the kinds of evidence the

Court generally considers on this question shows that Con- gress did not want §1446(b)(1) to be equitably tolled. Starting with the text of §1446(b)(1), this provision speaks in strict, mandatory terms. It requires that a notice of removal "shall be filed within 30 days" of the defendant receiving either a complaint or summons, "whichever pe- riod is shorter." To be sure, this kind of mandatory lan- guage is not sufficient, on its own, to rebut the presumption of equitable tolling. See, e.g., United States v. Kwai Fun

Wong, 575 U. S. 402, 410-411, 420 (2015) (deadline stating

that claim " 'shall be forever barred' " was subject to equita-

ble tolling). The strict phrasing of §1446(b)(1), however, is

at least consistent with treating its deadline as mandatory and not subject to equitable tolling. Cf. Boechler, 596 U. S., at 204, 211 (concluding that equitable tolling applied to a provision that merely set the deadline by which a person " 'may' " file a petition with the Tax Court). More important, and decisive here, is §1446(b)(1)'s struc- ture. This Court has repeatedly held that an "explicit list- ing of exceptions," set forth in a detailed manner, strongly indicates "that Congress did not intend courts to read other unmentioned, open-ended, 'equitable' exceptions into the statute that it wrote." Brockamp, 519 U. S., at 352; see, e.g.,

Arellano, 598 U. S., at 7. That is because "[i]t would be in-

consistent with [a] comprehensive scheme" that includes a

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default deadline and several exceptions "to extend [the deadline] still further through the doctrine of equitable toll- ing," outside of those specified exceptions. Arellano, 598

1. S., at 7. This "structural inference" is "heighten[ed]," moreover, if the "specific exceptions" at issue already "re- flect equitable considerations." Id., at 9. That is exactly the case here. Within §1446(b) itself, Con- gress provided that the ordinary 30-day deadline does not apply when a case at first appears unremovable, but a later "pleading, motion, order or other paper" reveals that it is (or has become) removable. §1446(b)(3). In that case, the defendant has another 30 days to remove from "receipt" of the paper "from which it may first be ascertained that the case is . . . removable." Ibid. This extension is limited, how- ever, if the basis for removal is diversity of citizenship. Such "[a] case may not be removed under subsection (b)(3) . . . more than 1 year after commencement of the action, un- less the district court finds that the plaintiff has acted in bad faith in order to prevent a defendant from removing the action." §1446(c)(1). This highly detailed scheme matters for at least two rea- sons. First, the "ascertain[ment]" provision in §1446(b)(3) functions much like a discovery rule, giving defendants ex- tra time to remove after the date on which they learned or should have learned that a case was removable. In doing so, Congress "has already effectively allowed for equitable tolling" in this one respect but not others, which cuts against the availability of broader tolling. United States v.

Beggerly, 524 U. S. 38, 48 (1998). Second, in creating the "bad faith" exception to §1446(c)(1)'s 1-year bar in diversity cases, Congress specifically "accounted for equitable fac- tors," by providing additional time for removal, in a way that would be superfluous if §1446(b)(1) already broadly provided for equitable tolling in all cases. Arellano, 598

1. S., at 10. 9 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)

Exceptions to §1446(b)(1)'s 30-day deadline outside of §1446 drive home the point. For actions against foreign states, Congress specifically allowed "the time limitations of section 1446(b) . . . [to] be enlarged at any time for cause shown." §1441(d). So too for actions involving certain in- tellectual-property rights. See §1454(b)(2). For certain cases involving fatal accidents, removal generally "shall be made in accordance with section 1446 . . . except that," as to timing, an action may be removed "at a later time with leave of the district court." §1441(e)(1). Each of these pro- visions explicitly incorporates §1446(b)(1)'s time limit but modifies it to allow equitable, case-specific exceptions. Each provision would be inexplicable and unnecessary, however, if Congress already understood §1446(b)(1) to con- tain a cross-cutting rule allowing equitable tolling. Stepping beyond the removal of civil cases, Congress's treatment of removal in criminal proceedings provides ad- ditional confirmation that Congress did not want equitable tolling under §1446(b)(1). Under §1455(b)(1), a criminal de- fendant with a removable case must generally remove within "30 days after the arraignment in the State court," but "for good cause shown [a court] may . . . gran[t] the de- fendant or defendants leave to file the notice at a later time." In criminal cases, Congress thus did grant federal courts a broad, generally applicable power to allow late re- movals. For civil cases, by contrast, Congress did not pro- vide courts with a similar general power to extend the 30- day removal deadline. Instead, through the limited excep- tions discussed above, Congress specified the cases in which it wanted to authorize equitable tolling. Enbridge's position would eliminate the variation between these two removal contexts, but "[w]hen Congress includes particular lan- guage in one section of a statute but omits it from a neigh- bor, we normally understand that difference in language to convey a difference in meaning." Bittner v. United States, 598 U. S. 85, 94 (2023).

10 ENBRIDGE ENERGY, LP v. NESSEL

Finally, and to "garnish an already solid argument," "the nature of the subject matter" here underscores the unavail- ability of equitable tolling. Arellano, 598 U. S., at 14; see

Brockamp, 519 U. S., at 352. The federal civil removal stat-

utes have an "obvious concern with efficiency," BP p.l.c. v.

Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 593 U. S. 230, 245

(2021), and a "general interest in avoiding prolonged litiga- tion on threshold nonmerits questions," Powerex Corp. v.

Reliant Energy Services, Inc., 551 U. S. 224, 237 (2007). That is reflected not only in the short deadline for removal itself, but also in the strict 30-day deadline for seeking re- mand of a removed action, §1447(c), and the default rule that remand orders are not appealable, §1447(d); see

Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U. S. 633, 640-642 (2006) (explaining that this interest in efficiency and final- ity necessarily sacrifices some measure of accuracy). Allowing equitable tolling of §1446(b)(1)'s deadline would undermine Congress's manifest interest in resolving threshold removal questions early and conclusively. Under the rule the Court adopts today, plaintiffs that sue in state court usually can be confident that, after §1446(b)(1)'s dead- line has elapsed, the forum question has been put to rest and the case will proceed in the chosen court. Under the rule Enbridge favors, to the contrary, the possibility of a late removal would hang over a case, generating uncer- tainty and risking significant waste of resources in one fo- rum before a possible belated removal to another. Cf.

Beggerly, 524 U. S., at 49 (holding equitable tolling unavail-

able based in part on the "cloud of uncertainty" such tolling would produce, in a context where "certainty" was of "spe- cial importance"). Because Enbridge's approach would up- set the "balance struck by Congress" in the removal stat- utes, Hallstrom, 493 U. S., at 30, these underlying concerns provide yet another reason to conclude that equitable toll- ing is not available under §1446(b)(1).

11 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)

III Enbridge's counterarguments are not persuasive. It starts by attempting to raise the bar for rebutting the pre- sumption of equitable tolling. In its view, it is not enough to show that tolling is inconsistent with the overall statu- tory scheme; the question is instead whether Congress has provided the " 'clearest command' " that equitable tolling

should not apply. Brief for Petitioners 32 (quoting Holland

1. Florida, 560 U. S. 631, 646 (2010)). This Court, however, has never applied such a requirement in this context, and doing so would conflict with the Court's repeated holdings that the presumption has been rebutted where "Congress's choice is evident," Arellano, 598 U. S., at 14, where tolling would be "inconsistent with the text of the relevant stat- ute," Beggerly, 524 U. S., at 48, and where there is "good reason to believe that Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply," Brockamp, 519 U. S., at 350. None of these decisions required the "clearest command" that Enbridge demands. They simply looked to text, struc- ture, and context and asked if there were "good reasons" to conclude that tolling should not be available. As discussed 3 above, such reasons are present here. On the text of §1446(b)(1), Enbridge argues that the 30- day deadline is short and focused on litigants' conduct, not courts' authority, which (according to Enbridge) makes it akin to other provisions the Court has held subject to equi- table tolling. See, e.g., Boechler, 596 U. S., at 209. This Court, however, has found other deadlines that speak at least in part to a litigant's conduct, and with even shorter

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Enbridge relies heavily on this Court's use of the "clearest command"3

language in Holland v. Florida, 560 U. S. 631 (2010), but Holland used that language to explain why the presumption was "reinforced" in that case: The Court will not read a statute to " 'displace' " the " 'equitable principles' [that] have traditionally 'governed' the substantive law of ha- beas corpus . . . absent the 'clearest command.' " Id., at 646. That is a different issue than displacing the presumption of equitable tolling.

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deadlines, not to be subject to equitable tolling when sur- rounding context led to that conclusion. See, e.g.,

Brockamp, 519 U. S., at 351, 354 (claim had to " 'be filed by

the taxpayer' " within certain periods); cf. Nutraceutical, 586 U. S., at 191, 194 (similar, with 14-day window). 4

Seeking to discount the many exceptions to §1446(b)(1)'s deadline, Enbridge disputes whether they are really "excep- tions" at all. As to §1446(b)(3), which applies to later-"as- certained" removability, Enbridge argues it is more akin to an accrual rule for a limitations period, which this Court has distinguished from a true " 'exception[n].'" Holland, 560 U. S., at 647. Even if so, however, that would not ac- count for the separate "bad faith" exception to the 1-year deadline for diversity cases in §1446(c)(1). Nor does Enbridge's rejoinder account for the many other provisions, outside of §1446, expressly allowing courts to toll §1446(b)(1)'s 30-day deadline "for cause shown" and the like. See supra, at 9. Enbridge labels these as "comprehen- sive legislation targeting a particular area for reform," not "exception[s] to Section 1446(b)." Reply Brief 16-17; see id., at 16-20. The problem is that, in the most important re- spect, these statutes are not "comprehensive": They do not set their own deadlines, but rely on §1446(b)(1) and modify it. Critically, they often do so precisely to allow considera- tion of the very same equitable factors that, on Enbridge's theory, are already built into §1446(b)(1). Enbridge also suggests that because these exceptions are located outside

------------ Enbridge tries to distinguish Brockamp on the ground that it set forth 4 its deadline in a "highly detailed technical manner." United States v.

Brockamp, 519 U. S. 347, 350 (1997). It is unclear, however, that 28

1. S. C. §1446(b)(1), with its two alternative deadlines, choice of which- ever period is "shorter," and many exceptions, is meaningfully less "de- tailed" than the statute in Brockamp. 519 U. S., at 351 (discussing stat- ute prohibiting claims for tax refunds " 'within 3 years from the time the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of such periods expires the later, or if no return was filed . . . within 2 years from the time the tax was paid' ").

13 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)

of §1446 itself, they should carry less force. The Court, how- ever, has already disapproved of such "[l]aser focu[s]" on a single provision in isolation. Arellano, 598 U. S., at 12. In- stead, courts must consider equitable tolling's "incon- gruen[ce] with the statutory scheme" overall. Id., at 13. The fact that the timing "scheme" here is set forth in provi- sions that extend beyond §1446 is not a meaningful differ- ence from Arellano. Enbridge also attempts to distinguish this case from Arel-

lano on the ground that the timing rule at issue in Arellano had 16 distinct exceptions while §1446(b)(1) has fewer, and points out that this Court has found equitable tolling to ap- ply even when a deadline has an explicit exception. See,

e.g., Holland, 560 U. S., at 647-648. Enbridge is correct on

the numbers, but this inquiry is not a mere counting exer- cise. In Holland, the key point was not that there was only one exception. It was that the exception at issue (tolling the time for seeking federal habeas relief while an application for state postconviction relief is pending) was "easily ex- plained" by a "special need for an express provision" ac- counting for state-court litigation, which "undermine[d]" any inference that Congress did not intend for equitable tolling more broadly to apply. Id., at 648; see Young, 535

1. S., at 53 (similar). Here, to the contrary, Enbridge can- not identify any sensible reason why Congress would have adopted so many express, specific equitable exceptions to §1446(b)(1) if equitable tolling was already available for be- lated removals across the board. Finally, Enbridge points to §1447(c)'s 30-day deadline for motions to remand, which does not apply if a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. As Enbridge sees it, Congress's requirement of remand even outside of the 30-day deadline for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, but not for other de- fects like untimeliness, suggests that Congress intended to treat untimeliness less harshly than the lack of jurisdiction, including by allowing equitable tolling. Enbridge's

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conclusion does not follow from its premises. Section 1447(c) reflects the unique stringency that applies to juris- dictional rules, which "cannot be waived or forfeited."

Boechler, 596 U. S., at 203; cf. Nutraceutical, 586 U. S., at 192 (explaining that even "mandatory" rules not subject to equitable tolling may be "subject to waiver and forfeiture"). As explained above, however, not all nonjurisdictional rules can be equitably tolled. See supra, at 6. The fact that §1447(c) requires remand at any time for jurisdictional de- fects, but not for nonjurisdictional defects like untimeli- ness, therefore in no way implies the availability of equita- ble tolling. 5 IV Assuming §1446(b)(1) is a statute of limitations and is therefore subject to the presumption of equitable tolling, the statute's text, structure, and surrounding context pro- vide good reason to find the presumption rebutted. Accord- ingly, §1446(b)(1)'s 30-day deadline cannot be equitably tolled. The Court of Appeals therefore correctly held that Enbridge's notice of removal was untimely and that this ac- tion must be remanded to the Michigan state court. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

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The Court resolves only the applicability of equitable tolling to5

§1446(b)(1), and does not resolve the applicability of other equitable doc- trines like waiver, forfeiture, and estoppel.