One Main Development LLC Chapter 7 Protective Order Motion Denied

Jump To

Top Caption Trial Court Document The text of this document was obtained by analyzing a scanned document and may have typos.

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

Jan. 16, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In Re One Main Development, LLC

United States Bankruptcy Court, C.D. Illinois

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 23-90402

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (10)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (58K)

• PDF

Trial Court Document

SIGNED THIS: January 16, 2026

Mary P. Gorman
United States Bankruptcy Judge

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
In Re )
) Case No. 23-90402
ONE MAIN DEVELOPMENT, LLC, )
) Chapter 7
Debtor. )

Before the Court is creditor Clayton Jefferson Development, LLC’s Motion
to Alter or Amend Order on Motion to Modify Protective Order, asking the Court
to alter or amend its order entered November 4, 2025, denying the creditor’s
motion to modify protective order, pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9023 and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). For the reasons set forth herein, the Motion
to Alter or Amend Order will be denied.

□□□

I. Factual and Procedural Background
The Debtor, One Main Development, LLC, filed its voluntary petition under
Chapter 7 on September 11, 2023. The Debtor filed the required schedules,

statements, and other documents shortly thereafter. The case trustee, Jeffrey D.
Richardson, conducted two creditors meetings, and, at the Trustee’s request, a
deadline for filing claims was set for February 16, 2024. The progression of the
case was largely uneventful until April 2024, when Clayton Jefferson
Development, LLC (“CJD”) entered the picture.
At that time, CJD filed a motion seeking authorization to issue subpoenas
pursuant to Bankruptcy Rules 2004 and 9016 to four individuals, four corporate
affiliates of the Debtor, and eight financial institutions. A hearing on the motion

was held May 8, 2024. Attorneys Mark Carter and Jack Shadid appeared on
behalf of CJD. Attorney Laura Cohen appeared on behalf of 502 N. Neil, LLC,
One Main Holdings, LLC, One Main Construction, LLC, and M2 on Neil, LLC—
the four affiliates of the Debtor to which subpoenas were to be directed. No one
appeared on behalf of the Debtor. After hearing the arguments of counsel, the
motion was granted without prejudice to the right of any individual or entity
subpoenaed to raise specific objections to their subpoena. The order granting the
motion was entered on May 9, 2024.

Less than a week later, Attorney Kevin Sterling entered his appearance for
the four affiliates previously represented by Attorney Cohen. Attorney Sterling
filed a motion for protective order on behalf of the affiliates seeking to have
certain requests for information from financial institutions stricken. The motion
asserted that discovery had been completed in related state-court proceedings,
and that the requests were burdensome and invasive as to nondebtors. CJD
responded asserting that the requests were not burdensome, that the financial

institutions had not objected, and that the information was needed to fully
understand the financial affairs of the Debtor.
A hearing on the motion for protective order was held on June 13, 2024.
Attorney Carter appeared for CJD, and Attorney Sterling appeared for the four
affiliates. Again, no one appeared for the Debtor. After hearing the somewhat
contentious arguments of counsel, the Court declined to strike any of the
subpoenas. Based on discussion at the hearing of terms that would be
acceptable to both sides, a protective order was entered limiting the use of any

information received pursuant to the subpoenas to bankruptcy-related
proceedings and limiting dissemination of the information to the Trustee and his
attorneys and to CJD’s attorneys. In the order entered June 14, 2024, this Court
suggested that it would consider modification of the protective order to allow for
review of the information by experts and other witnesses, but any such
modification would be on a document-by-document basis.
Nothing further was filed in the case until more than 13 months later when
Trustee Richardson filed his report of no distribution on July 21, 2025. The

Trustee represented that he had discovered no assets to be administered and
requested that he be discharged. On August 20, 2025, CJD filed an objection to
the Trustee’s report, asserting that it had identified causes of action that should
be prosecuted by the Trustee for the benefit of the estate. A hearing on the
Trustee’s report was then set for September 10, 2025.
On September 3, 2025, CJD filed two motions: one seeking authority to

proceed derivatively to prosecute claims on behalf of the estate and the other
seeking to modify the previously-entered protective order. A copy of a proposed
complaint was attached to the motion for derivative standing; the complaint
asserted causes of action against the Debtor, several of its affiliates, and three
individuals. An expedited hearing was requested because CJD claimed that the
deadline for the filing of the complaint—or at least some of the counts in the
complaint—was September 11, 2025. 11 U.S.C. §546 (a). As for its motion to
modify the protective order, CJD asserted that, to be able to fully understand the

documents received through the previously-authorized discovery and to be able
to prosecute the claims it identified on behalf of the estate, it needed to be able
to disclose the information to an expert witness and to CJD’s president. Both
motions were set for hearing on September 10, 2025, with the Trustee’s report
of no distribution.
The discussion at the September 10 hearing centered on CJD’s motion for
derivative standing. Mr. Carter for CJD acknowledged that the standard for
granting derivative standing requires findings that there exists a colorable claim

or cause of action and that the Trustee unjustifiably refused a demand to pursue
the action. But he said that the focus should be on whether there is a colorable
claim, and, if demand was made and the Trustee declined to pursue such claim,
that should be enough. The Court explained that a standard for derivative
standing requiring a demand and refusal without more is no standard at all, and
it declined to accept CJD’s position that simply making a demand on the Trustee
was sufficient. Rather, some presentation of evidence was necessary for the

Court to find that the Trustee unjustifiably refused to pursue a colorable claim
or cause of action likely to benefit the bankruptcy estate. In the absence of such
evidence, the Court ultimately denied CJD’s motion for derivative standing and
its objection to the Trustee’s report of no distribution. In doing so, the Court
noted the unresolved factual issues surrounding the demands made on the
Trustee, the Trustee’s offer to sell the claims under terms CJD deemed
unacceptable, and the timeline of events leading up to the motion. The Court
also noted statute of limitation issues as impediments to establishing a colorable

claim, which CJD did not meaningfully address other than arguing that there
might be some, unspecified basis for tolling the applicable statute. The denial of
the motion for derivative standing was without prejudice.
As for the motion to modify protective order, CJD expressed its intention
to proceed with its request notwithstanding the denial of derivative standing. A
further hearing on the matter was set for October 8, 2025, and a deadline was
set for interested parties to file written responses prior to the continued setting.
The four affiliates represented by Attorney Sterling filed a joint response

objecting to the motion to modify protective order. At the October 8 hearing, the
Court heard arguments for and against modification of the protective order. The
Court then took the matter under advisement, and, after reviewing the record
and the arguments of all interested parties, the Court entered a written order
denying the motion to modify protective order with the reasons for the denial set
forth therein.
The Order entered November 4, 2025, recited the history of activity in the

case, including the September 10 hearing at which the motion for derivative
standing was considered and denied and the October 8 continued setting on the
motion to modify protective order. The Order summarized the positions taken by
the interested parties at the October 8 hearing as follows. Attorney Shadid for
CJD represented that his client had no intention of going back to state court and
wanted to use the information subject to the protective order to pursue federal
causes of action only. He complained about the completeness of the information
that had been provided, noted that it was not privileged information, and

asserted that the assistance of an expert was needed to fully review the
documents that were produced. When questioned about where the case was
going given the apparent absence of any viable cause of action to pursue for the
estate, Attorney Shadid suggested that the claim filed in the case by CJD to
which no objection had been filed constituted a final judgment against the
Debtor which, under Illinois law, would be subject to collection efforts for seven
years after the judgment was entered. He argued that available collection
remedies could include piercing the corporate veil and pursuing alter ego claims

against the affiliates and certain individuals associated with the Debtor.
Attorney Sterling for the affiliates contended that any complaints about
subpoena compliance were stale and should have been raised earlier. He noted
that the Trustee had filed his report of no distribution and that CJD had been
denied derivative standing, calling into question the purpose of the motion and
the propriety of the relief sought. Attorney Sterling also complained that the
motion was overly broad and not justified under the circumstances.

In denying the motion to modify protective order, the Court noted the filing
of the Trustee’s report of no distribution, that CJD had been denied derivative
standing, and that, but for the pending motion, the case was ready to close. As
stated in the Order, “[b]ecause [CJD], after more than a year of extensive
discovery, has not identified any action it might file in this Court, there is no
basis to allow further discovery or to modify the protective order.” The Court went
on to explain that Attorney Shadid offered no authority for his argument that the
claim filed by CJD was a final judgment for collection purposes and that the

Court’s own research showed the weight of authority was to the contrary. See,
e.g., Thermal Surgical, LLC v. Brown, 150 F.4th 115, 125 (2d Cir. 2025) (“An
allowed claim in bankruptcy is not an enforceable money judgment that can be
attached to a debtor’s future assets.”); Ziino v. Baker, 613 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th
Cir. 2010) (“[A]n allowed claim in bankruptcy and a money judgment are not
functionally identical.”); In re S. Cal. Plastics, Inc., 165 F.3d 1243, 1248 (9th Cir.
1999) (“[A]n allowance of claim is not equivalent to a judgment for purposes of
perfecting an attachment lien.”).

The Court also agreed with Attorney Sterling’s objection to the broad scope
and lack of justification for the requested modification. Noting that the protective
order was entered in exchange for the broad and extensive authority for CJD to
pursue discovery under Bankruptcy Rule 2004, the Court explained that the
protective order clearly limited the use of information obtained to the bankruptcy
case and related proceedings and limited dissemination of the information to the
Trustee and the attorneys for CJD. The protective order further contemplated

the need for later modification to expand dissemination to CJD, experts, and
other witnesses on a document-by-document basis. But, as the Court explained
in the November 4 Order, the motion to modify protective order neither identified
particular documents for further dissemination nor made any claim that the
terms of the protective order should be lifted for each and every document
obtained. The motion to modify protective order likewise failed to justify the need
for relief other than in cryptic terms and, although the need for an expert was
explained, offered no explanation or justification for dissemination of information

to CJD’s president. The Court also noted in the Order that the motion to modify
protective order did “not seek modification of the limits placed on dissemination
of the information requiring that it only be used for bankruptcy purposes.” The
Court concluded that the lack of particularity as to the relief requested and
reasons therefor was a separate basis for denying the motion to modify protective
order.
On November 18, 2025, Attorney Shadid filed the Motion to Alter or Amend
Order on Motion to Modify Protective Order that is now before the Court.

Purportedly brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59,
incorporated and applicable in bankruptcy through Bankruptcy Rule 9023, the
Motion points to five findings and conclusions from the November 4 Order, which
CJD says warrant relief under Rule 59(e):
(1) “It is also admitted that the Trustee had offered to sell the causes of
action to it, but it had declined to purchase them.”

(2) “The Motion does not seek modification of the limits placed on the
dissemination of the information requiring that it only be used for
bankruptcy purposes.”

(3) “Because [CJD], after more than a year of extensive discovery, has not
identified any action it might file in this Court, there is no basis to allow
further discovery or to modify the protective order.”

(4) “[CJD] has been denied derivative standing to act on behalf of the
estate.”

(5) “[T]he request for dissemination to the president of [CJD] is wholly
unsupported by any facts about the knowledge or skill of the president
or what actual role he might play in the document examination.”

The Motion suggests that the Court patently misunderstood the parties’
positions and endeavors to justify CJD’s position in part by adding context not
previously provided.
The affiliates filed a response in opposition to the Motion to Alter or Amend.
They contend that the Motion is improperly brought under Bankruptcy Rule
9023 because the November 4 Order was not a final judgment and therefore
more appropriately analyzed under Bankruptcy Rule 7054 and Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(b). But regardless of the legal framework under which it is
analyzed, the affiliates argue that the Motion fails to meet the required standards
and rather “simply re-packages arguments CJD previously made or could have
made in connection with its Motion to Modify Protective Order and its motion for
derivative standing, and adds further detail about matters already discussed at
the hearings.”
The Trustee also filed a response stating his opposition to the Motion to
Alter or Amend and offering a “full copy” of the heavily redacted correspondence
attached as an exhibit to CJD’s Motion. He also took issue with CJD’s

characterization of itself as a judgment creditor for purposes of its legal theory
that it has colorable claims against the Debtor. In the Trustee’s opinion, CJD
has not identified any facts in the case to support its positions but rather relies
on the arguments themselves.
After the Court took the matter under advisement, Attorneys Carter and
Shadid filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for CJD, citing irreconcilable
differences based at least in part on CJD’s president filing notices in the case
without counsel’s involvement. The motion to withdraw was granted. The Court

having reviewed CJD’s Motion to Alter or Amend, the affiliate and Trustee
responses, and the entire record, the matter is ready for decision.

II. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction over the issues before it pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§1334. All bankruptcy cases and proceedings filed in the Central District of
Illinois have been referred to the bankruptcy judges. CDIL-Bankr. LR 4.1; see 28
U.S.C. §157 (a). Matters involving the administration of an estate or the

adjustment of the debtor-creditor relationship are core proceedings. 28 U.S.C.
§157 (b)(2)(A), (O). The matters here arise directly from the Debtor’s bankruptcy
itself and from the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and may therefore be
constitutionally decided by a bankruptcy judge. See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S.
462, 499, (2011).

III. Legal Analysis
Essentially a motion to reconsider, a motion to amend or alter a judgment
under Rule 59(e) is appropriately used to correct manifest errors of law or fact or
to present newly discovered evidence. Matter of Prince, 85 F.3d 314, 324 (7th Cir.
1996). Although Rule 59(e) should generally not be used to ask the court to
revisit arguments previously made, relief may be available when the court is
alleged to have misunderstood or misapprehended the facts or a party’s
contentions. County Materials Corp. v. Allan Block Corp., [436 F. Supp. 2d 997,

999](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2441658/county-materials-corporation-v-allan-block-corporation/#999) (W.D. Wis. 2006) (citing Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990), and LB Credit Corp. v. Resolution Trust
Corp., 49 F.3d 1263, 1267 (7th Cir. 1995)). The moving party must clearly
establish its entitlement to relief. Id. (citing FDIC v. Meyer, 781 F.2d 1260, 1268 (7th Cir. 1986)). The decision whether to grant or deny a Rule 59(e) motion is
within the discretion of the court. Prince, 85 F.3d at 324.
CJD’s assertion that there is manifest error here is centered around five
findings and conclusions in the Court’s November 4 Order. CJD first takes issue

with the Court’s reference to an offer being made by the Trustee to sell causes of
action to CJD which CJD declined to purchase. CJD complains that there is
more to the story; the terms of the offer, which included waiver of any right to
bring the causes of action in bankruptcy or federal court, made it unacceptable
given the terms of the protective order barring the use of Rule 2004 discovery for
non-bankruptcy purposes. Had the Trustee offered to sell the causes of action
without the federal restrictions, CJD says it would have accepted the offer.

CJD does not explain how the Court’s reference to the Trustee’s
unaccepted offer led to manifest error. It seems that CJD disagrees with the
Court’s characterization of CJD’s nonacceptance of the Trustee’s offer as
declining to purchase the causes of action. But arguing semantics of whether
CJD “declined to purchase” the causes of action by not accepting the Trustee’s
offer is a nonstarter. The denial of derivative standing was not based on a finding
that the Trustee’s offer was reasonable or that his refusal to prosecute the causes
of action was justifiable. Rather, the Court denied derivative standing based

largely on CJD’s failure to present a factual basis for finding the Trustee acted
unreasonably. Indeed, CJD not only failed to allege facts in its motion to support
granting derivative standing; at the hearing, its attorney declined to even second
guess the Trustee’s judgment over prosecuting claims. Compounding matters,
the motion was filed on the eve of what was alleged to be the statutory deadline
for bringing at least one cause of action such that holding an evidentiary hearing
on the issue was not feasible.
According to the email correspondence attached to the Motion to Alter or

Amend, the Trustee made his offer to sell the causes of action two months before
he filed his report of no distribution and four months before CJD filed its motions
for derivative standing and to modify the protective order. At the hearing on
derivative standing, Attorney Carter for CJD acknowledged that the timing of the
request limited the Court’s ability to have an evidentiary hearing but said he did
not have authority from his client to file the motion earlier. Despite anticipating
the issue, Mr. Carter had little else to offer on the subject beyond suggesting

there could be some unspecified basis for tolling applicable statutes of
limitations. He did ask that CJD be allowed to file its proposed complaint as a
placeholder pending resolution of evidentiary issues, which the Court denied.
But at no point did Mr. Carter suggest that the time-sensitive avoidance claims
were dispensable or that whatever other claims not so time-barred could
independently satisfy the standard for derivative standing if an evidentiary
hearing were to be held.
Perhaps the outcome would have been different had CJD promptly sought

relief from the Court after receiving the Trustee’s “unacceptable” offer, made a
meaningful case at hearing that the Trustee acted unreasonably, or been better
prepared to address the statutory impediments associated with seeking relief
when it did. But that is not the record upon which the Motion to Alter or Amend
comes before the Court, and CJD cannot use Rule 59(e) to relitigate matters or
present facts or arguments which could and should have been made before the
motion was decided. County Materials Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d at 999-1000 (citations omitted).

The second statement that CJD takes issue with is the Court’s finding that
the motion to modify protective order did “not seek modification of the limits
placed on the dissemination of the information requiring that it only be used for
bankruptcy purposes.” CJD believes this to be an incorrect statement and says
that its position is that the causes of action needed to be brought in federal court
rather than state court. It is clear there is a misunderstanding, but it is on the
part of CJD rather than the Court. The Court’s statement merely expressed that

the motion to modify protective order, on its face, did not request modification of
the limitation that use of the Rule 2004 discovery be limited to the bankruptcy
case and related proceedings in the bankruptcy court. All that was requested in
the motion to modify protective order was that the restriction on dissemination
of information be modified to give CJD’s president and an expert access to the
information. The Court’s statement of what relief was and was not requested in
the motion to modify protective order is accurate. But it also was not a
determinative factor in the Court’s decision and nothing in the November 4 Order

suggests otherwise.
CJD next takes issue with a statement in the November 4 Order that is at
the heart of the Court’s decision: “Because [CJD], after more than a year of
extensive discovery, has not identified any action it might file in this Court, there
is no basis to allow further discovery or to modify the protective order.” CJD
complains that the Trustee’s erroneous belief about the nature of potential
causes of action is “woven into the [November 4 Order] and reflects manifest
error.” CJD contends that it has asserted viable alter ego claims under Illinois

law and that the seven-year statute of limitations period applicable to
enforcement of judgments would apply to those claims. Alternatively, CJD
suggests that no statute of limitations would apply to alter ego actions through
which estate property might be recovered. There are several problems with CJD’s
position.
For starters, CJD has been denied derivative standing. This, of course, is

another finding in the November 4 Order that CJD says is manifest error. The
argument is wholly without merit. CJD seems to think that the Court’s statement
conflicts with its earlier order denying derivative standing that stated such denial
was without prejudice, but the denial being without prejudice does not change
the fact that CJD was denied derivative standing. As a result, there is currently
no cause of action that CJD could bring on the Trustee’s behalf. CJD says the
“distinction is significant as [it] intends to proceed with a new standing motion
if permitted to do so.” Again, this does not change the fact that CJD was denied

derivative standing. To date, CJD has not filed another motion for derivative
standing, and, absent a pending motion renewing its request for derivative
standing, CJD’s arguments about actions the Trustee could pursue are wholly
speculative and unpersuasive. Nor has CJD identified any causes of action it
might bring on its own behalf. Indeed, its arguments about possible alter ego
claims are premised on the Trustee rather than CJD having standing to bring
them, thus the request for derivative standing in the first place.
Further, the present Motion to Alter or Amend largely rehashes arguments

about the viability of alter ego causes of action previously raised, advances new
or modified legal theories that could and should have been raised earlier, or
otherwise seeks to relitigate old matters. The Seventh Circuit has plainly held
that Rule 59(e) motions cannot be used for such purposes. Vesely v. Armslist
LLC, 762 F.3d 661, 666 (7th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted); County of McHenry v.
Ins. Co. of the West, 438 F.3d 813, 819 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing LB Credit Corp., 49
F.3d at 1267).

In rejecting CJD’s contention at the October 8 hearing on modification of
the protective order—made without any citation to authority—that its
unobjected-to claim filed in the bankruptcy case was a judgment with a seven-
year limitation period for commencing a collection action, the Court carefully
considered the issue and explained its reasoning with citation to relevant case
law. In contending that the Court committed manifest error, CJD does not
challenge the Court’s reasoning but cites case law where courts have applied the
statute of limitation period for enforcement of judgments to alter ego claims.

None of the cases cited by CJD, however, involved unobjected-to claims as money
judgments, and CJD does not otherwise identify any underlying judgment
through which the limitations period for collection might be extended to alter ego
claims. To the extent the Motion is based on rehashed arguments, it is properly
denied.
Likewise, CJD’s alternate argument that no statute of limitations should
apply to alter ego claims because a trustee’s ability to recover property of the
estate is not subject to any limitation period is merely an attempt to relitigate its

motion for derivative standing through arguments it could and should have made
at the time the matter was under consideration. In doing so, CJD essentially
asks this Court to reconsider its order denying derivative standing under the
guise of its request to alter or amend the subsequent November 4 Order denying
modification of the protective order. The order denying derivative standing was
entered September 10, 2025. The only Rule 59(e) motion filed in the case is the
present Motion, which was filed November 18, 2025—long after the 14-day

deadline for reconsidering the September 10 order had passed. See Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 9023(b). The Court denied CJD derivative standing, and CJD declined
to challenge the ruling when it had an opportunity to do so. It cannot now use
its Motion to Alter or Amend the November 4 Order denying modification of the
protective order to circumvent procedural rules and undo a separate order on a
different motion entered two months earlier. To the extent CJD seeks to advance
legal theories or arguments that could and should have been presented earlier
or otherwise purports to relitigate matters previously decided, its Motion must

be denied.
The last finding that CJD points to as manifest error is the Court’s
statement that “the request for dissemination to the president of [CJD] is wholly
unsupported by any facts about the knowledge or skill of the president or what
actual role he might play in the document examination.” On this point too CJD
does not directly explain the error in the Court’s finding, but it does make a
general complaint about the protective order impairing its attorneys’ ability to
represent their client and satisfy their professional obligations to keep their client

reasonably informed. The professional obligations owed by attorneys—to their
clients and otherwise—are not to be taken lightly. But the impairment of such
obligations was never raised before now and CJD’s attempt to do so through Rule
59(e) is impermissible.
The protective order at issue was entered June 14, 2024. At the hearing
held the day before, Attorney Carter for CJD stated that he was amenable to a
protective order limiting dissemination to the Trustee and CJD’s attorneys in

exchange for CJD’s attorneys being able to proceed with broad discovery under
Bankruptcy Rule 2004. The protective order entered reflected the restrictions on
dissemination discussed at the hearing, and no relief from the order was sought
until September 2025 when the underlying motion to modify protective order
was filed. The motion to modify protective order itself made no mention of
attorney-client issues or the ability of CJD’s attorneys to represent their client.
Indeed, one basis for denying modification of the protective order was CJD’s
failure to offer any explanation of need or justification for broadening

dissemination of information to CJD’s president. The Court’s failure to consider
matters that CJD itself failed to raise is not manifest error.
On a final note, the Motion to Alter or Amend is peppered with other
arguments and assertions that are equally unavailing. CJD renews its belief that
the protective order should be lifted because the information is not subject to
any claim of privilege and because CJD has no intention of using the information
in state court proceedings. Not only are those assertions a further example of
CJD’s effort to relitigate the motion to modify protective order, but they are also

beside the point. The motion to modify protective order was denied for two
reasons: the failure of CJD to identify a cause of action it could bring to justify
lifting the protective order, and the failure of CJD to adequately identify, justify,
and explain which documents it wanted to disseminate for what purpose and
why it was necessary. CJD’s efforts to fill in some but not all of the gaps in its
position after the Court has heard and the decided the matters are too little, too
late.

IV. Conclusion
The Motion to Alter or Amend seeks to wind the clock back on matters
already litigated and decided. It purports to ask the Court to reconsider its order
denying CJD’s motion to modify protective order based on manifest error of fact
and law committed by the Court, but the relief sought goes beyond the narrow
relief available under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). None of the findings
and conclusions identified by CJD as manifest error were inaccurate based on

the facts and law presented to the Court. The reality of the situation is that CJD
was granted broad subpoena authority under Bankruptcy Rule 2004 long ago in
exchange for a protective order in favor of the subpoenaed parties that limited
the use and dissemination of discovered information, but it did nothing with that
information—and sought no relief from the related protective order—until the
Trustee filed his report of no distribution more than a year later. At that point,
CJD hurriedly filed a motion for derivative standing along with a motion to
modify protective order, wanting to share information subject to the protective

order with a consulting expert and CJD’s president and to prosecute certain
causes of action on behalf of the estate.
Unfortunately, CJD was either unprepared or unable to establish a basis
for the relief it sought under applicable standards, and both motions were
ultimately denied. The motion for derivative standing was denied first, and the
motion to modify protective order was denied two months later after further
briefing and hearing. Displeased with the outcome, CJD filed its Motion to Alter

or Amend the later order denying modification of the protective order. Although
framed as a request to correct manifest error, CJD really wants to give additional
context, offer new or modified arguments, or otherwise relitigate matters already
decided. It offered no support for its contentions of error that, at their core, relate
to the Court’s earlier order denying derivative standing which CJD failed to
challenge when it had the opportunity.
Whatever the reason for CJD proceeding as it did in its last-ditch efforts
to make something of the voluminous discovery obtained under Bankruptcy Rule

2004, the simple fact of the matter is that it failed to establish a basis for relief
on the record presented. The Court cannot unwind the events that have
transpired to allow CJD a second opportunity to make its case for modifying the
protective order or derivative standing. This case has otherwise been uneventful
and, based on the Trustee’s report of no distribution, is ready to close.
This Opinion is to serve as Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
pursuant to Rule 7052 of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.
See written Order.

###