Dillon Grundman Habeas Petition Denied

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April 10, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Dillon Grundman v. Department of Justice et. al.

District Court, S.D. Illinois

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 3:26-cv-00152

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (5)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (32.3K)

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Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DILLON GRUNDMAN,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 26-CV-00152-SPM

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE et. al.,

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

McGLYNN, District Judge:
Petitioner Dillon Grundman is a federal inmate presently housed at Federal
Correctional Institution Greenville in Illinois. He filed the instant Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). The case is now before the
Court for a preliminary review of the Petition pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules
Governing § 2254 cases in the United States District Courts. Rule 1(b) gives this
Court the authority to apply these Rules to Section 2241 cases. For the reasons set
forth below, the Petition is DENIED.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 21, 2022, Grundman was sentenced to 114 months in prison and three
years of supervised release after he pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a drug
user, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922 (g)(3) and 924(a)(2). United States v. Grundman,
No. 21-CR-02040-001 (N.D. Iowa 2022) (Doc. 51). His sentence was later reduced to
102 months in prison and three years of supervised release. Id. (Doc. 63).
Grundman filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on February
11, 2026, challenging the Bureau of Prisons’ (“BOP”) assignment of Prisoner
Assessment Tool Targeting Estimated Risks and Needs (“PATTERN”) recidivism
score points for programs completed and the process to petition the warden to apply
earned First Step Act (“FSA”) credits. (Doc. 1). First, Grundman argues that prisoners

should be able to continue to reduce their PATTERN recidivism score by completing
programs throughout the term of their imprisonment, instead of receiving PATTERN
recidivism score reductions for only the first eleven programs completed. (Id.).
Grundman asserts that he has already completed eleven programs, and that due to
the structure of the PATTERN recidivism scores, the eleven-program cap prevents
him from achieving a low/minimum risk score that would entitle him to earn fifteen
days per month of earned time credits and have those credits automatically apply to

his sentence. (Id.). Instead, as a high recidivism risk inmate, Grundman must
petition the warden to apply his credits only after his earned credits equal the time
remaining on his sentence. (Id.). He argues that this application is contrary to the
legislative intent behind the statute. (Id.). Second, Grundman argues that the fact
that he can petition the warden for release only every six months during his program
reviews and that the warden consults with the regional director is inconsistent with

the FSA. (Id.).
Grundman acknowledges that he has fewer time credits than the remaining
time under his sentence. (Id.). He does not ask that he be released, but rather he
requests that the Court direct the BOP and the Department of Justice to
“fix/correct/amend their polic[ie]s regarding the First Step Act . . . .” (Id.).
DISCUSSION
The Supreme Court has established that habeas petitions are appropriate only
where “success in [the] action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of
confinement or duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005). A federal

inmate may challenge the application of potential sentence credits in the calculation
of his or her sentence in a § 2241 petition, Setser v. United States, 566 U.S. 231, 244 (2012), but a prisoner has “no constitutional or inherent right” in being released prior
to the completion of a valid sentence, Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr.
Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). If a relevant statute places no “substantive limitations
on official discretion” in granting an early release from a valid sentence, no
constitutionally protected liberty interest is implicated. Olim v. Wakinekona, [461

U.S. 238, 249](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110921/olim-v-wakinekona/#249) (1983).
The FSA delegates to the Attorney General the authority to develop “a risk and
needs assessment system” used for the purpose of “determin[ing] the recidivism risk
of each prisoner as part of the intake process, and classify[ing] each prisoner as
having minimum, low, medium, or high risk for recidivism.” 18 U.S.C. § 3632 (a)(1).
This assessment system is used for: (1) determining an inmate’s recidivism risk; (2)

assessing an inmate’s risk of violent or serious misconduct; (3) determining the type
and amount of evidence-based recidivism reduction (“EBRR”) programming
appropriate for each inmate; (4) periodically assessing an inmate’s recidivism risk;
(5) reassigning an inmate to appropriate EBRR programs and productive activities;
(6) determining when to provide incentives and rewards for successful participation
in EBRR programs and productive activities; and (7) determining when the inmate is
ready to transfer to pre-release custody or supervised release. 28 U.S.C. § 3632 (a).
To be eligible for FSA early release, an inmate must “[have] shown through the
periodic risk reassessments a demonstrated recidivism risk reduction or [have]
maintained a minimum or low recidivism risk [during the term of imprisonment].” 18

U.S.C. § 3624 (g)(1)(B); see 28 C.F.R. § 523.44 (b). For placement in prerelease custody,
§ 3624(g) requires that the inmate “has been determined under the System to be a
minimum or low risk to recidivate pursuant to the last 2 reassessments of the
prisoner” or that the placement was specifically approved by the cognizant Warden. 18 U.S.C. § 3624 (g)(1)(D)(i). In a similar fashion, for early transfer to supervised
release, § 3624(g) requires that the inmate “has been determined under the System
to be a minimum or low risk to recidivate pursuant to the last reassessment.” 18

U.S.C. § 3624 (g)(1)(D)(ii).
Because Grundman has a “high” PATTERN score, he can accrue (but not use)
FSA time credits to reduce his sentence. (See Doc. 1). Instead, he must petition the
warden after he has accrued FSA time credits equivalent to the remainder of his
sentence. (See id.). Grundman argues that BOP is failing to execute the will of
Congress in the FSA. (See id.).

There is, however, a critical error with this argument. Although the Supreme
Court has stated that state statute-mandated time credits create a liberty interest,
“the Constitution itself does not guarantee good-time credit for satisfactory behavior
while in prison.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974). The FSA establishes
only that prisoners can earn good-time credits; it does not establish that good-time
credits are statutorily required. The FSA good-time credit system is executed in
accordance with regulations promulgated by BOP in the Federal Register. FSA Time
Credits, 87 Fed. Reg. 2705 (Jan. 19, 2022) (to be codified at 28 CFR pts. 523, 541). As
the Department of Justice has authority to establish regulations to implement the
FSA in BOP, both usage of PATTERN as one of the factors considered in award of

FSA time credits and the petition system for high-risk offenders to receive their good
time credits are reasonable. Grundman, thus, does not have a constitutionally
protected liberty interest that is cognizable in a § 2241 petition.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Grundman’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is DENIED and this case is DISMISSED with
PREJUDICE as it plainly appears that he is not entitled to relief. The Clerk of Court

is DIRECTED to close this case and enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 10, 2026

s/ Stephen P. McGlynn
STEPHEN P. McGLYNN
U.S. District Judge