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March 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Kenneth Carey v. Jonathan Kirk

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25-11748
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Nature of Suit: CON

• Opinion

• Authorities (9)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (11.3K)

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Combined Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-10866 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 03/26/2026 Page: 1 of 11

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 25-10866
Non-Argument Calendar

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KENNETH CAREY,
STEVE ANYADIKE,
Plaintiffs-Counter Defendants-Appellants,

versus

JONATHAN KIRK,
Individually, a.k.a. DaBaby,
Defendant-Counter Claimant-Appellee,
KHALIK CALDWELL,
a.k.a. Stunna 4 Vegas, et al.,
Defendants,
UNIVERSAL MUSIC GROUP, INC.,
a Colorado Corporation,
INTERSCOPE RECORDS,
USCA11 Case: 25-10866 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 03/26/2026 Page: 2 of 11

2 Opinion of the Court 25-10866

a Colorado Corporation,
Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-20408-JEM

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No. 25-11748
Non-Argument Calendar

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KENNETH CAREY,
STEVE ANYADIKE,
Plaintiffs-Counter Defendants-Appellants,
JONATHAN MAY,
THE LIONS’ DEN, ATTORNEY’S AT LAW,
Interested parties-Appellants,
versus

JONATHAN KIRK,
Individually, a.k.a. DaBaby,
Defendant-Counter Claimant-Appellee,
KHALIK CALDWELL,
a.k.a. Stunna 4 Vegas, et al.,
Defendants,
UNIVERSAL MUSIC GROUP, INC.,
a Colorado Corporation,
INTERSCOPE RECORDS,
USCA11 Case: 25-10866 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 03/26/2026 Page: 3 of 11

25-10866 Opinion of the Court 3

a Colorado Corporation,
Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-20408-JEM

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Before ABUDU, ANDERSON, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This consolidated appeal concerns three related motions for
sanctions. First, Defendants-Appellees Jonathan Kirk (Kirk) and Bil-
lion Dollar Baby Entertainment, LLC (BDBE) moved for sanctions
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c). Second, Defend-
ants-Appellees Universal Music Group, Inc. (UMGI) and Interscope
Records (Interscope) moved for sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 11(c). 1 These first two motions sought sanctions
against Plaintiffs-Appellants Kenneth Carey and Steve Anyadike
(collectively, Appellants), Appellants’ counsel Jonathan May, Esq.,
and May’s law firm, The Lions’ Den, Attorneys at Law,2 in connec-
tion with Appellants’ civil conspiracy claims, which were dismissed
by the district court. Last, Kirk moved for sanctions including an
award of attorney’s fees against Appellants’ counsel and renewed a

1 When referencing all Defendants together, we will identify them as Appel-

lees.
2 For the sake of clarity, we will refer to May and Lions’ Den as Appellants’

counsel for the remainder of the opinion.
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4 Opinion of the Court 25-10866

motion for fees, seeking sanctions under both 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and
the court’s inherent authority.
On appeal, Appellants argue that the district court abused its
discretion when it imposed sanctions against Appellants’ counsel,
and the court abused its discretion when it denied their motion to
recuse the district judge. After careful review, we affirm.
I. Background
Appellants are music event planners that book rap artists for
performances, and Kirk is a rap artist professionally known as
“DaBaby.” In January 2020, Kirk and Appellants entered into a con-
tract where Kirk agreed to appear at Café Iguana Pines in Pem-
broke Pines, Florida, for a party hosted by another artist. Kirk also
agreed to promote his presence at the event on social media. Hours
before the event was set to begin, Kirk and Appellants had an alter-
cation at the Novotel Hotel over payment. These interactions form
the basis of Appellants’ claims in this case.
In November 2021, Appellants, through their counsel, sued
Appellees, asserting eight claims: (1) breach of contract; (2) inten-
tional assault; (3) intentional battery; (4) promissory estoppel;
(5) civil conspiracy; (6) defamation; (7) intentional infliction of
emotional distress; and (8) civil theft. Relevant to this appeal, the
complaint alleged the existence of a conspiracy between Appellees
that “implemented a Marketing Plan and Scheme/Show that in-
cludes attacking and hurting innocent people, mostly African
USCA11 Case: 25-10866 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 03/26/2026 Page: 5 of 11

25-10866 Opinion of the Court 5

Americans, for the purposes of gaining news coverage and notori-
ety for their financial gain and they have gained incredible amounts
of influence and power from their illegal, criminal scheme.”
Kirk and BDBE jointly moved to dismiss the amended com-
plaint. Before the motion to dismiss was fully briefed, Kirk and
BDBE jointly moved for summary judgment. BDBE moved for
summary judgment against Appellants on all seven claims against
it, and Kirk moved for summary judgment against both Appellants
on all claims except the following: breach of contract by Anyadike
only, assault, and battery. Appellants moved for summary judg-
ment against Kirk and BDBE on all eight claims. While these were
pending, Kirk and BDBE moved for sanctions pursuant to Rule
11(c). UMGI and Interscope each independently moved to dismiss
the amended complaint. The court granted both motions to dis-
miss. Then UMGI and Interscope moved for similar sanctions un-
der Rule 11(c).
The court denied Kirk and BDBE’s motion to dismiss as
moot. The court granted summary judgment to BDBE on all
claims against it, granted Kirk summary judgment in part, and
granted Anyadike summary judgment in part. 3
The only claims that remained for trial were Anyadike’s
breach of contract claim against Kirk, a determination of damages

3 The district court granted summary judgment for Kirk on the following

claims: breach of contract by Carey, promissory estoppel, civil conspiracy, def-
amation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil theft. The court
granted summary judgment for Anyadike on the assault and battery claims.
USCA11 Case: 25-10866 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 03/26/2026 Page: 6 of 11

6 Opinion of the Court 25-10866

for Anyadike’s assault and battery claims against Kirk, Carey’s as-
sault and battery claims against Kirk, and Kirk’s two counterclaims
against Appellants for common law invasion of privacy and unau-
thorized use of name or likeness. These claims ended in a jury ver-
dict. After a trial in December 2022, the jury awarded Anyadike
$100 on his assault and battery claims against Kirk and awarded
Kirk $100 on his counterclaims against Appellants. Kirk was found
not liable for Carey’s alleged assault and battery.
After trial, the court held a sanctions hearing. Following our
prior affirmance of the appeal on the merits, Carey v. Kirk, No. 23-
10308, 2024 WL 3200475, at *2 (11th Cir. June 27, 2024) (per cu-
riam), the district court imposed Rule 11 sanctions against Appel-
lants’ counsel and denied sanctions against Appellants individually.
Carey v. Kirk, No. 21-20408-CIV, 2025 WL 850256, at *2 (S.D. Fla.
Feb. 13, 2025). The court found that Appellees were entitled to
sanctions because Appellants’ counsel should have been aware that
the civil conspiracy claims were frivolous. Id. at *25. The court de-
nied the § 1927 sanctions motion, finding any damages from Appel-
lants’ pursuit of frivolous claims were “redressed by the Rule 11
motions.” Id. at *2, *25.
Over two years after the close of trial, Appellants moved to
recuse the district judge, which was denied two days later. Appel-
lants timely appealed that order. The district court issued an order
on the amount of attorney’s fees. The total fees awarded against
Appellants’ counsel amounted to $984,451. Appellants timely ap-
pealed that order.
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25-10866 Opinion of the Court 7

II. Sanctions
Appellants’ counsel first argues that the sanctions imposed
by the district court against them were improper and should be dis-
missed. 4 “We review a district court’s imposition of Rule 11 sanc-
tions for abuse of discretion.” Gulisano v. Burlington, Inc., 34 F.4th
935, 941 (11th Cir. 2022). “A district court abuses its discretion if it
applies an incorrect legal standard, follows improper procedures in
making the determination, or bases the decision upon findings of
fact that are clearly erroneous.” Peer v. Lewis, 606 F.3d 1306, 1311
(11th Cir. 2010).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 “imposes an affirmative
duty on an attorney to conduct a reasonable inquiry into both the
facts and the law before filing a pleading or motion.” Gulisano, 34
F.4th at 942. If an attorney violates that duty, then the district court
“may impose an appropriate sanction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1). We
have held that a district court may impose Rule 11 sanctions in

4 Appellants’ brief does not clearly challenge the award of attorney’s fees. Ap-

pellants’ counsel argues only that “the amount of sanctions was improper” and
“award[ing] fees to a nonexisting party does not make sense.” Later in their
reply brief, they argue that the fees were “improper and extraordinarily
harsh.” But “[w]e have long held that an appellant abandons a claim when he
either makes only passing references to it or raises it in a perfunctory manner
without supporting arguments and authority.” Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins.
Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014). Appellants’ counsel has not offered a
single factual or legal argument in support of his challenge of attorney’s fees.
While we liberally construe a pro se litigant’s arguments, May, as a barred Flor-
ida attorney, has the requisite expertise to properly brief these issues and failed
to do so in remarkable fashion. Thus, the argument is abandoned. Id. at 683.
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8 Opinion of the Court 25-10866

three specific circumstances: “(1) when a party files a pleading that
has no reasonable factual basis; (2) when the party files a pleading
that is based on a legal theory that has no reasonable chance of suc-
cess and that cannot be advanced as a reasonable argument to
change existing law; or (3) when the party files a pleading in bad
faith for an improper purpose.” Worldwide Primates, Inc. v. McGreal,
87 F.3d 1252, 1254 (11th Cir. 1996) (quotation marks omitted).
In deciding whether to impose Rule 11 sanctions, courts
consider “(1) whether the party’s claims are objectively frivolous;
and (2) whether the person who signed the pleadings should have
been aware that they were frivolous.” Gulisano, 34 F.4th at 942
(quotation marks omitted). “A legal claim is frivolous when it has
no reasonable chance of succeeding.” Id. “A factual claim is frivo-
lous when it has no reasonable factual basis.” Id.
The court did not abuse its discretion by imposing sanctions
against Appellants’ Counsel. Appellants’ counsel argues that there
was sufficient factual and legal support for the conspiracy claim
against Appellees. We disagree. The well-reasoned district court
sanctions order provides extensive detail of their failure to provide
any factual or legal support for Appellants’ conspiracy claim. On
appeal, Appellants’ counsel has failed to present us with any record
evidence or law that challenges the district court order. Instead,
Appellants’ counsel briefly relies on evidence that was inadmissible
at trial under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), other unrelated
high-profile criminal cases, and their own opinion speculating
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25-10866 Opinion of the Court 9

about the conspiracy. The district court provided Appellants’ coun-
sel with ample time to investigate and produce relevant facts. Their
failure to do so is a clear indication that the claims were frivolous.
Additionally, Appellants’ counsel relies on the frivolous legal
argument that Kirk and BDBE, a company that Kirk solely owns,
conspired to perpetuate violence. “Simply put, under the doctrine
[of intracorporate conspiracy], a corporation cannot conspire with
its employees, and its employees, when acting in the scope of their
employment, cannot conspire among themselves.” McAndrew v.
Lockheed Martin Corp., 206 F.3d 1031, 1036 (11th Cir. 2000). Kirk, as
the sole employee of BDBE, cannot conspire against himself. The
district court was correct in finding that Appellants’ counsel have
presented “no argument to overcome or change the intra-corpo-
rate conspiracy doctrine, much less a reasonable one.” Carey, 2025
WL 850256, at *30. 5
In the continued absence of any factual or legal support for
the claims of conspiracy, we affirm the district court’s imposition
of sanctions against Appellants’ counsel.

5 Appellants’ counsel argues for the first time on appeal that the personal stake

exception applies to the conspiracy claim. “Under this exception, where an
agent has a personal stake in the activities separate from the principal’s inter-
est, the agent can be liable for civil conspiracy.” Mancinelli v. Davis, 217 So. 3d
1034, 1037 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (quotation marks omitted). But Appel-
lants’ counsel has provided no factual support for this alternative conspiracy
theory. Thus, the claim is frivolous because it has no chance of succeeding. See
Gulisano v. Burlington, Inc., 34 F.4th 935, 942 (11th Cir. 2022).
USCA11 Case: 25-10866 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 03/26/2026 Page: 10 of 11

10 Opinion of the Court 25-10866

III. Recusal
Next, Appellants argue that the district court erred in deny-
ing their motion to recuse the district judge. We review a district
court’s denial of a recusal motion for abuse of discretion. Loranger
v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 779 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
A federal judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 455 (a). The test under section 455(a) “is whether an objective, dis-
interested, lay observer fully informed of the facts underlying the
grounds on which recusal was sought would entertain a significant
doubt about the judge’s impartiality.” Parker v. Connors Steel Co.,
855 F.2d 1510, 1524 (11th Cir. 1988). “Disqualification under sec-
tion 455(a) is required only when the alleged bias is personal in na-
ture,” meaning that it stems from an extra-judicial source. Loranger,
10 F.3d at 780.
Appellants have not shown that the district judge abused his
discretion for failing to recuse himself. Appellants argue that the
sanctions imposed on Appellants’ counsel along with statements
made during trial “would lead a lay person to gain considerable
doubt about the judge’s impartiality.” Both arguments are merit-
less. First, an adverse judicial ruling alone “almost never consti-
tute[s] a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” Liteky v. United
States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). On its own, the sanctions order is
not enough to question the district court’s impartiality. The order
was replete with well-reasoned arguments and specific examples of
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25-10866 Opinion of the Court 11

Appellants’ counsel’ failure to provide support for his conspiracy
claim.
Second, the statements that Appellants identify as a source
of personal bias are at most “expressions of impatience, dissatisfac-
tion, annoyance, and even anger.” Id. at 555–56. Appellants suggest
nothing from the record that would support a finding of “deep-
seated and unequivocal antagonism.” Id. at 556. After reviewing
the comments cited by Appellants in the full context of the trial,
there is clear evidence of frustration by the district court. But frus-
tration alone does not amount to bias. We have found nothing in
the record that gives us “significant doubt” about the district
court’s impartiality. See Parker, 855 F.2d at 1524.
Appellants have not shown any evidence of judicial bias,
much less an abuse of discretion. Thus, we affirm the denial of the
motion to recuse.
AFFIRMED.