Sterling Service Group Must Respond to Sub-Zero Discovery in Appliance Dispute

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April 15, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Sterling Service Group, Inc., et al. v. Sub-Zero, Inc., et al.

District Court, W.D. Wisconsin

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 3:25-cv-00281

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (2)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

STERLING SERVICE GROUP, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs,
OPINION and ORDER
v.

25-cv-281-jdp
SUB-ZERO, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiffs Sterling Service Group, Inc., North East Certified Parts Distribution, LLC,
and Pinnacle Appliance Care, LLC, are suing defendants Sub-Zero, Inc. and Wolf Appliance,
Inc., for what plaintiffs characterize as alleged breached promises. After the court granted
defendants’ motion to dismiss all but one of the claims, defendants sent plaintiffs a second set
of interrogatories and noticed a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. The parties corresponded regarding
these matters, but plaintiffs did not serve answers to defendants’ interrogatories until
defendants filed the instant motion to compel, and the deposition date is still unconfirmed.
Defendants now ask to compel more fulsome answers to the interrogatories, dates certain for
the deposition, and for reasonable fees associated with making this motion.
For the reasons given in this opinion, the court GRANTS defendants’ motion, Dkt. 44.
BACKGROUND
The parties in this case are involved in the high-end kitchen appliance industry. Dkt. 1
at 4–5. In April 2025, plaintiffs sued defendants for breach of contract and promissory estoppel
relating to representations and promises defendants allegedly made regarding business dealings
in Brooklyn, New York. Id. at 33–42. In January 2026, the court granted most of defendants’
motion to dismiss, Dkt. 20, leaving a sole claim for promissory estoppel regarding defendants’
alleged promise that they would extend certain business opportunities to plaintiffs in their sales
territory in Brooklyn. Dkt. 38 at 2, 13.
Two weeks later, on February 11, 2026, defendants served plaintiffs with a second set

of interrogatories, Dkt. 46-1, and a notice of Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, Dkt 46-2. The second
set of interrogatories contained four requests related to plaintiffs’ remaining promissory
estoppel claim. See Dkt. 46-1 at 4–5. The notice included a March 17, 2026, deposition date
at plaintiffs’ counsel’s offices and listed seven deposition topics. Dkt. 46-2. On February 27,
defendants’ counsel emailed plaintiffs’ counsel asking to discuss rescheduling the deposition to
a later date to give defendants more time to consider plaintiffs’ responses to the interrogatories
ahead of the deposition. Dkt. 46-3 at 2. Plaintiffs’ counsel agreed to discuss scheduling over
the phone “next week,” Id. at 1, to which defendants’ counsel responded by asking for some

proposed times for the call, Id.
From this point onward, communication and cooperation broke down. Plaintiffs’
counsel did not follow up with a list of proposed times. Defendants’ counsel reached out on
March 5 and suggested the deposition be rescheduled to sometime day between March 20–25.
Dkt. 46-4 at 3. Plaintiffs’ counsel never responded. On March 10, defendants’ counsel sent
an email indicating a new deposition date of March 24. Id. at 2–3. Two days later, plaintiffs’
counsel responded by countering with potential dates between April 21–23, which defendants’
counsel refused, noting the May 1 deadline to file motions for summary judgment. Id. at 1–2.

Plaintiffs’ counsel responded by requesting updated deposition notices for March 31 and April
1 and noted that they would attempt to confirm their clients’ availability for those dates. Id.
at 1. On March 16, defendants’ counsel responded, saying they would send the notices when
the deponent’s availability was confirmed, and, after receiving no response, emailed again on
March 18 asking for confirmation. Id.; Dkt. 36-5 at 1. Plaintiffs’ counsel did not respond.
During this same correspondence, defense counsel asked about plaintiffs’ interrogatory
responses, which plaintiffs had not served by the March 16 deadline. Dkt. 46-6 at 3. Plaintiffs’

counsel responded that they would produce their answers after “additional conversations with
[their] clients later today and tomorrow[.]” Id. Two days later, plaintiffs still had not produced
anything. On March 20, defense counsel informed plaintiffs that if they did not receive the
answers to the second set of interrogatories and confirmation of the deposition dates by March
23, they would file a motion to compel. Id. at 2.
After not receiving the requested discovery and confirmation by March 25, defendants
filed this motion to compel on March 26, 2026. Dkt. 44. On April 9, plaintiffs served their
responses to defendants’ second set of interrogatories at essentially the same time they filed

their brief in opposition to the instant motion. Dkt. 48 & 48-1. Defendants filed a motion
for leave to file a reply brief, wherein they assert the late-served answers are still deficient for
various reasons.1 Dkts. 49 & 49-1.
It is unclear whether the noticed deposition has been set for a date certain. The deadline
for filing dispositive motions is currently May 1, 2026, Dkt. 29 at 3, and trial is scheduled for
November 16, 2026, Dkt. 29 at 5.

1 The court has read the reply brief and benefits from its additional argument. As such,
defendants’ motion to file a reply, Dkt. 49, is GRANTED.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any
party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance
of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to

relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the
issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely
benefit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Information within this scope of discovery need not be
admissible in evidence to be discoverable. Id.
An interrogatory may relate to any matter permitted under Rule 26(b) and is not
objectionable merely because it asks for an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the
application of law to fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(1)–(2); The Homesteader’s Store v. Kubota Tractor
Corp., No. 24-CV-23-JDP, 2025 WL 4276949, at *8 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 6, 2025). In some

instances, a party may respond to an interrogatory under Rule 33(d) by identifying records if
reviewing those records would answer the question posed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(d). But a
Rule 33(d) response will rarely satisfy a “how” contention interrogatory. Distefano v. Nordic
Consulting Partners, Inc., No. 23-CV-657-WMC, 2025 WL 2624405, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Sept.
11, 2025).
A party seeking to depose a person must give reasonable written notice to every other
party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(1). With notice given, the court expects parties to cooperate in
the scheduling of depositions for their own witnesses. Hopp v. MJC Am., Ltd., No. 23-CV-325-

JDP, 2025 WL 1492890, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 18, 2025).
ANALYSIS
Defendants seek to compel more fulsome responses to four interrogatories and dates for
the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition they attempted to schedule. Dkt. 45 at 7. Defendants also move
for reasonable fees incurred in litigating this motion under Rule 37(a)(5)(A). Id. at 8. The

court addresses each issue in turn.
A. Interrogatories
Defendants seek more fulsome answers to four interrogatories included in their second
set of discovery requests. The court has reviewed the responses provided and finds as follows:
1. Rog. No. 19
This interrogatory requests documents reflecting all or portions of the “starting budget
of $500,000” plaintiffs described in their amended complaint. Dkt. 46-1 at 4. Plaintiffs object
to the request as overbroad and violative of Rule 33. Dkt. 48-1 at 4. Plaintiffs argue that the

interrogatory “improperly seeks to shift the burden of analysis onto plaintiffs by requiring them
to identify specific documents . . . that purportedly support a particular damages theory,” and
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “do not require a responding party to marshal
evidence, conduct legal analysis, or organize its document production in a manner that
advances its opponent’s litigation strategy.” Dkt. 48 at 3–4.
This argument is not persuasive. Contention interrogatories are allowed by Rule 33
and embraced by precedent. See Shah v. Inter-Cont’l Hotel Chicago Operating Corp., 314 F.3d
278, 283 (7th Cir. 2002) (opining that serving a contention interrogatory would be “the

simplest way” for the defendant to obtain “a road map of the plaintiff’s suit”). Asking plaintiffs
to identify the documents that support the alleged “starting budget” they asserted in their
complaint is an appropriate way to seek plaintiffs’ contentions on this point. While plaintiffs
have identified certain documents in their response, Dkt. 48-1 at 5, it is not clear these are all-
inclusive considering plaintiffs’ objections. To the extent supplementation is required in light
of the overruled objections, the court ORDERS plaintiffs to supplement accordingly. If no
other responsive documents exist, plaintiffs should state so in a verified response.

1. Rog. No. 20 This request asks plaintiffs to describe and state the monetary amount of any alleged cost, expense, or loss incurred as a result of their reliance on defendants’ alleged promises articulated in the amended complaint. Dkt. 46-1 at 5. Plaintiffs objected to the request as overbroad and prematurely seeking expert discovery. Dkt. 48-1 at 5. These objections are overruled. Plaintiffs should be in possession of their own damages theories and related calculations. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 26(a)(1)(A)(iii) (requiring a party seeking damages to include computations of each category of damages claimed); see also Berger v. Wood

Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 21-CV-454-WMC, 2022 WL 594544, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 28,
2022) (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(A)(iii) requires a computation of each
category of damages claimed and the documents or other evidentiary material on which each
computation is based.”). Plaintiffs did provide a figure of $30,000,000 with four subcategories
but did not include any finer-grain details. Dkt. 17 at 36. The court ORDERS plaintiffs to
supplement this answer with details sufficient to break out the costs, expenses, and losses
associated with each subcategory listed. While discovery is ongoing and experts may still be
developing their opinions, plaintiffs must answer as fulsomely as possible now. If new

information arises, plaintiffs can supplement their answer under Rule 26(e).
3. Rog. No. 21
This request asks plaintiffs to identify each document in their production that supports
the existence of the costs, expenses, or losses described in response to Interrogatory No. 20.
Dkt. 46-1 at 5. Plaintiffs objected to the request on similar grounds to Interrogatories Nos. 19

and 20, arguing that they are “not required to . . . engage in legal analysis to determine what
information [plaintiffs] would deem relevant” in defense of their claims for damages.
Dkt. 48- 1 at 8.
For the reasons discussed above, plaintiffs’ objections are overruled. While plaintiffs
identified certain documents in their response, id., again, it is not clear these are all-inclusive
considering plaintiffs’ objections. Accordingly, to the extent supplementation is required in
light of the overruled objections, the court ORDERS plaintiffs to supplement accordingly. If
no other responsive documents exist, plaintiffs should state so in a verified response.

1. Rog. No. 22 This request asks plaintiffs to state the factual basis underpinning any claims for damages predicated on anything other than the costs, expenses, or losses incurred in reliance on any of the defendants’ alleged promises. Dkt. 46-1 at 5. After objecting to the interrogatory as compound, overly broad, and seeking premature expert discovery, plaintiffs indicated that they were “currently reviewing the potential existence of additional damages” associated with one of the plaintiffs’ loss of enterprise value and forced liquidation. Dkt. 48-1 at 9. This statement provides next to no information. As discussed

above, the discovery rules require plaintiffs to disclose damages theories and calculations at the
outset of the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iii) & (e). Discovery has been open since
August 2025, Dkt. 29, providing plaintiff with ample opportunity to explore, review, and
formalize their damages theories. At this point, plaintiffs should be in a position to provide
more than a bald assertion that they are reviewing the existence of additional damages. The
court ORDERS plaintiffs to supplement their initial disclosures to include whatever relevant
information they currently have regarding these “potential” additional damages.

B. Deposition
Defendants are entitled to deposition dates, having made several reasonable attempts
to notice their available dates and meet and confer to find a time and place amendable to
plaintiffs. The court expects parties to cooperate on scheduling depositions for their own
witnesses; parties should not have to hound one another for dates certain. See Tierney v. BNSF
Ry. Co., No. 23-CV-477-WMC, 2024 WL 4647854, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 31, 2024)
(satisfying the rule does not require multiple attempts to resolve disputes, let alone exhaustive
effort). Plaintiffs are ORDERED to promptly provide defendants a list of potential dates to

hold the deposition by April 30, 2026.
C. Fee shifting
The loser of a motion to compel must presumptively pay the other side’s expenses,
including attorney fees, absent a showing of substantial justification. See Rickels v. City of S.
Bend, 33 F.3d 785, 786 (7th Cir. 1994); Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5). This fee-shifting presumption
encourages parties to work hard on resolving discovery disputes without court intervention.
Golat v. Wisconsin State Ct. Sys., No. 23-CV-719-JDP, 2025 WL 2466697, at *2 (W.D. Wis.
Aug. 27, 2025). Having now granted defendants’ motion to compel, the court will, “after

giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party [] whose conduct necessitated the motion,
the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant's reasonable expenses
incurred in making the motion, including attorney’s fees.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A).
D. Deadline extensions
Plaintiffs’ delay in providing answers to discovery requests and scheduling the
deposition has prejudiced defendants’ ability to meet the dispositive motion deadline, currently
set for May 1, 2026. Dkt. 29 at 3. Recognizing defendants’ need for additional time, the court

RESETS the dispositive motion deadline from May 1, 2026, to May 28, 2026.
Rule 26(a)(3) disclosures and motions in limine deadlines remain in place and are due
October 9, 2026. Dkt. 29 at 5. Likewise, the trial date of November 16, 2026, remains in
place. Id. at 6.

ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. Defendants’ motion to compel, Dkt. 44, is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are ORDERED
to supplement their responses no later than April 22, 2026.
2. Defendants’ motion to file a reply, Dkt. 49, is GRANTED.
3. The dispositive motion deadline is RESET to May 28, 2026.
4. Defendants may submit any request for reasonable expenses incurred in bringing
this motion by April 22, 2026. Plaintiffs may file a response no later than 7 days
after.
Entered April 15, 2026.
BY THE COURT:

/s/

ANITA MARIE BOOR
Magistrate Judge