Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish - Federal Officer Removal Jurisdiction

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CAll agree that as Chevron's corporate predecessor, the Texas Com-1

pany's acts were Chevron's acts for the purposes of this case. We thus refer to it as "Chevron."

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its permitting requirement "[i]ndividual specific uses le- gally commenced or established prior to the effective date of the coastal use permit program." §49:214.34(C)(2). In 2013, Plaquemines Parish, along with other parishes, filed 42 state-court suits against oil and gas companies un- der the Act. The parishes alleged that the companies lacked permits for their uses of the coastal zone, and that some of these uses, although initiated before 1980, were illegally commenced and not covered by the Act's exemption for uses that commenced before 1980. The State of Louisiana and its Department of Energy and Natural Resources inter- vened in support of the parishes. Plaquemines Parish filed an expert report in one of these suits that made clear that it intended to challenge certain defendants' crude-oil production during the Second World War. The report alleged that several uses had been illegally commenced during the war, making them "violations which provide the basis for defendant liability." Preliminary Ex- pert Report on Violations, No. 2:18-cv-5256 (ED La.), ECF Doc. 1-3, p. 4. As to Chevron, the report identified produc- tion activities in the Delacroix Island field, where Chevron began drilling in 1941. Specifically, the report alleged that Chevron failed to use steel tanks instead of earthen pits. It alleged that Chevron should not have used vertical-drilling methods, which allegedly harmed the environment more than alternative methods. And, it alleged that Chevron failed to equip Delacroix Island with sufficient roads for transportation and instead primarily used canals. The re- port alleged that these production activities showed "bad faith" and failed to protect the "marshland from contamina- tion and excessive land losses," making Chevron subject to liability under the Act. ECF Doc. 1-5, p. 35. All agree at this stage that this report reflects the parishes' general the- ories of liability across the 42 suits. Several defendants removed the suits against them un- der the federal officer removal statute. 28 U. S. C.

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§1442(a)(1). The removal effort focused on the connection between these 1940s allegations and the defendants' 1940s federal contracts. Because the allegations concerned their 1940s crude-oil production, the defendants argued that the suits "relat[ed] to" their contractual duties to refine crude oil into avgas for the military at the same time. In this case, the parish's suit challenged Chevron's con- duct at the Delta Duck Club field, where Chevron drilled during the war. Chevron removed on the theory that the suit alleged that Chevron illegally produced crude oil in the Delta Duck Club field, while it simultaneously served as an avgas refiner for the military. The parish's state-court com- plaint, like its expert report in the parallel case, alleged that Chevron's use of the coastal zone had been illegally commenced prior to the effective date of the Act, citing its crude-oil production processes, use of earthen pits, and dredging of canals. Chevron's notice of removal thus ar- gued that the complaint, alongside the parishes' report, showed that the parish would target acts related to its per- formance of federal duties during the war. The District Court rejected this argument and granted the parish's mo- tion to remand to state court. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court agreed with Chev- ron that it had "acted under" a federal officer because it re- fined crude oil into avgas as a military contractor.

Plaquemines Parish v. BP America Production Co., 103

1. 4th 324, 334-335 (2024). But, the Fifth Circuit con- cluded that the suit was not "for or relating to" those acts. It agreed that the complaint, when "read in conjunction with the [expert] report," targeted crude-oil production ac- tivities during the war. Id., at 337. Nonetheless, it con- cluded that this suit, despite challenging Chevron's crude- oil production, did not relate to the performance of Chev- ron's avgas refining contract because the contract did not specify how to acquire crude oil. Id., at 340-341.

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Judge Oldham dissented. He reasoned that crude oil was "indispensable" to avgas, such that its production neces- sarily related to Chevron's performance of its federal avgas refining duties. Id., at 348. We granted Chevron's petition for a writ of certiorari. 605 U. S. 1009 (2025). II We address whether this suit, which implicates Chev- ron's wartime production of crude oil, is "for or relating to" Chevron's wartime refining of crude oil into avgas for the military. 28 U. S. C. §1442(a)(1). Chevron's wartime 2 crude-oil production was closely connected to its wartime avgas refining, so the parish's suit challenging that crude- oil production relates to that refining. The phrase "relating to" sweeps broadly. It means " 'to stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to per- tain; refer; to bring into association with or connection with.' " Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U. S. 374, 383 (1992) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1158 (5th ed. 1979)). One thing can relate to another even if the connec- tion is "indirect." Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498

1. S. 133, 139 (1990). One thing can relate to another even if it was "not specifically designed to affect" it. Ibid. And, one thing can relate to another even without a "strict causal relationship." Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial

Dist. Court, 592 U. S. 351, 362 (2021); see also Altria Group,

Inc. v. Good, 555 U. S. 70, 85-86 (2008). Accordingly, a re-

moving defendant need not show that his federal duties

------------ AThe Fifth Circuit held that Chevron satisfied the first requirement of 2 the removal statute because it "act[ed] under" a federal officer when it refined crude oil into avgas for the military pursuant to a federal con- tract. No party disputes that Chevron acted under a federal officer in that capacity. We assume, without deciding, that it did.

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specifically required or strictly caused the challenged con- duct. See District of Columbia v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 89 3

1. 4th 144, 155 (CADC 2023) (collecting cases). The ordinary meaning of "relating to," however, is not "so broad that it is meaningless." Rutledge v. Pharmaceutical

Care Management Assn., 592 U. S. 80, 93 (2020) (T HOMAS, J., concurring). To be sure, in a literalist sense, "everything is related to everything else." California Div. of Labor

Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N. A., Inc.,

519 U. S. 316, 335 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring). But, gen- erally in statutory interpretation, "it is the ordinary, not lit- eralist, meaning that is the better one." Rutledge, 592 U. S., at 93 (T HOMAS, J., concurring); see A. Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 24 (1997) ("the good textualist is not a liter- alist"). The ordinary understanding of "relating to" requires a connection that is not "tenuous, remote, or peripheral."

Rutledge, 592 U. S., at 94 (T HOMAS, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). Ordinary readers would not un- derstand the statement that someone is " 'related to Joe' " to refer to "a mutual tie to Adam and Eve." Ibid. Nor would they understand the fluttering of a butterfly's wings to "re- late to" the next week's weather. And, in this context, they 4 would not understand the federal officer removal statute to reach all suits with any attenuated connection to federal

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Congress only recently adopted the "relating to" statutory language.3

Before 2011, the statute required that the suit be "for" an act under color of office. 28 U. S. C. §1442(a)(1) (2006 ed.). This Court had interpreted that language to require the removing defendant to "show a nexus, a ' "causal connection" between the charged conduct and asserted official authority.' " Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 U. S. 423, 431 (1999). In 2011, Congress broadened the statute by authorizing removal of suits "for or relating to" an act under color of office. §2(b), 125 Stat. 545.

Cf. E. Lorenz, Predictability: Does the Flap of a Butterfly's Wings in 4

Brazil Set Off a Tornado in Texas?, at the American Association for the Advancement of Science (Dec. 29, 1972) (describing what is now known as the butterfly effect).

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duties. For instance, the D. C. Circuit has held that a false- advertising suit targeting an oil company's statements to consumers about the future effects of fossil fuels on climate change did not relate to its decades-earlier production for the Government. See Exxon Mobil Corp., 89 F. 4th, at 156; see also Minnesota v. American Petroleum Inst., 63 F. 4th 703, 715 (CA8 2023). B Chevron's case fits comfortably within the ordinary meaning of a suit "relating to" the performance of federal duties. Chevron has plausibly alleged a close relationship between its challenged conduct and the performance of its federal duties--not a tenuous, remote, or peripheral one. Cf. Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U. S. 81, 89 (2014) (explaining that, when reviewing a remand to state court, we credit plausible factual allegations by the removing party).

This suit implicates Chevron's wartime efforts to produce and supply avgas' essential feedstock, so it is closely con- nected to Chevron's wartime avgas refining for the military. Much of the crude oil that Chevron produced in the Delta Duck Club field was ultimately used for its own avgas re- fining. And, as the Fifth Circuit assumed and no party dis- putes, this suit will challenge Chevron's actions that al- lowed it to increase its production of crude oil in the Delta Duck Club field during wartime. See 103 F. 4th, at 337. The parish's report alleged that Chevron's use of the coastal zone had been illegally commenced because of its reliance on vertical-drilling methods, canals, and earthen pits. See

ibid. But, using vertical-drilling methods "maximize[d]

production" of crude oil. App. 19. Using canals instead of building roads saved "time, materials, and manpower," re- sulting in more "timely oil production." Id., at 18. And, using earthen pits complied with the P. A. W.'s directive to preserve steel. See id., at 22; 6 Fed. Reg. 5880 (1941). If

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Chevron had refrained from these actions and produced less crude oil as a result, its avgas refining for the military may have suffered. Moreover, the Government emphasized the importance of increasing Chevron's crude-oil production to support avgas refining as part of the war effort. The P. A. W. identified Delta Duck Club as a " 'Critical Fiel[d ] Essential to the War

Program' " because it produced a " 'preferential' " kind of crude oil for refining avgas. App. 112-113. Under Chev-

ron's refining contract, the Government paid more for avgas when the price of obtaining crude oil increased. Meanwhile, the P. A. W. required the development of plans "to increase to a maximum the production of all grades of aviation gas- oline . . . in the shortest possible time," including by ad- dressing the need for components such as crude oil. 6 Fed. Reg. 6433-6434. And, the P. A. W.'s regulations required the vertical-drilling methods challenged by the parish as part of its effort to "provide adequate supplies of petroleum for military and other essential purposes." 8 Fed. Reg. 3955; see id., at 3957. In this all-hands-on-deck, wartime context, Chevron needed to produce more crude oil as quickly as possible to facilitate more avgas refining, includ- ing its own. Chevron has therefore satisfied the "relating to" require- ment. This suit implicates acts by Chevron that are closely connected to the performance of its federal duties. 5 We disagree with the Fifth Circuit's two main reasons for ruling to the contrary. First, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that Chevron's refining contract did not specify how to obtain or produce crude oil, so Chevron's crude-oil production was unrelated to the

------------ CWe do not resolve whether the defendants in the related cases can 5 satisfy the "for or relating to" requirement. We also do not address the other requirements of federal officer removal.

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performance of its federal refining duties. 103 F. 4th, at

1. But, the ordinary meaning of "relating to" does not require the defendant to show that his federal duties spe- cifically invited his challenged conduct. See, supra, at 7-8. For example, we have held in the preemption context that a state law can "relate to" benefit plans even when the law was "not specifically designed to affect such plans."

Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U. S., at 139. Likewise, Chevron's con- tract did not have to expressly direct or invite Chevron's crude-oil production for that conduct to "relate to" its avgas refining. Second, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the P. A. W.'s al- location of crude oil to refineries severed any relation be- tween producing and refining. 103 F. 4th, at 344. But, as this Court's decision in Morales illustrates, an act can re- late to its consequences even when the causal chain in- cludes actions by intermediaries. Morales concerned whether state rules for advertising " 'relat[ed]' " to airline " 'rates' " and were therefore preempted by a federal statute. 504 U. S., at 378-379. This Court explained that if States restrict advertising, the market puts less pressure on air- lines to "price competitively." Id., at 388 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, advertising rules related to rates, even though advertising affects rates only through the acts of an intermediary, the consumer. Id., at 389. Likewise, producing crude oil relates to refining it into avgas, even if the P. A. W. acted as an intermediary allocating the crude oil to refineries. D Finally, we disagree with Louisiana's argument that it should prevail on an alternative theory. On Louisiana's view, this case should not turn on the meaning of "relating to" at all. Instead, Louisiana argues, the removal statute requires that the defendant was "acting under" a federal of- ficer in taking the specific actions challenged in the suit.

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Brief for Respondent State of Louisiana et al. 18, 21. Loui- siana does not dispute that Chevron acted under a federal officer while engaged in avgas refining. But, because Chev- ron did not produce crude oil pursuant to a federal contract, Louisiana reasons that the suit is not against a defendant "acting under" an officer. Louisiana's theory is not consistent with the statutory text. The statute permits the removal of state-court suits against "any officer (or any person acting under that of- ficer)" that are "for or relating to any act under color of such office." 28 U. S. C. §1442(a)(1). It contemplates removal of suits against officers or their agents for acts that were not done under color of their offices, so long as the suits "relat[e] to" such acts. Louisiana's interpretation would leave the "relating to" requirement with little, if any, independent function. As the Fifth Circuit explained, Louisiana's inter- pretation "impermissibly conflates the 'distinct' 'acting un- der' and 'connected or associated with' elements of the fed- eral officer removal test." 103 F. 4th, at 335. We generally do not read a statute "in a way that makes part of it redun- dant." National Assn. of Home Builders v. Defenders of

Wildlife, 551 U. S. 644, 669 (2007).

III The Fifth Circuit erred in concluding at this stage that the suit against Chevron was not "for or relating to" its per- formance of federal duties. Accordingly, we vacate the judg- ment of the Fifth Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

JUSTICE ALITO took no part in the decision of this case.

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No. 24-813

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CHEVRON USA INCORPORATED, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. PLAQUEMINES PARISH, LOUISIANA, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT [April 17, 2026]

JUSTICE JACKSON, concurring in the judgment. The Court correctly holds that the underlying lawsuit is "for or relating to" Chevron's acts done "under color of [fed- eral] office." 28 U. S. C. §1442(a)(1); see ante, at 12. But I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the federal officer removal statute's "for or relating to" language re- quires only an indirect relationship between the conduct targeted by the lawsuit and the asserted federal duties. See

ante, at 7-8. In my view, the statute demands more.

Understood in the context of its statutory and legislative history, §1442(a)(1) requires a causal nexus between the targeted conduct and the federal duties, as I explain below. Chevron satisfies the causal-nexus requirement on the facts presented here, so I agree that the Fifth Circuit's rul- ing must be vacated. I therefore respectfully concur only in the majority's judgment. I A Since 1948, Congress has authorized federal officers, and people acting under federal officers, to remove lawsuits brought "for any act under color of [federal] office." Act of June 25, 1948, §1442(a)(1), 62 Stat. 938. We interpreted this statutory language to require "a causal connection

between the charged conduct and asserted official author- ity." Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U. S. 402, 409 (1969) (in- ternal quotation marks omitted). In other words, we held that the federal directive giving rise to the authority to act must be a but-for cause of the conduct challenged by the lawsuit. See Maryland v. Soper, 270 U. S. 9, 33 (1926) (ex- plaining that, under a similar statute, a federal official could remove a prosecution to federal court if the case was "based on or arises out of the acts he did under authority of federal law in the discharge of his duty and only by reason thereof "); accord, Willingham, 395 U. S., at 409. Congress amended the federal officer removal statute in 2011, adding the "or relating to" language. See Removal Clarification Act of 2011, §2(b), 125 Stat. 545. The question the Court answers today is what this addition means. In responding to this inquiry, the majority considers in isolation the "ordinary meaning" of the phrase "relating to."

Ante, at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted). Based on our

case law interpreting that phrase in other contexts, the ma- jority concludes that this language requires only an indirect relationship between the conduct alleged in the lawsuit and the asserted federal duties. Ante, at 7-9. Accordingly, in the majority's view, Congress's addition of "or relating to" jettisoned the causal-nexus test in favor of a looser stand- ard. Ante, at 8, and n. 3. I think the Court should interpret the "relating to" addi- tion primarily by determining what Congress intended to accomplish with this amendment. Learning Resources, Inc.

1. Trump, 607 U. S. __, _-__ (2026) (J BACKSON, J., con- curring in part and concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 1- 2). Indeed, the Court's "fundamental task" in interpreting federal statutes is to give effect to Congress's intent. R. Katzmann, Judging Statutes 31 (2014) (Katzmann); see

Pennington v. Coxe, 2 Cranch 33, 59 (1804) (opinion for the

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Court by Marshall, C. J.) ("It is the duty of the court to dis- cover the intention of the legislature, and to respect that intention"). And the Court faithfully discharges this duty when it considers all reliable evidence of Congress's in- tent--including statutory and legislative history. See

United States v. Hansen, 599 U. S. 762, 775 (2023) ("Statu-

tory history is an important part of [the] context" in which we interpret text); Katzmann 38 ("Legislative history . . . can help [judges] understand what the law means"). Here, the statutory and legislative history is clear: Con- gress did not set out to change the causal-nexus require- ment with its 2011 amendment. Rather, the "relating to" addition was motivated by a problem entirely separate from the causal-nexus requirement. At the time of the amendment, 40 States had laws au- thorizing private parties to compel document production or depositions before they commenced a lawsuit. See Removal Clarification Act of 2010: Hearing on H. R. 5281 before the Subcommittee on Courts and Competition Policy of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 111th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (2010) (House Hearings).* Federal officers were some- times the target of such presuit discovery proceedings.

1. R. Rep. No. 112-17, pt. 1, pp. 3-4 (2011) (H. R. Rep.).
   Courts were split, however, on whether federal officers could remove presuit discovery proceedings to federal court under §1442(a)(1). House Hearings, at 1-2; compare Price

2. Johnson, 600 F. 3d 460, 462 (CA5 2010) (reviewing Dis-
   trict Court order determining such a proceeding was not re- movable), with In re Subpoena In Collins, 524 F. 3d 249, 251 (CADC 2008) (determining such a proceeding was re- movable).

------------ *The House Hearings were for a predecessor bill proposed the year be- fore the Removal Clarification Act was passed. That predecessor bill in- cluded the "or relating to" language that was ultimately enacted. See

1. R. 5281, 111th Cong., 2d Sess., §2(b)(2) (2010). 4 CHEVRON USA INC. v. PLAQUEMINES PARISH J

Congress amended the federal officer removal statute to clarify that presuit discovery proceedings targeting federal officers were removable. H. R. Rep., at 4. Congress made substantive changes to that end; for example, it specifically stated that "any proceeding" in which "a judicial order, in- cluding a subpoena for testimony or documents, is sought or issued" was removable. §2(a)(1), 125 Stat. 545 (codified at 28 U. S. C. §1442(d)(1)); see H. R. Rep., at 4. Congress also made several "conforming amendments." §2(b), 125 Stat. 545. The addition of the "or relating to" lan- guage to §1442(a)(1) was one of them. 125 Stat. 545 (refer- ring to this change as a "conforming amendment"); accord, House Hearings, at 44 (describing this as a "minor chang[e] to existing §1442(a) [to] make it consistent" with the sub- stantive changes). The addition of "or relating to" was not a substantive change. C That the addition of "or relating to" was a "conforming amendment" is meaningful. Congress rarely changes the substance of a statute through "mere conforming amend- ment[s]." INS v. Stevic, 467 U. S. 407, 428 (1984). Such amendments are typically "minor tweak[s]," intended to harmonize or clarify amended statutory provisions. Cyan,

Inc. v. Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund, 583

1. S. 416, 430 (2018); accord, Stevic, 467 U. S., at 428. Thus, it would be passing strange to conclude that "Con- gress made a radical--but entirely implicit--change" to the standard for federal officer removal through a conforming amendment. Director of Revenue of Mo. v. CoBank ACB, 531 U. S. 316, 324 (2001). And indeed, the legislative history here confirms that Congress did no such thing. It makes crystal clear that the Removal Clarification Act was "not changing the underly- ing removal law," but was instead simply clarifying that §1442 would apply "anytime a legal demand is made on a

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Federal officer for any act done under their official capac- ity." House Hearings, at 2; see id., at 13 (testimony of the House General Counsel that the bill "does not alter the standard for general removal for Federal officer removal under [§]1442"); id., at 17 ("[U]nder the terms of the bill . . . , each of the currently existing requirements of the federal officer removal statute still must be met for removal to be permitted"); 157 Cong. Rec. 2792 (2011) (statement of Rep. Jackson Lee that the bill "does not make any changes to the underlying removal law"). Moreover, the history es- tablishes that Congress knew the removal law it was amending required a causal nexus. See H. R. Rep., at 3 ("Federal officers . . . must demonstrate a causal connection between the charged conduct and asserted official author- ity"). So, with full knowledge of the causal-nexus test, Con- gress made only a "conforming" change--it did not alter the substantive requirements for removal. This is not to say that the "or relating to" language served no purpose. By adding it, Congress confirmed that sub- poena enforcement and presuit discovery proceedings "fall within the scope of Section 1442." House Hearings, at 20 (testimony of the House General Counsel). The nature of presuit discovery proceedings necessitated such confirmation. Presuit discovery proceedings seek to get information, not to accuse the target of engaging in un- lawful conduct. Thus, to describe a subpoena or a deposi- tion as being "for" unlawful conduct is factually inaccurate. If the statute permitted removal of only those proceedings that are "for" federally directed conduct, then arguably that statutory provision would not authorize removal of presuit discovery proceedings. But presuit discovery proceedings

are "related to" a defendant's federally directed conduct. See Brief for Former Governor John Bel Edwards as Ami-

cus Curiae 12-13. So, "[b]ecause the amended §1442 would now include proceedings that do not seek to impose civil li- ability or a criminal penalty on the federal officer, [the

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statute] allows removal not only in proceedings 'for' acts un- der color of the federal office but also in proceedings 'relat- ing to' such acts." House Hearings, at 68 (statement of Ar- thur D. Hellman, University of Pittsburgh School of Law). In short, by adding "or relating to," Congress confirmed that the substantive changes "broaden[ed] the universe of acts that enable Federal officers to remove to Federal court." H. R. Rep., at 6. The amendment clarified that pre- suit discovery proceedings were squarely within "the uni- verse of acts" that a federal officer could remove. But Con- gress did not intend to change any of the underlying removal requirements--including the causal-nexus test. II Although the majority and I interpret the "for or relating to" requirement differently, we agree that the state lawsuit here satisfies this requirement. The lawsuit targets Chev- ron's crude-oil production activities. And as the majority explains, Chevron's predecessor contracted with the Fed- eral Government during the Second World War to produce aviation gasoline ("avgas"), a product refined from crude oil.

Ante, at 3-4.

Chevron used much of the crude oil it pumped from its Louisiana oil fields to refine into avgas during the war. This was no accident. The crude oil from Chevron's Louisi- ana fields was particularly well-suited for refining into avgas, and the Federal Government pushed its refiners, in- cluding Chevron, to produce more and more avgas. Ante, at

1. This in turn demanded an ever-increasing supply of crude oil. Ibid. Chevron therefore produced crude oil, at least in part, to meet the demands of its federal contracts-- satisfying the causal-nexus requirement. The Fifth Circuit erred in concluding that the removal statute's "for or relating to" requirement was not met under the circumstances presented here. It faulted Chevron for failing to identify a specific contractual directive

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"pertaining to oil production." Plaquemines Parish v. BP

America Production Co., 103 F. 4th 324, 341 (2024). But

Chevron's federal contracts can be a but-for cause of the challenged crude-oil production without specifically di- recting that production. Because the Fifth Circuit's contractual-directive demand goes a step further than even the causal-nexus test, I agree with the majority that the Fifth Circuit's judgment must be vacated.