Daniels v. Warden - Motion for Reconsideration Denied

Jump To

Top Caption Trial Court Document The text of this document was obtained by analyzing a scanned document and may have typos.

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

April 9, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

David Lee Daniels II v. Warden, Joseph Harp Correctional Center

District Court, W.D. Oklahoma

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 5:25-cv-01085

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (18)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (1.1K)

• PDF

Trial Court Document

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

DAVID LEE DANIELS II, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-25-1085-R
)
WARDEN, JOSEPH HARP )
CORRECTIONAL CENTER, )
)
Respondent. )

ORDER
Before the Court is Petitioner’s1 Motion for Reconsideration [Doc. Nos. 11, 11-1].
In a previous Order [Doc. No. 9], the Court adopted the Report and Recommendation [Doc.
No. 7] issued by United States Magistrate Judge Shon T. Erwin recommending that
Petitioner’s request for habeas relief be dismissed. The Order found the Court lacked
jurisdiction over the habeas petition because it was second or successive and Petitioner had
not complied with 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b)(3)(A): “Before a second or successive application
. . . is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals
for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.”
Because Petitioner’s Motion was filed within 28 days of entry of judgment,2 it is
most appropriately considered under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). “Rule 59(e)

1 Because Petitioner is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his motion liberally but does
not act as his advocate. See Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).

2 Though ECF reflects the Motion was filed on January 30, 2026 (thirty days after entry of
judgment), the envelope within which Petitioner mailed his Motion to the courthouse was
stamped on January 27, 2026, which falls within 28 days of this Court’s entry of judgment
relief is available in limited circumstances, including ‘(1) an intervening change in the
controlling law, (2) when new evidence previously was unavailable, and (3) the need to

correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.’” Hayes Family Tr. v. State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co., 845 F.3d 997, 1004 (10th Cir. 2017) (brackets omitted) (quoting Servants of the
Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000)). “Thus, a motion for
reconsideration is appropriate where the court has misapprehended the facts, a party’s
position, or the controlling law” but “not appropriate to revisit issues already addressed or
advance arguments that could have been raised in prior briefing.” Servants of the Paraclete, 204 F.3d at 1012.
Petitioner argues reconsideration is necessary to correct clear error and prevent
manifest injustice, but his Motion fails to meet the Rule 59(e) standard.
First, Petitioner contends this Court improperly relied upon Parker v. Tensley, No.
CIV-25-767-D, 2025 WL 3443227 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 1, 2025) because it is an unpublished,

non-final decision. Petitioner supports his argument with a citation to Tenth Circuit Rule
32.1(A), which states that “citation of unpublished decisions is permitted as authorized in
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1. Unpublished decisions are not precedential, but
may be cited for their persuasive value.” (emphasis added).3

[Doc. No. 11-2]. “[T]he ‘prisoner mailbox rule’ provides that an inmate’s pleadings are
deemed filed as of the date on which they are deposited into the appropriate prison mailing
system.” Lockaby v. Young, 42 F. App’x 313, 318 (10th Cir. 2002) (unpublished) (citing
Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 275-76 (1988)).

3 “A court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of federal judicial opinions[ or] orders .
. . that have been . . . designated as ‘unpublished,’ ‘not for publication,’ ‘non-precedential,’
‘not precedent,’ or the like.” FED. R. APP. P. 32.1.
In response, the Court will quote from Tronox Inc. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp.,
14-CV-5495 (JPO), 2025 WL 2242166, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2025):

[Petitioner’s] argument is baseless . . . because [Parker] is exactly as
“nonprecedential” as every other district court opinion. Unlike appellate
court decisions, district court decisions are not precedential in the strict sense
of the word: they are not binding on other courts or judges—even judges in
the same district—in subsequent cases. See Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S.
692, 709 n.7 (2011).

As far as district court opinions go, both
a district court opinion that is published in the Federal Supplement reporter,
giving it an “F. Supp. 3d” citation, and an opinion published only on a
computerized database such as Westlaw or Lexis[,] . . . can be and are
routinely cited for their persuasive value, and both can be rejected when other
judges and courts find that they lack persuasive force. . . . District court
opinions can, however, provide persuasive guidance for those in similar or
distinguishable situations, making them “not merely the property of private
litigants.” See U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18,
26 (1994). Id. (footnote omitted).

While non-binding, the Tronox decision is persuasive to this Court. Citing Parker
was not improper. Nowhere did the Court state that it viewed Parker as “binding
precedent.” The Court engaged in its own review of Petitioner’s arguments and the law
relevant to the decision made in its Order, found Parker persuasive, and ruled accordingly.4
Petitioner next argues his Petition was not second or successive because (1) it was
the first challenge to a new judgment and (2) his claims were not ripe at the time of his

4 Petitioner devotes part of his briefing to distinguishing Parker from the facts of his case.
But it does not change the fact that, like the Petitioner in Parker, he is challenging
Oklahoma’s post-conviction proceedings, something which, as discussed below, is not
cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding.
prior habeas petitions. See Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 331 (2010) (a prisoner’s
later resentencing “led to a new judgment, and his first application challenging that new

judgment cannot be ‘second or successive’ such that § 2244(b) would apply”); Brewer v.
Drummond, 751 F. Supp. 3d. 1246 (N.D. Okla. 2024) (habeas petition was not successive
where facts underlying the claims did not exist before the conclusion of the prior habeas
petition). The Court disagreed with Petitioner, who now raises arguments similar to those
in his Objection, claiming that denial of relief under the Oklahoma Survivors’ Act was a
new judgment and/or new factual predicate that allows Petitioner to overcome the second

or successive procedural bar.
The OSA, OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1090.1, et seq., establishes sentence mitigations
for qualifying prisoners who are survivors of domestic violence and other abuse. Petitioner
filed an application for relief pursuant to the OSA, but his application was denied. He
argues the denial of his OSA application violated his constitutional rights.

This Court found Petitioner’s challenge to the denial of his OSA application was a
challenge to Oklahoma’s post-conviction procedure under the OSA, and such a challenge
was not a cognizable basis for a habeas petition. Indeed, as the Court said in its Order, and
as the Tenth Circuit has stated:
Many states, like Oklahoma, provide post-conviction remedies even though
they’re not constitutionally required. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S.
551, 556-57 (1987) (concluding that states have no constitutional obligation
to provide post-conviction relief). Given the availability of these remedies, a
defendant might seek habeas relief based on a state court’s errors in the
postconviction proceedings. But habeas relief is unavailable when the error
involves only the post-conviction procedures rather than the imposition of
the conviction or sentence. See Sellers v. Ward, 135 F.3d 1333, 1339 (10th
Cir. 1998) [].
Graham v. White, 101 F.4th 1199, 1205 (10th Cir. 2024) (citation altered).
Petitioner insists his challenge to the denial of his OSA application is not merely a
challenge to state post-conviction procedures. But the Oklahoma Supreme Court has
spoken on whether proceedings for resentencing under the OSA are classified as

postconviction relief:
Under the Survivors’ Act, a sentencing hearing is defined as “a
postconviction hearing in which the defendant is brought before the court for
imposition of a sentence.” OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1090.2(5). In the same way,
a resentencing hearing would also be classified as a postconviction hearing
as it entails relief available only after a person has been convicted of a crime.
Therefore, we conclude that, based on the plain language of the statute, the
proceedings for resentencing under the Survivors’ Act are indeed
postconviction relief.

Pybas v. Crites, 578 P.3d 1209, 1212-13 (Okla. 2025) (citation altered) (finding prohibition
on Oklahoma Indigent Defense System’s representation of indigent defendants in
postconviction proceedings applied to OSA postconviction resentencing proceedings).
Thus, postconviction proceedings pursuant to the OSA are considered
“postconviction relief.” “[B]ecause the constitutional error [Petitioner] raises focuses only
on the State’s post-conviction remedy and not the judgment which provides the basis for
his incarceration, it states no cognizable federal habeas claim.” Sellers, 135 F.3d at 1339;
see also Steele v. Young, 11 F.3d 1518, 1524 (10th Cir. 1993) (a challenge to Oklahoma’s
post-conviction procedures, on its face and as applied to the petitioner, is not cognizable in
a federal habeas proceeding); Jackson v. Ray, 292 F. App’x 737, 740 (10th Cir. 2008)
(unpublished) (“Habeas relief under § 2254 is granted only for errors in the state judgment
forming the basis for incarceration. If that judgment was proper, there is no ground for
habeas relief based on flaws in state postconviction proceedings.”); Parker, 2025 WL
3443227, at *2 (where the “crux” of petitioner’s § 2254 petition was his dissatisfaction

with the state district court’s denial of resentencing under the OSA, he stated no cognizable
habeas claim). Petitioner’s challenges based on his OSA application’s denial are challenges
only to Oklahoma’s postconviction procedure. These challenges cannot form the basis of a
habeas petition.5
Petitioner next argues the recent publication of neuroscientific research from
Virginia Tech (indicating childhood maltreatment causes brain development delays that

increase risk of impaired judgment) is a new factual predicate that is grounds for
overcoming the second/successive bar. Despite the Court’s Order stating that the
publication of the new research was not a new factual predicate for Petitioner’s claims,
Petitioner insists otherwise.
A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under
section 2254 that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed
unless . . . the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered
previously through the exercise of due diligence; and . . . the facts underlying
the claim . . . would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would
have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

5 Petitioner briefly reasserts the argument that the denial of his OSA application was a new
judgment, and thus his habeas Petition challenging that denial is not second or successive.
The Court rejected this argument in its Order and will not engage with it further. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).6 Petitioner’s arguments on this point are primarily a
regurgitation of those he made in his Objection to the Report; the Court has already stated

it cannot characterize the publications as a newly discovered factual predicate.
The factual basis for Petitioner’s claim—that Petitioner’s history of childhood
sexual abuse affected his ability to adhere to the law—existed long before the publication
of the Virginia Tech research. See Thompson v. Bryant, 750 F. App’x 708, 710 (10th Cir.
2018) (unpublished) (quoting United States v. Williams, 790 F.3d 1059, 1068 (10th Cir.
2015)) (exception to the bar on unauthorized successive § 2254 motions applies “‘where

the factual basis for a claim does not yet exist—not where it has simply not yet been
discovered—at the time of a defendant’s first motion’”). Petitioner himself cited countless
sources, available well before 2024, that indicated long-term maltreatment can cause
deficits in cognitive systems essential for lawful behavior. One of the sources Petitioner
cited was published as long ago as 2003. Moreover, Petitioner stated in his Petition: “At

the time of sentencing (2015), substantial research was available documenting childhood
sexual abuse effects on brain development as acquired brain injuries. . . . A competent
neuropsychological evaluation would have established the connection between Mr.
Daniels’ documented abuse and his compromised decision-making capacity.” Pet. at p. 31.
Although the Virginia Tech research may have bolstered Petitioner’s claims, given

6 See also McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013) (holding “actual innocence . . .
serves as a gateway through which a petitioner may pass whether the impediment is a
procedural bar . . . or . . . expiration of the statute of limitations,” but indicating such a
standard is difficult to meet because a petitioner must persuade the court no reasonable
juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt).
Petitioner’s own assertions that he could have established his diminished decision-making
capacity based on the research available at the time of his sentencing, the Court cannot
conclude the Virginia Tech research qualifies as a new factual predicate7 for Petitioner’s

habeas petition that could not have been discovered even with due diligence.8
Thus, because Petitioner’s claims regarding the denial of his OSA application are
not cognizable on habeas, and neither the Virginia Tech publications nor the denial of
Petitioner’s OSA application constitute new factual predicates or new judgments, the Court
lacks jurisdiction over Petitioner’s second or successive Petition.

Petitioner argues that even if the Court lacks jurisdiction over his Petition, it should
have transferred the matter to the Tenth Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631. “When a
second or successive § 2254 [] claim is filed in the district court without the required
authorization from [the Tenth Circuit], the district court may transfer the matter to [the
Tenth Circuit] if it determines it is in the interest of justice to do so under § 1631, or it may

7 Petitioner also appears to argue that the second/successive bar should not apply to his
claims because they did not ripen until the publication of the Virginia Tech research. See
Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 947 (2007); In re Weathersby, 717 F.3d 1108, 1111 (10th Cir. 2013). But the Tenth Circuit in Weathersby indicated a claim is not second or
successive if the basis for the claim didn’t exist during the prior habeas proceedings. Id. The Court reiterates that, even though the Virginia Tech research had not yet been
published, the factual basis for Petitioner’s claims was available long before his prior
habeas proceedings—Petitioner himself admitted this in his Petition.

8 Petitioner briefly argues the Virginia Tech research also forms a new factual predicate for
his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. This is a recycled argument the Court
already rejected in its Order. Moreover, the Court’s decision that the Virginia Tech research
does not qualify as a new factual predicate applies to this claim as well. Petitioner posits
that he could not have raised his current IAC claim until the publication of the Virginia
Tech research—but because such research does not qualify as a new factual predicate, his
IAC claim is barred as second or successive.
dismiss the motion or petition for lack of jurisdiction.” In re Cline, 531 F.3d 1249, 1252 (10th Cir. 2008). When “there is no risk that a meritorious successive claim will be lost

absent a § 1631 transfer, a district court does not abuse its discretion if it concludes it is not
in the interest of justice to transfer the matter.” Id. Petitioner merely restates the arguments
he presented in his Petition or Objection when arguing this Court should have transferred
the matter. The Court already considered and rejected these arguments.9
And finally, Petitioner insists that even if the Court finds the Petition second or
successive, the merits of his constitutional claims demonstrate manifest injustice will result

if the Order is not reconsidered. The Court has already found it lacks jurisdiction over his
claims and thus cannot consider the merits.
In any event, Petitioner states that all the constitutional violations he asserts “[t]race
[b]ack to the OSA [d]enial.” Doc. No. 11 at p. 11. As this Court has already stated, such
claims are not cognizable in a habeas petition. In Petitioner’s own words, “[i]f the OSA

application had been heard properly, these [constitutional] violations would not exist. . . .
All arguments must tie back to the OSA application for resentencing to ensure a fair
hearing.” Id. at pp. 11-12. Claims based upon Petitioner’s clear dissatisfaction with
postconviction proceedings related to his OSA application are not cognizable in a federal
habeas proceeding.

9 This hearkens back to a letter written by Judge Wayne Alley regarding motions for
reconsideration. There, Judge Alley asked, “Is there some misapprehension widely held in
the bar that our court, in ruling on a motion after it is fully briefed, is just hitting a fungo?”
62 Okla. B.J. 108 (1991); also cited in United States v. Cos, 498 F.3d 1115, 1123 n.2 (10th
Cir. 2007).
Accordingly, Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration [Doc. Nos. 11, 11-1] is
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 9" day of April, 2026.

DAVID L. RUSSELL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

10