Peo in Interest of DJC - Parental Rights Termination Affirmed

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April 16, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Peo in Interest of DJC

Colorado Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25CA1836

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (10)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (31K)

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Combined Opinion

25CA1836 Peo in Interest of DJC 04-16-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1836
El Paso County District Court No. 23JV30679
Honorable Robin Chittum, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of D.J.C., a Child,

and Concerning B.W. and M.C.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE YUN
Grove and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 16, 2026

Kenneth R. Hodges, County Attorney, Melanie E. Gavisk, Senior County
Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Justin Twardowski,
Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant B.W.

The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for
Appellant M.C.
¶1 In this dependency and neglect action, B.W. (mother) and M.C.

(father) appeal the judgment terminating their parental rights to

D.J.C. (the child). They each contend that they received ineffective

assistance of counsel and that the juvenile court erred by finding

that the El Paso County Department of Human Services (the

Department) made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate them. Father

also contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that he could

not become fit within a reasonable time. We disagree with each of

these claims and affirm the judgment.

I. Background

¶2 The Department filed a petition in dependency and neglect

alleging that the child tested positive for methamphetamines at

birth. The petition further alleged that mother and father had an

ongoing dependency and neglect action with the child’s two older

sisters.

¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and

neglected and adopted treatment plans for both parents. The

Department later moved to terminate both parents’ parental rights.

Two years after the petition was filed, the juvenile court terminated

mother’s and father’s parental rights after a contested hearing.

1
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶4 Mother and father contend that their respective counsel were

ineffective because they failed to subpoena the Department

caseworker to testify at the termination hearing. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law

¶5 A parent has a statutory right to the effective assistance of

counsel in dependency and neglect proceedings. §§ 19-1-105(2),

19-3-202(1), C.R.S. 2025; A.R. v. D.R., 2020 CO 10, ¶ 47. A parent

may raise an ineffective assistance claim for the first time on

appeal. People in Interest of C.H., 166 P.3d 288, 291 (Colo. App.

2007).

¶6 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a

parent must show that (1) “counsel’s performance was outside the

wide range of professionally competent assistance,” and (2) “there is

a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

A.R., ¶¶ 48, 60; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

687 (1984). “If the parent fails to establish either prong of this test,

the claim fails.” People in Interest of C.B., 2019 COA 168, ¶ 26.

2
¶7 Applying this standard, we remand the case for further factual

findings only if the parent’s allegations are “sufficiently specific to

constitute a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of

counsel.” A.R., ¶ 63. If the allegations lack sufficient specificity or

do not meet this standard, we may summarily deny the claim. Id.

B. Additional Background

¶8 The caseworker was placed on administrative leave shortly

before the termination hearing began. Counsel for both parents

requested a continuance and expressed concern that his leave

might be tied to his performance in the case. Each attorney

represented that they intended to subpoena the caseworker and

asked the Department to provide information so he could be served

at home.

¶9 Rather than grant a continuance, the juvenile court set a

second hearing date and stated that either or both parents could

subpoena the caseworker “if they want[ed] to call him on rebuttal.”

¶ 10 The hearing ultimately spanned three days over three months.

Neither parent called the caseworker. Beyond the brief discussion

on the first day of trial, the record is silent as to any further efforts

by the parents’ counsel to subpoena him.

3
¶ 11 The caseworker’s supervisor, however, testified on all three

days of the hearing. As relevant here, the supervisor testified that

the Department had (1) received a report that the caseworker

falsified records about contacts with children; (2) audited all the

caseworker’s cases; and (3) uncovered fraudulent activity in six of

those cases. The Department did not find fraudulent activity in this

case, but the audit revealed that the caseworker had failed to meet

obligations under several administrative regulations promulgated by

the Colorado Department of Human Services. See Dep’t of Hum.

Servs. Rules 7.301.22(B) and 7.304.64(A), 12 Code Colo. Regs.

2509-4. Specifically, the supervisor testified that the caseworker

had failed to regularly communicate with treatment providers,

submit family time plans to the court, or hold regular staffing and

family engagement meetings.

¶ 12 The caseworker was terminated from his employment the day

before the second day of the termination hearing.

C. Analysis

¶ 13 Both parents contend that there was “no justifiable reason not

to subpoena” the caseworker because his testimony was needed “to

address and resolve concerns about the caseworker’s conduct,

4
whether it impacted this case, and the completeness of the record.”

We need not consider the merits of parents’ complaints about their

attorneys’ performance, however, because we conclude that the

parents failed to allege with sufficient specificity that they were

prejudiced. See C.B., ¶ 6.

¶ 14 To show prejudice, a parent must demonstrate a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance or

unprofessional errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have

been different. A.R., ¶ 60. To obtain a remand for an evidentiary

hearing, the parent must allege facts with sufficient specificity —

including, for example, the substance of any witness’s testimony

and how that testimony would have changed the result of the

proceeding. People In Int. of Ferguson, 2025 COA 82, ¶ 38 (citing

People In Int. of E.D., 2025 COA 11, ¶ 7). If the parent’s allegations

lack sufficient specificity, we may summarily deny the ineffective

assistance claim. C.H., 166 P.3d at 291.

¶ 15 Even assuming that trial counsel’s representation fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness, both parents have failed to

allege facts that, if proven, would demonstrate prejudice. Counsel

for both parents subpoenaed providers beyond those called by the

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Department. In addition to the caseworker’s supervisor, counsel

elicited testimony from father’s substance dependence and

supervised family time providers, and from mother’s life skills,

therapeutic family time, domestic violence treatment, and sober

living providers. Neither parent explains with any specificity what

additional information the caseworker would have provided had he

been subpoenaed.

¶ 16 Critically, neither parent explains how direct testimony from

the caseworker about his own misconduct would have produced a

different outcome. The court, based on evidence presented by

parents’ counsel, stated that it was “furious with” the caseworker

due to his clear misconduct. Yet the court also found the

supervisor credible in her explanation of the Department’s audit

and found the treatment providers credible when they “came in here

and gave us the long and short.” Thus, even without the

caseworker’s testimony, the juvenile court had the information it

needed “to address and resolve concerns about the caseworker’s

conduct, whether it affected this case, and the completeness of the

record.”

6
¶ 17 Because the parents’ allegations are not sufficiently specific or

compelling to constitute a prima facie showing of ineffective

assistance of counsel, we deny their claim. C.H., 166 P.3d at 291.

III. Reasonable Efforts

¶ 18 Next, both mother and father contend that the juvenile court

erred by finding that the Department made reasonable efforts to

rehabilitate them. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 19 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child has been

adjudicated dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has not

complied with an appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the

plan has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the

parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a

reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025; People in Interest of

E.S., 2021 COA 79, ¶ 10.

¶ 20 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

presents a mixed question of fact and law because it involves

application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in

Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. “We review the juvenile

7
court’s findings of evidentiary fact — the raw, historical data

underlying the controversy — for clear error and accept them if they

have record support.” People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12,

¶ 10. But we review de novo the juvenile court’s legal conclusions

based on those facts. See id. In particular, the ultimate

determination of whether the Department provided reasonable

efforts is a legal conclusion we review de novo. People in Interest of

A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8.

¶ 21 It is for the juvenile court, as the trier of fact, to determine the

sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence and to

assess witness credibility. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244,

249-50 (Colo. 2010).

B. Applicable Law

¶ 22 Before the juvenile court may terminate parental rights under

section 19-3-604(1)(c), a department must make reasonable efforts

to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family. §§ 19-1-103(114),

19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2025. Reasonable

efforts means the “exercise of diligence and care” for a child who is

in out-of-home placement, and the reasonable efforts standard is

8
satisfied when services are provided in accordance with section

19-3-208. § 19-1-103(114).

¶ 23 The services that “must be available and provided” as

determined by individual case planning include: screening,

assessments, and individual case plans for the provision of services;

home-based family and crisis counseling; information and referral

services to available public and private assistance resources; family

time services for parents with children in out-of-home placement;

and placement services including foster care and emergency shelter.

§ 19-3-208(2)(b). Additional services may be required if funding is

available, including transportation, childcare, diagnostic and

mental health services, drug and alcohol treatment services, and

family support services. § 19-3-208(2)(d).

¶ 24 Whether a department made reasonable efforts should be

“measured holistically.” People in Interest of E.D., 2025 COA 11,

¶ 11. A parent is ultimately responsible for using the services

offered by a department, and the juvenile court “may therefore

consider a parent’s unwillingness to participate in treatment when

determining whether a department made reasonable efforts.” Id. at

¶ 12.

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C. The Caseworker’s Misconduct Did Not Foreclose a Finding of
Reasonable Efforts

¶ 25 Both parents claim the caseworker’s misconduct should have

led the juvenile court to find that the Department failed to make

reasonable efforts.

¶ 26 But the juvenile court found that the Department made

reasonable efforts despite the caseworker’s misconduct. The court

found, with record support, that the Department maintained

regular contact with both parents; provided gas and phones; offered

to pay for mother’s sober living upon completion of inpatient

treatment; paid for repairs on father’s truck; facilitated family time;

and sent out “lots of referrals” for services, benefits, and resources

for both parents. The court also found that “reasonable efforts were

tempered by the parents’ inability, unwillingness to engage” in

services, and their decision to live far outside of town. Neither

parent contests these factual findings.

1. Father’s Reasonable Efforts Claims

¶ 27 Father contends that the caseworker’s “work on this case

should not be accepted to withstand a clear and convincing

burden.” The juvenile court, however, made clear that it did not

10
rely on the caseworker’s work — his notes or representations to

others — in making its decision. Father also asserts that he was

unable to complete treatment “due to communication issues and

case mismanagement.” The record belies this claim. Father’s

treatment provider established that father was discharged

unsuccessfully — after consultation with the caseworker — because

of his failure to consistently attend treatment or participate in

required urinalysis testing. Father further claims that the

caseworker failed to schedule regular family team meetings.

Section 19-3-208, however, does not require family team meetings

or case management. Moreover, father does not explain — and we

cannot discern — how family team meetings would have made a

difference when father himself testified that he did not follow

through with treatment and simply “forgot to do the class” that he

was referred to.

¶ 28 Father also claims that the Department failed to make

reasonable efforts because it did not support family time in the

community or with a third-party supervisor. The record suggests

otherwise. Father offered uncontested testimony that he regularly

saw the children for six hours a week at a supervision center and in

11
the community. The juvenile court further found, with record

support, that the Department attempted to use third-party

supervisors for father’s family time but discontinued the

arrangement because the supervisors were not following the rules

or being protective of the children.

¶ 29 Father also claims that his family time “remained stagnated”

and should have expanded beyond the supervised level. The level of

supervision for family time, however, is within the juvenile court’s

purview, not the Department’s. People in Interest of B.C., 122 P.3d

1067, 1070-71 (Colo. App. 2005) (Family time orders are always

“subject to the continuing supervision and review by the trial court,

which, in the final analysis, retains ultimate decision-making

authority in the case.”). Moreover, father never asked the juvenile

court to liberalize his family time. In any event, the court found,

with record support, that it “just couldn’t liberalize and expand time

because, well, we still are concerned about his sobriety.”

¶ 30 We therefore discern no error in the juvenile court’s finding

that the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate father,

notwithstanding the caseworker’s misconduct.

12
2. Mother’s Reasonable Efforts Claims

¶ 31 Mother contends that “through the inaction of the

caseworker,” the Department “did not meet its most basic

standards for case management, as laid out in Volume 7.” The

caseworker’s failure to meet those standards was uncontested.

¶ 32 Section 19-3-208 — not the Department’s regulations —

identifies the services required to satisfy the reasonable efforts

obligation. See People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo.

App. 2011); see also § 19-3-208(2)(b) (outlining required services);

§ 19-3-208(2)(d) (identifying additional services required if sufficient

funding is available). Nothing in section 19-3-208 requires the

Department to make monthly contacts with treatment providers,

provide comprehensive case management services, or facilitate

regular family engagement meetings. Mother cites no legal

authority for her suggestion that a caseworker’s failure to provide

these particular services constitutes a failure of reasonable efforts.1

1 To the extent father had concerns about the caseworker’s conduct,

the Children’s Code and Department regulations provide ways to
address such concerns. See § 19-3-211, C.R.S. 2025; Dep’t of
Hum. Servs. Reg. 7.606, 12 Code Colo. Regs. 2509-7.

13
¶ 33 Mother argues that the caseworker’s poor communication

hindered the effectiveness of services provided to meet her basic

needs, in effect holding her “back from being able to work on other

needs and being successful in this case.” Mother’s life skills

provider testified that what the Department was supposed to be

helping mother with was a “source of confusion this entire time,”

and that the caseworker’s failure to communicate a clear answer

made it more difficult to determine what assistance mother needed.

The juvenile court, however, also heard from mother’s long-time

domestic violence treatment provider, who opined that mother had

“lots of options, choices, times” to complete her treatment plan.

The provider furthered testified that mother “had the support” and

that “[r]esources were available,” but that she made excuses “that

stopped that from happening.” Finally, the provider testified that

“ultimately, [mother]’s actions have led us to where we are today.”

We will not reweigh this evidence. See A.J.L., 243 P.3d at 256. The

juvenile court, as the trier of fact, is entrusted to weigh conflicting

evidence and assess witness credibility. See In re Marriage of Kann,

2017 COA 94, ¶ 36 (“[O]ur supreme court has . . . expressed

unbridled confidence in trial courts to weigh conflicting evidence.”);

14
see also Carrillo v. People, 974 P.2d 478, 486 (Colo. 1999)

(recognizing “the trial court’s unique role and perspective in

evaluating the demeanor and body language of live witnesses” and

“discourag[ing] an appellate court from second-guessing those

judgments based on a cold record”).

¶ 34 Because mother does not dispute that the Department made

the appropriate referrals for services required under section

19-3-208, we conclude that the juvenile court did not err by finding

that the Department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation.

IV. Fit Within a Reasonable Time

¶ 35 Father also contends that the juvenile court erred by finding

that he could not become fit within a reasonable time. We are not

convinced.

¶ 36 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders

them “unable or unwilling to give the child reasonable parental care

to include, at a minimum, nurturing and safe parenting sufficiently

adequate to meet the child’s physical, emotional, and mental health

needs and conditions.” § 19-3-604(2). In determining whether a

parent’s conduct or condition is likely to change within a reasonable

time, “the court may consider whether any change has occurred

15
during the proceeding, the parent’s social history, and the chronic

or long-term nature of the parent’s conduct or condition.” People in

Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 24. A parent’s noncompliance

with a treatment plan generally “demonstrates a lack of

commitment to meeting the child’s needs and, therefore, may also

be considered in determining unfitness.” People in Interest of D.P.,

181 P.3d 403, 408 (Colo. App. 2008). In determining unfitness, the

court may also consider the statutorily prescribed factors, including

the parent’s past involvement with a department of human services

or juvenile court, the parent’s use of illegal substances, and

whether a department provided reasonable efforts. § 19-3-604(2).

¶ 37 What constitutes a reasonable time is fact-specific and must

be determined by considering the physical, mental, and emotional

conditions and needs of the particular child. S.Z.S., ¶ 25. When, as

here, the child is under six years old at the time the petition is filed,

the action is subject to the expedited permanency planning

provisions, and the court must consider the child’s need to be

placed in a permanent home as expeditiously as possible.

§§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123, C.R.S. 2025.

16
¶ 38 The juvenile court found that father was unfit and unlikely to

become fit within a reasonable time. The court noted that the child

was two years old and that “a reasonable period of time has

passed.” The court further found that the child, who had

“extraordinary needs,” could not wait any longer for father to

become fit.

¶ 39 Father claims that he made “consistent, significant changes

during the course of the proceeding.” The record shows otherwise.

Father testified that he did not follow through with domestic

violence treatment and was not participating in treatment for

substance dependence or mental health. The caseworker’s

supervisor, an expert in child protection and child welfare, opined

that father demonstrated “minimal compliance” with the treatment

plan and exhibited the same problems — substance dependence

and domestic violence — that had necessitated Department

involvement nearly three years earlier.

¶ 40 To the extent father claims that he could have become fit

within a reasonable time with a different caseworker, we disagree.

The court found, with record support, that father’s substance

dependence — not any misconduct by the caseworker — prevented

17
him from engaging in treatment, progressing in family time, or

obtaining stability. And the court properly noted that the child’s

siblings had been the subject of multiple dependency and neglect

actions. See § 19-3-604(2)(i) (permitting the juvenile court to

consider a parent’s prior involvement with a department in

determining unfitness).

¶ 41 We therefore discern no basis for reversal.

V. Conclusion

¶ 42 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.

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