Jump To

Top Caption Trial Court Document The text of this document was obtained by analyzing a scanned document and may have typos.

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 2, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Saad Alhiti, Zainab Abduljabbar v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of State, Kristi Noem, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Marco Rubio, U.S. Secretary of State, Thomas Barrack, Ambassador of the U.S. at the U.S. Embassy Akara, Turkey

District Court, N.D. Illinois

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:25-cv-04999

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (24)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (62.9K)

• PDF

Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

SAAD ALHITI, ZAINAB

ABDULJABBAR,

Plaintiffs,

v.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND Case No. 25-cv-04999

SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

STATE, KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of Judge Mary M. Rowland

the Department of Homeland Security,

MARCO RUBIO, U.S. Secretary of

State, THOMAS BARRACK,

Ambassador of the U.S. at the U.S.

Embassy Akara, Turkey

Defendants.

          MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                               
Plaintiffs Saad Alhiti and Zainab Abduljabbar bring suit against Defendants 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), Secretary of DHS Kristi Noem,
(“Non-State Department Defendants”), U.S. Department of State, Marco Rubio,
Secretary of State, and Thomas Barrack, the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey (“State
Department Defendants”). Plaintiffs allege unreasonable delay by the government in
the processing of Ms. Abduljabbar’s visa application. Id. Plaintiffs seek relief under
the Mandamus Act, 28 §1361, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §
555 (b) and §706(1), and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process clause to compel the
government to adjudicate the application. [5] Defendants move to dismiss the
Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).

For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [18] is granted.
I. Background

The following factual allegations taken from the operative complaint [5] are

accepted as true for the purposes of the motion to dismiss. See Lax v. Mayorkas, 20
F.4th 1178, 1181 (7th Cir. 2021). Additionally, because Defendants raise this motion
under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court takes facts from “documents attached to the complaint,
documents that are critical to the complaint and referred to in it, and information
that is subject to proper judicial notice.” Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743,
745 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012).

Plaintiff Saad Alhiti is a U.S. citizen who is engaged to be married to non-

citizen Zainab Abduljabbar. [5] at ¶ 1. Alhiti filed a Form I-129F “Petition for Alien
Fiance Visa” with the U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services (USCIS) and paid the
required fee on February 7, 2023. Id. at ¶ 2. The petition was issued a receipt number
and approved on November 28, 2023. Id. Once it was approved, the file was sent to
the National Visa Center (“NVC”) for processing. Id. NVC sent the file to the U.S.
Embassy in Turkey on or about January 22, 2024. Id. The Embassy scheduled an

interview shortly after. Id.

On May 3, 2024, Abduljabbar was interviewed at the embassy. Id. at ¶ 3.
According to the complaint, at Ms. Abduljabbar’s interview, she was informed that
additional documentation was required. Id. at ¶ 4. Specifically, she was instructed to
submit Supplemental Questions for Visa Application, Form DS-5535. Id. She
submitted the required Form DS 5535 the next day, on May 4, 2024. Id. Attached to
Defendants’ motion to dismiss is the declaration of Samuel McDonald, a U.S.
Department of State attorney-adviser. [19-1] McDonald stated that on May 3, 2024,
the consular officer refused Abduljabbar’s application under INA § 221(g), 8 U.S.C.

§1201 (g). Id. at ¶ 7. The consular officer determined that Abduljabbar failed to
demonstrate her eligibility for the visa, and additional security screening was
required. Id. Plaintiffs responded by attaching correspondence from the State Department.
21-2. The text
states:

A U.S. Consular officer has adjudicated and refused your application…. If you 
were  informed  by  the  consular  officer  that  your  case  was  refused  for 
administrative processing, your case will remain refused while undergoing 
such  processing.  You  will  receive  another  adjudication  once  such 
processing is complete. . . . Id. (emphasis added).                                                     
On  May  12, 2025,  Plaintiffs  brought  this  action  to  compel  Defendants  to 

explain the cause and nature of the visa’s processing delay and accelerate the
processing of Abduljabbar’s visa application. [5].

Defendants move to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule
12(b)(1), arguing that (1) Plaintiffs lack standing, (2) the case is moot, and (3) consular
non-reviewability makes this case non-justiciable. Defendants also move to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that (1) there is no legal entitlement to a visa, and
(2) there is no due process interest in a non-citizen spouse’s admittance into the
United States.

II. Standard

A. Rule 12(b)(1) Legal Standard

“In evaluating a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, the court must first

determine whether a factual or facial challenge has been raised.” Silha v. ACT, Inc., 807 F.3d 169, 173 (7th Cir. 2015). There are two types of standing challenges: “A
facial challenge attacks standing on the pleadings, arguing that the plaintiff lacks
standing even if the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint are taken as true. A
factual challenge, by contrast, asserts that there is in fact no standing.” Flynn v. FCA
U.S. LLC, 39 F.4th 946, 952 (7th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted).

“[I]n  evaluating  whether  a  complaint  adequately  pleads  the  elements  of 

standing, courts apply the same analysis used to review whether a complaint
adequately states a claim: ‘Courts must accept as true all material allegations of the
complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party.’” Silha, 807 F.3d at 173 (alterations accepted) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)). “[W]hen evaluating a facial challenge to subject matter jurisdiction under
Rule 12(b)(1), a court should use Twombly–Iqbal’s ‘plausibility’ requirement, which

is the same standard used to evaluate facial challenges to claims under Rule 12(b)(6).”
Id. at 174.

However, when a defendant challenges subject matter jurisdiction on mootness
grounds, the defendant bears the burden of establishing that a court no longer has
jurisdiction. West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 719 (2022).

B. Rule 12(b)(6) Legal Standard

“To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must
provide enough factual information to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face and raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Haywood v. Massage Envy
Franchising, LLC, 887 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank
Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)
(requiring a complaint to contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief”). A court deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
“construe[s] the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept[s] all

well-pleaded facts as true, and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s
favor.” Lax, 20 F.4th at 1181. However, the court need not accept as true “statements
of law or unsupported conclusory factual allegations.” Id. (quoting Bilek v. Fed. Ins.
Co., 8 F.4th 581, 586 (7th Cir. 2021)). “While detailed factual allegations are not
necessary to survive a motion to dismiss, [the standard] does require ‘more than mere
labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action to
be considered adequate.’” Sevugan v. Direct Energy Servs., LLC, 931 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Bell v. City of Chicago, 835 F.3d 736, 738 (7th Cir. 2016)).
Dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper “when the allegations in a
complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). Deciding the plausibility of the claim is
“a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th
Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)).

III. Analysis

A. Article III standing and mootness.

Defendants contend Plaintiffs have not alleged facts demonstrating that they 

have Article III standing. Here, Defendants raise external facts to question the
Court’s jurisdiction to challenge Article III standing. See [19] at 7–8. Thus, the Court
treats Defendants’ motion as a factual challenge, not a facial challenge. To establish
Article III standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he “(1) suffered an injury in
fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and
(3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v.

Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016); Fox v. Dakkota Integrated Sys., LLC, 980 F.3d
1146,1151 (7th Cir. 2020).

Defendants argue Plaintiffs lack standing because no named defendants can
redress their asserted injury of unreasonable delay regarding visa applications. [19]
at 7-8. Plaintiffs respond that they have standing because Defendants have not
completed the adjudication of Abduljabbar’s visa application and that Defendants

confuse jurisdiction with mootness. [21] at 3-4. Plaintiffs fail to address the
distinction between the State Department as opposed to non-State Department
defendants.

1. Non-State Department Defendants: DHS and Secretary of DHS Noem

Here, Plaintiffs allege that DHS is the agency “responsible for implementing

the applicable provisions of the law [the INA and the APA] and assisting with
background and security checks”, and Secretary Noem is sued because she is the
highest-ranking official within DHS. [5] at ¶¶ 9, 12. However, courts in this district
and beyond have found that “plaintiffs seeking adjudication of their visa applications,
after USCIS forwarded their application to the U.S. Consulate, lacked standing

against. . . . DHS because those defendants already completed their role in the visa
application process.” Arif, 2025 WL 1866661 at *4 (emphasis added) (citing Salem v.
Noem, 2025 WL 1567864, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2025); Shamim v. Rubio, 2025 WL
1399166, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 2025)); see also Al-Gharawy v. DHS, 617 F. Supp.
3d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2022).

As an initial matter, Plaintiffs do not respond to this argument and thus waive

any argument. Moreover, the Court agrees that Plaintiffs lack standing to sue the
DHS Defendants, because it is the State Department alone that can decide to issue
the visa. See e.g. Khan v. Blinken, 2021 WL 5356267, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 17, 2021)
(describing the State Department’s responsibility for determining K-1 visa issuance).
Once DHS forwarded Abduljabbar’s visa application to the State Department, the
DHS Defendants completed their role in the process.

In sum, there are no allegations here that reasonably allege liability against

the DHS Defendants. A “court may dismiss a defendant when the plaintiff fails to
include allegations about the defendant’s role in the adjudication of the immigration
application.” Arif v. Rubio, 2025 WL 1866661, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 7, 2025) (citing
Alqrinawi v. Noem, 2025 WL 1222651, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 28, 2025)); Kulla v.
Mayorkas, 2024 WL 4188017, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 2024); Hasbani v. Noem, 2025
WL 1103817, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 14, 2025)).

Accordingly, DHS and Secretary Noem are dismissed with prejudice for lack of
standing.

2. State Department Defendants: State Department, Secretary of State
Rubio, Turkish Ambassador Barrack

Turning  to  the  State  Department  Defendants,  Plaintiffs  allege  these 

Defendants “[are] and ha[ve] been complicit in the delay in processing Abduljabbar’s
visa application,” ([5] at ¶ 23) and argue they can redress Plaintiffs’ injuries by
concluding the adjudication within a reasonable time ([21] at 3–4). Defendants
disagree. They argue only a consular officer is authorized to adjudicate visa
applications and Plaintiffs cannot point to any authority that makes the State
Department Defendants responsible for matters that are statutorily beyond their
respective areas of control. [22] at 5.

Defendants contend the INA bars the Secretary of State, the State Department
itself, and the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey from adjudicating visa applications. [22]

at 5. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1104 (a), the Secretary is conferred with authority over “the
administration and the enforcement of . . . immigration and nationality laws relating
to . . . the powers, duties, and functions of the United States, except those powers,
duties, and functions conferred upon the consular officers relating to the granting or
refusal of visas.” (emphasis added). Courts are divided as to whether that provision
allows the Secretary to redress a visa plaintiff’s claims. Although courts agree

§ 1104(a) precludes the Secretary from directing a particular outcome of the visa
adjudication, courts routinely hold the Secretary, in his position as the head of the
State Department, may exert control over the timing by which the consular officer
considers visa applications and may direct the consular officer to conclude such visa
adjudications “within a reasonable time.” Al-Gharawy, 617 F. Supp. 3d at 10 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 555 (b)); see also Salem v. Noem, 2025 WL 1567864, at *4 (finding standing

for claims related to delayed visa adjudication against the Secretary of State);
Hamdan v. Oudkirk, 2024 WL 4553983, at *4 (D.D.C. Oct. 23, 2024) (“In this case,
where plaintiff does not challenge the consular officer’s adjudication of his visa
application but seeks instead only timely adjudication . . . nothing precludes [the
Secretary] from directing the consular officers to decide [the] pending applications
within a reasonable time, as the APA requires.”); Lee v. Blinken, 2024 WL 639635, at

*3 (D.D.C. Feb. 15, 2024) (holding that the Secretary can “direct[ ] consular officers
to decide pending applications within a reasonable time”).

Accordingly, the Court will continue its analysis of Plaintiffs’ standing to sue
the State Department Defendants.

3. Mootness

Defendants also argue the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint because 

a consular officer decided to withhold a visa from Ms. Abduljabbar in May 2024 and
her application remains refused, thus the dispute is moot. [19] at 8–10. The Court
disagrees.

Plaintiffs have not received a final decision on Abduljabbar’s visa application.
Plaintiffs received a response that provided more processing was required:

A U.S. Consular officer has adjudicated and refused your application….
If you were informed by the consular officer that your case was refused
for administrative processing, your case will remain refused while

undergoing such processing. You will receive another adjudication

once such processing is complete.

21-2 (emphasis
added).

The Seventh Circuit has not yet addressed the issue of whether a refusal for

administrative processing under Section 221(g) is final, but courts in this district
have found the language cited above is not a final determination. In Ebrahami v.
Blinken, 732 F.Supp.3d 894, 904 (N.D. Ill. 2024), the court found that the refusal was
not final, reasoning that “the State Department’s use of will in this communication
all but guarantees the applicant another adjudication once administrative processing
is complete.” (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Barazandeh v.

U.S. Dep't of State, 2024 WL 341166, at *5 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2024); Kiani v. Blinken, 2024 WL 658961, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2024) (“It is reasonable to infer that under
this process that forthcoming decision is actually the final adjudication ..., and not a
re-adjudication.”); Quiros v. Amador, 2023 WL 4364161, at *4 (D.D.C. July 6, 2023)
(“application clearly remains in administrative processing per the express language
of the consular officials”); Isse v. Whitman, 2023 WL 4174357, at *1, *4–5 (D.D.C.
June 26, 2023); Giliana v. Blinken, 596 F. Supp. 3d 13, 18–19 (D.D.C. 2022); Billoo v.

Baran, 2022 WL 1841611, at *2–4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2022) (“Department of State's
own statements and instructions on their website ... demonstrate that [applicant] has
not received a final determination on his visa application.”). In Arif, the court
similarly found the initial decision was not final, reasoning that “the government’s
communications clearly suggest further adjudication down the line”. 2025 WL
186661, at *7. (“The phrases ‘we will contact you when this is complete’ and ‘when we
let you know’ on the worksheet suggest that the Consulate plans to act on
Mr. Mumtaz’s application in the future and that review of his application is
incomplete.”).

Here,  the  government’s  communication  that  Plaintiff  Abduljabbar  “will 

receive another adjudication once . . . processing is complete” means her
application’s refusal is not final, but rather an ongoing adjudication. The cases the
government cites, all of which involve final adjudications, are therefore
distinguishable. The matter is not moot.

B. The Consular Non-reviewability doctrine does not bar this case
Defendants argue that the doctrine of consular non-reviewability makes this

case nonjusticiable [19] at 10. Plaintiffs respond that the doctrine is inapplicable
because Plaintiffs are not challenging a substantive decision. [21] at 4.

The doctrine of non-consular reviewability “bars judicial review of visa
decisions made by consular officials abroad.” Yafai v. Pompeo, 912 F.3d 1018, 1020–
21 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Matushkina v. Nielsen, 877 F.3d 289, 294 (7th Cir. 2017)).
Where a consular’s decision is not final, consular nonreviewability does not apply.

Arif, 2025 WL 1866661, at *8.

Here, the doctrine is inapplicable. Defendants are correct that this case would
be nonjusticiable if the State Department had issued a final decision refusing Ms.
Abduljabbar’s visa application. But that is not what happened. The case Defendants
cite in support is inapposite. Yaghoubnezhad v. Stufft, 734 F. Supp. 3d 87, 102 (D.D.C.
2024) (consular officers’ § 221(g) refusals are final).

4. Plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action pursuant to FRCP 12 (b)(6)
A. Mandamus relief is inappropriate

Plaintiffs request the “Court issue a writ of mandamus compelling Defendants

to . . . . accelerate processing of the visa application.” [5] at 7. (requests for relief).

District courts are granted the power “to compel an officer or employee of the 

United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1361. A writ of mandamus is “a drastic and extraordinary remedy reserved for really
extraordinary causes.” United States v. Henderson, 915 F.3d 1127, 1132 (7th Cir.
2019) (cleaned up). A court will grant a writ of mandamus where a petitioner shows:
“(1) a clear right to the relief sought; (2) that the defendant has a duty to do the act
in question; and (3) no other adequate remedy is available.” Calderon-Ramirez v.

McCament, 877 F.3d 272, 275 (7th Cir. 2017).

The third factor is dispositive because another remedy is available: the APA.
Courts may compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed under
the APA. U.S.C. § 706(1)). Here, the APA’s alternative remedy dooms the writ of
mandamus. Arif, 2025 WL 1866661, at *9 (dismissing the petition for writ of
mandamus). Accordingly, the Court declines to grant the writ of mandamus.

     B.  There is no unreasonable delay under the APA                

Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs’ unreasonable delay claim is meritless  

because there is no statutory deadline under federal law by which a consular office
must adjudicate a visa, and Plaintiffs’ claims fail under the relevant case authority.
[19] at 12-14. Plaintiffs respond that the case law supports finding that a fifteen-
month delay is unreasonable. [21] at 6. The Court agrees with Defendants.
The Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 555 (b), provides that “[w]ith
due regard for the convenience and necessity of the parties or their representatives
and within a reasonable time, each agency shall proceed to conclude a matter

presented to it.” District courts have the power to “compel agency action unlawfully
withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1). To evaluate claims of
unreasonable delay, courts use the six-factor test from Telecomms. Rsch. & Action
Ctr. (“TRAC”) v. F.C.C., 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984):

(1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a “rule
of reason”; (2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other
indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in
the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may supply content for this
rule of reason; (3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of
economic regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare
are at stake; (4) the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed
action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority; (5) the court
should also take into account the nature and extent of the interests
prejudiced by delay; and (6) the court need not find any impropriety
lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that agency action is
unreasonably delayed.

Id. (cleaned up); Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. EPA, 947 F.3d 1065, 1075 (7th
Cir. 2020) (Hamilton, J., concurring) (“The D.C. Circuit has set forth a general
framework for deciding claims of agency delay that courts can apply to unanswered
rulemaking petitions.”); Orozco v. Blinken, No. 22 C 5134, 2023 WL 4595377, at *2–
6 (N.D. Ill. July 18, 2023) (applying six-factor “TRAC” analysis in this context). ‘There
is no congressional imposed timeline for processing fiancé visa applications.”
Mohammad v. Blinken, 2021 WL 2866058, at *3 (D.D.C. July 8, 2021) (internal
citation omitted). “To the contrary, Congress has given the agencies wide discretion
in the area of immigration processing.” Skalka v. Kelly, 246 F. Supp. 3d 147, 153–54
(D.D.C. 2017).

The first and second factors ask whether the agencies make decisions by a rule

of reason and whether Congress has provided a timetable that is favorable for
Defendants. Telecomms. Research. & Action Ctr., 750 F.2d at 80. These factors are
typically considered together because “they both analyze whether there is ‘sufficient
rhyme and reason to explain the Government's response time.’” Mahmood v. U.S.
Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 21 C 1262, 2021 WL 5998385, at *7 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 2021)
(quoting Dastagir v. Blinken, 557 F. Supp. 3d 160, 166 (D.C.C. 2021)). Here, the first

factor is satisfied because government agencies process visa applications in the order
they are received, and the second factor is satisfied because the Court is not aware of
any cases that have held a fifteen month, or even two-year, delay is unreasonable.
See Brzezinski v. DHS, 2021 WL 4191958, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 15, 2021) (surveying
case law, finding “no case that found an unreasonable delay when the delay was
under two years[,]” and concluding 17-month delay not unreasonable); see also
Ghadami v. United States Dep't of Homeland Sec., 2020 WL 1308376, at *1–2, *8

(D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2020) (finding that a twenty-five month delay was not long enough
to tilt the first two TRAC factors in favor of the plaintiff); Bagherian v. Pompeo, 442
F. Supp. 3d 87, 95 (D.D.C. 2020)) (holding that a twenty-five month delay is not
unreasonable as a matter of law); Ebrahami, 732 F. Supp. 38 at 911 (twelve month
delay so short as to counsel heavily against finding unreasonable delay); Orozco, 2023
WL 4595377, at *4 (same); Arif, 2025 WL 1866661, at *10 (twenty two months is not
an unreasonable delay). The first factor is the most important factor in the six-factor
analysis. In re Core Commc'ns, Inc., 531 F.3d at 855. Here, both the first and second
TRAC factor weigh in favor of the Government.

The third and fifth factors look to whether “human health and welfare are at 

stake” and “the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by delay.” Telecomms.
Research. & Action Ctr., 750 F.2d at 80. These factors tilt in favor of Plaintiffs. Here,
it is reasonable to determine that there is harm because Plaintiffs are engaged, and
ongoing uncertainty “prevents Plaintiffs from planning their marriage, careers and
family”, causing “ongoing prejudice to their most fundamental personal interests.”

[21] at 5; See also Brzezinski, 2021 WL 4191958, at *5 (“[T]he loss of consortium and
general diminishment in quality of life for the engaged couple nonetheless tilt these
factors somewhat in Plaintiff's favor.”). Here, the third and fifth factors weigh in favor
of Plaintiffs.

The fourth factor requires the Court to consider the effect of expediting delayed
action on “agency activities of a higher or competing priority.” Telecomms. Research.
& Action Ctr., 750 F.2d at 80. This weighs in favor of the government. Indeed, courts

have found “where compelling an adjudication for one party would prejudice others
who also await final decisions on their visa applications, the fourth factor weighs in
favor of the government and is, at times, all but controlling in the unreasonable-delay
analysis.” Ebrahami, 732 F. Supp. 3d at 913 (citing Calderon-Ramirez, 877 F.3d at
275) (denying mandamus relief where “nothing in the record” suggested applicant's
“wait time [was] any more unreasonable than [that of] other petitioners waiting in
the same line”); Cohen v. Jaddou, No. 21 C 5025, 2023 WL 2526105, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 15, 2023) (adjudicating plaintiff’s visa application would put her “ahead of those
without the capacity to sue.”). Here, this factor favors Defendants.

The sixth and final factor clarifies that a court does not have to find agency 

impropriety to grant relief. Telecomms. Research. & Action Ctr., 750 F.2d at 80.
Here, the Complaint is devoid of any allegations of bad faith or impropriety on the
government’s part. This factor is therefore neutral.

Weighing all the factors together, including the most important factor, rule of
reason, the Court cannot find unreasonable delay. Accordingly, the APA claim is

dismissed. However, the government is encouraged to provide Plaintiffs with a
decision so they may plan their futures.

C. Plaintiffs’ Due Process Claim is Dismissed

Defendants argue that the Due Process claim should be dismissed because

Abduljabbar does not have constitutional rights of her own, and Alhiti does not have
a fundamental liberty interest in his non-citizen spouse’s admittance into the
Country. [19] at 14-15. The Court agrees with Defendants.

It well established that a foreign national who is not physically present in the 

U.S. does not have constitutional rights of their own. Bangert v. U.S. Embassy, No.
24 C 50272, 2025 WL 1883595, at *8 n.7 (N.D. Ill. 8, 2025) (citing Agency for Int’l
Develop. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 591 U.S. 430, 433 (2020)). Consequently, Ms.
Abduljabbar does not have a Due Process claim under the U.S. Constitution. Turning
to Mr. Alhiti, the Supreme Court recently decided in Dep't of State v. Munoz, “that an
American citizen ‘does not have a fundamental liberty interest in [their] noncitizen
spouse being admitted to the country under the Fifth Amendment.” Bangert, 2025
WL 1883595, at *8 (quoting 602 U.S. 899, 909 (2024)). Given this Supreme Court
precedent, the Due Process claim cannot survive.
Accordingly, the Due Process claim is dismissed with prejudice.
IV. Conclusion
For the stated reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [18] is granted. Civil
case terminated. Judgment to enter.

                                         ENTER: 

                                         M            lake    
  Dated: March 2, 2026                         ip   M       om 
                                  □ MARYM.ROWLAND 
                                         United States District Judge 

                                                                       17