Estate of W. Lea, DA 25-0391, Affirmed

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April 21, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Estate of: W. Lea

Montana Supreme Court

• Citations: 2026 MT 85N
• Docket Number: DA 25-0391
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
• Nature of Suit: Direct Appeal

• Disposition: AFFIRMED

• Opinion

• Authorities (6)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (16K)

• PDF

Disposition

AFFIRMED

Combined Opinion

by Beth Baker

04/21/2026

DA 25-0391
Case Number: DA 25-0391

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2026 MT 85N

IN RE THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:

JOHN WILLIAM LEA, a/k/a WILLIAM LEA,

Deceased.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Tenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Judith Basin, Cause No. DP-2018-1
Honorable Heather M. Perry, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Bradley J. Jones, R. Spencer Bradford, Bulman Jones & Cook PLLC,
Missoula, Montana

For Appellee:

Evie J. Hudson, Lauren LaRance, Hudson Law PLLC, Great Falls,
Montana

Dale Schowengerdt, Landmark Law PLLC, Helena, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: February 25, 2026

Decided: April 21, 2026

Filed:

---

Clerk
Justice Beth Baker delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating

Rules, we decide this case by memorandum opinion. It shall not be cited and does not

serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this

Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana

Reports.

¶2 Stacey Kelly appeals the Tenth Judicial District Court’s order denying her motion

to set aside the final decree of distribution of her deceased husband’s estate. Stacey claims

that the District Court abused its discretion when it denied her motion, arguing that she is

entitled to relief under M. R. Civ. P. 60(b) because the personal representative failed to

notify her of the proceedings and failed to distribute to her sufficient assets to satisfy her

intestate share. Because Stacey failed to demonstrate that she is entitled to relief under

Rule 60(b), we affirm.

¶3 John W. Lea died intestate in January 2018. John was survived by his spouse Stacey

Kelly and two adult children from his prior marriage—Jakob and Johnna Lea. On

February 7, 2018, Stacey petitioned the Tenth Judicial District Court to appoint her the

personal representative of John’s estate. The court granted Stacey’s petition.

¶4 Nothing further occurred in the probate proceedings until Stacey’s then-counsel,

Kris Birdwell, moved to withdraw in August 2021. Mr. Birdwell said that Stacey was

unresponsive and that she failed to provide him with information necessary to administer

2
the estate. The court granted Mr. Birdwell’s motion, and Stacey did not obtain new

counsel.

¶5 In November 2021, Jakob petitioned the court to remove and replace Stacey as

personal representative for cause, claiming that she breached her duties to the estate. The

court set a hearing on Jakob’s petition for December 13, 2021. Stacey failed to appear at

the hearing. The court granted Jakob’s petition for removal, naming him the new personal

representative. The court ordered that Stacey “shall be liable” to Jakob and Johnna for any

damages and losses resulting from the breach of her fiduciary duties as personal

representative.

¶6 Jakob filed a petition in January 2024 for determination of heirs, adjudication of

intestacy, approval of final account, and for settlement and distribution of the estate. The

total value of the estate after expenses was approximately $2,000,000. Jakob alleged that

Stacey improperly transferred at least $56,000 from the estate’s account to her own

personal bank account during her time as personal representative. He therefore proposed

that, as part of the final distribution, Stacey receive (1) all property distributed to her while

she was serving as personal representative, including the $56,000; (2) her joint bank

account with John; (3) John’s retirement account of which she was a beneficiary; (4) John’s

2006 Pontiac Grand Prix; and (5) a release of liability for any damages that she caused by

breaching her fiduciary duties. Jakob proposed to distribute the “rest, residue and

remainder” of John’s estate equally between himself and Johnna. The court held a hearing

on Jakob’s petition on February 20, 2024. Although Jakob sent notice of the hearing to
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Stacey, she did not appear or object to the proposed distribution. The court ordered

distribution of the estate in accordance with Jakob’s petition that same day and discharged

him as the personal representative.

¶7 On February 19, 2025, after retaining new counsel, Stacey filed a motion under

M. R. Civ. P. 60(b) to set aside the decree of distribution and reopen the estate. Stacey

argued that the court should set aside the decree because Jakob failed to notify Stacey of

key developments in the case and that he failed to distribute to her the value of her intestate

share under § 72-2-112, MCA. Stacey also challenged the decree based on conduct that

occurred after the court ordered distribution.1 The District Court denied Stacey’s motion

and closed the case, reasoning that she failed to demonstrate that she was entitled to relief

under Rule 60(b). 2

¶8 Courts have authority to grant litigants relief from a final judgment upon a showing

of the circumstances enumerated in M. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)-(6), including “(1) mistake,

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; . . . (3) fraud . . . misrepresentation, or

misconduct by an opposing party; . . . or . . . applying [the judgment] prospectively is

no longer equitable . . . .” “Our standard of review of a district court’s ruling on a motion

1
Stacey alleged that in July 2024, Jakob agreed to deed her John’s property in Hobson, Montana,
if Stacey paid the property’s back taxes. Stacey claimed that although she delivered the funds to
Jakob, he had yet to transfer the property to her. Jakob responded that he transferred Stacey the
Hobson property in November 2024 and attached the deed as an exhibit.
2
Stacey also argued that the decree should be set aside because there remained a dispute regarding
who received title to John’s Chevrolet Silverado truck. On appeal, Stacey does not challenge the
court’s denial of her motion on this ground.
4
pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 60(b) depends on the nature of the final judgment, order, or

proceeding from which relief is sought and the specific basis of the Rule 60(b) motion.”

Essex Ins. Co. v. Moose’s Saloon, Inc., 2007 MT 202, ¶ 16, 338 Mont. 423, 166 P.3d 451

(citation omitted). We apply an abuse of discretion standard when the movant seeks relief

under subsections (1), (3), (5), and (6). Greater Missoula Area Fed’n of Early Childhood

Educators v. Child Start, Inc., 2009 MT 362, ¶ 17, 353 Mont. 201, 219 P.3d 881. A court

abuses its discretion when it “act[s] arbitrarily without employment of conscientious

judgment or exceed[s] the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice.” Essex Ins.

Co., ¶ 19 (quoting Jarvenpaa v. Glacier Elec. Coop., 1998 MT 306, ¶ 13, 292 Mont. 118,

970 P.2d 84).

¶9 Stacey claims that the District Court abused its discretion when it refused to grant

her motion to set aside the decree, raising the same arguments that she made to the District

Court regarding notice, the value of her intestate distribution, and the court’s failure to

consider evidence regarding the Hobson property.3 Stacey does not clearly identify the

subsections of Rule 60(b) under which she claims she is entitled to relief, but her argument

generally references the grounds set forth in subsections (1), (3), and (5). Jakob responds

3
Stacey also argues for the first time on appeal that Jakob violated her due process rights by failing
to notify her that Mr. Birdwell withdrew from the case. See § 37-61-405, MCA; U. Dist. Ct. R.
10. Because Stacey did not raise this issue in the District Court, we do not address it. Estate of
Harris v. Reilly, 2025 MT 126, ¶ 17, 422 Mont. 383, 570 P.3d 552 (“We generally do not consider
issues raised for the first time on appeal.” (citation omitted)).
5
that the District Court properly denied Stacey’s motion because it was merely an improper

substitute for an appeal and that she is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b).

¶10 We first address Stacey’s argument that Jakob violated her due process rights by

failing to properly notify her. Although Stacey concedes that Jakob mailed notices to the

address that she provided to the court, she claims that she did not receive these notices

because she frequently traveled for work and that Jakob knew how to contact her via other

methods and should have attempted to reach her through those methods. Section

72-1-301(1)(a), MCA, provides that notice is proper if mailed to a person’s address at least

fourteen days before a hearing. The record establishes that Jakob complied with

§ 72-1-301(1)(a), MCA’s notice requirements. Stacey did not request a different method

of service or provide an alternative address. See § 72-1-301(2), MCA (allowing the court

for good cause shown to provide different methods of giving notice of any hearing). Her

argument is therefore without support.

¶11 With respect to Stacey’s remaining arguments, this Court has recognized that a Rule

60(b) motion is not a substitute for direct appeal, Donovan v. Graff, 248 Mont. 21, 25, 808

P.2d 491, 494 (1991), and “must contain more than a request for rehearing or a request that

the [d]istrict [c]ourt change its mind.” Essex, ¶ 22 (internal quotations and citation

omitted). A party’s “failure to appeal for almost any reason is fatal to a motion to reopen

judgment under Rule 60(b).” Essex, ¶ 29 (quoting Koch v. Billings Sch. Dist. No. 2, 253

Mont. 261, 271, 833 P.2d 181, 187 (1992)).

6
¶12 Stacey did not object to Jakob’s proposed distribution of the estate, did not attend

the February 2024 distribution hearing, and did not appeal the court’s decree within the

time prescribed by law. See M. R. App. P. 4(5)(a)(i) (requiring litigants to file a notice of

appeal within thirty days from the date judgment is entered). Stacey’s Rule 60(b) motion

did not set forth the particular subsection under which she sought relief, nor did it contain

a legal or factual basis demonstrating that she was entitled to relief under the rule. The

District Court correctly recognized that Stacey’s arguments were substantive in nature and

that her motion was a “thinly veiled attempt to relitigate major estate issues.” Because

Stacey’s Rule 60(b) motion was in essence a motion for reconsideration of the decree of

distribution, the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Stacey’s motion.

¶13 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our

Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the

Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of

applicable standards of review. The District Court’s ruling denying Stacey’s motion to set

aside the decree was not an abuse of discretion. Its order is affirmed.

/S/ BETH BAKER

We Concur:

/S/ CORY J. SWANSON
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY
/S/ JIM RICE

7