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March 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

S.K. v. P.K.

Ohio Court of Appeals

• Citations: 2026 Ohio 1048
• Docket Number: 115392

• Judges: S. Gallagher

• Opinion

• Authorities (10)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (1.7K)

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Syllabus

Medical records; privilege; waiver; R.C. 2317.02; protective order. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The domestic relations court erred by not granting a protective order to limit the dissemination of the medical records to anyone other than the parties and their counsel of record, or any experts or professionals retained by counsel in preparation for trial. Notwithstanding, the trial court did not err by denying plaintiff's request to preclude the defendant from reviewing the materially relevant evidence to assist in preparation of the case.

Combined Opinion

[Cite as S.K. v. P.K., 2026-Ohio-1048.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

S.K., :

Plaintiff-Appellant, :
No. 115392
v. :

P.K., :

Defendant-Appellee. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 26, 2026

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Domestic Relations Division
Case No. DR-23-396537

Appearances:

Thurman Baron, LLC, Adam J. Thurman, and Erik B.
Quattro, for appellant.

Kvale Antonelli & Raj and Manav H. Raj, for appellee.

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:

S.K. appeals the trial court’s decision denying her motion for

protective order, which sought to prevent P.K. from reviewing her medical records,
which were in the possession of, and reviewed by, S.K.’s retained expert. For the

following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

In light of the interlocutory nature of this appeal, our recitation of

the underlying facts is unnecessary. In this divorce proceeding, S.K. retained an

expert to review her medical records, which she concedes are relevant to the

question of spousal support. P.K., through his attorney, issued a subpoena to that

expert to obtain

[a]ny and all documents, records (medical or otherwise), recordings,
videos, tests, laboratory results, or information utilized or reviewed by
yourself in the preparation and completion of your professional
medical opinion report relative to [S.K.] dated May 8, 2025.

Although narrowly tailored to only obtain the medical records for which S.K.

waived her privilege by producing them to her retained expert, S.K. filed a motion

for a protective order. The primary focus of that motion was S.K.’s “substantial

concerns about the disclosure of her medical records and private health

information directly to [P.K.], who is employed by University Hospitals as Deputy

General Counsel, the hospital system in which Plaintiff has received most, if not

all, of her medical care.” S.K. sought an order

preventing the disclosure of [her] private health information and
medical records to any individual other than counsel for the parties, or
any experts or professionals retained by counsel in preparation of trial,
and for an order specifically preventing the disclosure of Plaintiff’s
private health information and medical records to [P.K.].

P.K. generally objected to the request, focusing on the relevance of the information

requested and the waiver of privilege based on the records being submitted to S.K.’s

retained expert in the underlying litigation. P.K. does not appear to object to a
preclusion against disseminating the medical records to third parties unrelated to

the litigation.

The trial court denied the motion for protective order and compelled

the expert to produce the requested records. This appeal followed in which S.K.

asserts a single assignment of error claiming the trial court abused its discretion by

denying the motion for protective order, which would preclude the defendant from

reviewing the relevant evidence pertinent to S.K.’s claims.1

The decision denying a motion for protective order is reviewed for an

abuse of discretion. Clinical Technology, Inc. v. NeuroTherm, Inc., 2013-Ohio-

3739, ¶ 4 (8th Dist.), citing Scanlon v. Scanlon, 2013-Ohio-2694, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.).

“A trial court abuses its discretion when it exercises its judgment in an unwarranted

way regarding a matter over which it has discretionary authority.” Palmieri v.

Palmieri, 2024-Ohio-2720, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.), citing Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-

Ohio-3304, ¶ 35. If the discovery issue involves a recognized privilege, “the

appropriate standard of review is determined by whether the asserted privilege

raises a question of law or fact.” 12312 Mayfield Rd. LLC v. High & Low Little Italy,

LLC, 2024-Ohio-2717, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.), citing Randall v. Cantwell Mach. Co., 2013-

Ohio-2744, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.), and MA Equip. Leasing I, L.L.C. v. Tilton, 2012-Ohio-

1 Although P.K. discusses the jurisdictional question regarding whether a final

appealable order exists, it has been concluded that the denial of a protective order and the
compelling production of privileged material satisfies the jurisdictional question because
it both grants a provisional remedy and no timely appeal would remedy the disclosure.
Razick v. Tayeh, 2023-Ohio-3063, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.).
4668, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.). The determination of whether the privilege applies requires

a de novo review, but any factual questions fall under the abuse-of-discretion

standard. Id., citing State v. Kelley, 2024-Ohio-157, ¶ 31 (8th Dist.), and Randall.

Because S.K. concedes that she waived the physician-patient privilege

with respect to the medical records produced to her expert for the purposes of the

underlying litigation, there is little dispute as to the discoverability of those specific

records. See R.C. 2317.02(B)(1)(a)(i), (iii) (physician-patient privilege is waived by

the consent of the patient or through the filing of a claim by the patient);

Friedenberg v. Friedenberg, 2020-Ohio-3345, ¶ 39 (The “filing of this divorce

action, with claims for child custody and spousal support, triggered the R.C.

2317.02(B)(1)(a)(iii) exception to the privilege for communications that relate

causally or historically to physical or mental injuries relevant to issues in the divorce

action”). The issue in this appeal is twofold: S.K. seeks to preclude P.K. from

reviewing the discovery material and, in addition, an order prohibiting

dissemination of the medical records to third parties not retained or employed by

counsel.

S.K. has not demonstrated good cause for imposing a protection order

precluding P.K. from reviewing evidence relevant and material to S.K.’s claims. In

fact, no case authority was provided to justify such a specific request. See State v.

Quarterman, 2014-Ohio-4034, ¶ 19, citing State v. Bodyke, 2010-Ohio-2424, ¶ 78

(O’Donnell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (the parties, not an

appellate court, bear the burden of advancing and supporting an argument with
citations to legal authority and facts in the record). Litigants in general have a right

to review the evidence deemed relevant to the claims in any pending action to assist

in preparation of the case. See Civ.R. 26(B)(1) (“Parties may obtain discovery

regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.”)

“In determining whether to grant a protective order, a trial court must balance the

competing interests to be served by allowing discovery to proceed against the harm

which may result.” Alpha Benefits Agency v. King Ins. Agency, 731 N.E.2d 1209

(8th Dist. 1999), citing Arnold v. Am. Natl. Red Cross, 639 N.E.2d 484 (8th Dist.

1994). General privacy concerns cannot override a plaintiff’s limited waiver of the

privilege that occurs through making their medical records relevant to proceedings.

In this case, S.K. made the medical records requested relevant by sharing those with

her expert. P.K. is entitled to review that material in preparation for trial.

P.K.’s appellate argument focuses solely on the relevance of the

material sought but is silent as to the dissemination of materials outside the orbits

of this litigation. See Friedenberg, 2020-Ohio-3345, at ¶ 39 (affirming the trial

court’s procedure of conducting an in camera review of the materials and after

determining the materials relevant, releasing those materials subject to a protective

order). The medical records requested are relevant and material. In light of the

sensitive nature of the documents to be produced, the complete denial of the

protective order was in error. Without a protective order, parties to a lawsuit are

generally permitted to disseminate discovered materials to whom they wish. See,

e.g., Byrd v. U.S. Xpress, 2014-Ohio-5733, ¶ 22 (1st Dist.), citing Jepson Inc. v.
Makita Elec. Works, Ltd., 30 F.3d 854, 858 (7th Cir. 1994). We recognize that

general proposition does not fully apply to medical records produced in the course

of litigation based on the limited nature of the waiver of the physician-patient

privilege. In Hageman v. Southwest Gen. Health Ctr., 2008-Ohio-3343, paragraph

one of the syllabus, for example, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[a]n attorney

may be liable to an opposing party for the unauthorized disclosure of that party’s

medical information that was obtained through litigation.” Notwithstanding, given

the limitations placed on the dissemination of personal and confidential medical

records obtained for the purpose of litigation based on the limited waiver by a

patient for the purposes of litigation, the expeditious course of action is to explicitly

preclude dissemination of those records beyond the case and parties when that

limitation is requested through a protective order. This step simply eliminates any

confusion as to the scope of the waiver at issue and applies to preclude P.K. from

using any of the records beyond the litigation, in part quelling S.K.’s stated concern.

The domestic relations court erred by not granting a protective order

to limit the dissemination of the medical records to anyone other than the parties

and their counsel of record, or any experts or professionals retained by counsel in

preparation for trial. In light of the lack of objection to that request, the protective

order should have been granted in part. Notwithstanding, the trial court did not err

by denying S.K.’s request to preclude P.K. from reviewing the discovery material to

assist in preparation of the case.
Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further

proceedings.

It is ordered that appellant and appellee share costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

---

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

LISA B. FORBES, P.J., and
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR