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March 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

United States v. Raul Colon-Ocasio

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 24-13252
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Nature of Suit: NEW

• Opinion

• Authorities (8)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (34.2K)

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Combined Opinion

USCA11 Case: 24-13252 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 03/26/2026 Page: 1 of 6

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

No. 24-13252
Non-Argument Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus

RAUL COLON-OCASIO,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 2:23-cr-00041-TPB-KCD-1

Before ABUDU, ANDERSON, and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Raul Colon-Ocasio appeals his statutory maxi-
mum sentence of 840 months’ imprisonment, including supervised
USCA11 Case: 24-13252 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 03/26/2026 Page: 2 of 6

2 Opinion of the Court 24-13252

release for life, based on his convictions for two counts of child por-
nography and one count of possession and access with intent to
view child pornography. Colon-Ocasio argues that his sentence
was substantively unreasonable because the district court placed
too much emphasis and weight on the need to protect the public
while not giving meaningful consideration to the mitigating factors
he presented at sentencing. Having reviewed the record and read
the parties’ briefs, we affirm Colon-Ocasio’s sentence.
I.
We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence un-
der a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard considering the total-
ity of the circumstances. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128
S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). A district court abuses its discretion when it
(1) fails to consider relevant factors that were due significant
weight, (2) gives an improper or irrelevant factor significant
weight, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment by balancing the
proper factors unreasonably. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160,
1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). The party challenging the sentence
bears the burden of showing that the sentence is unreasonable in
light of the record, the factors listed in § 3553(a), and the substantial
deference afforded to sentencing courts. United States v.
Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015).
II.
Under § 3553(a), the district court must impose a sentence
that is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to reflect the seri-
ousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, to provide
USCA11 Case: 24-13252 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 03/26/2026 Page: 3 of 6

24-13252 Opinion of the Court 3

just punishment for the offense, to afford adequate deterrence, and
to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant. 18
U.S.C. § 3553 (a). The court must also consider the nature and cir-
cumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the de-
fendant, the applicable Guidelines range, any pertinent policy state-
ments from the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwar-
ranted sentence disparities among similarly situated defendants,
and the need to provide restitution to any of the defendant’s vic-
tims. Id.
Although the district court is required to consider all rele-
vant § 3553(a) factors, “the weight given to each factor is commit-
ted to the sound discretion of the district court,” and the court may
attach great weight to one factor over the others. United States v.
Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2022). The court does not
have to state explicitly on the record that it has considered all the
factors or expressly discuss each factor. United States v. Al Jaberi, 97
F.4th 1310, 1330 (11th Cir. 2024). “Instead, an acknowledgment
the district court has considered the defendant’s arguments and the
§ 3553(a) factors will suffice.” Id. (quotation marks omitted, alter-
ations adopted). Furthermore, “it is within the district court’s dis-
cretion to find that a factor the defendant argues to be mitigating is
instead aggravating.” United States v. Boone, 97 F.4th 1331, 1343
(11th Cir. 2024) (holding that the court acted within its discretion
when it found the defendant’s military service placed him in a po-
sition of trust and authority, making him more dangerous).
USCA11 Case: 24-13252 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 03/26/2026 Page: 4 of 6

4 Opinion of the Court 24-13252

We ordinarily expect sentences within a defendant’s guide-
line range to be reasonable. United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191,
1220 (11th Cir. 2009). We have upheld as substantively reasonable
lengthy sentences based on consecutive statutory maximums for
cases involving sex crimes. See, e.g., Boone, 97 F.4th at 1338 (up-
holding as reasonable an 840-month sentence, based on consecu-
tive statutory maximums, for sexually abusing a 4-year-old and pro-
ducing child pornography of the abuse); United States v. Isaac, 987
F.3d 980, 983-84, 988, 996 (11th Cir. 2021) (upholding as reasonable
a 960-month sentence, based on consecutive statutory maximums,
for sexually abusing a 13-year-old victim, creating child pornogra-
phy of the abuse, and possessing other child pornography); Sarras,
575 F.3d at 1196, 1209, 1221 (upholding as reasonable a 1,200-
month sentence, based on consecutive statutory maximums, for
persuading a minor child to engage in sexually explicit activity for
the purpose of producing child pornography).
III.
Colon-Ocasio argues that the district court abused its discre-
tion by giving too much weight to the “protection of the public”
factor while failing to weigh properly his mental health mitigating
factors. Colon-Ocasio claims that the district court incorrectly con-
verted his mitigating evidence into an aggravating factor. Based on
our review of the record, we disagree.
The record demonstrates that the district court’s 840-month
sentence is substantively reasonable because the court considered
USCA11 Case: 24-13252 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 03/26/2026 Page: 5 of 6

24-13252 Opinion of the Court 5

the § 3553(a) factors to adequately reflect the seriousness of the of-
fense, to protect the public, and to provide adequate deterrence,
and it did not commit a clear error in judgment in its assessment of
the relevant factors. The district court properly balanced Colon-
Ocasio’s history as a sexual abuse victim, struggles with mental ill-
ness and drug abuse, and difficult childhood against the seriousness
of his offenses and the tremendous danger he posed to the public
because of his repeated predatory behavior toward young women
aged 14 to 16. The district court considered the relationship be-
tween Colon-Ocasio’s mental illness and his offenses, noting that
the mental illness causes Colon-Ocasio to do things that harm
other people.
Additionally, the district court imposed a within-the-guide-
lines range sentence. See Sarras, 575 F.3d at 1220 (we ordinarily
expect a sentence within the guideline range to be reasonable).
The PSI provided for an enhanced offense level because Colon-
Ocasio’s offenses were serious, and he was a repeat and dangerous
sex offender who had victimized children under the age of 16.
These enhancements did not account for additional aggravating
factors such as his exploitation of his underage victims’ desire for
drugs, his months-long sexual relationship with one of his victims,
and his solicitation of children to reach and attempt to exploit other
children. Those factors and his repeated sexual abuse of children
warrant his 840-month sentence. See Boone, 97 F.4th at 1338; Butler,
39 F.4th at 1351-54.
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6 Opinion of the Court 24-13252

We conclude, based on the record, that the district court
considered the proper sentencing factors and Colon-Ocasio’s miti-
gating evidence in imposing a reasonable sentence. The district
court has great discretion in weighing the sentencing factors, and
it has broad discretion to find that a factor the defendant argues is
mitigating is, instead, aggravating. Boone, 97 F.4th at 1343. The
district court acted within its discretion when it concluded that Co-
lon-Ocasio posed a greater threat to the public and required specific
deterrence because he suffered a mental illness that caused him to
hurt other people and prevented him from controlling his deviant
sexual behavior. In sum, because the district court did not consider
any improper sentencing factors, considered all relevant factors,
and did not commit any clear error in judgment in its analysis of
the factors, we conclude that it did not abuse its discretion in im-
posing the statutory maximum sentence, and Colon-Ocasio’s sen-
tence is substantively reasonable.
Accordingly, based on the aforementioned reasons, we af-
firm Colon-Ocasio’s 840-month sentence.
AFFIRMED.