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March 2, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Raul Montes v. City of Chicago

District Court, N.D. Illinois

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:25-cv-00918

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (19)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Trial Court Document

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

RAUL MONTES, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Case No. 1: 25-cv-00918

v. )

) Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman

CITY OF CHICAGO, )

)

Defendant. )

           MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                              
Plaintiff,  Raul  Montes  (“Plaintiff”),  brought  suit  against  Defendant,  City  of  Chicago 

(“Defendant”), alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause, violations of the Illinois Gender
Violence Act (“IGVA”), violations of the Illinois Human Rights Act (“IHRA”), violations of Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”), and Due Process violations stemming from Plaintiff’s
loss of employment and alleged mistreatment at Defendant’s Department of Transportation
(“CDOT”) based on his ethnicity, sexual orientation, and age. Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion
to Dismiss (“Motion”) Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (hereinafter, “Complaint”) for failure to
state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below,
the Court grants Defendant’s Motion [38].

BACKGROUND

On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts the complaint’s well-pleaded
factual allegations, with all reasonable inferences drawn in the non-moving party’s favor. See Smoke
Shop, LLC v. United States, 761 F.3d 779, 785 (7th Cir. 2014). Unless otherwise noted, the following
factual allegations are taken from Plaintiffs’ Complaint, (Dkt. 23), and are assumed true for purposes
of this Motion. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schumacher, 844 F.3d 670, 675 (7th Cir. 2016).
A. Alleged Discriminatory Work Environment

Plaintiff is a Mexican American, male member of the LGBTQIA+ community. During his
non-work time, Plaintiff is an activist and is seen frequently on the news, on the radio, in the
newspaper, and on the internet advocating for victims of crime. In May 2022, Plaintiff was hired by
CDOT as a sign hanger. .

From the outset of his employment, three African American employees, Eric Stevens, Lindell 

Rouse, and Ronnie Marzette, began “bullying” Plaintiff. Plaintiff was repeatedly subjected to offensive
slurs from these three individuals, including “faggot,” “bitch,” “gump,” “beaner,” “spic,” “wetback,”
and “cocksucker.” Multiple coworkers and superiors also directed sexually explicit and homophobic
comments at Plaintiff, including demands that he perform sex acts such as fellatio.
Plaintiff reported the incidents to his foreman over the course of several months. Each time,
the foreman assured Plaintiff that he would address the matter, but nothing was done. Plaintiff also
escalated the reports of harassment to Sam Alexander (“Alexander”), a Black male and Deputy
Commissioner of Sign Management at CDOT. Not only did Alexander fail to intervene, but after
Plaintiff escalated his complaints to him, he began engaging in the anti-Hispanic and anti-LGBTQIA+
harassment as well.

Plaintiff, who suffers from rectal diastasis and a hernia, also alleges that when he requested
time off due to medical issues, he was denied, while similarly situated employees, who did not share

his demographic characteristics, were granted such requests. Plaintiff continued to work without
taking any time off, despite his worsening medical conditions caused by using a jackhammer. After
facing harassment from his coworkers and supervisors, and after his supervisors denied him medical
leave, Plaintiff made additional internal complaints and sought assistance from his union, without
avail.

B. Plaintiff’s Termination

On December 30, 2022, Alexander unexpectedly called Plaintiff to his office. While waiting
outside of Alexander’s office, Plaintiff overheard Alexander speaking with another manager, Tuvall
Frazier (“Frazier”), a Black male, who participated in the decision to lay off Plaintiff and failed to
prevent the harassment. Plaintiff heard Alexander say, “Let’s get rid of the spic; he’s always on the
news,” referring to Plaintiff’s Mexican heritage and his activism.

After calling Plaintiff into the office, Alexander told Plaintiff that his seasonal employment

was over for the year despite that not being his original end date. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff learned
that two female employees, one with less seniority than Plaintiff, had not been laid off; but instead,
were converted to full-time positions.

C. Denial of Rehire

While Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s seasonal position early, Plaintiff believed that he would
still be prioritized for rehire based on provisions in the union’s contract providing preference to
returning seasonal employees. Plaintiff was scheduled to return for the 2023 summer season. On
May 2, 2023, HR representative Deidre Green emailed Plaintiff an official job offer, contingent only
on his completion of final onboarding documents. Plaintiff completed all required paperwork and
submitted to a drug test. Between May and June 2023, Plaintiff had multiple conversations with HR
officials, who repeatedly assured him that he had been hired and would soon receive his congratulatory
letter.

Despite these repeated assurances, on June 26, 2023, Plaintiff received an unexpected email 

from HR stating that his job offer had been rescinded. On June 28, 2023, HR told Plaintiff that
CDOT “no longer wanted to hire [him]” and would no longer respond to his calls or emails. Plaintiff
was not provided with any opportunity to appeal or explain his situation after HR stopped responding
to him. Other similarly situated employees, who did not report discrimination, were rehired,
consistent with the City’s custom and practice.

D. Present Action

Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Illinois Human Rights Commission (“IHRC”) soon after
his termination and the City’s decision to revoke his employment. On October 24, 2024, the IHRC
dismissed his complaint for “lack [of] substantial evidence” and issued Plaintiff a Letter of
Determination and a Right to Sue Letter. Plaintiff timely filed the present suit with this Court and
cross filed his claims with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Upon

Plaintiff’s information and belief, the EEOC ended their investigation.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim tests the sufficiency
of the complaint, not its merits. See Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir.
2014). When considering dismissal of a complaint, the Court accepts well pleaded factual allegations
as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); Trujillo v. Rockledge Furniture LLC, 926 F.3d 395, 397 (7th Cir. 2019). To survive a
motion to dismiss, plaintiff must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

DISCUSSION

Defendant asserts all of Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The
Court addresses each of its arguments, in turn.

I. Title VII Claims

Defendant first asserts all of Plaintiff’s Title VII claims fail because he failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. (See Dkt. 40 at *4). Before bringing a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must first
exhaust his administrative remedies by filing charges with the EEOC and receive a right-to-sue letter.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1); Chaidez v. Ford Motor Co., 937 F.3d 998, 1004 (7th Cir. 2019).
Plaintiff asserts his Title VII claims are not barred for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies because he “cross-filed his charge of discrimination with the EEOC, and upon information
and belief, has been informed that the EEOC investigation has been closed.” (Dkt. 55 at *3 n. 1).

Plaintiff does not contest that he failed to provide the Court with a right-to-sue letter, but instead
asserts, to the extent Defendant raises failure to exhaust as an affirmative defense, such a defense is
premature and more appropriately resolved at the summary judgment stage, given the current posture

of the administrative proceedings. Id. Based on the uncontested record before the Court, Plaintiff’s claims are not ripe for
adjudication. Plaintiff merely states “upon information and belief” that his EEOC investigation has
been “closed.” He does not provide any evidence or documentation from the EEOC, yet alone the
requisite right-to-sue notice necessary to maintain his Title VII claims. In fact, the uncontested record
before this Court, including March 6, 2025, correspondence from the EEOC, strongly evidences that
Plaintiff’s investigation is still ongoing. (See Dkt 42-2 at *1.) Plaintiff is demonstrably false that ruling
on whether he exhausted his administrative remedies is “premature” at this stage because such
exhaustion is a prerequisite to bringing his Title VII claims before this Court. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–
5(e)(1). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Title VII claims are dismissed, without prejudice, pending his proof
of administrative exhaustion.

II. Equal Protection Discrimination Claims

Defendant next asserts Plaintiff fails to properly allege municipal liability as to support his 

Equal Protection discrimination claims. (Dkt. 40 at *6.) “[A] local government may not be sued under
§ 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of
New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). To establish liability against a municipality, a plaintiff must allege
that his injury was caused by an official policy, custom, or practice. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. A policy,
custom, or practice may be demonstrated by: (1) an express policy that, when enforced, causes a
constitutional deprivation; (2) a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or
express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the
force of law; or (3) an allegation that the constitutional injury was caused by a person with final
policymaking authority. McTigue v. City of Chicago, 60 F.3d 381, 382 (7th Cir.1995) (internal quotations
and citation omitted). Since Plaintiff does not allege the CDOT has an official policy of
discrimination, the Court’s analysis is limited to whether Plaintiff has plausibly stated a claim under

the second or third theories.

Defendant argues Plaintiff’s Equal Protection claims fail because he does not sufficiently allege
that he suffered a constitutional violation that was caused by any City policy, practice, or by a person
with policymaking authority to plausibly allege Monell liability. (Dkt. 38 at *2.) First, Defendant
argues, Plaintiff has no allegations as to any specific policy or practice and instead relies on a legal
conclusions of general discrimination against Hispanics, individuals with disabilities, LGBTQIA+
individuals, and older individuals. (Dkt 40 at *7). Plaintiff’s blanket conclusory statements like,
“[d]iscrimination against Hispanic employees was pervasive and systemic,” according to Defendant,
do not suffice to establish the City’s custom or practice. (Id.). Under the alternative theory, Defendant
maintains that Plaintiff fails to provide any facts that his alleged discrimination was carried out by
anyone with final policymaking authority on behalf of the City. His reliance on discriminatory conduct
by supervisors and coworkers, Defendant argues, does not suffice to maintain his claim. (Dkt. 40 at

*8-9.) In response, Plaintiff reiterates the same conclusion that denial of equal work opportunities
based on race was a widespread practice of the City in Plaintiff’s department. (Dkt. 55 at *3.) Plaintiff
also maintains that, at this stage, he has sufficiently alleged and provided facts that it was the policy of
the city to allow Alexander to act as the “final decision-maker” to determine who was allowed to
come back to the department. Id. Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that his claims can survive under the second theory
because he does not provide sufficient evidence that the discrimination he complains of constitutes a
governmental custom. To succeed on the second theory, “the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
practice is widespread and that the specific violations complained of were not isolated incidents.” Gill
v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335, 344 (7th Cir. 2017). At the pleading stage, “a plaintiff pursuing this
theory must allege facts that permit the reasonable inference that the practice is so widespread as to

constitute a governmental custom.” Thomas v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dept., 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir.
2010). As it stands, Plaintiff merely provides legal conclusions that his supervisor discriminated, across
races, genders, disability statuses, and age. Plaintiff’s sole evidence that the “discriminatory behavior”
was widespread at the CDOT comes from his assertion that Alexander’s administrative assistant, a
white woman of Irish descent, submitted a 13-page statement in an unrelated discrimination case in
which she documented discriminatory conduct by Alexander. (See Dkt. 23 at *8.) Plaintiff’s reliance
on an unrelated discrimination case, filed by a woman who shares no protected identities with Plaintiff,
is not sufficient to establish the City’s custom of discrimination against his protected identities.
Plaintiff’s claims also cannot survive based on the third theory because he did not sufficiently
show that his supervisor had final decision-making authority. “State law informs who legally
constitutes a final policymaker.” Walker v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., No. 19 CV 4115, 2021 WL
1143517, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2021) (Blakey, J.) (citing Burger v. Cnty. of Macon, 942 F.3d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 2019)). “Final policymaking authority may be granted directly by statute or delegated or
ratified by an official having policymaking authority.” Kujawski v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Bartholomew Cnty., 183 F.3d 734, 737 (7th Cir. 1999). There must be a delegation of authority to set policy for hiring and
firing, not only a delegation of the final authority to hire and fire.” Id. at 739; Valentino v. Vill. of S.
Chi. Heights, 575 F.3d 664, 676 (7th Cir. 2009) (“It is a well-established principle that the mere
unreviewed discretion to make hiring and firing decisions does not amount to policymaking
authority.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Defendant’s discretion to hire and fire
within the sign division of CDOT does not, as a matter of law, make him a final decision-maker to
sustain a Monell claim against the City. Absent proof that Alexander was granted authority to establish
hiring and firing policies by statute or delegated that authority by someone with such power, Plaintiff’s
discrimination claims cannot survive. See Connelly v. Cook Cnty. Assessor’s Office, 583 F. Supp. 3d 1142,
1148 (Coleman, J.)(N.D. Ill. 2022) (rejecting a Monell claim that the Cook County Assessor possessed

or was delegated final policymaking authority for termination decisions, as opposed to delegated
authority to make hiring and firing decisions in individual cases). Plaintiff’s Equal Protection
discrimination claims are thus dismissed, without prejudice, until Plaintiff can provide sufficient
factual allegations to proceed under a “final decision-maker” theory.

While the Court will not allow Plaintiff’s claims to survive as pled, the Court acknowledges
Plaintiff’s workplace treatment was heinous and far beyond the bounds of propriety. The Court would
be remiss to not voice its concern with Defendant’s choice to diminish its employee’s claims that he
was repeatedly victim to homophobic and ethnicity-based attacks, by likening slurs to “sporadic
examples of improper behavior,” like a police officer speeding (See Dkt. 40 at *7) (citing Flores v. City
of South Bend, 997 F.3d 725, 733 (7th Cir. 2021) (concluding that a complaint offering three examples
of one officer speeding did not plausibly suggest that a city had a widespread practice of allowing
officers to speed). Furthermore, the Court is concerned by Plaintiff’s allegations that when he

reported such conduct to his superiors, they not only ignored the abuse, but began acting as principal
perpetrators of the harmful conduct. If Plaintiff is able to amend his pleadings to provide evidence
of a custom or policy by Defendant to discriminate against individuals with the protected
characteristics he actually holds or to show that Alexander had final decision-making authority, such
allegations would hold weight in a later ruling.

III. Equal Protection Retaliation Claims

Defendant next argues that Plaintiff’s Equal Protection retaliation claim should be dismissed
because it is not cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Dkt. 40 at *9). The right to be free
from retaliation may be vindicated under the First Amendment or Title VII, but not the equal
protection clause. Grossbaum v. Indianapolis–Marion County Bldg. Auth., 100 F.3d 1287, 1296 n. 8 (7th
Cir.1996) (“We do not imply, however, that retaliation claims arise under the Equal Protection Clause.
That clause does not establish a general right to be free from retaliation.”) Boyd v. Illinois State Police, 384 F.3d 888, 898 (7th Cir. 2004). Because Defendant’s Equal Protection retaliation claim cannot be
vindicated through the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court dismisses his claim.

IV. Due Process Retaliation Claims

Finally, the Court analyzes whether Plaintiff’s Due Process retaliation claim can survive. To
bring a Fourteenth Amendment procedural Due Process claim, a plaintiff must have a constitutionally
protected property interest of which he has been deprived without due process of law. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 14 (prohibiting states from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law”). Property interests are not created by the Constitution but rather are created and
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law,
rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those
benefits. Frey Corp. v. City of Peoria, 735 F.3d 505, 509–10 (7th Cir. 2013). In the employment context,
such a property interest “can arise from a statute, regulation, municipal ordinance, or an express or

implied contract.” Price v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 755 F.3d 605, 607–08 (7th Cir. 2014).
While the Court notes both parties’ arguments addressing the merits of Plaintiff’s Due Process
Retaliation claim, are threadbare, the Court still determines that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged
his claim. Plaintiff’s Complaint and Response to Defendant’s Motion are void of any allegations that
Plaintiff had a property interest in his position with Defendant. Absent any argument that a statute,
regulation, municipal ordinance, or an express or implied contract, provides such an interest, Plaintiff's
claim cannot survive. See Price, 755 F.3d at 607-08.
Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's Due Process retahation claim, without prejudice,
absent any proof that Defendant had a property interest in his position. Since all of Plaintiff's federal
claims have been dismissed, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
remaining state law claims. Groce v. EX Lilly ¢ Co., 193 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir.1999) (“Tt is the well-
established law of this Circuit that the usual practice 1s to dismiss without prejudice state supplemental
claims whenever all federal claims have been dismissed.”)'
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion is granted, without prejudice, as to his Title
VII and Equal Protection discrimination claims and Due Process retahation claim. Defendant’s
Motion is granted with prejudice as to Plaintiffs Equal Protection retaliation claim. ‘The Court also
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state law claims and thus
dismisses them without prejudice. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his Complaint as to his Title
VII claim—with proof of administrative exhaustion—Equal Protection discrimination claim, and
supplemental state claims within 30 days if he has a good faith basis for believing he can cure the
pleading deficiencies identified in this Opinion. If Plaintiff does not file his amended complaint within
30 days from the date of this Order, Plaintiffs case will be dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 3/2/2026 GOLLE
Entered:

SHARON JOHNSON COLEMAN
United States District Judge

Court makes no determination as to the merits of Plaintiffs remaining IHRA and IGVA claims, 

it merely declines to retain jurisdiction at this time absent any remaining federal claims.
10